Citation
D25
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
RELEASED N FULL
PAGE 01
ACTION AF-01
KIGALI 04551 01 OF 06 231115Z
OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01
LAB-04
10-16
TEDE-00 INR-00
H-01
HA-09
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 01C-02 OMB-01 PA-01
TRSE-00
SS-00
SNP-00 SP-00
PRS-01 P-01
/045W
USIE-00 RPE-01
13BE3B 231116Z /38
P 231044Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5357
INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 01 OF 06 KIGALI 04551
DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RA
YAOUNDE FOR DAO
E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNAMIR'S PHASE 1 OPERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
KIGALI 04551 01 OF 06 231115Z
REF: KIGALI 4440
1. CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT
2. SUMMARY. PHASE ONE OF UNAMIR'S OPERATIONS INCLUDE
CREATING A WEAPONS SECURE AREA WITHIN A 10 KILOMETER
PERIMETER AROUND KIGALI BY DECEMBER 20 IN ORDER TO ALLOW
THE RPF TO BE ESCORTED TO TOWN BEFORE THE END OF THE
YEAR. UWAMIR'S OPERATIONAL PLAN LOOKS GOOD ON PAPER BUT
THE PLAN'S DETAILS HAVE NOT BEEN FULLY IMPLEMENTED.
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L PARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 15 DEC 2005 200103014
UNCLASSIFIED
EUR-01
L-03
PM-02
T-00
UNCLASSIFIED
COMMUMICATION PROBLEMS, SHORTAGES OF MEN AND MATERIEL
PERSIST. THE GOR AND RPF STILL HAVE NOT REACHED AN
AGREEMENT AS TO WHERE THE RPF WILL BE HOUSED IN KIGALI,
NOR HAS THE GOVERNMENT WORKED ON PLANS FOR PROVIDING
TRANSPORTATION FOR THE RPF TRANSFER OR FOOD FOR THE RPF
BATTALION ONCE THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IS ESTABLISHED.
UNAMIR BELIEVES UNDP'S DEMOBILIZATION PLAN COULD
THREATEN THE SUCCESS OF PHASES TWO AND THREE OF UNAMIR'S
MISSION, UNLESS THE TRAINING PERIOD IS LENGTHENED. END
SUMMARY.
3. UNAMIR INVITED ALL CHIEFS OF DIPLOMATIC MISSIONS IN
RWANDA TO ATTEND A OPERATIONAL/SECURITY BRIEFING AT THE
AMAHORO HOTEL ON MONDAY, 13 DECEMBER (SEE REFTEL). THE
BRIEFING WAS PROVIDED AGAIN TO ALL EMBASSY SECURITY AND
CONSULAR PERSONNEL ON FRIDAY, 17 DECEMBER. THE
OPERATIONAL PLAN OUTLINED BELOW IS WHAT WAS PROVIDED BY
UNAMIR'S GENERAL STAFF OFFICERS AT THESE BRIEFINGS.
ASSESSMENTS OF HOW THE PLAN IS BEING IMPLEMENTED WERE
GIVEM TO ECONOFF BY LTCOL ISLAM NAZRUL, THE UNAMIR CHIEF
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 01 OF 06 231115Z
PAGE 03
OF STAFF/CHIEF OF OPERATIONS AND LTCOL EPHREM
RWABALINDA, THE GOR LIAISON OFFICER WITH UNAMIR, IN
PRIVATE CONVERSATIONS OUTSIDE THIS PUBLIC FORUM.
