Fiche du document numéro 8082

Num
8082
Date
Tuesday May 16, 1995
Amj
Fichier
Taille
147355
Pages
12
Titre
Relocating Rwandan Refugees
Tres
Le Département d'Etat propose d'éloigner les camps de réfugiés de la frontière du Rwanda.
Source
Fonds d'archives
CHP
Type
Document diplomatique, TD
Langue
EN
Citation
UNCLASSIFIED
Page: 26

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

RELEASED :INI/tULL

ccc<.>>»
PTQ4731

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ORIGIN EUR-01

PTQ4731

STATE 117859 160459Z

INFO LOG-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 • OASY-00 DODE-00 OIG0-01 TEDE-00
FMP-00
SR-00
ADS-00 NSAE-00 OIC-02
I0-08
INR-00
/031R
PRM-10 DRL-09
DRAFTED BY: EUR/UBI:EBROCKING
APPROVED BY: EUR/UBI: JMLEKSON
PRM/AAA:MJMCKELVEY
EUR/WE: LLEWIS
C5E1C4 160500Z /38
R 160452Z MAY 95
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
INFO AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY PARIS
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 117859
FOLLOWING STATE 117859 DATED 12 MAY 95 SENT ACTION GENEVA,
INFO BUJUMBURA, DAR E SALAAM, KAMPALA, KIGALI, KINSHASA,
NAIROBI, ROME, USUN NY, BEING REPEATED FOR YOUR INFO.
QUOTE.
C ONFIDENTIALSTATE 117859
GENEVA-RMA ROME-FODAG KAMPALA & NAIROBI-REFC
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF PREL RW
SUBJECT: RELOCATING RWANDAN REFUGEES
REF: (A) 95 KAMPALA 2353, (B) 95 GENEVA 3509, (C) 95 KIGALI 1370
CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 26

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: CHARLES L. PARIS
DATE/CASE ID: 12 DEC 2001 200103617

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Page: 27

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Channel: n/a

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 02
1.

STATE 117859 160459Z

C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE USG POLICY ON
RWANDA OVER THE LAST YEAR HAS BEEN TO WORK FOR THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE, VOLUNTARY/VOLUNTARY RETURN OF RWANDAN
REFUGEES FROM BOTH THE NEW AND OLD CASELOAD.
REGRETTABLY, RECENT ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES COMBINED WITH ONGOING REFUGEE FEAR AS WELL AS
INTIMIDATION BY SOME REFUGEE LEADERS HAVE REDUCED
REPATRIATION MOVEMENTS AMONG THE NEW CASELOAD OF RWANDAN
REFUGEES TO ALMOST NIL. MOREOVER, IT SEEMS LIKELY,
DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS, THAT CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO
THE REPATRIATION OF SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS WILL NOT EXIST
THIS YEAR. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESENCE OF CAMPS NEAR
THE BORDERS IN EACH OF THE ASYLUM COUNTRIES REPRESENTS A
SECURITY THREAT TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA AND
CONVERSELY TO THE REFUGEES. WE HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED
THAT IT IS TIME TO ENCOURAGE AN ACCELERATION OF THE UNHCR
PLAN TO CREATE CAMPS MORE SUITABLE TO LONGER-TERM SELF
SUFFICIENCY FURTHER AWAY FROM THE BORDERS. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT UNHCR/GENEVA IS PRESENTLY NEGOTIATING THE RELOCATION
OF FOUR CAMPS IN ZAIRE. THIS SHOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT
IMPACT IN REDUCING THE GOR'S SECURITY CONCERNS ABOUT THE
ZAIRIAN CAMPS. FOR THE KIBUMBA CAMP, WHICH IS WHERE WE .
BELIEVE THE PROCESS SHOULD BEGIN, THIS WILL HAVE THE
ADDED ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT OF REMOVING PRESSURE ON THE
NEARBY GORRILLA PRESERVE. WHILE, THE EXPENSE AND
POTENTIAL DOWNSIDES OF MOVING CAMPS ARE MULTIPLE AND
MANIFEST, WE HAVE LIMITED PROSPECTS FOR REVERSING THE
DOWNWARD SPIRAL CAUSED BY THE MUTUALLY NEGATIVE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 160459Z
PAGE 03
REINFORCING ACTIONS AND ATTITUDES OF THE MORE EXTREME IN
BOTH "CAMPS." WE UNDERSTAND FROM INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS
THAT THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS BELIEVE MOVING THE CAMPS AT
THIS JUNCTURE IS NOT WELL ADVISED. NEVERTHELESS,
Page: 27

