

8

The Arusha Accords and the Failure of International Intervention in Rwanda

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Overview

THE PERIOD FOLLOWING an agreement on ending internal conflict can often be even bloodier and more dangerous than the period before the agreement. The Arusha Peace Accords, which ostensibly ended the ongoing conflict in Rwanda between an exiled Tutsi guerrilla group (the Rwandese Patriotic Front) and the Hutu government of President Juvenal Habyarimana, are a tragic example of a negotiated agreement failing miserably in its implementation. Almost immediately following the signature of the Arusha Accords, Hutu extremists who felt left out of the process and threatened by the results organized a horrific massacre of Tutsi and Hutu moderates. Between 800,000 and one million people died between April and July 1994.

Rather than focusing on the period of the massacre, this chapter examines how the mediation of the Arusha Accords set the stage for what many have described as genocide. The chapter also highlights the unsuccessful mediation attempts leading up to the Arusha Accords; the successful mediation of the Arusha Accords by a highly skilled Tanzanian diplomat, Ami Mpungwe; and the violence following the breakdown of the Accords after the suspicious death of President Habyarimana. The role of regional organizations and other international actors in the pre-Arusha mediations and the Arusha process itself is analyzed. The skill of the mediator in pacing the negotiations, focusing the substance of the negotiations, and using connections with the international community

strategically are also examined. The chapter looks at the dangers presented when a bitterly divided party must negotiate with a party of unusual unity and strategic vision, and how the inclusion or exclusion of extremist groups can derail negotiation attempts. The chapter finally highlights the misperceptions arising from a serious lack of intelligence information and the tragedy of peace-keeping forces whose weak mandate and lack of materiel made them impotent to stem the horrendous violence.

Timeline

- 1860** The Tutsi King Rwabugiri (1860–95) expands his power and creates a centralized state.
- 1880** The first European explorers arrive in Rwanda.
- 1899** Germany begins its colonial rule.
- 1911** An uprising in northern Rwanda is repressed by combined German and Tutsi-led southern forces, creating significant bitterness on the part of the northern Hutu.
- 1916** Belgium takes over control (under a League of Nations mandate).
- 1920s–30s** A policy of “ethnogenesis” exaggerates the “ethnic” differences between the Hutu and Tutsi and creates a monopoly Tutsi rule. Ethnic identity cards are introduced.
- 1959–61** A Hutu “revolution” replaces the Tutsi monarch with an independent Hutu republic controlled by President Kayibanda and southern Hutu political elites.
- 1973** A coup by Juvenal Habyarimana transfers power to northern Hutu.
- 1960s–70s** Attacks and repression against the Tutsi result in a refugee population that numbers approximately 600,000.
- 1990** **Oct. 10:** The Rwandese Patriotic Front (RPF) invades Rwanda.
- 1990–91** A series of regional mediation efforts are undertaken. The Communauté Economique de Pays des Grand Lacs (CEPL) hosts summits that include the participation of Zaire, Uganda, Burundi, and Tanzania.
- 1991** **Feb. 19:** The Dar-es-Salaam Declaration produces a refugee agreement that is later used as the basis for the Arusha refugee talks. **Mar. 29:** The N’Sele Cease-fire, although short-lived, formally creates the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG). **Sept. 16:** The Gabolite Cease-fire deploys the NMOG. In addition, the control of mediation switches from Zaire to Tanzania. **October:** Low intensity traditional guerrilla warfare by the Force Armées Rwandaises (FAR) sees initial success and is followed by a resurgence of the RPF.
- 1992** **May 8:** U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen meets with the RPF and Yoweri Museveni in Kampala, Uganda. **May 10:** Cohen meets with Habyarimana and opposition members, Prime Minister Nsengiyaremye and Foreign Minister Boniface Ngulinzira, in Kigali, Rwanda. **May 24:** PM Nsengiyaremye and FM

Ngulinzira meet in Kampala with the RPF to explore peace talks. **June 6:** The RPF and the Rwandan Government hold preliminary talks in Paris. **June 20:** Government of France's Director for Africa and Maghreb Affairs Dijoud and Assistant Secretary Cohen meet with Ugandan Foreign Minister Ssemogere and RPF representatives in Paris to strongly encourage talks. **July 12:** The Arusha talks open under the auspices of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). The primary facilitation is delegated to Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his ambassador, Ami Mpungwe. **Aug. 18:** The Rule of Law Protocol signed. **September:** The power-sharing talks begin. **Oct. 6–31:** The talks on the Framework for a Broad Based Transitional Government (BBTG) continue. An agreement that significantly reduces the scope of presidential powers is reached. The Transitional National Assembly is also created to replace the Conseil National de Développement (CDN). FM Ngulinzira initials the agreement without the authority of Habyarimana. **November–December:** Discussions on the composition of the transitional institutions continue. **Nov. 15:** Habyarimana calls the Arusha Accords "pieces of paper."

1993

Jan. 5–10: The distribution of the seats in the BBTG is finalized. The extremist Coalition pour la Défense de la République (CDR) is excluded. **Feb. 8:** The RPF launches an offensive. **June 9:** The Protocol on the Rights of Refugees and Displaced Persons is signed. **June 24:** The Protocol on the Integration of the Armed Forces of the Two Parties is signed. **July 8:** The extremist Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines starts broadcasting. **July 23–24:** A meeting of the MDR expels Faustin Twagiramungu, signaling the beginning of the splintering of the opposition parties. **Aug. 4:** President Habyarimana and RPF chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe sign the Arusha Accords. **Oct. 5:** The UN Security Council approves the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), a 2,500-strong peacekeeping force. **Nov. 1:** The UNAMIR forces start arriving. **Nov. 21:** Tutsi military extremists assassinate Burundi Hutu President Ndadaye. The subsequent repression and reprisal killings result in tens of thousands of deaths and over 600,000 refugees. **Dec. 28:** 600 RPF soldiers arrive in Kigali as part of the Arusha Accords.

1994

Jan. 8: Deadlocks within the Mouvement Démocratique Républicain (MDR) and Parti Libéral (PL) block the convening of the BBTG. **Feb. 10:** Further attempts to convene the government are aborted by the assassination of the Parti Social Démocrate (PSD) leader Felicien Gatabazi and the reprisal killing of Martin Bucyana of the CDR. **Apr. 6:** Habyarimana and Burundi President Ntaryamira are killed when their plane is shot down while approaching the Kigali airport. **Apr. 7:** Interim Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana is killed along with ten Belgian peacekeepers as-

signed to protect her. Belgium withdraws its forces. **Apr. 8:** The RPF renews its fighting. **Apr. 21:** UN Security Council resolution reduces UNAMIR from 2,500 to 270 (UNSCR 917). **Apr. 30:** By the end of April at least 100,000 people have been killed, and 1.3 million have become refugees. **July 18:** The RPF declares that the war is over. Almost one million people have lost their lives, and in October the United Nations estimates the war, through death and displacement, has reduced the population of Rwanda from 7.9 million to 5 million.

Background

Three principal interwoven factors allowed a small group of political elites in April 1994 to mobilize tens of thousands of ordinary Rwandan citizens to slaughter between 800,000 and 1,000,000 of their neighbors with gruesome efficiency. This genocide is even more tragic because it occurred after the signing of the Arusha Accords, meant to bring about power sharing between the Hutu and Tutsi. These factors are first, the poverty and high population of the country; second, Rwanda's history of authoritarian rule; and third, the "ethnic" conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi. In reporting the killings, much of the Western media simplistically described the genocide as a spontaneous explosion of long simmering ethnic hatred. A more sophisticated description of the ethnic relations between the Hutu and Tutsi is required, however, not only to understand the true source of the genocide but also the context within which the Arusha Peace Accords were negotiated.