UNAMIR'S DIVIDES ITS MISSION INTO FOUR PHASES
4. AS OUTLINED KIGALI SECTOR COMMANDER, COL. MARCHAL,
UNAMIR SEES ITS ROLE IN RWANDA DIVIDED INTO FOUR
DISTINCT PHASES:
PHASE 1 - (OCT- DEC/1993)
OPERATION "SAFE CITY"
INSTALLATION OF TRANSITIONAL
GOVERNMENT (TG)
PHASE 2 - (JAN - MAR/1994)
SECURITY FOR TG
PREPARATION FOR DEMOBILIZATION AND
FORCE INTEGRATION
PHASE 3 - (APR-DEC/1994)
SECURITY FOR TG
DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
FORCE INTEGRATION PROCESS
PHASE 4 - (JAN-OCT/1995)
PREPARATION FOR ELECTIONS
UNAMIR'S OPERATIONAL PLAN UNDER PHASE ONE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 01 OF 06 231115Z
PAGE 04
5. IH COMPLETING ITS MISSION UNDER PHASE 1, UNAMIR HAS
DRAWN A 10 KILOMETER PERIMETER AROUND KIGALI AND CALLED
THIS AREA THE "KIGALI WEAPONS SAFE AREA (KWSA)" IN WHICH
EFFECTIVE DECEMBER 20, ALL MILITARY WEAPONS ARE SUPPOSED
TO BE UNDER DIRECT UN CONTROL (SEE REFTEL). WITHIN THIS
KWSA, TWO BATTALIONS OF 400 PEACEKEEPERS EACH AND 78
MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL BE RESPONSIBLE FOR SECURITY
MATTERS. CURRENTLY, THE BANGLADESHI BATTALION (RUTBAT),
BASED OUT OF RUTONGO) IS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE NORTHERN
HALF OF THE KWSA. MOST OF THE CITY OF KIGALI AND THE
SOUTHERN HALF OF THE KWSA, INCLUDING THE AIRPORT AND
UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS, IS IN THE BELGIAN BATTALION'S
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNIT
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ACTION AF-01
INFO
LOG-00
HA-09
ADS-00
PRS-01
USIE-00
KIGALI
CIAE-00
H-01
NSAE-00
P-01
RPE-01
04551
02 OF 06
C-01
TEDE-00
NSCE-00
SNP-00
/045W
OASY-00
INR-00
01C-02
SP-00
231117Z
DODE-00
10-16
OMB-01
SS-00
DOEE-00
LAB-04
PA-01
TRSE-00
UNCLASSIFIED
EUR-01
L-03
PM-02
T-00
UNCLASSIFIED
13BE64 231117Z /38
P 231044Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5358
INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 02 OF 06 KIGALI 04551
DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RA
YAOUNDE FOR DAO
E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNAMIR'S PHASE 1 OPERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
KIGALI 04551 02 OF 06 231117Z
(KIBAT) AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY.
6. COL LEROIT IS THE SOUTHERN SECTOR COMMANDER. THE
FORMER FRENCH NOROIT DETACHMENT'S HEADQUARTERS IS NOW
LEROIT'S. IN HIS BRIEFING TO WESTERN MISSION'S ON
DECEMBER 17, HE EXPLAINED THAT KIGALI PROPER HAD BEEN
SUBDIVIDED INTO THREE SUBSECTORS WITH THREE SEPARATE
DETACHMENTS BASED AT THE AIRPORT TO THE EAST, AT THE ETO
JOHN BOSCO - A VOCATIONAL TRAINING SCHOOL TO THE SOUTH
(KIMIHURURA), AND AT A BELGIAN COOPERATION BUILDING TO
THE WEST.
7. FROM EACH OF THESE THREE BASES, SEVERAL ROVING
PATROLS WOULD PATROL WITHIN THEIR AREA OF RESPONSIBILITY
TO ASSURE THAT THERE WERE NO VIOLATIONS OF THE STANDARD
OPERATING PROCEDURES (SOP) AGREEMENT SIGNED ON DECEMBER
17 BY BOTH THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT AND RPF. THE SOP SETS
THE RULES FOR BOTH SIDES' MOVEMENTS WITHIN THE KWSA,
EFFECTIVE 8:00 A.M. DECEMBER 20 AND UPON RPF ARRIVAL IN
KIGALI.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
RULES OF CONDUCT WITHIN THE KIGALI WEAPONS SAFE ZONE
8. NEITHER SIDE WILL MOVE AROUND THE CITY WITHOUT UN
PRIOR KNOWLEDGE. NEITHER SIDE WILL MAINTAIN STATIC
CHECKPOINTS OR ROADBLOCKS ANYWHERE IN THE CITY. THERE
WILL ALSO BE NO MOVEMENTS OF 10 SOLDIERS OR MORE, UNLESS
WITH A UN ESCORT. (THE RPF WITH ITS STANDARD 5 MAN
PATROL, HAS AGREED TO CONFORM WITH THE REQUIREMENT FOR A
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 02 OF 06 231117Z
PAGE 03
UN ESCORT.) EXCEPTIONS HAVE BEEN MADE FOR THE PRESIDENT
AND OTHER HIGH RANKING MEMBERS OF BOTH THE GOR AND RPF
COMMAND ELEMENT WHO MAY TRAVEL WITH THEIR BODYGUARDS.
