

Chapter 5

Propaganda, hate speech and mass killings

Anthony Oberschall

In March 2010, the Appeals Chamber of the ICTR upheld the conviction of Simon Bikindi for “direct and public incitement to commit genocide based on public exhortations to kill Tutsis” which he made from a vehicle in an Interahamwe convoy outfitted with a public address system. Bikindi urged that the majority of the population, the Hutu, should rise up to exterminate the minority, the Tutsi.¹ The incitement took place at a time when mass killings of civilians was going on in the area.

Though Bikindi was not proven to be formally a member of Interahamwe and other organizations responsible for the mass killings of Tutsi civilians, he was a well-known, popular artist whose songs had been playing for years on the radio. The trial chamber held that “the influence he derived from his status made it likely that others would follow his exhortations.”² Although he was not in a command and control position over the potential killers, his influence on his audience, who included killers and potential killers in ongoing mass violence, was judged an effective incitement to massacres during the larger Rwanda genocide.

The original indictment also read that “Simon Bikindi participated in anti-Tutsi campaign in Rwanda in 1994 through his musical composition and speeches he made at public gatherings inciting and promoting hatred and violence against Tutsi.” For instance, Bikindi attended a mass meeting at a football field in Kivumu in 1993 at which he urged the audience to kill Tutsi and during which his music played on cassettes. The Appeals Chamber, however, found that the Kivumu meeting did not lead to anti-Tutsi violence immediately thereafter and overturned the specific Kivumu trial verdict.

Both courts examined three songs composed and recorded by Bikindi, which the prosecution charged encouraged ethnic hatred and which were played in a propaganda campaign to target Tutsi as the enemy and to incite the listening public to attack and kill Tutsi. The theme of the songs was Hutu solidarity against the Tutsi, Tutsi as enslavers of Hutu, and similar pro-Hutu and anti-Tutsi themes. The Appeals Chamber found that Bikindi’s songs were “used to fan the flames of ethnic hatred, resentment and fear of the Tutsi . . . however there is no evidence that Bikindi played a role in these broadcasts or in the dissemination of the three songs . . . agreeing to disseminate ethnic hatred against a protected group does not go as far as agreeing to the destruction, in whole or in part, of that group.”

Thus the Appeals Court declined to rule that ethnic hatred advocacy is a crime under existing international law, but affirmed the widely-accepted principle that speech inciting to violence and killings when they are already happening or are imminent is a crime. At issue are the reasons and circumstances for criminalizing ethnic hatred advocacy and propaganda. To answer that question from a social science perspective, several topics have to be addressed: What is propaganda and specifically ethnic hate speech and hate propaganda? How effective is propaganda for shaping beliefs, arousing passions and influencing behavior? When and why do ethnic violence and mass killings occur and how are they organized? How does ethnic hate propaganda enter the causal chains of events and actions leading to mass killings? Would criminalizing ethnic hate speech deter ethnic cleansing and killings? These are big topics on which differences of opinion and some uncertainty exist. Social science has a useful contribution to make about hate speech, hate propaganda, and ethnic violence.

Political discourse, propaganda and hate speech

Political communication can be classified on a scale from crude propaganda to democratic deliberative discourse. Propaganda is the use of images, slogans, symbols and falsehoods that resonate with prejudices and emotions for persuasion.³ Another author writes that "propaganda is an endeavor to spread ideas without regard to truth and accuracy."⁴ Propaganda is communicated to mass audiences in print media, radio and television, videos, and nowadays also websites and the internet. Political speech, deliberative discourse in assemblies and public debate in democracies is meant to influence people and create a consensus, or at least majority support, for the speaker's point of view.⁵ It does often appeal to emotions and prejudices and it does contain inaccurate information, but the core of democratic political speech and deliberative discourse is reasoned argument without lying and deception, and it avoids whipping up destructive passions and hatred.⁶

Rather than rely on subjective judgments, scholars content analyze political communication. In content analysis of communications, two dimensions are distinguished. The first consists of verbal and visual techniques for making a message persuasive to recipients; the second dimension frames the substance or theme of the message, for example, discourse about ethnic groups and ethnic relations. The common techniques of persuasion are:

- 1 Stereotyping and labeling, typically positive for one's group and negative for an adversary;
- 2 Generalization, i.e. lumping all members of a group into the same category;
- 3 Testimonial, i.e. God, history, ancestors, national heroes, experts and trusted authorities are on our side and support us;
- 4 *Vox populi, vox dei*, i.e. everybody is in favor of our program, everyone is joining our bandwagon;
- 5 Repetition, keep repeating the message over and over again, never change the narrative.

These five techniques are common to much political communication, but the sixth makes communication into propaganda:

- 6 Falsehood and lies, from selective omission of facts, deliberate mischaracterization of events and adversaries to out and out fabrication and lies.

The language of propaganda is an Orwellian transformation of normal speech. "Aggression" becomes "self-defense;" "ethnic cleansing" is "voluntary exchange of population;" the property of those who have been expelled is "abandoned" and can be seized by the authorities; prisoners are shot while "trying to escape." Everything is called its opposite.