The Hutu and Tutsi ethnic classifications have various historical antecedents, including colonial classifications, clan affiliation, occupational status, "feudal" relations, and ancestral origin. As in numerous long-standing conflicts, there was a range of pre-genocide attitudes toward ethnicity and identity. Most, conscious of the ethnic divide, harbored some suspicions toward the other group; but some viewed the other as anathema and were deeply opposed to a multiethnic Rwanda, and certainly to power sharing. Prior to the genocide, the vast majority of Hutu and Tutsi lived side by side, dispersed throughout the country. With the high poverty rate and history of tensions, the majority of Hutu peasants were susceptible to manipulation by a small band of Hutu elites who were willing to destroy Rwanda in a desperate bid to preserve their power and economic privilege.

Poverty and Population Pressure

Dominated by lush terrain, Rwanda is a land of tremendous physical beauty. The terrain is primarily mountainous with high plateaus. Running along the northwestern region are the Virungu volcanic mountains, familiar to the West through Dian Fossey's gorilla research. The country is blessed with considerable rainfall, and moderate average temperatures; many regions are capable of up to three agricultural growing cycles per year.¹

The pressures on the land, however, are extreme. A country of only 23,000

square kilometers, Rwanda had a population of 7.15 million people and an annual growth rate of 3.1 percent (1991 census). With the national parks and forests excluded, the average pre-genocide population density was 405 people per square kilometer, the highest in Africa. The northern Ruhuengeri region, the most populated, had 820 people per square kilometer of productive land.² Most people were poor subsistence farmers. In 1984, 57 percent of the rural households farmed less than one hectare and 25 percent had access to less than half a hectare to support a family of five.³

Rwanda's economy was severely injured by the collapse of the international coffee market in the 1980s and by civil war (1990–93). The war's impact was fourfold: 1) the internally displaced people posed a loss to coffee production and an increased demand on government resources, 2) the region controlled by rebels cut off a main export route, 3) the nascent tourist industry was destroyed, and 4) the government's military spending consumed significant resources.⁴ In addition, structural adjustment programs demanded by the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund were particularly hard on Rwanda's peasants. The combined effects resulted in the average per capita income falling from U.S. \$330 in 1989 to U.S. \$200 in 1993, a 40 percent decrease in only four years.⁵

Although there are numerous factors contributing to the genocide, the economic, population, and land pressures were clearly among them. As Rwandan scholar Gerard Prunier commented,

the decision to kill was of course made by politicians, for political reasons. But at least part of the reason why it was carried out so thoroughly by the ordinary rank-and-file peasant . . . was the feeling that there were too many people on too little land, and that with a reduction in their numbers, there would be more for the survivors.⁶

“Ethnic” Relations and Authoritarian Rule

In orchestrating their genocide, the extremists were able to call upon two interwoven themes from Rwanda's history, its tradition of authoritarian rule and the “ethnic” conflict between the Hutu and Tutsi. For the past two hundred years Rwanda has been governed by a highly organized hierarchical social and political structure that has existed in three distinct forms: a centralized state created by Tutsi kings, a colonial government administered indirectly through the Tutsi, and finally Hutu-controlled dictatorships.

Overlapping and combining with these governing developments was the evolution of the Hutu and Tutsi “ethnic” classification. Always a somewhat fluid identity, the classification has been transformed from a multifaceted social description, often secondary to local clan affiliation, to a more rigid social and political ordering imbued with powerful overtones of intellectual superiority and political and economic dominance. To carry out their plan, the Hutu extremists utilized an administrative structure that provided direct access to and obedience from the peasants. They also manipulated “ethnic” tension through hate-filled rhetoric to create a hysterical climate of fear.

Precolonial: Creation of Centralized Authority and Development of "Ethnic" Classifications

The Hutu, Bantu-speaking agriculturists, appear to have arrived in what is present-day Rwanda around 1000 C.E., slowly displacing the indigenous forest-dwelling Twa. Principally involved in agriculture, many of the Hutu organized themselves into "statelets" by the fifteenth century. These local administrative and political structures were based largely on clan affiliation. As part of a general pastoralist influx from the lakes region from the eleventh to the fifteenth centuries, the Tutsi began arriving in the area.⁷ When Tutsi moved into a region there was usually an initial period of peaceful coexistence characterized by trading, Tutsi cattle products for Hutu agricultural goods. Subsequently the Tutsi would often subjugate the local population and establish military and administrative control.⁸

Although by the middle of the eighteenth century the Tutsi dominated the local power structure, they themselves had been assimilated by the Hutu, and the ethnic classifications were flexible. The Tutsi adopted the Hutu language, Kinyarwanda, and incorporated many of their traditions and cults. During this period, the Hutu/Tutsi classification corresponded roughly to occupational status and wealth. Cattle-herders, soldiers, and administrators were generally Tutsi, and the majority of the farmers were Hutu.⁹ As symbols of wealth, power, and good breeding, cattle provided a form of social mobility in which a Hutu, and his lineage, could become "Tutsified" if he were able to acquire a sizable enough herd. Conversely a Tutsi who lost all his wealth and needed to cultivate the land would be "Hutuified."¹⁰ Clans, which were multi-class and multiethnic, were arguably a more important form of identification at this time than "ethnicity."¹¹

As the Tutsi extended their control, "ethnic" classification began to play a more significant role. From the fifteenth to the nineteenth centuries, the Tutsi rulers of the eastern Nyiginya region expanded their dominance over the neighboring areas. King Rwabugiri, who reigned from 1860 to 1895, was the most influential of the Tutsi kings. During his rule, he greatly increased the centralization of power and created a highly efficient administrative state that extended through much of the country and extracted obedience from even remote areas.¹² He was unable, though, to subjugate the northern and southwestern regions, an important fact for later intra-Hutu and Hutu/Tutsi relations.

Underpinning the royal governing structure on a local level, and important to the development of Hutu/Tutsi relations, was a "feudal" system of patronage, *ubuhake*. Between two men of unequal status, this arrangement involved bonds of loyalty and an exchange of goods and services. Tutsi were generally the patrons with subordinate Tutsi or Hutu as the clients. As a hierarchical system of social organization, *ubuhake* institutionalized socioeconomic differences between the Hutu and Tutsi and created a greater awareness of the "ethnic" classification, particularly among the Hutu. In later ideological battles, *ubuhake* became an important point of contention. For Tutsi ideologues the system was a

mutually beneficial partnership, and for Hutu ideologues the system was a form of slavery.¹³

The “ethnic” divisions created during this period were not monolithic, however, and much of the political struggle existed as a fight between the center and the periphery. To dilute remote resistance, the king established an overlapping system of local governance in which up to three chiefs shared power over the basic administrative unit, the hill. The “chief of the pastures” was almost always a Tutsi; the “chief of the land” was usually a Hutu; and the “chief of men,” the tax collector, was usually a Tutsi. To complicate the system, the chiefs did not always share control over the same hilltop, and often the king created a patchwork of intertwining rule in a particularly rebellious region.¹⁴

During this period, the Tutsi elites who held all the highest positions of power almost certainly began to associate their status and privilege with their Tutsi “ethnicity.” At the middle-level and lower ranks of the social structure, however, “ethnicity” was simply one factor in determining an individual’s social stature. Furthermore, as mentioned above, local affiliations were important in the on-going struggle against the centralized power of the royal state.

