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ORIGIN AF-01
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INFO
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/065R
216726
RELEASED IN PART
1.4(B)
161905Z
AMAD-01
H-01
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6121
DRAFTED BY: AF/C: KCAISTON
APPROVED BY: AF/C: RMPRINGLE
AF/c: RCPORTER
AF/E: CWILSON
EUR/WE: PROE (INFO)
D7EF4E 161906Z /38
P 161905Z JUL 93
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY KIGALI PRIORITY
INFO AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY PARIS PRIORITY
USMISSION USUN NEW YORK PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY BAMAKO
AMEMBASSY BANGUI
AMEMBASSY BONN
AMEMBASSY BRUSSELS
AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA
AMEMBASSY DAKAR
CONFIDENTIAL
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STATE
AMEMBASSY HARARE
AMEMBASSY KAMPALA
AMEMBASSY LAGOS
AMEMBASSY LILONGWE
AMEMBASSY LONDON
AMEMBASSY MOSCOW
AMEMBASSY NAIROBI
SECDEF WASHDC 0000
AMEMBASSY TUNIS
AMEMBASSY YAOUNDE
216726 161905Z
CONFIDENTIALSTATE 216726
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE
REVIEW AUTHORITY: HARMON E KIRBY
DATE/CASE ID: 03 APR 2008 200103014
YY31
UNCLASSIFIED
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
DOEE-00
L-03
OMB-01
SSO-00
NISC-02
UNCLASSIFIED
SECDEF FOR PK/PE AND ISA/AFR; PARIS FOR PERLOW
E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL MOPS OAU RW FR RS UG
SUBJECT: FRENCH VIEWS ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN RWANDA
REF: A) KIGALI 02620 B) ADDIS ABABA 04498
C) STATE 212598
1.
CONFIDENTIAL - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY. FRENCH EMBASSY POLITICAL COUNSELOR HERVE DE
LA BATIE CALLED ON AF/C DIRECTOR ROBERT PRINGLE ON JULY 15
TO PRESENT FRENCH VIEWS ON PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS IN
RWANDA. DE LA BATIE EXPRESSED THE GOF'S STRONG SUPPORT
FOR A UN-LED NEUTRAL INTERNATIONAL FORCE (NIF), WHICH HE
CHARACTERIZED AS ESSENTIAL TO THE SUCCESS OF THE PEACE
PROCESS. ON THE UN BORDER FORCE ISSUE, HE EXPRESSED
CONCERN THAT UGANDA STILL HAD NOT SIGNED THE SOFA, BUT
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STATE 216726 161905Z
FOUND SOME COMFORT IN THE GOU'S RECENT ASSURANCES THAT
THEY SEE NO DIFFICULTY WITH THE DRAFT THAT HAS BEEN
PRESENTED TO THEM. AS FOR THE EXPANSION OF THE NMOG, DE
LA BATIE REPORTED THAT, AS FAR AS HE KNOWS, THE PREVIOUS
FRENCH OFFER OF TRANSPORT ASSISTANCE STILL STANDS.
END SUMMARY.
FRENCH VIEW UN-LED NIF AS ESSENTIAL TO PEACE PROCESS
3. DE LA BATIE REPORTED THAT THE GOF STRONGLY FAVORS A
UN-LED NIF IN RWANDA. ACCORDING TO DE LA BATIE, FRANCE
VIEWS THE NIF AS AN ESSENTIAL ELEMENT IN THE PEACE PROCESS
AND BELIEVES THAT THE FORCE MUST BE IN PLACE AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE TO ENSURE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE PEACE ACCORDS.
HE EMPHASIZED THAT FRANCE CONSIDERS THIS A UN
RESPONSIBILITY. THE GOF DOES NOT THINK THAT THE OAU HAS
THE NECESSARY RESOURCES OR EXPERTISE TO MOUNT AN NIF, NOR
DO THEY HAVE THE CONFIDENCE OF THE RWANDAN GOVERNMENT.
(DE LA BATIE ADDED THAT THE GOT MADE THESE POINTS TO THE
RUSSIANS IN A RECENT COUNTER-DEMARCHE, AND THAT THE TWO
SIDES, IN HIS WORDS, AGREED TO DISAGREE.)
4.
ON THE ISSUE OF FINANCING, DE LA BATIE REPORTED THAT
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
THE GOF PREFERS ASSESSED RATHER THAN VOLUNTARY
CONTRIBUTIONS, FOR TWO REASONS. FIRST, AS A MATTER OF
PRINCIPAL, THE GOF CONSIDERS THE PROVIDING OF A PKO TO BE
A DUTY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. AS SUCH, ALL
COUNTRIES SHOULD CONTRIBUTE, ACCORDING TO THE UN RULES ON
ASSESSED CONTRIBUTIONS. SECOND, AS A PRACTICAL MATTER,
INTERNAL BUDGETARY RULES MAY PREVENT THE GOF FROM MAKING
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VOLUNTARY CONTRIBUTIONS TO INTERNATIONAL PKO'S. DE LA
BATIE EXPRESSED OPTIMISM THAT THE NIF WOULD NOT HAVE TO
STAY IN RWANDA TOO LONG AND COULD OPERATE WITH A NARROW
MANDATE, THEREBY KEEPING COSTS DOWN.