ALL TRAVEL, HOWEVER, MUST BE AUTHORIZED BY THE UN. THE
NUMBER OF WEAPONS AND BULLETS ALLOWED OUT AT ANY ONE
TIME WILL ALSO BE LIMITED.
MOBILE AND STATIC UNAMIR PATROLS TO MONITOR KWSA
9. ACCORDING TO LTCOL. NAZRUL, THE UNAMIR OPERATIONS
OFFICBR, UNAMIR WILL HAVE BOTH MOBILE AND STATIC PATROLS
THROUGHOUT THE CITY. EACH MOBILE PATROL GROUP WILL BE
COMPRISED OF SIX MEN AND THREE VEHICLES, WITH 2 MEN PER
VEHICLE ROTATING WITHIN THEIR GROUP ON 8 HOUR SHIFTS.
STATIC PATROLS WILL BE ESTABLISHED AT MAIN TRAVEL
ARTERIES AND AT STRATEGIC POINTS OF ACCESS FROM MILITARY
AND GENDARME FACILITIES AND WHEREVER THE RPF IS FINALLY
HOUSED.
10. MILITARY OBSERVERS WILL BE ROVING THE CITY AND
MONITORING THE AMMUNITION AND WEAPONS STOCKPILES TO
INSURE THAT ONLY AUTHORIZED RELEASES OF WEAPONS AND
MUNITIONS OCCUR. THESE OBSERVERS, THOUGH UNARMED, WILL
BE ESCQRTED BY PEACEKEEPERS TO REDUCE OBSERVERS'
VULNERABILITY. THE PEACEKEEPERS RULES OF ENGAGEMENT ARE
THAT THEY MAY FIRE IF ANYONE THREATENS SERIOUS BODILY
HARM TO THEM OR THE OBSERVERS. (NOTE: COL. NAZRUL
EXPLAINED THAT THE UN MAY NOT RETURN FIRE IF SOMEONE
FIRES ON A MEMBER OF THE GOR OR RPF, SINCE THE THREAT OF
BODILY HARM IS NOT DIRECTLY AIMED AT A UNAMIR MEMBER.)
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 04
KIGALI 04551 02 OF 06 231117Z
11. COL. MARCHAL, THE KWSA COMMANDER, NOTED THAT UNAMIR
WAS NOT INSTALLED TO TAKE THE PLACE OF THE GENDARMERY OR
THE POLICE. UNAMIR WOULD ONLY WORK WITH THEM TO ASSURE
THAT THEY RESPONDED TO CALLS IN AN APPROPRIATE MANNER
AND THAT WEAPONS AND MUNITIONS WERE PROPERLY USED WHEN
RESPONDING. COL. MARCHAL ADDED THAT ANY WEAPONS IN THE
HANDS OF LOCAL RWANDAN AUTHORITIES WOULD ALSO BE UNDER
DIRECT UN SUPERVISION; THAT IS ALL LOCAL PATROLS WITH
WEAPONS WOULD ALWAYS HAVE A UN ESCORT.
UNAMIR'S APPROACH TO ILLEGAL WEAPONS CACHES IN KIGALI
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ACTION AF-01
KIGALI 04551 03 OF 06 231118Z
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00
H-01
HA-09
ADS-00 NSAE-00
PRS-01 P-01
USIE-00 RPE-01
C-01
TEDE-00
NSCE-00
SNP-00
/045W
OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00 EUR-01
LAB-04 L-03
INR-00 10-16
PM-02
01C-02 OMB-01 PA-01
TRSE-00 T-00
SS-00
SP-00
13BE83 231119Z /38
P 231044Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5359
INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 03 OF 06 KIGALI 04551
DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RA
YAOUNDE FOR DAO
E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNAMIR'S PHASE 1 OPERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
KIGALI 04551 03 OF 06 231118Z
12. IN DISCUSSING THE ISSUE OF WEAPONS CACHES, COL.
MARCHAL AND COL. NAZRUL BOTH AGREED THAT THEY WERE UNDER
NO ILLUSION THAT WEAPONS HAD BEEN CACHED BY BOTH THE GOR
AND RPF AS WELL AS BY THE CIVILIAN POPULATION. IN ORDER
TO DEAL WITH THESE WEAPONS CACHBS, UNAMIR WOULD BE
GATHERING INTELLIGENCE AS TO WHERE WEAPONS CACHES WERE
BEING MAINTAINED. WHEN DEEMED APPROPRIATE, UNAMIR WOULD
ACT ON INFORMATION RECEIVED BY CORDONING OFF AN AREA AND
SEARCHING THROUGH BOTH CIVILIAN RESIDENCES AND
MILITARY/GOVERNMENT/COMMERCIAL ESTABLISHMENTS.