*German Colonial Rule (1899–1916) and Belgian Trusteeship (1916–1961):
Indirect Rule through Tutsi*

The importance of the Hutu/Tutsi “ethnic” classification dramatically increased during the period of European control. With limited resources, the Europeans usurped the royal governing structure of Rwanda and ruled indirectly through the Tutsi. The Europeans actively pursued a policy of “ethnogenesis,” a “politically-motivated creation of ethnic identities based on socially constituted categories of the pre-colonial past.”¹⁵ The effect of the colonial policies was to exaggerate the economic and political differences between the groups and to provide a theoretical underpinning for the divisions. The organizing principle for colonial rule was the racist Hamitic thesis stating that everything of value in Africa could be traced to Caucasian origin. Early anthropologists identified the Tutsi as Hamites; based on this classification, colonial administrators came to regard and promote the Tutsi as the intellectually superior, naturally aristocratic race.¹⁶

Acting under this view, the Germans and, especially, the Belgians, transformed the royal governing structure to suit their administrative needs, creating a monopoly Tutsi rule and a rigid ethnic classification system. From approximately 1926 to 1931, the Belgians instituted an administrative reform replacing all Hutu chiefs and deputy chiefs with Tutsi. In 1933, the Belgians introduced compulsory ethnic identity cards that were based on fairly arbitrary criteria.¹⁷ Henceforth, ethnicity was the determining factor for access to education and economic and political privilege. In addition, relations between Hutu and Tutsi were further hardened by the transformation of the previously flexible *ubuhake* system into a mechanism for extracting forced labor. The effect of sixty years of colonial rule was to exaggerate the egos and fortunes of the Tutsi and create a bitter sense of resentment and inferiority among the Hutu.¹⁸

Independence: Dictatorship and Exploitation of Ethnicity

Four crucial elements of the Hutu/Tutsi relationship emerged during Rwanda's transition to independence and the first and second Hutu republics. These elements are important to understanding the 1990 civil war and the dynamics of the Arusha Accords. First, in the late 1950s, the struggle for power had become defined in ethnic terms. Second, the ascension of the first Hutu republic began a cycle in which power was transferred from one political elite to another in a zero-sum game of winner-takes-all.¹⁹ Third, the large Tutsi refugee population displaced by fighting and repression became the source of the RPF guerrilla army. Fourth, intra-Hutu tensions that developed during the first and second republics (1962–90), mainly between northern/western and southern groups, dominated Rwanda's multiparty democracy and then hobbled the government of Rwanda (GoR) negotiating team during the Arusha Accord negotiations.²⁰

The Bahutu Manifesto, signed by nine Hutu intellectuals in 1957, including future president Grégoire Kayibanda, demonstrated that the colonial conception of Rwandan society as defined by the Hutu/Tutsi divide had taken hold.²¹ An important statement of principle for the coming Hutu "revolution," the document sought to create a general awareness of ethnic identity among the Hutu masses. It argued that the root of Rwanda's problems was the ethnic conflict between the Hutu and the foreign Hamites, principally the Tutsi. In response, two high Tutsi chiefs wrote letters ridiculing the Hutu and asserting that Tutsi dominance was justified by their military defeat of the Hutu "little" kings.²²

From 1959 to 1961, a Hutu "revolution" replaced the Tutsi monarch with an independent Hutu republic controlled by Kayibanda and southern Hutu political elites. During the transition, the Belgian authorities and the Catholic Church switched allegiance and supported the Hutu. The change was precipitated in part by a Tutsi attempt to unilaterally gain independence and by generalized guilt over the treatment of the Hutu during colonial rule.

Repression of Tutsi during this period, including a massacre that killed 5,000 to 8,000, led to a massive exodus of refugees into Burundi, Zaire, Tanzania, and Uganda. Violence in Rwanda continued against the Tutsi, particularly in 1963–65 and 1973, and led to successive waves of exodus. By 1990 the refugee population, including their descendants, numbered almost 600,000.²³ Some of the refugees in Uganda joined in the fight against Idi Amin and Milton Obote. In particular, the future RPF leaders Paul Kagame and Major General Fred Rwigyema were among the twenty-six original fighters who started in the bush with Yoweri Museveni, the president of Uganda.²⁴

Juvenal Habyarimana's bloodless coup in 1973 transferred power to northern Hutu. The coup represented not only competition for political control but also a desire for revenge for the subjugation suffered by the northerners early in the century. During the seventeen years of the Habyarimana regime, members of Habyarimana's immediate power circle, the *akazu*, consolidated power at the expense of southern Hutu groups and Hutu from other clans.²⁵ By the mid-

1980s, members of Habyarimana's Bagogwe clan held 80 percent of the top military posts and dominated the ruling Mouvement Révolutionnaire National pour le Développement (MRND), Rwanda's only political party, many of whose leaders were among the main organizers of the genocide.²⁶ The *akazu*, particularly Habyarimana's wife and brothers-in-law, represented a distinct Hutu subculture whose earlier members had remained independent into the twentieth century until they were defeated by combined German and Tutsi-led southern forces. Fiercely proud of its pre-Tutsi past, this group was deeply suspicious of any reconciliation with the RPF and hostile to moderate Hutu who supported dialogue.²⁷ Having felt like second-class citizens first to the Tutsi and then to other Hutu, the northerners were loath to relinquish power once having gained control.

During the Habyarimana regime, Rwanda experienced significant economic development. From 1976 to 1990, Rwanda moved from the bottom to the top of a per capita GNP ranking of regional countries. During the 1980s, the World Bank considered Rwanda a relative success. In 1987 its debt was 28 percent of its GNP, one of the lowest rates in Africa.²⁸ Although Rwanda's human rights record was still problematic, the situation was considered to be improving. Before 1990, no major ethnic violence had occurred during Habyarimana's regime, and, to some extent, he was favored by the internal Tutsi.²⁹

Civil War and Multiparty Politics

The early 1990s involved considerable change for Rwanda. First, the RPF began its guerrilla war. Second, as mentioned earlier, the economic crisis placed considerable strain on the government. Third, under internal and external pressure, Habyarimana's regime began instituting multiparty politics.

On October 1, 1990, the RPF invaded northern Rwanda. After initial success, they were pushed back into Uganda by the internationally reinforced Force Armées Rwandaises (FAR). Over the next few years, the fighting settled into a low-level guerrilla war. Significantly motivated by the refugee crisis and their increasingly hostile treatment in Uganda, the RPF had an eight-point political agenda that was directed at reform of the Rwandan government.

Immediately on the heels of the RPF invasion France, Belgium, and Zaire sent troops to aid the Habyarimana regime. By October 4, France had sent 150 members of the 2ème Régiment Étranger Parachutiste to Kigali. Brussels followed with over 400 paratroopers. Mobutu Sese Seko, president of Zaire, sensing an opportunity to gain favor with France and Belgium, sent several hundred of his top Presidential Guard to the aid of his longtime friend Habyarimana. A few days later, after being deceived by a staged attack on the capital by the FAR (armed forces of the Habyarimana and interim governments) itself, France committed an additional 600 troops.³⁰ Paris continued its support throughout the war and in addition to logistical assistance underwrote and facilitated the purchase of over U.S. \$10 million in military supplies.³¹

Because of its desperate economic situation, Rwanda was susceptible to

pressure from donor nations, and, first weakly in 1990 and then more forcefully in 1992, Habyarimana's regime instituted political reforms. Initiated by the French military attaché, Lt. Col. Galinie, and then adopted by all donor nations, democratization was seen as a necessary complement to the ongoing negotiations with the RPF. In March of 1991, the MDR was launched and identified itself as the successor to Kayibanda's MDR/PARMEHUTU party. In addition the PSD, which enjoyed principally southern support, and the PL, whose base came primarily from the capital, were formed.³² Under intense internal and external pressure, Habyarimana formed a new transitional government on April 6, 1992, that included all the major opposition parties. The government was led by Habyarimana, as president, and Dismas Nsengiyaremye, an MDR member, as prime minister.