5. FINALLY, DE LA BATIE SAID THAT FRENCH TROOPS WOULD
PROBABLY NOT BE ABLE TO PARTICIPATE IN A UN-LED NIF, GIVEN
THE RPF'S STRONG OBJECTION TO FRENCH PRESENCE IN RWANDA.
HE ALSO NOTED PARENTHETICALLY THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT SEE
ANY REAL SAVINGS FROM A WITHDRAWAL IN RWANDA, SINCE THESE
TROOPS ARE BASED IN THE CAR, WHICH IS JUST AS EXPENSIVE.
FRENCH EXPRESS CONCERN ABOUT UNOMUR SOFA SIGNING
6. DE LA BATIE EXPRESSED THE GOF'S CONCERN REGARDING THE
DELAY IN SIGNING OF THE STATUS OF MISSION AGREEMENT FOR
UNOMUR, THE UN BORDER MONITORING FORCE TO BE DEPLOYED IN
UGANDA. HE CHARACTERIZED UNOMUR AS FRANCE'S TOP PKO
PRIORITY IN RWANDA AND SAID THAT IT WAS NECESSARY TO
CONVINCE THE RPF THAT THE MILITARY OPTION WAS NOT VIABLE.
1.4(B)
. ACCORDING TO DE LA BATIE,
1.4(B)
I
FRANCE NOW THINKS THAT
THE UN SECRETARIAT SHOULD TRY TO WORK THROUGH THE UNDP
REPRESENTATIVE IN KAMPALA TO PUSH FOR A RAPID SIGNING OF
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STATE 216726 161905Z
UNCLASSIFIED
UNCLASSIFIED
THE SOFA. ON THE POSITIVE SIDE, THE FRENCH HAVE BEEN
HEARTENED BY RECENT STATEMENTS FROM KAMPALA THAT THE GOU
SEES NO DIFFICULT WITH THE SOFA DRAFT, WHICH HAS
APPARENTLY FINALLY REACHED THE RIGHT PEOPLE IN UGANDA.
FRANCE CONSIDERING OAU'S REQUEST FOR NMOG TRANSPORT
8. DRAWING ON THE POINTS IN REF (A), WE ASKED WHETHER THE
GOF WAS WILLING TO PROVIDE TRANSPORT FOR ADDITIONAL NMOG
TROOPS, AS THE OAU HAD REQUESTED (REF B). DE LA BATIE
SAID THAT HE THOUGHT THE GOF WOULD BE WILLING TO UPHOLD
THEIR PREVIOUS OFFER TO SUPPLY TRANSPORT FOR THE
SENEGALESE CONTINGENT. HE ADDED THAT THE OAU'S RECENT
REQUEST IS STILL UNDER CONSIDERATION AND THAT HE EXPECTS A
REPLY SOON, WHICH HE WILL PASS TO US.
COMMENT
9. WE WERE ENCOURAGED BY DE LA BATIE'S STRONG LANGUAGE IN
SUPPORT OF A CREDIBLE UN-LED NIF. WE WILL CERTAINLY NEED
FRANCE'S SUPPORT IN THE UN TO PERSUADE RUSSIA AND ANY
OTHER HOLDOUTS OF THE NECESSITY FOR A CREDIBLE NIF WITH
SIGNIFICANT UN INVOLVEMENT. DE LA EATIE'S RESPONSE ON THE
FINANCING ISSUE, HOWEVER, WAS LESS ENCOURAGING. WE
SUSPECT THAT FRANCE'S PREFERENCE FOR ASSESSED
CONTRIBUTIONS STEMS MORE FROM THEIR RELATIVELY SMALL UN
ASSESSED PKO SHARE THAN IT DOES FROM INTERNAL BUDGETARY
RESTRAINTS OR LOFTY UN PRINCIPLES OF SHARED
RESPONSIBILITY. WE WERE NOT SURPRISED BY THE GOF'S
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RELUCTANCE TO SUPPLY TROOPS TO AN NIF, GIVEN THE RPF'S
ADAMANT INSISTENCE ON FRENCH WITHDRAWAL AND FRANCE'S OWN
STATED DESIRE TO PULL OUT OF RWANDA. END COMMENT.
CHRISTOPHER
CONFIDENTIAL
UNCLASSIFIED