13. COL. NAZRUL COMMENTED THAT UNAMIR'S BIGGEST CONCERN
WAS NOT THE WEAPONS HELD BY THE MILITARY OR GENDARMERY
BUT THOSE IN CIVILIAN HANDS. UNAMIR WAS ESPECIALLY
CONCERNED ABOUT SOME OF THE YOUTH GROUPS WITH WEAPONS,
PARTICULARLY THE INTERAHAMWE, THE YOUTH GROUP OF THE
FORMTR SINGLE PARTY, THE MRND. THE GOVERNMENT HAD SENT
OUT A CIRCULAR TO ALL MILITARY COMMANDS AND PREFECTURES
ASKING THAT ALL WEAPONS BE TURNED IN; BUT FEW WEAPONS
HAVE BEEN COLLECTED. THE BLACK MARKET IN GRENADES ALSO
CONTINUES TO BOOM, DESPITE THE GOVERNMENT'S RECENT
EFFORTS TO BUY BACK GRENADES.
GOOD ON PAPER BUT IS UNAMIR'S OPERATIONAL PLAN WORKING?
14. THE PLAN ON PAPER (PRESENTED IN MILITARY STYLE BY
UNAMIR OFFICERS WITH SLIDE PROJECTIONS AND GRID MAPS)
LOOKS MORE THAN ADEQUATE FOR MEETING MISSION OBJECTIVES.
AS OF DECEMBER 20 - THE DAY ESTABLISHED AS THE START OF
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 03 OF 06 231118Z
PAGE 03
KWSA RULE AND PROCEDURES, HOWEVER, UNAMIR DOES NOT HAVE
EVERYTHING IN PLACE.
15. LOGISTICALLY, COL LEROIT ADMITTED THAT HIS THREE
SUBSECTOR COMMANDERS STILL DID NOT HAVE TELEPHONES TO
COMMUNICATE WITH ONE ANOTHER, NOR DID COL LEROIT HAVE
ANY NUMBER TO GIVE OUT TO THE DIPLOMATIC COMMUNITY FOR
TELEPHONING FOR ASSISTANCE OR SECURITY INFORMATION. THE
ONLY NUMBER AVAILABLE AT THIS TIME IS THE NOROIT'S
PREVIOUS DETACHMENT NUMBER AND THE NUMBERS TO THE
AMAHORO HOTEL, UNAMIR'S HEADQUARTERS.
16. COMMUNICATION LINKS WITH PATROLS IN THE DMZ ARE ALSO
ALMOST NON-EXISTENT. WHEN ASKED IF UNAMIR COULD PROVIDE
BASIC SECURITY INFORMATION ON THE DMZ TO THE PRIVATE
VOLUNTARY ORGANIZATIONS WORKING IN THE AREA, COL.
MARCHAL REPLIED THAT IT WAS OFTEN A DAY OR TWO BEFORE
UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS ITSELF HAD UP TO DATE INFORMATION
FROM THE PATROLS.
UNAMIR SHORTAGE OF MEN AND MATERIEL CONTINUES
17. COL. NAZRUL TOLD ECONOFF THAT AS FOR MEN AND
EQUIPMENT, UNAMIR WAS ALSO STILL LACKING. AS LATE AS
CHRISTMAS DAY (THE DAY BEFORE THE RPF'S EXPECTED ARRIVAL
TO TOWN), 200 BANGLADESHI TROOPS WOULD BE ARRIVING IN
KIGALI TO BRING CONTINGENT NUMBERS UP TO 1225. THESE
TROOPB WILL NOT HAVE ANY PRIOR KNOWLEDGE OF RWANDA OR
ITS TERRAIN. THE UN FORCE WAS ALSO SUPPOSED TO HAVE 78
OBSERVERS AND ONLY 4B HAVE ARRIVED. THIS HAS POSED
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 03 OF 06 231118Z
PAGE 04
PROBLEMS, SINCE 10 OBSERVERS FROM THE DMZ HAD TO BE
PULLBD TO MONITOR DISTURBANCES ON THE SOUTHERN BORDER
WITH BURUNDI (PREVIOUSLY NOT ENVISIONED AS PART OF
UNAMIR'S TACTICAL PLAN).