Form and Specific Mechanisms of Intervention

This section of the chapter presents the Arusha Peace Accords that were negotiated between the RPF and the government of Rwanda (GoR). The Arusha Accords are best analyzed in a tripartite manner: the pre-negotiation phase, the talks themselves, and finally the failed implementation.³³

Pre-Negotiation: Regional Efforts, Failed Cease-fires, and International Intervention

The efforts leading up to the Arusha talks included ultimately ineffective African initiatives, a series of failed cease-fires, and finally an intervention by the United States and France that brought the parties to the table in Arusha.

The invasion of Rwanda by the RPF in October 1990 immediately prompted significant diplomatic activity. Only days after the invasion, Belgium sent a high-level delegation, consisting of the prime minister, foreign minister, and defense minister, to Kigali in an attempt to resolve the conflict. This group met in Nairobi, Kenya, with President Habyarimana on October 14 and then held talks with the governments of Kenya, Tanzania, and Uganda and with the OAU. The efforts by the Belgian group culminated in a regional summit on October 17 that laid the groundwork for the involvement of neighboring countries and the OAU.³⁴

Regional efforts included the sponsoring of cease-fire talks and a series of ad hoc summits. The summits were hosted by the heads of state of the CEPL (members were Rwanda, Burundi, and Zaire) and involved the participation of Uganda, Tanzania, the OAU, and the United Nations. At early meetings Mobutu Sese Seko was chosen as a mediator despite Zaire's military involvement in Rwanda. A monitoring force, the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), was also created. The Dar-es-Salaam Declaration on Rwandese Refugees Problem, signed on February 19, 1991, was the first significant achievement from these summits and later formed the basis for refugee negotiations at Arusha.³⁵ At this meeting, under pressure from Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni and

Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi, Habyarimana also signed the Zanzibar Communiqué that supposedly expressed his commitment to negotiate with all parties in an attempt to resolve the conflict.³⁶

The focus of the talks then shifted to cease-fire negotiations that failed because Mobutu was a biased and ineffective mediator³⁷ and because both sides in turn perceived continued fighting to be to their advantage. The first cease-fire was negotiated and signed on March 29, 1991, in N'Sele, Zaire. The agreement formalized the creation of the NMOG and developed a basis for future talks. Almost immediately after the signing, however, the FAR shelled RPF positions, and fighting continued for several months.³⁸ A second cease-fire was signed on September 16, 1991, in Gabolite, Zaire. In this agreement, the military leadership of the NMOG shifted from Zaire to Nigeria, and the objectives of a peaceful solution articulated at N'Sele were reconfirmed. After the Gabolite talks, the mediator role passed from Mobutu to Tanzanian President Mwinyi.³⁹

The final pre-Arusha stage of the resolution efforts involved the partially coordinated, low-level involvement of France and the United States. In Paris on January 14–15, 1992, Quai d'Orsay's director for Africa and Maghreb convened a meeting with GoR Ambassador Pierre-Claver Kanyarushoke and RPF leader Pasteur Bizimungu where the director encouraged the RPF to stop fighting and the GoR to heed more closely the RPF's demands.⁴⁰ During this same time, the Rwandan desk officer at the U.S. State Department, Carol Fuller, was communicating with RPF representatives in Washington. These discussions finally matured into the involvement of Assistant Secretary of State for Africa Herman Cohen, who began a series of interagency meetings that for the next two years oversaw U.S. involvement in Rwanda.⁴¹ Because of the lack of progress in the peace talks throughout 1991, U.S. Ambassador Bruce Flatin in Kigali lobbied for a more active U.S. role. In response, Cohen arranged for a parallel series of meetings with leaders in Kampala and Kigali, where he encouraged negotiations and offered U.S. technical assistance.⁴²

From May 8 to 9, 1992, Cohen met with President Museveni and representatives of the RPF in the Ugandan capital. In these discussions Cohen argued that the war was slowly destroying Rwanda's economy and that a military solution was not feasible given that the RPF could not hope to gain more than its small northern enclave.⁴³ In addition Cohen suggested to Museveni that a negotiated settlement of the refugee problem would serve the dual purposes of easing the internal burden on Uganda and injuring his longtime opponent Habyarimana.⁴⁴ Museveni was pleased that the United States did not share France's view that Uganda was the source of the conflict and pledged to use his influence with the RPF. For its part, the RPF expressed an interest in negotiations but asserted that the GoR was refusing to recognize their right to return.

From May 10 to 11, 1992, Cohen met separately with Habyarimana and representatives of the opposition parties. During these meetings, the president again refused to acknowledge the RPF as anything but Ugandans, but expressed a willingness to consider the right of return issue. Cohen's discussions with opposition leaders highlighted two points important to future negotiations: First,

he perceived them as true reformers open to change, and second, they were clearly deeply suspicious of the RPF. They feared the rebel force as a throwback to previous aristocratic Tutsi rule and were concerned that the Tutsi would be able to dupe them at the negotiating table. Cohen left Kigali without a promise of negotiations but felt certain that talks were imminent.⁴⁵

The precipitating factor for the start of substantive negotiations was the combined pressure of the United States and France on the RPF to remove its precondition that Habyarimana step down in favor of an interim government. The joint effort occurred when Dijoud asked Cohen to join him on June 20 at the Foreign Ministry Conference Center for a meeting with Ugandan Foreign Minister Paul Ssemogere. At the meeting Cohen forcefully told Ssemogere and his military entourage, who he assumed were RPF members, that the United States considered the RPF demands to be unreasonable and expected Uganda to use its considerable leverage with the RPF to create a climate conducive to negotiations. To back-up the demand, Cohen made an implicit threat of the withdrawal of aid. He stated that the refugee situation was sapping limited Western resources, and if the situation were not resolved, then a portion of the assistance currently provided to Uganda would most likely need to be diverted.⁴⁶ After the June talks, the RPF and the GoR agreed to meet in Arusha under the auspices of the OAU for comprehensive negotiations. Authority for the talks was delegated to Tanzanian President Mwinyi and the first session commenced on July 12, 1992.

The prestige, moral authority, and leverage introduced by the Western powers were certainly central to achieving an agreement where African efforts had failed. The success is also attributable to the ripeness of the conflict. From 1990 until 1992 both parties in turn felt that there was an advantage to be gained from continued fighting. At first buoyed by its initial victory, the government had hopes that it could defeat the RPF militarily, but by 1992 military victory seemed remote, and the economic crisis was placing considerable strain on the government. As for the RPF, after its initial poor performance, it was interested in improving its negotiating position. RPF leaders, though, realized that they could not win on the battlefield and that negotiations were necessary.

