Citation
‘ms NS,
18
‘ MDHIAN 0924
FM UKMIS NEW YORK
TO DESKBY 200730Z FCO
TELNO 1410 .
OF 200146Z APRIL 94 NUE, _jà iso en]
INFO IMMEDIATE PARIS, BRUSSELS, KAMPALA,ÏROME, DAKAR, ADDIS ÂABABA
INFO IMMEDIATE ACCRA, WASHINGTON, DAR ES SAEY =
INFO PRIORITY UKMIS GENEVA, SECURITY COUNCIL POSTS, ACTOR
@N 7 2)
YOUR TELNO 5760) MY TELNO 13892 RWANDA
SUMMARY
1. Situation in Kigali continues to deteriorate. Government
forces shell national stadium where Large numbers of refugees
sheltering and part of UNAMIR stationed,. No UNAMIR casualties but
at least 25 civilians killed and more wounded. Prospects for
ceasefire bleak. Positions of both sides hardening. EP
. Secretary-General to submit
his recommendations on the future of UNAMIR to the Security Council
on 20 April. I underline need for the Council to take a
substantive decision immediately on the basis of these
recommendations. Secretariat tell us Secretary-General Likely to
recommend immediate withdrawal of all but 250-300 of UNAMIR's
personnel. Force Commander believes it would be dangerous to
announce complete withdrawal.
DETAIL
2. During informal consultations of the Security Council on 19
April, Gharekhan (Secretary-General's special. political adviser)
briefed on the Latest developments îin Rwanda, The situation in
Kigali continued to deteriorate. Fighting had intensified Late on
18 April, culminating in the direct shelling of the national
stadium where 5,000 refugees were sheltering and where parts of
UNAMIR were stationed. At least 25 people had been killed, 50
wounded and there were an unknown number of casualties outside the
stadium: one shell had Landed on the roof of the UNAMIR
headquarters there but it did not explode. There had been no (no)
UNAMIR casualties. The shelling had stopped after UNAMIR had
protested to the Rwandan government forces (RGF) who were
responsible for it. The wounded had been taken to King Feisal
Hospital where there were already some 8,000 civilians sheltering.
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The evacuation of foreigners continued with UNAMIR's assistance.
3. Gharekhan said the shelling of the stadium by the Rwandan
government forces represented an escalation of the conflict with no
regard to the consequences for the civilians inside or for UNAMIR
personnel. The Force Commander and Special Representative (SRSG)
were doing their best to encourage negotiations but the prospects
for a ceasefire were becoming increasingly bleak. The positions of
both sides were hardening and they seemed to be preparîing for
prolonged armed conflict. UNAMIR had put forward a draft ceasefire
agreement which the RGF said they could agree.
&. Gharekhan said that, in these cireumstances, it was almost
impossible for UNAMIR to carry out its mandate. There was also an
increasing threat to UNAMIR personnel. The Secretary-General was
considering reports from the Force Commander and the SRSG and
expected to submit a report to the Security Council at the Latest
by 2016007.
5, Keating (New Zealand, Council President) said he had had
further discussions with the troop contributing countries (TCCs).
The TCCs had appreciated the efforts made by the Secretariat to
keep them informed of developments in Rwanda and welcomed the
Security Council's recognition of theïr concerns. There was a wide
range of views amongst the TCCs. The Ghanaîians had said they
wanted to stay come what may and urged others to do the same. At
the other end of the spectrum a number of TCCs were extremely
concerned at the Lack of a clear mandate.
6. Cardenas (Argentina) asked whether it was correct that radio
stations had been broadcasting anti-UNAMIR material. Gharekhan
replied that there had been broadcasts critical of UNAMIR because
UNAMIR had rejected RGF suggestions of joint UNAMIR/RGF control of
the airport but so far neither side were overtly to hostile to
UNAMIR. However, given the rapidly deteriorating situation, this
could change at any time. Walker CUS) asked whether UNAMIR still
had the ability to extricate itself safely. Gharekhan said that
they did, as of now, and probably also în the immediate future.
But the situation could change at any point. The situation wss
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grave. The Secretary-General would be making a clear
recommendation to the Council, not presenting options. The
recommendation was unlikely to be for a total pullout (though he
subsequently made a point of saying that no option could be ruled
out) but rather for the msintenance of a smaller force,
7. I said the Council must take action on the future of UNAMIR
before the end of the week. The situation had detériorated
significantly since our earlier discussion of UNAMIR's mandate (our
telno 1374). We could not delay a decision further when UNAMIR
personnel were exposed to such very real risks.
8. Gharekhan told me separately that elements of UNAMIR
Cprincipally unarmed military observers and civilian police
observers}) were already being withdrawn, Annabi (DPK0) told us
Later that Riza CASG for Peacekeeping) had been inclined earlier in
the day to recommend immediate and complete withdrawal. The Force
Commander had however argued very forcefully indeed that announcing
a complete withdrawal would precipitate an immediate battle between
the parties for the airport and put UNAMIR at severe risk. His
advice, which DPKO had accepted, was that the Secretary-General
should recommend to the Security Council the immediate scaling down
of UNAMIR. The Secretariat would no longer argue that a ceasefire
Was a necessary pre-condition for such scaling down. They
envisaged a presence of 250-300, which should continue to be called
UNAMIR: the alternative, suspending UNAMIR and talking of a UN
presence under a different name, might help the Americans but would
play badly ïin Rwanda. Annabi said that in practice the UN would
keep à very close watch on the situation, and review the continued
presence of the “rump" UNAMIR'‘in ño Later than two weeks. He
implied that he, at lesst, foresaw it too being withdrawn at that
point unless there were unexpected developments în the interim, but
that it would be better not to be specific at this Siege” 2
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