18. AS FOR EQUIPMENT, ONLY 2 OF 5 HELICOPTERS HAVE
ARRIVED TO DO THE AIR RECONNAISSANCE PATROLS OF KIGALI
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
AND THE DMZ. UNAMIR WAS SUPPOSED TO HAVE 3 COMPANIES OF
PEACEKEEPERS AS MOBILE PATROLS AND 1 COMPANY OF
PEACEKEEPERS IN ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS. NONE OF THE
ARMORED PERSONNEL CARRIERS HAS ARRIVED AND ONLY 1/3 TO
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ACTION AF-01
KIGALI 04551 04 OF 06 231120Z
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00
H-01
HA-09
ADS-00 NSAE-00
PRS-01 P-01
USIE-00 RPE-01
OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
C-01
LAB-04
10-16
TEDE-00 INR-00
NSCE-00 01C-02 OMB-01 PA-01
TRSE-00
SS-00
SNP-00 SP-00
/045W
13BEA1 231120Z /38
P 231044Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5360
INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 04 OF 06 KIGALI 04551
DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RA
YAOUNDE FOR DAO
E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PINS, RW
UNCLASSIFIED
EUR-01
L-03
PM-02
T-00
UNCLASSIFIED
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNAMIR'S PHASE 1 OPERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
KIGALI 04551 04 OF 06 231120Z
1/2 OF THE EXPECTED NUMBER OF JEEPS HAVE ARRIVED,
MEANING MANY OBSERVERS ARE WITHOUT THE GROUND
TRANSPORTATION NEEDED TO MONITOR AND PATROL THE AREA.
19. COL NAZRUL BELIEVED THAT ALL THE LOGISTICS PROBLEMS
OF GETTING EQUIPMENT AND MEN TO KIGALI WERE DIRECTLY
LINKED TO DIFFICULTIES THE COMMAND WAS HAVING WITH
BUDGET QUESTIONS HANDLED OUT OF NEW YORK. ACCORDING TO
NAZRUL, SINCE THIS MISSION IS NOT A HIGH PROFILE ONE, UN
NEW YORK IS NOT GIVING UNAMIR'S BUDGET DIFFICULTIES
QUICK ATTENTION. FOR NAZRUL, MORE ATTENTION SEEMED TO BE
GIVEN TO OPERATIONS GETTING THE PUBLICITY, NAMELY
SOMALIA AND YUGOSLAVIA.
OPERATION SAFE CITY HASN'T NECESSARILY MADE THE CITY SAFE
20. ON THE OPERATIONS SIDE, THE LINKS SUPPOSED TO BE
ESTABLISHED WITH THE GENDARMES AND POLICE HAVE NOT BEEN
COMPLETELY ESTABLISHED. OVER THE WEEKEND OF DECEMBER 18
AND 19, POST'S SECURITY OFFICER (PSO) WAS CONTACTED BY
AN EMBASSY EMPLOYEE NEEDING ASSISTANCE IN GIKONDO. THE
EMPLOYEE'S FAMILY AND HOUSE HAD BEEN ATTACKED BY MEMBERS
OF THE LOCAL MRND YOUTH GROUP, INTERAHAMWE. WHEN EFFORTS
TO CONTACT THE GENDARMES BY PSO YIELDED NO RESULT, PSO
CALLBD UNAMIR FOR ASSISTANCE. UNAMIR ADMITTED THAT THEY
HAD NO DIRECT CONTACT AT THAT TIME WITH THE GENDARME
DETACHMENT RESPONSIBLE FOR THE GIKONDO AREA; INSTEAD
THEY CONTACTED MEMBERS OF COL. NYDINDILIMANA'S (THE HEAD
OF THE GENDARMERY) STAFF FOR ASSISTANCE.
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 03
KIGALI 04551 04 OF 06 231120Z
21. AND, ALTHOUGH MEMBERS OF THE MISSION HAVE SEEN
NUMEROUS PATROLS THROUGHOUT THE CITY, IT IS UNCLEAR AS
TO WHAT EFFECT THEY ARE HAVING ON THOSE WHO DO NOT WANT
TO SEE THIS PROCESS GO FORWARD. THE INTERAMAMWE, FOR
EXAMELE, RELEASED A COMMUNICADE DECEMBER 20 STATING THAT
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
THEY WOULD BE IMPLEMENTING THEIR VERSION OF THE "FINAL
SOLUTION", DESIGNATING THE WEEK OF DECEMBER 20-24 AS THE
"WEEK OF DEATH" FOR ALL TUTSI'S, AND BY IMPLICATION RPF
SUPPORTERS. THESE TYPES OF THREATS AND INTIMIDATION
CONTINUE TO KEEP ALL RWANDANS UNEASY ABOUT THE RPF'S
EXPECTED ARRIVAL IN TOWN, DESPITE UNAMIR'S CLAIM THAT
KIGALI IS NOW SECURED AND DESIGNATED A WEAPONS SAFE AREA.