Arusha Talks

The Arusha peace talks were a sophisticated exercise in conflict resolution, but the process was greatly complicated by the internal dynamics of the parties. In theory Arusha was a textbook mediation: All the parties were present at the table, the conflict had reached a window of opportunity for conflict resolution, the root causes were addressed, and a neutral mediator guided the negotiations.⁴⁷ In reality, the talks were flawed because the GoR was forced to negotiate not only with the RPF, but also with opposition members of its own party. This meant that while the RPF was disciplined and well organized, the GoR was fragmented. Ultimately the different levels of negotiating competence led to a final settlement that was essentially a victor's deal for the RPF.⁴⁸

To provide an understanding of the negotiating dynamics behind the Arusha Accords, the first part of the next section will analyze the role, objectives, motivations, and strategies of the various parties to the talks. The second part will describe the negotiating process, focusing particularly on the two most contentious issues: the composition of the transitional government and the integration of the armed forces.

Parties to the Negotiations

RPF: Disciplined and United

The RPF was a disciplined and highly effective guerrilla army, and its seriousness and determination expressed themselves in its negotiating approach. A former RPF official described the basis of the party's success at the table as four-fold:⁴⁹ 1) they were highly motivated because they felt that they were fighting for a just cause, 2) their strong organization and discipline allowed them to speak unflinchingly with one voice, 3) they were in a strong negotiating position because of their military successes, and 4) they were able to more effectively develop support among the observer group.⁵⁰

When the RPF arrived in Arusha, they already had a theoretical structure for their demands and detailed position papers for many of the finer points.⁵¹ The major issues for the RPF were the establishment of the rule of law, a power-sharing arrangement that included a veto over essential government functions, an integration of the national army, and the right of return for refugees. Security concerns were at the core of most of the RPF's positions. Although the final settlement gave the RPF almost all of its demands, observers noted that in some key instances the RPF would probably have settled for less if forced to do so.⁵²

Throughout the negotiations, the RPF sought to enlist the government opposition's support in trying to create a post-Habyarimana regime. To this end, they used both enticements and implicit threats. Especially in relation to the rule of law, the RPF argued for the creation of a pluralistic Rwandan society that guaranteed individual rights and was not based on ethnicity.⁵³ All parties were aware, however, that the RPF was prepared to return to the battlefield if they did not reach an adequate settlement.

GoR: Fragmented

The weakness that the GoR delegation displayed at the negotiating table can be attributed primarily to its fragmented nature but also to a sense of inferiority. The delegation was composed of representatives from the MRND and the opposition parties, MDR, PSD, and PL, which were essentially negotiating the intra-Hutu power dynamics of a future government while at the same time trying to resolve issues with the RPF. The leader of the delegation, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira, an MDR member, commented that it was often more difficult to reach agreement within the GoR than with the RPF. The fragmented nature of

the GoR delegation not only led to disorganization and lack of preparedness, but also presented obvious divisions that the RPF was able to exploit.

Throughout the negotiations, Habyarimana vacillated between the moderates who supported some reconciliation and the hard-liners who adamantly opposed it. Several observers feel that he had no intention of abiding by the Accords and that he expected that the French would bail him out of any agreement.⁵⁴ In a now famous speech given in November 1992, Habyarimana called the Arusha Accords mere "pieces of paper."⁵⁵ Habyarimana later recanted this claim, but his lack of commitment is also used to explain his placing an opposition figure in charge of the GoR delegation. The theory is that he expected the talks to break down and so planned to blame the failure on his political opponents.⁵⁶ Ultimately, however, the negotiations reached a settlement, and whatever his earlier stance, many feel that when his plane was shot down, he was intending to proceed with implementation.

The opposition, caught in the middle between Habyarimana and the hard-liners and the RPF, did not have clear and consistent objectives throughout the negotiations. Many were genuine reformers who had common purpose with the RPF on numerous issues, especially the removal of Habyarimana. In addition, they generally did not support the war, as they perceived it as a fight between northern Hutu and the RPF.⁵⁷ The opposition was also, however, deeply suspicious of the RPF. They were uncertain about the rebels' true commitment to power sharing, and the RPF's offensive in February 1992 significantly deepened this concern. They were fearful of being taken advantage of by the "Tutsi" RPF, which some viewed as intellectually superior.⁵⁸ The opposition was also consumed in its own power struggles that ultimately had a disastrous effect on the implementation of the Accords.

Tanzania: Skilled Mediation

As the primary facilitator,⁵⁹ the lead Tanzanian diplomat, Ami M. Mpungwe, demonstrated a sophisticated, theoretical, and practical approach to the negotiations. Mpungwe considered his role to be essentially that of a referee who encouraged the parties, sometimes forcefully, to address seriously their problems by developing a coherent, reasonable agreement for the future of Rwanda. Mpungwe directed the talks in a proscribed sequence and developed and employed various mechanisms and leverage to resolve sticking points. In its efforts, Tanzania was motivated by a variety of interests that were compatible with its role.

The guiding principle for Mpungwe in the talks was the need to establish trust and confidence between the parties. To this end, the talks were disaggregated and moved from the least difficult to the most contentious issues. A cease-fire was established first. This was followed by discussions on the rule of law defining the new political order. As momentum built, the talks next addressed how the new order would be reached: the power-sharing arrangements in the BBTG and the transitional institutions. Finally, when the process had gained signifi-

cant authority, respect, and momentum, especially in the eyes of the observers, the negotiations tackled the most contentious issue, the integration of the armed forces.

To achieve resolution on problematic issues, Mpungwe employed a variety of measures. First, whenever the talks became contentious, Mpungwe would separate the groups and hold proximity discussions, functioning as an intermediary. To apply leverage, Mpungwe would threaten to withdraw Tanzania as the mediator or to identify one party to the international community as blameworthy. As Tanzania was the only neutral regional party, and a negotiated settlement significantly depended on its involvement, the former threat carried considerable weight. Mpungwe would sometimes condition his use of leverage on the parties reaching a settlement by a specified deadline. In addition, Mpungwe was able to appeal to the international and regional community to apply diplomatic or economic pressure.⁶⁰ Finally, once an agreement had been reached, Mpungwe would strengthen commitment by coordinating, prior to its announcement, its immediate recognition by the international community. The statements of support lent the new, sometimes tense, and tentative agreements an aura of international authority.

In undertaking and sustaining the year-long negotiations, Tanzania was motivated by the mutually compatible goals of humanitarian concern, a self-interest in resolving the long-standing refugee problem, and the promotion of regional stability through the development of a sustainable Rwandan government.

OAU: Regional Organization

Having previously refrained from involvement in the “internal” politics of its member countries, the OAU’s involvement in the pre-negotiations and the Arusha talks was somewhat remarkable and can be attributed to two principal factors. First, Ugandan President Museveni was chair of the OAU at the time and supported a diplomatic resolution of the conflict.⁶¹ Second, the new secretary-general of the OAU, Salim A. Salim, a Tanzanian, was extremely interested in the organization taking a lead in resolving African conflicts. The United States was supportive of these efforts and provided an initial \$U.S. 3–4 million for the NMOG force that was under OAU control.⁶²

France: A Dual Policy

In general terms France perceived the English-speaking RPF as a threat to its Francophone hegemony. Although Paris was unfailingly supportive of the Habyarimana regime, it pursued a dual policy of supporting the government militarily while at the same time promoting a negotiated settlement.⁶³

The dual policy was principally the result of divisions within the French government, with the Africa Unit at the Elysée Palace on one side and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the other. President Mitterrand’s son, in charge of the

Africa Unit, said immediately following the RPF invasion that France would "send a few boys to help old man Habyarimana."⁶⁴ He expected the conflict to be short-lived, but the Africa Unit continued its military assistance even as the conflict continued. Increasingly critical of this approach, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, as indicated by the Paris talks discussed above, actively supported negotiations as the best solution. They thought the RPF might be able to win militarily but not politically and that the GoR was basically in the opposite situation. The Ministry's objective was a settlement as favorable to Habyarimana as possible. Although France encouraged the negotiations, it was not a disinterested observer. Throughout the talks, Paris championed the GoR position, especially regarding the composition of the government and the integration of the military.