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Page: 28

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Channel: n/a

MISSION/GENEVA IS REQUESTED TO ALERT THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE TO OUR VIEWS AND ADVISE FURTHER ON
THEIR PLANS FOR MOVING ZAIRIAN CAMPS. END SUMMARY.
3. A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE USG POLICY ON RWANDA OVER
THE LAST YEAR HAS BEEN TO WORK FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE,
VOLUNTARY/VOLUNTARY RETURN OF RWANDAN REFUGEES FROM BOTH
THE NEW (I.E., POST APRIL 1994) AND OLD CASELOAD (I.E.,
FROM THE 1959, EARLY 1960S ERA). WE HAVE SEEN THIS AS A
KEY COMPONENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND OF
STABILIZING THE REGION. THE PLAN OF ACTION ADOPTED BY
ALL OF THE PLAYERS AT THE FEBRUARY REGIONAL REFUGEE
CONFERENCE IN BUJUMBURA ENVISIONED, INTER ALIA, RENEWED
REPATRIATION EFFORTS COUPLED WITH MOVING THE RESIDUAL
(HOPEFULLY SMALL) REFUGEE POPULATION TO MORE SUITABLE
CAMPS FURTHER FROM THE BORDERS AND OUT FROM UNDER THE
SWAY OF EX-FAR AND EX-IGOR ELEMENTS. REGRETTABLY, RECENT
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE RWANDAN AUTHORITIES COMBINED WITH
ONGOING REFUGEE FEAR AS WELL AS INTIMIDATION BY THOSE
AMONG THE REFUGEE LEADERS WHO ARE LEFT OVER FROM THE OLD
REGIME HAVE REDUCED REPATRIATION MOVEMENTS (AMONG THE NEW
CASELOAD OF RWANDAN REFUGEES) TO ALMOST NIL. WITH REGARD
TO ZAIRE PARTICULARLY (BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY), MILITARY
TRAINING AROUND AND/OR IN REFUGEE CAMPS COUPLED WITH
CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS INTO RWANDA HAVE HEIGHTENED THE
RWANDAN GOVERNMENT'S SENSE OF INSECURITY AND LEGITIMATE
OUTRAGE THAT REFUGEE CAMPS AND RESOURCES SHOULD BE
MISUSED. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 160459Z
PAGE 04
PART OF OUR OVERALL STRATEGY -- THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL, THE REHABILITATION OF THE RWANDAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM, THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AND OF
UNAMIR -- HAVE EITHER NOT HAD THE INTENDED EFFECT OR ARE
SO EMBRYONIC THAT THEIR INTENDED EFFECTS ARE YET TO BE
REALIZED.
4. AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, WE CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS TIME
TO ENCOURAGE AN ACCELERATION OF THE UNHCR PLAN TO CREATE
CAMPS MORE SUITABLE TO LONGER-TERM SELF SUFFICIENCY
FURTHER AWAY FROM THE BORDERS IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA, AND
Page: 28

