Citation
; | ET __—_ | GS
| | . 14607
MDHIAN 1077
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 210730Z FCO
TELNO 1434
OF 210155Z APRIL 94 D Ten à £
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALAÏ ROME, DHAKA, WASHINGTON
INFO IMMEDIATE ADDIS ABABA, ACCRA, DAR ÉS_ SALAAM nus
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR
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MY TELNO 1410: RWANDA €
SUMMARY
Na et
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1. Secretary-General's recommendations onthe future of UNAMIR
fail to materialise, Situation on the ground still tense. Heavy
fighting around Byumba. Efforts to achieve a cease-fire continue,
The Belgian contingent have now Left. In addition some
non-essential UNAMIR military personnel have also Left.
Humanitarian situation deteriorating. TI underline once again the
need for the Council to take a substantive decision on UNAMIR this
week and express hope that the Secretary-General's recommendation
Will not be further delayed. -
DETAIL
2. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 20
April Gharekhan (Secretary-General's Special Political Adviser)
told Council members that the recommendation of the Dé”
Secretary-General to which he had referred on 19 April were not yet
available and he wished to withdraw all that he had said previously
as to what the report might contain (para 6 of TUR). He hoped
something would be available on 21 April but could not guarantee
this.
3. Gharekhan reported that the general situation in Rwande
remaîned tense. The fighting had been intense on the morning of 19
April but had declined Later on. The ICRC, with UNAMIR's
assistance, had been able to evacuate the wounded from the stadium
shelled on 19 April. The number of casualties had increased to 40
dead and 100 seriously wounded. . There was heavy fighting around
.the regional city of Byumba. Efforts to negotiate a cease-fire
continued,
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CREED. The Last of the Belgian contingent
had Left on 19 April, 264 non-essential UNAMIR military personnel
had also been evacuated to Naïrobi, UNAMIR's force strength was
therefore now at 1707. The humanitarian situation was
deteriorating. In particular the sanitary conditions st the
national stadium and the King Faisal Hospital were now serious.
UNAMIR had escorted an ICRC convoy to distribute food to the 4000
or so displaced people still in the stadium. UNAMIR forces were
continuing to regroup in Kigali. 237 Ghanaïans had evacuated from
the DMZ into Kigali where they had deployed with the rest of their
contingent at-the airport. The remaining 87 members of the
Ghanaïîan battalion were expected to arrive in Kigali Late on 28.
April.
&« Gambari (Nigeria) said he was disappointed at the situation on
the ground but not discouraged. He drew attention to the meeting
held in Kampala under President Musaveni's auspices (Kampala telno
120 refers). This had made some progress. He also noted that a
meeting would be held between the parties and regional Leaders în
Arusha on 23 April which was aîmed at persuading the parties of the
futility of a military solution to the problems in Rwands. The
Secretary-General of the OAU was also contacting regional Leaders.
Gambari also noted that there was a draft resolution on the table.
We should aim to take this forward. Whatever our recommendations
on UNAMIR's future mandate, there was a need for the Council to
make a political statement on the events în Rwanda...
5. In response to questions Gharekhan ssid that UNAMIR had been
unable to resolve the problem of the control of the airport. There
had been no attacks on UNAMIR in the past 24 hours and no
deliberate hostility. But while the fighting continued there was
alwsys a danger of UNAMIR getting caught ïin the crossfire. The
process of evacuation of non-essential personnel was not complete.
But much would depend on what the Council decided on the future of
UNAMIR, There was no basis the figure being reported in the press
that 500 military personnel were about to Leave. But in this
connection he added that troop contributors might in the end decide
themselves whether they wanted to stay. They might force the issue
sooner rather than later. e
6. I said that while the ultimate decision on the presence of
UNAMIR did indeed rest with the troop contributors since if they
were to decide to Leave then, force majeure, the Council would have
to accept this. But this was not a desirable outcome. The
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Security Council should be taking decisions on which the troop
contributors could base theïr actions rather than the other Way
round. We were arriving at the point when we needed to agree to a
regrettable but necessary downsizing of the operation. We should
do this in a Logical and properly planned way, not by default,
Furthermore we should not discredit ourselves by taking decisions
which were only viable on paper. When we took a decision on the
size of a UN presence in Rwanda it should be on the basis of
numbers of military personnel which we were sure could be achieved.
But whatever happened the Council must not postpone a decision on:
Rwanda beyond the coming weekend. I supported the Spanish
Ambassador's call for assurances that we would receive the
Secretary-General's recommendations on 21 April.
7. Keating (New Zealand, Council President) said that as President
he had been encountering increasing numbers of collesgues outside
the Council who were expressing grave concern that Security Council
had not yet said or done anything about the horrifie killings in
Rwande. It was not easy to explaïin whether to the press or to
other UN members, why the Security Council was not pointing the
finger at someone since it was clear from the Secretariat and other
reports that the bulk of the. killing was the responsibility of one
side. He endorsed my plea for an early decision, as did Cardenas
(Argentina), who said that the force was in Limbo without a mandate
and the Council's continued failure. to rectify this wes difficult
to defend.
COMMENT "
8. LS
CNED. One of the options is reported to be to increase
the force Level, despite the fact that, as noted in para 8 of TUR,
the Force Commander has recommended an immediate scaling down of
UNAMIR. |
HANNAY
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