FINAL PLANS FOR OPERATION CLEAN CORRIDOR STILL IN LIMBO
22. UNAMIR HAS CALLED THE OPERATION TO BRING THE RPF TO
TOWN "OPERATION CLEAN CORRIDOR". THE PLAN IS TO BRING
THE RPF TO KIGALI VIA BYUMBA IN TWO TRANCHES, UNDER
BELGIAN PEACEKEEPER ESCORT ON DECEMBER 26 AND 27. (NOTE.
THESE DATES ARE NOT/NOT ANNOUNCED TO THE PUBLIC. END
NOTE) YET, WHETHER THAT DAY HOLDS FIRM IS UNCERTAIN. AS
OF DECEMBER 21, THERE IS STILL NO AGREEMENT AS TO WHERE
THE RPF WILL BE HOUSED IN KIGALI. PROPOSALS HAVE BEEN
PASSED BACK AND FORTH, WITH NO AGREEMENT. THE GOR
REJECTED HOUSING THE RPF AT THE PRESIDENTIAL VILLAS, 200
KILOMETERS FROM THE MERIDIEN HOTEL. THE RPF REJECTED
CAMP KAMI, SEVEN KILOMETERS OUTSIDE OF KIGALI. THE OAU
REPRESENTATIVE TOLD CHARGE THAT THE RPF FEARS POSSIBLE
LAND MINES ON THE DIRT ROAD TO THE REMOTE CAMP KAMI
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 04 OF 06 231120Z
PAGE 04
SITE. THE RPF ALSO REJECTED THE PROPOSALS PRESENTED 19
DECEMBER TO HOUSE ITS COMMAND AMD POLITICAL ELEMENTS
APART FROM ITS SECURITY BATTALION. THE LATEST COUNTER
PROPOSAL IS IN A LETTER TO THE RPF SIGNED BY THE
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, OFFERING THE HOTEL ATTACHED
TO THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY BUILDING. THE GOR AND UNAMIR
AWAIT THE RPF'S REPLY.
23. CHOOSING THE SITE, UNFORTUNATELY, IS ONLY THE FIRST
OF SEVERAL LOGISTICAL PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH THE RPF'S
COMING TO TOWN THAT STILL HAVE TO BE WORKED OUT WITH
ONLY A WEEK BEFORE THE PLANNED TRANSFER. FOR EXAMPLE,
CONFIDENTIAL.
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ACTION AF-01
KIGALI 04551 05 OF 06 231122Z
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01
TEDE-00
H-01
HA-09
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00
SNP-00
PRS-01 P-01
/045W
USIE-00 RPE-01
OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
LAB-04
1NR-00 10-16
01C-02 OMB-01 PA-01
TRSE-00
SS-00
SP-00
13BED2 231122Z /38
P 231044Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5361
INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 05 OF 06 KIGALI 04551
DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RA
YAOUNDE FOR DAD
E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNAMIR'S PHASE 1 OPERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
KIGALI 04551 05 OF 06 231122Z
SINCE THE SITE FOR THE RPF AND ITS BATTALION IS STILL
UNCERTAIN, NO ADVANCE PLANNING HAS BEEN DONE AT ANY SITE
TO PROVIDE FOR ADEQUATE SANITATION FACILITIES FOR THE
UNCLASSIFIED
EUR-01
L-03
PM-02
T-00
UNCLASSIFIED
MEN.
24. WHEN ASKED WHAT MEANS OF TRANSPORTATION IS GOING TO
BE MADE AVAILABLE TO THE RPF FOR THE TRANSFER (SINCE THE
ARUSHA ACCORDS STATE THAT THE GOR IS RESPONSIBLE FOR
TRANSPORTATION) THE GOR'S MILITARY LIAISON OFFICER, COL.