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Page: 29
Channel: n/a

EVEN PERHAPS IN BURUNDI. WE UNDERSTAND FROM REF B AND
OTHER DISCUSSIONS THAT UNHCR HAS REACHED A SIMILAR
CONCLUSION, AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO THE CAMPS IN ZAIRE,
AND HAS PLANS TO RELOCATE, AS FIRST STEPS, THE KIBUMBA
AND MUGUNGU CAMPS IN NORTH KIVU AND THE BIRAVA AND HONGA
CAMPS IN SOUTH KIVU. RELOCATION OF THE KIBUMBA CAMP
WOULD HAVE THE ADDED ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT OF REMOVING •
. PRESSURE ON THE NEARBY GORRILLA PRESERVE. MORE
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT RELOCATION IN TANZANIA MAY HAVE TO
AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF THE OCTOBER ELECTIONS.
SIMILARLY, BURUNDI MAY BE TOO TENSE TO CONSIDER
RELOCATIONS UNTIL THE ISSUE OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED
IS SETTLED.
5. THE EXPENSE AND POTENTIAL DOWNSIDES OF SWITCHING TO
AN APPROACH OF RELOCATING REFUGEES BEFORE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES HAVE REDUCED THE REFUGEE
POPULATION TO A MORE MANAGEABLE (AND DIGESTIBLE FOR THE
ASYLUM COUNTRIES) SIZE ARE MULTIPLE AND MANIFEST: COST,
ASYLUM COUNTRY RELUCTANCE TO DATE TO SHOW ANY WILLINGNESS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 160459Z
PAGE 05
TO CONSIDER LONGER-TERM REFUGEE SETTLEMENT, REFUGEE
ATTITUDES (THOSE AMONG THE REFUGEE CAMP POPULATION WHO
HAVE AN INTEREST IN REMAINING WITHIN MILITARY STRIKING
DISTANCE OF RWANDA MIGHT NOT AGREE TO MOVE AND MIGHT
THREATEN TO JEOPARDIZE THE RELOCATION EFFORT), AND DELAY
IN RESOLVING THE CURRENT REFUGEE SITUATION.
6. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE EQUATION: RELOCATION
SHOULD IMPROVE THE SECURITY SITUATION; OAU AND
INTERNATIONAL NORMS REQUIRE REFUGEE CAMPS TO BE AT LEAST
50 KMS FROM THE BORDER (IN THIS CASE WE THINK 50 KMS
WOULD NOT/NOT BE A SUFFICIENT DISTANCE TO STOP -- THOUGH
IT WOULD HINDER -- ATTACKS BY EXTREMIST ELEMENTS AMONG
' THE REFUGEES); THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THESE CAMPS ON
• THE BORDER HAS A DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON RWANDA AND THE
SUBREGION; THE PROXIMITY OF THE CAMPS TO RWANDA ONLY
FACILITATES BORDER INCURSIONS (WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN
ATTACKS INTO RWANDA AND AT LEAST ONE ATTACK ON A REFUGEE
Page: 29

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Page: 30

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Channel: n/a

CAMP IN ZAIRE THAT APPARENTLY WAS LAUNCHED FROM RWANDA);
THE GOR HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT PUT UP WITH A
CONTINUATION OF THE INCURSIONS, BANDITRY AND GENERAL
INSECURITY CAUSED BY THESE NEARBY CAMPS; MOVING THE CAMPS
SHOULD NOT ONLY IMPROVE SECURITY BUT ALSO FOSTER A
GREATER SENSE OF SECURITY WITHIN RWANDA, WHICH SHOULD
LEAD TO A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS AND CREATION OF AN
ATMOSPHERE THAT IS MORE CONDUCIVE IN THE LONG RUN TO
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION.
7. WEIGHING THE ABOVE WITH THE CURRENT DOWNWARD SPIRAL
AND OUR LIMITED PROSPECTS FOR REVERSING IT (I.E., BETWEEN
THE PROVERBIAL ROCK AND A HARD PLACE), WE CONCLUDE THAT
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 160459Z
PAGE 06
IT IS TIME TO MOVE AHEAD WITH RELOCATION. MOVING THE
CAMPS COULD CONCEIVABLY WEAKEN THE EXTREMISTS, BUT IN ANY
EVENT, IN ORDER TO AVOID STRENGTHENING THEIR HAND BY
SENDING A SIGNAL THAT THE TWO MILLION NEW REFUGEES HAVE
NO NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS FOR RETURN HOME (AND RECOUPING
LANDS) AND RISK RECREATING THE SAME DISENFRANCHISED
OUTLOOK THAT SPAWNED THE RPF AMONG THE EARLIER REFUGEES
WITH STILL MORE VIOLENCE SOME YEARS IN THE FUTURE, WE
BELIEVE THAT RELOCATION MUST BE CAST IN TERMS OF PUTTING
REFUGEE CAMPS ON A MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT BASIS CONFORMING
WITH INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCATION AT SAFE
DISTANCES FROM BORDERS AND SO ON. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE
A GRAVE MISTAKE TO CHARACTERIZE A RELOCATION AS
"RESETTLEMENT" OF REFUGEES, THUS IMPLYING A MORE
PERMANENT SITUATION.
8. THIS WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT EXPENSES OF
POLITICAL CAPITAL AND EVEN FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE
A CONSENSUS AMONG THE INTERESTED PARTIES. WE DID NOT/NOT
RAISE THIS ISSUE AT THE LAST (APRIL 21) RWANDA
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP IN VIEW OF INFORMAL SOUNDINGS
WITH THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS WHO INDICATED THAT THEY DO
NOT THINK MOVING THE CAMPS AT THIS JUNCTURE IS WELL
ADVISED. IN MORE RECENT DISCUSSIONS, THE BELGIANS
CONTINUED TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT RELOCATION WOULD UNDERCUT
Page: 30

i Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Page: 31

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Channel: n/a

THE PROSPECTS FOR AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE
RWANDAN CRISIS. WE ARE PREPARED, NEVERTHELESS, TO
UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS TO GARNER THE NECESSARY SUPPORT
FOR A PHASED RELOCATION, BEGINNING WITH KIBUMBA AT THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 160459Z
PAGE 07
9. FOR GENEVA: MISSION IS REQUESTED TO ALERT THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE (UNHCR) TO OUR VIEWS, ENCOURAGING A
RAPID RELOCATION OF THE FOUR CAMPS, AND ADVISE ON THE
STATUS OF THEIR PLANNING FOR THIS MOVE, AND INFORM THEM
THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THEIR PLANS IN
CAPITALS AS THEY DEVELOP.
CHRISTOPHER UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

CONFIDENTIAL
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UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
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Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117 .859

Channel: n/a

NNNN
6N@OASYS(Na
PTQ9491

CONFIDENTIAL
PAGE 01
ORIGIN PRM-10

PTQ9491

STATE 117859 122346Z

INFO LOG-00 AF-01
OIG0-01
EUR-01
M-00
ADS-00
PRS-01
PM-00
USIE-00
T-00

AID-00 CIAE-00 SMEC-00 OASY-00 DODE-00
L-01
10-08
TEDE-00 INR-00
H-01
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NSAE-00 NSCE-00 01C-02
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DRAFTED BY: PRM/AAA: MJMCKELVEY
APPROVED BY: PRM: PEOAKLEY
AF/FO: PXBUSHNELL (DRAFT)
IO/ESA: MJPOLLACK (DRAFT)
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AF/RA: TBFRIEDMAN
DESIRED DISTRIBUTION:
DRL, IO/UNP, USAID/BHR, PM
C5387C 122348Z /38
P R 122345Z MAY 95
• FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO USMISSION GENEVA PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY KIGALI
AMEMBASSY KINSHASA
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
AMEMBASSY ROME
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK
Page: 32

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Page: 33

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Channel: n/a

CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 122346Z
PAGE 02
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 117859
GENEVA-RMA ROME-FODAG KAMPALA & NAIROBI-REFC
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREF PREL RW
SUBJECT: RELOCATING RWANDAN REFUGEES
REF: (A) 95 KAMPALA 2353, (B) 95 GENEVA 3509, (C) 95 KIGALI 1370
1.

C - ENTIRE TEXT

2. SUMMARY. A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE USG POLICY ON
RWANDA OVER THE LAST YEAR HAS BEEN TO WORK FOR THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE, VOLUNTARY/VOLUNTARY RETURN OF RWANDAN
REFUGEES FROM BOTH THE NEW AND OLD CASELOAD.
REGRETTABLY, RECENT ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE RWANDAN
AUTHORITIES COMBINED WITH ONGOING REFUGEE FEAR AS WELL AS
INTIMIDATION BY SOME REFUGEE LEADERS HAVE REDUCED
REPATRIATION MOVEMENTS AMONG THE NEW CASELOAD OF RWANDAN
REFUGEES TO ALMOST NIL. MOREOVER, IT SEEMS LIKELY,
DESPITE OUR BEST EFFORTS, THAT CONDITIONS CONDUCIVE TO
THE REPATRIATION OF SIGNIFICANT NUMBERS WILL NOT EXIST
THIS YEAR. IN THE MEANTIME, THE PRESENCE OF CAMPS NEAR
THE BORDERS IN EACH OF THE ASYLUM COUNTRIES REPRESENTS A
SECURITY THREAT TO THE CURRENT GOVERNMENT IN RWANDA AND
CONVERSELY TO THE REFUGEES. WE HAVE THEREFORE CONCLUDED
THAT IT IS TIME TO ENCOURAGE AN ACCELERATION OF THE UNHCR
PLAN TO CREATE CAMPS MORE SUITABLE TO LONGER-TERM SELF
SUFFICIENCY FURTHER AWAY FROM THE BORDERS. WE UNDERSTAND
THAT UNHCR/GENEVA IS PRESENTLY NEGOTIATING THE RELOCATION
OF FOUR CAMPS IN ZAIRE. THIS SHOULD HAVE A SIGNIFICANT
CONFIDENTIAL