Stereotyping and generalization eliminate nuances and qualifications from communication. In inter-group relations, they erect all or nothing distinctions that intensify antagonisms and undermine compromise. Testimonial and *vox populi, vox dei* legitimizes one's message and delegitimizes the adversary's. With repetition sooner or later everyone gets exposed to the message and keeps getting reinforcement. Without exposure to contrary messages (explained below), the audience is persuaded to accept the message as true.

Persuasion techniques are used in all political communication and advocacy. On political issues, there is no unbiased and proven method of establishing truth and falsity as there is about natural phenomena with the scientific method. As Charles Lindblom put it "I take it as undeniable that what people think about the social world—belief, attitude, value and volition – derive from social interchange far more than from direct observation . . . you depend almost entirely on other people, including acquaintances, journalists, and other people who reach you through press and broadcasting."⁷ In the "court of public opinion" adversaries use all means of persuasion, from deliberative discourse to propaganda, i.e. communication filled with falsehood and lies. Falsehood and lies are not meant for benevolent purposes. The communicator manipulates the minds and emotions of the audience under false pretenses. Propaganda justifies harmful, destructive and lethal actions against adversaries for reasons that are false.

Teun van Dijk, a well known expert on discourse analysis, asks "when are recipients of communications susceptible to manipulation?" and he answers: (1) when they have incomplete or lack knowledge; (2) when strong emotions are aroused (e.g. fear, atrocity stories and threats) that make them vulnerable; and (3) when "authorities" like professors, public intellectuals, and church leaders are the communicators and the recipients are poorly educated.⁸

By far the most effective condition for susceptibility to persuasion are threat messages that raise anxiety and fear in the public. Fear arousing appeals are particularly persuasive and create public demand for relief and action to reduce the threat.⁹ A basic textbook on persuasion states that "experimental data overwhelmingly suggest that all other things being equal, the more frightened a person is by a communication, the more likely he or she is to take positive preventive action. Given the power of fear to motivate and direct our thoughts, there is much

potential for abuse. Illegitimate fears can always be invented for any given propaganda purpose."¹⁰ The French political scientist J.P. Derrien writes that the most common discourse of nationalist leaders is "You are threatened and you therefore need me as your leader."¹¹ The Nazi leader Hermann Goering explained the power of threat propaganda in an interview: "The people can always be brought to do the bidding of the leader. That is easy. All you have to do is tell them they are being attacked and denounce the pacifists for lack of patriotism and exposing the country to great danger. It works the same way in any country."¹² Threats are a huge component of propaganda, and specifically of hate speech and hate propaganda. Other conditions of influence are messages from trusted leaders and experts (cf. above "testimonial"), peer consensus (cf. above "*vox populi, vox dei*") and message monopoly, when there is no access to other opinions and arguments.

The second dimension of content analysis concerns the framing of the message, in our case the framing of ethnic discourse in hatred. Hate is at the extreme of a scale that runs from dislike through animosity to hate. The response to ethnic dislike tends to be personal avoidance; to animosity, it is avoidance and institutional separation or segregation; hate arouses passion for revenge and aggression. Hate is part of a larger emotional and ideological package that motivates and justifies violence. For James Waller, hate speech, hate discourse and hate ideology in inter-group relations have three components:¹³

- 1 The target group is negatively stereotyped as different, alien, inferior, and inhuman, in an extreme way, not meriting the protection and rights to life, liberty and property accorded to human persons. The labeling is often referred to as "dehumanization" (or "demonization") because it describes the target as vipers, cockroaches, bloodsuckers, hyenas and other dangerous and harmful animals that one kills and crushes, but it also covers designations for inferior, threatening, dangerous and morally flawed humans such as "slaves," "barbarians (Huns)," "communists," "capitalists" and so on, depending on the cultural context. The degree of negative stereotyping awakens sentiments from dislike and animosity to passions like hatred.
- 2 The target is characterized as an extreme threat to the survival and well-being of one's ethnic group, nationality or nation. The threat is physical: they threaten to kill us or expulse us from our homes and territory. It can also be demographic: their numbers are multiplying through high birthrate or immigration and they are becoming an alien majority in our midst; economic: they control the productive capacity, vital resources and wealth of our country, exploit and rob us, lower our well-being; cultural: we are losing our values and traditions to their alien culture because they refuse to acculturate and assimilate. All threats can operate at the same time.
- 3 Advocacy for an eliminationist solution to the threat, which ranges from limitations (quotas) and discrimination (legal segregation) imposed on the target, to expulsion (ethnic cleansing) and in extreme hate discourse killing

and annihilating. Alternatives to elimination, like avoidance, compromise and negotiated conflict management are rejected in the eliminationist discourse.