EPHREM RWARALINDA, SAID THAT THE GOR WOULD MAKE 5 BUSES
AVAILABLE. 5 BUSES CLEARLY IS NOT ENOUGH TO TRANSFER 300
PLUS MEN IF THE TRANSFER IS DONE IN TWO TRAMCHES.
UNAMIR'S OWN VEHICLE SHORTAGE MAKES IT DIFFICULT FOR
UNAMIR TO PROVIDE ANY ADDITIONAL MEANS OF
TRANSPORTATION.
25. THE ARUSHA ACCORDS ALSO STATED THAT THE GOR WOULD BE
RESPONSIBLE FOR FEEDING THE 600 MAN RPF BATTALION ONCE
THE TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT WAS ESTABLISHED. YET, THE
GOR DOES NOT HAVE ANY PLAN IN PLACE FOR ASSURING THAT
THE RPF MEN GET FED. COL. NAZRUL TOLD ECONOFF THAT THE
UN HAD STOCKPILED A 15 DAY SUPPLY OF MRE'S, AS PROVIDED
FOR IN THEIR BUDGET, TO FEED THE RPF IN THE INTERIM
PERIOD BETWEEN THEIR ARRIVAL TO TOWN AND THE
ESTABLISHMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT BUT THAT WOULD NOT BE
SUFFICIENT OVER THE LONG HAUL.
26. ACCORDING TO COL. NAZRUL, WITHOUT THE LOGISTICAL
DETAILS FINALIZED, UNAMIR CANNOT ADEQUATELY PLAN FOR
SECURITY UPON RPF ARRIVAL. UNAMIR NEEDS AT LEAST SOME
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 05 OF 06 231122Z
PAGE 03
LEAD TIME TO MAP OUT ITS PATROLLING AREAS DEPENDING ON
THE FANAL SITE CHOSEN TO HOUSE THE RPF. THE GOR MAY BE
ABLE TO MAKE DECISIONS AT THE ELEVENTH HOUR BUT UNAMIR
CANNOT REACT BY THE TWELFTH HOUR TO ASSURE THAT
OPERATIONS GO SMOOTHLY.
MAIN CONCERN IS POLITICS, NOT SECURITY SITUATION
27. UNAMIR'S MAIN CONCERN IS NOT THREATENED ACTIVITY BY
THE CDR AND THE YOUTH GROUPS OR THE RPF'S ARRIVAL IN
TOWN. ACCORDING TO COL. NAZRUL, THE REAL CONCERN IS ON
THE POLITICAL FRONT. HE BELIEVES THE CURRENT SPLIT IN
THE MDR AND THE PL THREATEN THE SUCCESSFUL
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE TRANSITION GOVERNMENT IN THAT
NEITHER PARTY HAS A SINGLE VOICE TO ASSUME IT POSITIONS
IN THE GOVERNMENT. IF THE GOVERNMENT GETS BOGGED DOWN IN
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
POLITICAL IN-FIGHTING, NO PROGRESS WILL BE MADE IN
DEALING WITH THE ISSUES OF THE DAY, NAMELY THE COUNTRY'S
ECONOMIC PROBLEMS, THE UPCOMING DEMOBILIZATION OF
SOLDIERS AND THE INTEGRATION OF FORCES. NAZRUL SAID THE
SUCCESS OF THE UNAMIR MISSION AMD ITS ABILITY TO KEEP
THE GOVERNMENT TO THE 22 MONTH TIMETABLE DEPENDS ON THE
GOVERNMENT ACTING DECISIVELY. WITH POLITICAL PROBLEMS IN
TWO OF THE MAIN OPPOSITION PARTIES, THIS TIMETABLE MAY
GET DERAILED.
FOUR MONTHS TRAINING NOT ENOUGH FOR DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS
2G. LOOKING AHEAD TO PHASE 2 AND 3 OF UNAMIR'S MISSION,
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 05 OF 06 231122Z
PAGE 04
COL. NAZRUL SAID THAT MANY OF THE BANGLADESHI OFFICERS,
WITH THEIR EXPERIENCE FROM CAMBODIA, WERE CONCERNED
ABOUT THE DEMOBILIZATION PLANS BEING DEVELOPED BY THE
GOR AND THE RPF UNDER UNDP AUSPICES. COL NAZRUL SAID THE
UNDP'S PROPOSAL TO GIVE FOUR MONTHS OF TRAINING TO THE
DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS WAS NOT ENOUGH TIME TO TEACH THEM A
VALUABLE SKILL THAT WOULD EARN THEM A LIVING. FOUR
MONTHS TIME FROM DEMOBILIZATION BEGINNING IN APRIL WOULD
ALSO NOT BE ENOUGH TIME FOR THE ECONOMY TO ABSORB AND
PROVIDE JOBS FOR THOSE DEMOBILIZED.