Page: 33

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED



Page: 34

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Channel: n/a

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 122346Z
PAGE 03
IMPACT IN REDUCING THE GOR'S SECURITY CONCERNS ABOUT THE
ZAIRIAN CAMPS. FOR THE KIBUMBA CAMP, WHICH IS WHERE WE
BELIEVE THE PROCESS SHOULD BEGIN, THIS WILL HAVE THE
ADDED ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT OF REMOVING PRESSURE ON THE
NEARBY GORRILLA PRESERVE. WHILE, THE EXPENSE AND
POTENTIAL DOWNSIDES OF MOVING CAMPS ARE MULTIPLE AND
MANIFEST, WE HAVE LIMITED PROSPECTS FOR REVERSING THE
DOWNWARD SPIRAL CAUSED BY THE MUTUALLY NEGATIVE
REINFORCING ACTIONS AND - ATTITUDES OF THE MORE EXTREME IN
BOTH "CAMPS." WE UNDERSTAND FROM INFORMAL DISCUSSIONS
THAT. THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS BELIEVE MOVING THE CAMPS AT
THIS JUNCTURE IS NOT WELL ADVISED. NEVERTHELESS,
MISSION/GENEVA IS REQUESTED TO ALERT THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE TO OUR VIEWS AND ADVISE FURTHER ON
THEIR PLANS FOR MOVING ZAIRIAN CAMPS. END SUMMARY.
3. A CENTRAL ELEMENT OF THE USG POLICY ON RWANDA OVER
THE LAST YEAR HAS BEEN TO WORK FOR THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE,
VOLUNTARY/VOLUNTARY RETURN OF RWANDAN REFUGEES FROM BOTH
THE NEW (I.E., POST APRIL 1994) AND OLD CASELOAD (I.E.,
FROM THE 1959, EARLY 1960S ERA). WE HAVE SEEN THIS AS A
KEY COMPONENT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION AND OF
STABILIZING THE REGION. THE PLAN OF ACTION ADOPTED BY
ALL OF THE PLAYERS AT THE FEBRUARY REGIONAL REFUGEE
CONFERENCE IN BUJUMBURA ENVISIONED, INTER ALIA, RENEWED
; REPATRIATION EFFORTS COUPLED WITH MOVING THE RESIDUAL
(HOPEFULLY SMALL) REFUGEE POPULATION TO MORE SUITABLE
CAMPS FURTHER FROM THE BORDERS AND OUT FROM UNDER THE
SWAY OF EX-FAR AND EX-IGOR ELEMENTS. REGRETTABLY, RECENT
ACTIONS TAKEN BY THE RWANDAN AUTHORITIES COMBINED WITH
ONGOING REFUGEE FEAR AS WELL AS INTIMIDATION BY THOSE
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 122346Z
PAGE 04
AMONG THE REFUGEE LEADERS WHO ARE LEFT OVER FROM THE OLD
REGIME HAVE REDUCED REPATRIATION MOVEMENTS (AMONG THE NEW
CASELOAD OF RWANDAN REFUGEES) TO ALMOST NIL. WITH REGARD
Page: 34