Since the genocide, France has been severely criticized for the material and psychological assistance it provided to the regime. By propping up the government with military and economic aid, France encouraged intransigence on the part of the GoR and provided a shield behind which the extremists were able to develop their desperate plan.⁶⁵ The counterargument, however, is that the positions taken by France and the GoR would have ultimately proved to be more sustainable. These issues are discussed more extensively below in the conclusion section.

United States: Technical Resource

From the beginning the United States did not take a primary role in the Arusha process, but acted as a facilitator, providing technical assistance and lending authority to the talks.⁶⁶ In 1992 and 1993, U.S. attention was directed elsewhere because of its significant involvement in several other ongoing negotiations in Angola, Mozambique, Ethiopia, Liberia, and Namibia. With its lack of strategic interest in the area, the United States was generally perceived as an effective neutral intermediary. The lower level of U.S. involvement did, however, have its negative consequences, as discussed in the conclusion section below.

As a facilitator, the United States primarily focused its efforts on maintaining an effective process, that is, on aiding the parties in reaching a mutually agreeable settlement. Although in general the United States did not evaluate the content of the agreement, it did occasionally encourage an approach that it thought was more sustainable.⁶⁷ After early talks in which the RPF was surprised at its success, Charles Snyder, director of the Office of African Regional Affairs in the U.S. State Department, encouraged the RPF not necessarily to take all the concessions it could win. In particular he suggested that they seek a lower percentage in the military. Early U.S. involvement focused on the development of a workable cease-fire and on helping the parties identify the issues that would need to be addressed in later rounds. In particular, U.S. observers offered advice on the creation and implementation of the cease-fire, the structure of the Neutral Military Observer Group (NMOG), encouraging a feasibly limited mandate, and the operations of the Joint Political Military Committee (JPMC).

As suggested above, the United States generally functioned as an information

resource, although it occasionally took a more active role. An example of the former role was the advice that Lt. Col. Marley, political-military advisor, Africa Bureau, State Department, provided on the integration of the officer ranks. The GoR had eight command levels, whereas the RPF had four. In brief meetings with either side, Marley suggested a matrix including considerations of an officer's age, responsibility, and education. Months later when the issue was addressed at the table, both parties presented matrices, and the issue was resolved within thirty minutes. An example of more interventionist involvement came after the RPF offensive in February of 1992, during an extraordinary session of the JPMC that was designed to restart the talks. During negotiations the Rwandan prime minister had agreed to the withdrawal of French forces from Rwanda. Believing that the agreement was not sustainable, the Tanzanians asked Marley to intercede. In separate late night talks, Marley confirmed that the prime minister was not committed to the withdrawal and instead brokered a deal that addressed the RPF's demands and the GoR's security concerns by cutting the French force in half and by limiting its presence to Kigali.⁶⁸

Actual Negotiations

The Arusha talks ran from July 12, 1992, until the signing of the Accords in August 1993. Under the auspices of the OAU, Tanzanian President Ali Hassan Mwinyi and his OAU Ambassador Ami Mpungwe facilitated the talks between the RPF and the GoR. Observers from regional countries, Burundi, Uganda, and Zaire, and the international community, France, Belgium, Germany, the United States, and Senegal, were present at various sessions. A recurring theme during the talks was the tension between the Habyarimana regime and the opposition parties leading the delegation. Repeatedly Habyarimana would veto breakthroughs agreed to by Foreign Minister Ngulinzira that significantly reduced the former's power and the influence in the ruling MRND.⁶⁹ The final package of protocols included

- N'Sele amended cease-fire (7/12/1992)
- principle and creation of the rule of law (8/18/92)
- power sharing, the enlargement of the transition government (i.e., inclusion of the RPF), and the creation of a transition parliament (10/30/92 and 1/9/93)
- reintegration of refugees and internally displaced persons (6/9/93)
- creation of a nationally unified army (i.e., merger of RPF and FAR) (8/3/93)⁷⁰

In addition to establishing a cease-fire, the preliminary session in July 1992 stipulated the agenda for the talks and implemented the JPMC. The JPMC was a forum that ran parallel to the Arusha talks to address military issues, especially cease-fire violations, and although the Committee had no adjudication authority, it proved to be an important safety valve for releasing tensions.⁷¹ Amending

previous cease-fires, the new agreement held throughout the negotiations except for a RPF offensive in February of 1992.

The session on the rule of law dealt with the background conditions in Rwanda that the RPF, and the opposition, saw as the roots of the country's instability. In particular, the protocol sought to establish the fundamental rights of the people, including the freedom of expression and the right to life, as articulated by the UN Charter and other internationally recognized fundamental documents. In these negotiating sessions, the RPF argued for the importance of creating a broadly defined pluralistic society. For the RPF pluralism represented not simply multipartyism but a political culture capable of sustaining debate and dialogue. Along these lines, the RPF stressed that the Rwandan people should be indivisible and not identified in terms of ethnicity. The RPF viewed the principles articulated in the rule of law protocol as the theoretical underpinnings on which all subsequent agreements should build and which the parties should seek to reinforce.⁷²

Negotiations on the creation of the new government and the transitional institutions proved extremely contentious.⁷³ They ultimately resulted in an agreement with three key ingredients: one, the extremist CDR party was excluded from participation; two, the power of the government shifted from the presidency to the parliament, with the MRND relegated to a minority position;⁷⁴ and three, a majority vote was defined as requiring the concurrence of four parties despite the mention of consensus rule. Elections were stipulated to occur at the end of the transitional period, and a commission was to draft a new constitution that would be approved by a referendum.⁷⁵ During the negotiations on November 15, Habyarimana essentially withdrew his support, calling the protocols merely "pieces of paper." Despite Habyarimana's disapproval, Foreign Minister Ngulinzira returned to Arusha in December and continued to negotiate essentially without authority.

On power sharing, the RPF's demand that the CDR be excluded from the government was probably the most significant barrier and stalled talks for several weeks. During this period, Mpungwe separated the parties and along with members of the observer group strenuously lobbied the RPF to allow the CDR to participate in the government. As articulated by one Western diplomat, the logic was that it was better to have the CDR inside the tent than outside, threatening to burn it down.⁷⁶ The RPF, however, remained absolutely intransigent.⁷⁷ Their reasoning, which ultimately prevailed over Mpungwe, with the agreement of the opposition, was that the extremists were the source of Rwanda's suffering and were bent on destroying any power-sharing arrangement. The best means of controlling them was the quick implementation of the transitional government and the integrated security forces that could check their agitation. As discussed below, this did not occur.⁷⁸

The government's eventual accommodation was based on several factors: The opposition was sympathetic to the RPF viewpoint; the RPF had made it clear that it would readily resume hostilities; and in the eyes of the international community, Habyarimana's commitment to peace would be dubious if he scuttled

talks by insisting on the inclusion of a sectarian extremist group. It is unclear, however, if those in Kigali were ever committed to the power-sharing arrangement. Supporters of Habyarimana said they would never be a permanent minority.