29. UMAMIR COMMANDER DALLAIRE APPEALED TO DIPLOMATS AT
HIS 13 DECEMBER BRIEFING AS WELL ABOUT THE IMPORTANCE OF
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
KIGALI 04551 06 OF 06 231123Z
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
ACTION AF-01
OASY-00 DODE-00 DOEE-00
INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 C-01
LAB-04
10-16
TEDE-00
INR-00
H-01
HA-09
ADS-00 NSAE-00 NSCE-00 01C-02 OMB-01 PA-01
TRSE-00
SS-00
SP-00
SNP-00
PRS-01 P-01
/045W
USIE-00 RPE-01
13BEF2 231124Z /38
P 231044Z DEC 93
FM AMEMBASSY KIGALI
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 5362
INFO AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY PARIS
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
CONFIDENTIALSECTION 06 OF 06 KIGALI 04551
DEPT FOR AF/C AND AF/RA
YAOUNDE FOR DAO
E.O. 12356: OADR: DECL.
TAGS: MOPS, PREL, PINS, RW
SUBJECT: CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF UNAMIR'S PHASE 1 OPERATIONS
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
KIGALI 04551 06 OF 06 231123Z
SUPPORTING A TRAINING PROGRAM FOR DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS
LONGER THAN THE 4 MONTH PROGRAM CURRENTLY UNDER
CONSIDERATION BY UNDP. SINCE THEN, THE GOR, RPF, AND
UNDP HAVE AGREED ON A PROGRAM PROVIDING 5 MONTHS OF
TRAINING FOR INTEGRATION INTO CIVILIAN LIFE AND 6-8
MONTHS OF TECHNICAL TRAINING FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE
DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS.
30. UNAMIR IS WORRIED ABOUT FUNDING AVAILABILITY AND
PROGRAM DETAILS WHICH, IF NOT WORKED OUT, COULD SPELL
PROBLEMS FOR THE WHOLE DEMOBILIZATION PROCESS SCHEDULED
FOR THE SECOND AND THIRD PHASES OF UNAMIR'S OPERATION.
DISGRUNTLED DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS WHO CANNOT EARN A
UNCLASSIFIED
EUR-01
L-03
PM-02
T-00
UNCLASSIFIED
LIVING ON THE LOCAL ECONOMY WITH THE TRAINING THEY ARE
GIVEN COULD TURN TO BANDITRY AND OTHER CRIMINAL
ACTIVITY. UNAMIR'S OPERATION SAFE CITY, THEN, COULD
BECOME MORE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE. SECURITY PROBLEMS
CAUSBD BY DEMOBILIZED SOLDIERS OUTSIDE THE DMZ AND
KIGALI COULD ALSO PRESENT PROBLEMS FOR UNAMIR.
COMMENT
31. UNAMIR OPERATIONS, ALTHOUGH WELL CONCEIVED, ARE
PROVING DIFFICULT TO IMPLEMENT. ALTHOUGH BOTH SIDES
UNDERSTAND THAT THERE IS A JANUARY 5 DEADLINE FOR
SHOWING PROGRESS, BOTH THE RPF AND GOR APPEAR TO BE
WAITING TO THE LAST MINUTE TO FINALIZE DETAILS. UNAMIR
CLEARLY DOES NOT WANT TO OPERATE ON THE GOR-RPF'S
SCHEDULE AND GENERAL DALLAIRE IS PUSHING TO GET THE
CONFIDENTIAL
CONFIDENTIAL
KIGALI 04551 06 OF 06 231123Z
PAGE 03
TRANSITIONAL GOVERNMENT IN PLACE BY THE BEGINNING OF THE
YEAR. WITHOUT CRUCIAL DETAILS WORKED OUT AS TO THE
LOGISTICS OF BRINGING THE RPF TO TOWN, HOWEVER, DALLA
RE
MAY NOT BE ABLE TO KEEP EVERYTHING ON TRACK WITHOUT SOME
COST TO THE INTEGRITY OF HIS OPERATIONAL PLAN. LEADER
CONFIDENTIAL
NNNN
UNCLASSIFIED