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Page: 35

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Channel: n/a

TO ZAIRE PARTICULARLY (BUT NOT EXCLUSIVELY), MILITARY'
TRAINING AROUND AND/OR IN REFUGEE CAMPS COUPLED WITH
CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS INTO RWANDA HAVE HEIGHTENED THE
RWANDAN GOVERNMENT'S SENSE OF INSECURITY AND LEGITIMATE
OUTRAGE THAT REFUGEE CAMPS AND RESOURCES SHOULD BE
MISUSED. THE CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES THAT HAVE BEEN
PART OF OUR OVERALL STRATEGY -- THE INTERNATIONAL
TRIBUNAL, THE REHABILITATION OF THE RWANDAN JUDICIAL
SYSTEM, THE PRESENCE OF HUMAN RIGHTS MONITORS AND OF
UNAMIR -- HAVE EITHER NOT HAD THE INTENDED EFFECT OR ARE
SO EMBRYONIC THAT THEIR INTENDED EFFECTS ARE YET TO BE
REALIZED.
4. AGAINST THIS BACKDROP, WE CONCLUDED THAT IT WAS TIME
TO ENCOURAGE AN ACCELERATION OF THE UNHCR PLAN TO CREATE
CAMPS MORE SUITABLE TO LONGER-TERM SELF SUFFICIENCY
FURTHER AWAY FROM THE BORDERS IN ZAIRE AND TANZANIA, AND
EVEN PERHAPS IN BURUNDI. WE UNDERSTAND FROM REF B AND
OTHER DISCUSSIONS THAT UNHCR HAS REACHED A SIMILAR
CONCLUSION, AT LEAST WITH RESPECT TO THE CAMPS IN ZAIRE,
AND HAS PLANS TO RELOCATE, AS FIRST STEPS, THE KIBUMBA
AND MUGUNGU CAMPS IN NORTH KIVU AND THE BIRAVA AND HONGA
CAMPS IN SOUTH KIVU. RELOCATION OF THE KIBUMBA CAMP
WOULD HAVE THE ADDED ENVIRONMENTAL BENEFIT OF REMOVING
PRESSURE ON THE NEARBY GORRILLA PRESERVE. MORE
DISCUSSIONS ABOUT RELOCATION IN TANZANIA MAY HAVE TO
AWAIT THE CONCLUSION OF THE OCTOBER ELECTIONS.
SIMILARLY, BURUNDI MAY BE TOO TENSE TO CONSIDER
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 122346Z
PAGE 05
RELOCATIONS UNTIL THE ISSUE OF THE INTERNALLY DISPLACED
IS SETTLED.
5. THE EXPENSE AND POTENTIAL DOWNSIDES OF SWITCHING TO
AN APPROACH OF RELOCATING REFUGEES BEFORE
CONFIDENCE-BUILDING MEASURES HAVE REDUCED THE REFUGEE
POPULATION TO A MORE MANAGEABLE (AND DIGESTIBLE FOR THE
ASYLUM COUNTRIES) SIZE ARE MULTIPLE AND MANIFEST: COST,
ASYLUM COUNTRY RELUCTANCE TO DATE TO SHOW ANY WILLINGNESS
TO CONSIDER LONGER-TERM REFUGEE SETTLEMENT, REFUGEE
Page: 35

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
Page: 36

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Channel: n/a

ATTITUDES (THOSE AMONG THE REFUGEE CAMP POPULATION WHO
HAVE AN INTEREST IN REMAINING WITHIN MILITARY STRIKING
DISTANCE OF RWANDA MIGHT NOT AGREE TO MOVE AND MIGHT
THREATEN TO JEOPARDIZE THE RELOCATION EFFORT), AND DELAY
IN RESOLVING THE CURRENT REFUGEE SITUATION.
6. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE OF THE EQUATION: RELOCATION
SHOULD IMPROVE THE SECURITY SITUATION; OAU AND
INTERNATIONAL NORMS REQUIRE REFUGEE CAMPS TO BE AT LEAST
50 KMS FROM THE BORDER (IN THIS CASE WE THINK 50 KMS,
WOULD NOT/NOT BE A SUFFICIENT DISTANCE TO STOP -- THOUGH
IT WOULD HINDER -- ATTACKS BY EXTREMIST ELEMENTS AMONG
THE REFUGEES); THE CONTINUED PRESENCE OF THESE CAMPS ON
•THE BORDER HAS A DESTABILIZING EFFECT ON RWANDA AND THE
SUBREGION; THE PROXIMITY OF THE CAMPS TO RWANDA ONLY
FACILITATES BORDER INCURSIONS (WE HAVE ALREADY SEEN
ATTACKS INTO RWANDA AND AT LEAST ONE ATTACK ON A REFUGEE
CAMP IN ZAIRE THAT APPARENTLY WAS LAUNCHED FROM RWANDA);
THE GOR HAS MADE IT CLEAR THAT IT WILL NOT PUT UP WITH A
CONTINUATION OF THE INCURSIONS, BANDITRY AND GENERAL
INSECURITY CAUSED BY THESE NEARBY CAMPS; MOVING THE CAMPS
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 122346Z
PAGE 06
SHOULD NOT ONLY IMPROVE SECURITY BUT ALSO FOSTER A
GREATER SENSE OF SECURITY WITHIN RWANDA, WHICH SHOULD
LEAD TO A RELAXATION OF TENSIONS AND CREATION OF AN
ATMOSPHERE THAT IS MORE CONDUCIVE IN THE LONG RUN TO
VOLUNTARY REPATRIATION.
7. WEIGHING THE ABOVE WITH THE CURRENT DOWNWARD SPIRAL
AND OUR LIMITED PROSPECTS FOR REVERSING IT (I.E., BETWEEN
THE PROVERBIAL ROCK AND A HARD PLACE), WE CONCLUDE THAT
IT IS TIME TO MOVE AHEAD WITH RELOCATION. MOVING THE
CAMPS COULD CONCEIVABLY WEAKEN THE EXTREMISTS, BUT IN ANY
EVENT, IN ORDER TO AVOID STRENGTHENING THEIR HAND BY
SENDING A SIGNAL THAT THE TWO MILLION NEW REFUGEES HAVE
NO NEAR-TERM PROSPECTS FOR RETURN HOME (AND RECOUPING
LANDS) AND RISK RECREATING THE SAME DISENFRANCHISED
OUTLOOK THAT SPAWNED THE RPF AMONG THE EARLIER REFUGEES
WITH STILL MORE VIOLENCE SOME YEARS IN THE FUTURE, WE
Page: 36