During and after the agreement, the Tanzanian facilitators tried to encourage the supporters of Habyarimana by making apparent that the Accords did not represent a conspiracy against him and that he would be guaranteed a fair shot in free elections. To some extent Habyarimana took to heart the facilitators' advice about the possibilities of maintaining power through the new political process. Starting in the spring, he began to manipulate the opposition to change the distribution of power in the new transitional government. The hard-liners, however, reacted violently to their exclusion. During the power-sharing negotiations Col. Bagasora had threatened to bring about "an apocalypse."⁷⁹ In late January, over 300 Tutsi were killed in Bagogwe, home to Habyarimana's clan.

The final significant barrier to the conclusion of the Accords were the negotiations on the integration of the armed forces. They were completed in the summer of 1993 and followed the RPF offensive in February. Ostensibly taken in response to the Bagogwe massacre, the offensive doubled the RPF's territory and allowed them to enter the military negotiations having dramatically demonstrated their superiority. The principal difficulty of the negotiations focused on the proportions each side would gain in the new integrated army. The government entered the negotiations proposing approximately a 20 percent share for the RPF as commensurate with their ethnic proportion of the population. The RPF was committed to a fifty-fifty split.

Guiding Mpungwe's mediation was a desire to avoid the situation that had occurred in Angola, in which each faction had retained its own military force. Mpungwe's goal was a reconciliation of the security concerns of the two sides. Given his dedication to the rule of law and a de-emphasis on ethnicity, Mpungwe was not sympathetic to the government's initial offer. He separated the parties and refused to communicate the GoR position to the RPF. The formula developed for settlement involved a horizontal and vertical integration of the security forces.⁸⁰ The horizontal balance was achieved by giving the MRND control over the military and the RPF control over the gendarmerie. Vertical checks were instituted by requiring that the two most senior officers at each command level be from opposing sides. For example, if the commander was from the FAR, then the deputy commander would be an RPF officer. An additional important lesson from Angola was the decision not to schedule elections until six months after the scheduled integration of the security forces.

After significant effort, the final settlement split the command and control functions fifty-fifty and gave the GoR a sixty-forty advantage in troop composition.⁸¹ When Foreign Minister Ngulinzira agreed to the above formula, Habyarimana flatly rejected it and in fact recalled Ngulinzira. Ngulinzira refused and the negotiations continued for a period during which he had no authority. Ultimately, Habyarimana reshuffled the cabinet. Former Defense Minister and MRND party member James Gasana was placed in charge of the talks, and they

recommenced in Rwanda. Angered by Habyarimana's refusal, the RPF demanded an increased representation in the troop levels. During the first week in June, democratic elections had replaced Tutsi leaders with a Hutu president. The removal of the southern Tutsi ally probably contributed to the RPF's insistence on high percentages. After considerable lobbying by Mpungwe and the observers, the RPF returned to its earlier position and a final agreement was achieved.

Signed on August 3, 1993, by Habyarimana and RPF chairman Alexis Kanyarengwe, the Accords called for the inauguration of the transitional government, led by Faustin Twagiramungu, within at least thirty-seven days. Until the arrival of the UN peacekeeping and implementation force, the caretaker government of Agathe Uwilingiyimana was to retain control.⁸²

Implementation

Driven by a desperate plan orchestrated by Hutu extremists, numerous factors internal and external to Rwanda led to the disastrous failure of the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Central to the extremists' plans was the development of a rural militia and the manipulation of ethnicity to create a climate of fear. Political infighting by the opposition also contributed to the undermining of the Accords. In addition, an ineffective peacekeeping force, in part the result of a disjuncture between the United Nations and the OAU, failed to propel the peace process or provide the needed security and stability. Finally, pressure by regional countries and the international community was ultimately ineffective.

Although the Accords prescribed a dramatic reduction in the extremists' power, they held control of the military and administrative machinery of the government during the negotiations and the crucial implementation phase. The *akazu* formed the core of the hard-liners and had members in ruling positions in the military, the CDR, and the MRND. Using the regional prefectures and deputy prefectures, they organized and trained local militias, the infamous *interahamwe*, "those who work together," throughout the country. Military documents reveal that the extremists hoped to arm one in ten peasants, often targeting unemployed young men, and developed extermination lists of Tutsi and moderate Hutu.⁸³ Although these efforts intensified during late 1993 and early 1994, the groundwork for the genocide had begun even while the Arusha talks were in progress.

Paralleling these efforts was a media campaign that effectively exploited events to incite hatred and fear and sow ethnic division among the Hutu masses. Beginning on July 8, 1993, Radio-Télévision Libre des Mille Collines (RTLNC) began broadcasting rhetoric vehemently opposed to the Arusha Accords. A turning point in the implementation occurred with the disastrous events in neighboring Burundi. On October 21, 1993, Tutsi extremist military officers assassinated the newly elected Hutu president, Melchior Ndadaye, and began a campaign of repression that resulted in approximately 50,000 Hutu and Tutsi deaths and led to about 300,000 Hutu refugees fleeing into Rwanda.⁸⁴ When

combined with the installation of a 600-man RPF battalion in Kigali, the extremists were able to paint a dark picture of an imminent Tutsi usurpation of power. With the transitional government not yet in place in Rwanda, the only governmental institution with real power was Habyarimana's presidency. Although the president had clearly been hesitant about the Accords, Mpungwe believes that the assassination of Ndadye allowed the extremists to decisively commit Habyarimana to oppose the Accords.⁸⁵ Regardless of Habyarimana's position, numerous observers credit the assassination with allowing the extremists to develop a broad constituency that otherwise might have still supported the transitional government.

During this time, the opposition parties became splintered by personal power struggles that dissolved into ideological and regional divisions. Immediately after the designation of Faustin Twagiramungu (MDR) as interim prime minister by the Arusha Accords, he was expelled from his own party as part of MDR infighting.⁸⁶ Habyarimana exploited these divisions among the opposition and used the absence of opposition consent to justify delaying the implementation of the transitional government. On January 8, 1994, the convening of the BBTG was blocked by deadlocks within the MDR and PL. Attempts to proceed on February 10 without the PL were aborted by the assassination of the PSD leader Felicien Gatabazi and the reprisal killing of Martin Bucyana of the CDR.⁸⁷ Although the United Nations was able to reestablish order after riots in Kigali, Rwanda was hurtling toward the precipice.

Under pressure from the French, the United Nations had rebuffed efforts by the OAU to take an active role in the implementation and monitoring of the Arusha Accords and had assumed primary responsibility for what would be a completely ineffective peacekeeping force.⁸⁸ As the Arusha Accords called for French troops to be withdrawn and replaced with UN blue helmets, it is likely Paris wanted to ensure UN control as an indirect means of maintaining its hegemony. With the OAU's hopes of providing a transitional military presence rejected, there was no monitoring or implementing force on the ground during the crucial, tense six months it took the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR) to materialize. Once in place UNAMIR lacked much of its essential equipment and was short on even basic supplies such as ammunition.⁸⁹ In addition to the resistance shown by the international community, the parties, especially the RPF, pushed for a lower level of involvement for UNAMIR.⁹⁰ The mission was further crippled by a toothless mandate that prohibited any involvement should hostilities erupt.⁹¹ After fighting did start, the European battalion of UNAMIR withdrew. The African battalion, however, remained.

