Citation
123474
Ë COPY MDADAN 7309
CTI
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 130830Z FCO
TELNO 1306
OF 130342Z APRIL 94 ner
INFO DESKBY 1307302 PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA
INFO IMMEDIATE WASHINGTON»> DAR ES SALAAM, ADDIS ABAB
INFO IMMEDIATE UKMIS GENEVA
INFO IMMEDIATE OTHER SECURITY COUNCIL POS
INFO IMMEDIATE ACTOR
OUR TELNO 125 AND TELECONS PLUMBLY/MCLENNAN:
RWANDA |
SUMMARY
1. Further Secretariat report on situation. Evacuation of
foreign nationals almost complete. Interim Government has fled
Kigali and RPF have taken all key points in the city. UNAMIR
force commander's efforts to negotiate ceasefire and a truce
unsuccessful. Secretariat expect to receîve force commander's
assessment of prospects for UNAMIR on 13 April.
2. Preliminary discussion among Council members on options
for UNAMIR. All stress that a decision needs to be taken as
soon as possible.
DETAIL
3. Rwanda was discussed again during informal consultations of
the Security Council on 12 April. Keating (New Zealand,
Council President) drew members attention to a statement issued
by the RPF Ctext by fax to ADCE)2.. This said that RPF forces
had entered Kigali and were engaging elements of Rwandan
Government forces. Despite the picture painted în the media,
the conflict in Rwanda was à political and not a tribal one.
The RPF was not a Tutsi rebel group but a national organisation
advocating national unity, democracy, and security for people
and theîïr property: It called on the international community
to support the RPF objective of stopping the killing and
restoring Law and order în Rwanda. Keating said that it was
notable that the Arusha Peace Agreement was nowhere mentioned
în the statement. |
CEE CURE ER
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MDADAN
4. Riza CASG, DPKO) then gave 8 briefing to Council members.
The situation în Kigali was still very confused and chaotic.
The killing continued. The intérim Government had Left the
city and was heading south towards Butare near the Burundi
border. The RPF, now strengthened by units from the DMZ, had
taken virtually all key points in the city. There was less
shooting and Less use of heavy weapons but there were still
clashes between the RPF and Government forces. There were also
reports of disorder in other parts of the country.: ALL efforts
of the Force Commander to achieve a cease fire or truce had
been unsuccessful. Instead he had received Letters from the
two parties guaranteeing safety of the evacuation of foreign :
nationals. The Minister of Defence was the only government
figure of any authority Left in Kigali. But the RPF were
refusing to negotiate with him. In order to maintaîin some
dialogue, the Force Commander and Special Representative were
holding separate meetings with the RPF and the Minister of
Defence. The only radio station still on the air was
broadcasting anti-foreigner and anti-Belgian propaganda.
5. Riza saïîd the evacuation had gone well. Cooperation
between French and Belgian forces and UNAMIR had been
successful. The Belgians intended to stay for at least another
48 hours. In the agreement between the Force Commander and the
two parties, the RPF had insisted on setting a time Limit for
the withdrawal of the French and Belgian forces. This was set
for 7 pm local time on 14 April. Riza explaïined subsequently
that the time Limit had been set by the RPF because they had
taken positions near the airport where there were some Rwandan
Government forces whom the RPF wished fo engage. They could
not hold their fire indefinitely. However, if the evacuation
was not completed by this deadline then the Force Commander
estimated that he would be able to persuade the RPF to delay a
Little longer.
6. Riza said part of the UNAMIR presence in the DMZ had now
moved to Kigali (a Bangladeshi engineering company and half the
Ghanian battalion). The other half of the Ghanian battalion
had moved within the DMZ to avoid RPF bombardment of Byumbe.
He concluded that UNAMIR was unable in current cireumstances to
fulfil its mandate. Decisions therefore needed to be taken on
its future. Recommendations from the Secretary General's
Special Representative would be with the Secretariat on 13
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April. The Security Council would be briefed on these
recommendations as soon as possible,
7. Gambarïi (Nigeria) speaking on behalf of the NAM caucus drew
attention on an African group statement (text by fax to AD(E))
which inter alia called for an immediate cease fire, asked the
Council to consider expanding the size and mandate of UNAMIR,
and reiterated the importance of full implementation of the
Arusha Peace Agreement. Gambari SSSR
CRM. he ceuse fire was not holding-— More and more
people were dying. UNAMIR was doing what it could to help
protect several thousands of Rwandans. The Council should
consider what more it could do. The NAM caucus were
considering elements for a draft resolution which would be
circeulated to Member States on 13 April.
8. Merimee (France) said French troops would probably Leave on
13 April. The withdrawal of French and Belgian forces would
create a security vacuum. The Council needed to consider what
should be done about UNAMIR. If it Left there was a risk of
chaos and massacre. UNAMIR was a stabilising force, But this
function was not within its mandate and it did not have the
resources to fulfil it in the longer term. One possiblé answer
was to strengthen UNAMIR to give it a new mandate and new
resources. A second was to withdraw the force altogether.