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED
.

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL
Current Handling: n/a
Document Number: 1995STATE117859

Page: 37

Channel: n/a

BELIEVE THAT RELOCATION MUST BE CAST IN TERMS OF PUTTING
' REFUGEE CAMPS ON A MORE SELF-SUFFICIENT BASIS CONFORMING
WITH INTERNATIONAL PRINCIPLES OF LOCATION AT SAFE
DISTANCES FROM BORDERS AND SO ON. WE BELIEVE IT WOULD BE
A GRAVE MISTAKE TO CHARACTERIZE A RELOCATION AS
"RESETTLEMENT" OF REFUGEES, THUS IMPLYING A MORE
, PERMANENT SITUATION.
8. THIS WILL OF COURSE REQUIRE SIGNIFICANT EXPENSES OF
POLITICAL CAPITAL AND EVEN FINANCIAL RESOURCES TO ACHIEVE
A CONSENSUS AMONG THE INTERESTED PARTIES. WE DID NOT/NOT
RAISE THIS ISSUE AT THE LAST (APRIL 21) RWANDA
OPERATIONAL SUPPORT GROUP IN VIEW OF INFORMAL SOUNDINGS
WITH THE FRENCH AND BELGIANS WHO INDICATED THAT THEY DO
CONFIDENTIAL

CONFIDENTIAL
STATE 117859 122346Z
PAGE 07
NOT THINK MOVING THE CAMPS AT THIS JUNCTURE IS WELL
ADVISED. IN MORE RECENT DISCUSSIONS, THE BELGIANS
CONTINUED TO TAKE THE VIEW THAT RELOCATION WOULD UNDERCUT
THE PROSPECTS FOR AN EVENTUAL NEGOTIATED SOLUTION TO THE
RWANDAN CRISIS. WE ARE PREPARED, NEVERTHELESS, TO
UNDERTAKE CONSULTATIONS TO GARNER THE NECESSARY SUPPORT
FOR A PHASED RELOCATION, BEGINNING WITH KIBUMBA AT THE
EARLIEST POSSIBLE MOMENT.
9. FOR GENEVA: MISSION IS REQUESTED TO ALERT THE HIGH
COMMISSIONER'S OFFICE (UNHCR) TO OUR VIEWS, ENCOURAGING A
RAPID RELOCATION OF THE FOUR CAMPS, AND ADVISE ON THE
STATUS OF THEIR PLANNING FOR THIS MOVE, AND INFORM THEM
THAT WE WILL BE PREPARED TO SUPPORT THEIR PLANS IN
CAPITALS AS THEY DEVELOP.
CHRISTOPHER

Page: 37

Current Class: CONFIDENTIAL

UNCLASSIFIED
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fgtquery v.1.9, 9 février 2024