Throughout the implementation, the international and regional powers exerted pressure on Habyarimana to abide by the Accords. In Kigali the international diplomatic core was united in relentlessly lobbying the government to fulfill its commitment to the peace process. On April 3, 1994, a group of influential Western ambassadors met with Habyarimana and stressed that the Accords must be implemented. Three days later at a regional summit, the leaders of the neighboring countries and the secretary-general of the OAU harshly

reprimanded Habyarimana and reiterated the same point.⁹² The problem with this strategy was that Habyarimana may have been a prisoner too and was soon to become a victim of the extremists.

On April 6 the plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundi President Cyprien Ntaryamira, was shot down as it approached the Kigali airport. Even before the missile was fired, the *interahamwe* militias had set up roadblocks around the city and had begun their killing. On April 7, Agathe Uwilingiyama, the appointed prime minister, was murdered in her home along with ten Belgian peacekeepers who were tortured before being killed. As intended, this led to the withdrawal of the European component of UNAMIR.⁹³ Over the next three months the extremists spread their genocidal mania throughout the countryside. Before the RPF forces were able to take control of the country, nearly one million people had been brutally killed, and approximately two million refugees had poured over Rwanda's borders in the largest and fastest exodus of displaced persons in modern history.⁹⁴

Analysis

Although at the time of the signing of the Arusha Accords many considered it to be the best peace agreement in Africa since Lancaster House, much of the subsequent commentary views the Accords as having contributed to the violence in 1994. Academic critics and participants in the negotiations focus on both the theoretical and practical aspects of the negotiations. The theoretical analyses fault the Accords for not co-opting the extremists or otherwise neutralizing them and question the appropriateness of international pressure.⁹⁵ The practical perspectives emphasize the lack of available resources and intelligence.

Some of the academic writing argues that the Arusha Accords broke a fundamental tenet of conflict resolution by failing to give the extremists a stake in the new government.⁹⁶ The extremists were driven into a corner first by excluding them from the government and then by removing their control over the military. The hard-liners were left with the stark choice of loss of power or violent opposition.⁹⁷ Underlying this view is the unprovable counterfactual argument that the extremists might not have perpetuated their plans had they been included in the government.⁹⁸ There is circumstantial evidence for this position. Although the extremists clearly did not support the Arusha process, at least initially they did not regard it as irrelevant. During the BBTG negotiations, they argued ardently for the inclusion of the CDR. At some point during the military discussions, however, they appear to have abandoned interest in the process.⁹⁹

If the extremists were to lose political and military power through implementation of the Accords, then it is argued that some means had to be provided to achieve this. The internal political opposition and the RPF military forces certainly provided some pressure, but the primary implementation mechanism articulated by the Arusha Accords, UNAMIR, was a neutral peacekeeping force not designed or directed to remove the hard-liners. Such an effort, as in Haiti, would have required the disarming of the hard-liners or their removal from the

country. Without the removal of hard-liners, the Accords were not a complete and sustainable solution.¹⁰⁰

The disjuncture between the OAU and the United Nations represents a crucial missed opportunity. Although the OAU lacked training and resources it clearly had the political will to be significantly involved in the implementation and monitoring of the Accords. The OAU repeatedly lobbied for participation, and its troops remained in Rwanda after the fighting began. In the future, cooperative relationships between the United Nations and regional organizations may represent a means of overcoming the perennial lack of political will to undertake remote peacekeeping operations demonstrated by the international community. Such arrangements might be criticized as mercenary, but as with the OAU, these organizations are often interested in addressing their own regional problems and can do so with technical and financial assistance. Ensuring neutrality is a significant concern, but certainly not an insurmountable barrier.

Given the failings in the Arusha Accords and the international community's lack of commitment to implementation, commentators have questioned whether the international community should have aggressively pushed for the acceptance and implementation of the agreement.¹⁰¹ Peacemaking can be a risky process, and the involvement of the United Nations, the United States, and the Europeans provided a false sense of security for those seeking change.¹⁰² Herman Cohen has suggested that the United States was locked in a routine act of "rote" diplomacy that viewed a cease-fire and negotiations as inherently beneficial.¹⁰³ With twenty-twenty hindsight, he suggests that an alternative solution would have been to condemn the RPF invasion from the start and to pursue a more modest plan of encouraging internal political reform before compounding the political and military instability with the introduction of the RPF. This accords with the view of Ian Linden, who described the Arusha Accords as "too much, too far, too fast."¹⁰⁴ It should be again noted that several of the observer groups counseled restraint on the part of the RPF and that the RPF's military strength, combined with the GoR's deteriorating economic situation, placed considerable independent pressure on the GoR. There are strong indications, however, that without significant regional and international pressure, Habyarimana's regime would not have accepted the Accords or proceeded with their implementation.¹⁰⁵

The practical recommendations from U.S. participants were primarily a response to the low priority that the talks represented for the United States. Both Herman Cohen and Charles Synder commented that the coordination and brainstorming sessions that had been used in other conflicts would have been helpful in Arusha.¹⁰⁶ Using input from all U.S. participants and therefore from all of the parties' perspectives, these sessions developed an overall strategy that provided clear direction for the individual participants in their interactions with the teams. This would have eliminated the fuzzy mandate that instructed U.S. facilitators to simply encourage the groups to reach a mutually agreed settlement. A higher priority would also have meant more continuity, as facilitators would not have been switched from Arusha to other conflicts. In addition, with

more resources, the U.S. team would have been able to allocate more personnel to the talks; for example, someone could have been present during the December and January power-sharing talks. While discussing the above points, U.S. participants also noted that the United States purposefully took a less active role so as not to undermine the Tanzanian and OAU mediators.

Crucial to any mediation is good intelligence. Members of the observer community and the academic literature have suggested that those who mediated and implemented the Arusha Accords needed better information.¹⁰⁷ In hindsight the warning signs appear clear, but for many participants at that time the magnitude of the impending crisis was not apparent. Participants and members of the RPF remember dismissing RTLMC precisely because it was so literal and extreme.¹⁰⁸ For some, the January massacres were interpreted as a negotiating tactic. In addition, there was a belief that some killings were the inevitable result of transition. Part of the problem may also have arisen because of the dramatically different atmospheres that existed in Arusha and Kigali. For example, when the Accords were signed, no celebration occurred in the Rwandan capital. Instead the city was dominated by a state of fear, especially acute among the Tutsi population.

The human rights community had been documenting the efforts of the extremists and the disturbing trend they represented. Tragically, what almost no one anticipated before early 1994 were the brutally inhumane lengths to which the extremists were willing to go in their desperate bid to retain power. There are strong arguments that a robust response by the international community could have stopped the killings before they spread throughout the country. What happened instead was that the United Nations, after having insisted on unilateral control, simply withdrew. The civilians, who were being killed by the thousands each day, were abandoned to their fate.¹⁰⁹ Although UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali was perhaps trying to spread the blame, his outrage about the world's inaction was shared by many:

We are all to be held accountable for this failure, all of us, the great powers, African countries, the NGO's, the international community. . . . I have failed. . . . It is a scandal.¹¹⁰

Conclusion

The Arusha Accords stand as a testament to the strength of and the implicit danger represented by third-party intervention. They indicate that even the most carefully crafted resolution is not complete until implemented. They also underscore the deep responsibility of third parties to maintain their full commitment once having accepted the burden of involvement. Especially for small countries, the international community has the power to dramatically alter the course of events. International powers must remain fully cognizant that partial efforts are likely worse than no efforts at all.