France was open to ideas. Merimee Se
CE RE D
CD)
CB. There was no alternative in the Long term to
implementation of the Arusha Agreement. The Council should
perhaps consider à resolution making this point and calling for
renewed negotiations, as Gambari had suggested. Speaking
personally, he wondered whether it might be possible to declare
a safe area round Kigali aïrport where UNAMIR could concentrate
its forces. (Comment:
CMD: “e had besn told earlier by the French Mission that
they were considering temporary redeployment of UNAMIR to
Tanzania in response to African concern that withdrawal of the
force would Look Like the abandonment of Rwanda. Our Belgian
colleagues regard such à redeployment as. absurd Logistically,
and poîintless in military terms.)
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9. I said we needed urgently to reach a conclusion as to what
could be done. There were four possible options. The first
was to reinforce UNAMIR and give it a new mandate. This did
not seem practical, given the situation on the ground. The
second was total withdrawal. While we could of course accept
such a withdrawal if it became necessary on security grounds,
such action could reflect on the UN's commitment to
peacekeeping operations in Africa. The third option was to
leave the force in its present configuration to do what it
could to encourage return to order. However, it was already
cleër that UNAMIR was unable to fulfil its current mandate and
Îts Safety was threatened. A fourth option was an Angola type
solution: a significant reduction in the force, Leaving in
theatre a small group of civilians and/or ohservers who might
play a useful facilitating role. We believed this option
merited consideration. But the key,was for a decision to be
taken quickly. We should not delay substantive discussion of
UNAMIR's future beyond 13 April.
10. Walker CUS) agreed that there was a need for an early
decision. If UNAMIR had to be withdrawn then it would be
easier to do so in conjunction with the French and Belgian
forces. The US Government had some doubts as to the continued
viability of UNAMIR in current circumstances. It was possible
that they were în fect a destabilising factor. Eleven members
of UNAMIR had been murdered:and the security and safety of some
national contingents was being threatened. Walker doubted
whether the US would favour a depleted UNAMIR force remainingin
Rwanda: if withdrawal were necessary, the force as a whole
should withdraw although it might in the first instance
withdraw to another country. NN
RM: another option they suggested was the "UNMIH" one
î1.-e 3 paper operation authorised by resolution, but with no
presence on the ground.) Walker said that the US Government
would în any case favour the SRSG and a small staff remaining
în place to act as facilitators, although they might need to
temporarily redeploy outside Rwanda until the security
situation improved.
11. Pedauye (Spain) agreed with me as to the possible options
for UNAMIR, ALL of them presented problems, including
an Angola type solution. It was quite easy to wind an
operation down but not s0 easy to expand it again.
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UD, MDADAN 7309
12. Cardenas (Argentina) agreed on the need for an urgent
decision. But it would. be premature to dissolve UNAMIR. He
agreed that it might be possible to redeploy it to a
neîghbouring country. It would be important for the Presidency
to consult very rapidly with troop contributing countries,
particularly the Belgians, given the peculiar circumstances of
theïir contingent. It made no sense for the Security Council to
deliberate on the future of UNAMIR if troop contributors' views
were different. He also thought it important for the President
to make a statement to the press. Given the continuing killing
and the fact that thousands of Rwandan Lives had been Lost and
more were în danger, there was a need to show public opinion
that The Council was doing something. Such a press statement
might note that the Council continued to follow events in
Rwanda closely and that it was seriously concerned at the
continuing hostilities, and emphasise the need for the parties
to agree to an immediate cease fire.
13. Vorontsov (Russia) said that UNAMIR had not been able to
avert mayhem. Even if its mandate was changed, without
reinforcement in terms of numbers or equipment it was unlikely
that UNAMIR could help. The matter must be decided on 13
April. The Council should urgently request the
Secretary-General to convey his views.
14. Walker CUS) supported Cardenas' suggestion on
consultations with troop contributors. The Council could
perhaps meet troop contributors and hear their concerns direct.
Kovanda (Czech Republic) supported a statement to the press and
a troop contributors meeting. He also asked whether
developments on the ground were affecting UNOMUR.
15. Riza replied that UNOMUR would certaïinly be affected. The
Special Representative's recommendations would cover it. He
recalled that the event that set off the chsos in Rwanda had
been only five days ago. There had been enormous danger to
Rwandan civilians and to UNAMIR. The immediate aim of the
force had been to foster security in so far as possible. There
was a need to assess the situation. He hoped this SGSR would
report by 13 April.
16. Keating saîd that he would speak to the press as proposed.
He agreed there was merit in exploring troop contributors
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views. However there were sensitivities about how such
consultation should be handled,. He thought it best for the
Presidency to seek the views of Belgium and Bangladesh as the
major troop contributors as well as any other troop
contributors who wished to make their views known.
COMMENT
17. It would be helpful to have any further views you may
have on UNAMIR deskby 1313007, in time for informal
consultations Later in the day.
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