Negative stereotyping is abusive, disparaging and insulting, and sometimes hateful, but by itself falls short of hate speech, though there are differences of opinion on this score. Hate discourse, which I prefer to hate speech as the fundamental concept, in my view also contains threats, incitement to violence and prejudicial actions against the target, i.e. eliminationist discourse. Threat and fear make the audience susceptible to persuasion and justify negative stereotypes, hate and eliminationist actions against the target group.

Although the public can be made susceptible to propaganda, communications research has also found that many people are not simply puppets manipulated at will by propagandists in the mass media. The public selectively exposes itself to communications and communicators it tends to agree with, referred to as selective exposure and confirmation bias, and filters out messages and messengers it tends to disagree with. When exposed to a message, it selects content that is favorable to its viewpoint. Political adversaries select content from the same communication and draw different conclusions, called selective perception. The public also tends to check media messages with opinion leaders in their own social milieu for guidance on whether to believe them or discount them.¹⁴ Confirmation bias, selective exposure, selective perception and opinion leaders impede manipulation of the public through the mass media. The public is, however, not uniformly resistant to manipulation. Groups with strong political identities and views embedded in a social milieu discount adversaries' appeals. But the so-called "independent voter," who lacks political knowledge and firm political views, and who is not anchored in a political milieu, is influenced by testimonial and bandwagon techniques in political communication.

Content analysis of ethnic discourse: anti-semitism, Šešelj's Serb nationalism and Arab racism in Darfur

It is instructive to find out how scholars have content analyzed and measured ethnic discourse, and in particular hate content in political communication. William Brustein did a content analysis of major German, French, British, Italian and Romanian newspapers, randomly sampling articles from 1899 to 1939.¹⁵ The unit coded was an article. In the code instructions, item 13 was whether Jews were characterized as a threat to society and to the national interest. That is the threat dimension of hate speech. Item 14 was whether derogatory terms were used to describe Jews (Jews are "kikes"). Item 19 was "Jewish malfeasance," which could be religious (e.g. Jews are Christ killers), economic (Jews manipulate prices and cheat), physical (Jews have crooked noses), social (Jews are parasites), and political (Jews are unpatriotic, they seek world domination). These codes measure negative stereotyping and labeling of the target as dangerous, threatening,

anti-social and deviant. Items 7, 8, 15, 33 and 34 coded the eliminationist dimension, i.e. advocacy of quotas, bans, boycotts, violence against Jews and Jewish property, and limiting Jewish immigration. Brustein also coded for favorable mentions of Jews, and advocacy on their behalf. He was thus able to measure the balance of pro- and anti-Semitic discourse in the pre-Second World War European press.

From a variety of sources Brustein also established a trend of anti-Semitic actions in the five countries (e.g. vandalizing a synagogue). He writes that "the most striking finding . . . is the sharp increase in unfavorable articles about Jews in Germany, Italy and Romania after 1932,"¹⁶ which is paralleled by a sharp increase of anti-Semitic acts in Germany and Romania, but not Italy. Regime change and regime policy, Nazism and fascism, account for these changes, and not simply traditional popular anti-Semitism. The news stories reveal a heightened perception of Jews as a threat to non-Jews, which Brustein linked to the deterioration of the nation's economic well-being (the world depression of the 1930s), increased Jewish immigration, and growth of support for the political left and the extent to which leadership of communism, revolutionary socialism and anarchism were identified with Jews.¹⁷ These were themes highlighted also in the political discourse and propaganda of the nationalist, Nazi and fascist parties and leaders. In summary, Brustein did not create a "hate speech" index from the content analysis. He measured the three dimensions of hate discourse separately, extreme negative stereotypes, the Jewish threat, and advocacy for harmful and eliminationist actions against Jews, which were woven into a strong anti-Jewish narrative. That narrative constitutes hate discourse, as the title of his book, *The Roots of Hate*, makes clear.

Another content analysis of political discourse on ethnic relations was done by Anthony Oberschall on behalf of the ICTY in the *Vojislav Šešelj* trial.¹⁸ Šešelj founded and headed the SRS, was a member of the Serb Assembly, and recruited, organized and indoctrinated volunteers in the Croatian and Bosnian wars, called Chetniks. He was indicted at the ICTY for participating in a joint criminal enterprise for forcibly removing non-Serbs from parts of Croatia and Bosnia and Herzegovina, for instigating in public speeches the expulsion of Croats from parts of Vojvodina, and for inflammatory ethnic rhetoric to the SRS volunteers to attack and ethnically cleanse non-Serbs. From a CD collection of Šešelj's political speeches, interviews, broadcast appearances, news articles, campaigning, legislative speeches and other public communications, for the years 1991 to 1994, using a search engine that identified discourse on Serbs-Croat, Serb-Muslim and Serb-Albanian relations, 242 texts called "records" were randomly sampled and content analyzed for ethnic, nation and nationalities discourse. All paragraphs sampled were analyzed, regardless of whether Šešelj expressed positive, negative or neutral views on Serb-non-Serb relations. The records were translated into English by a PhD candidate in linguistics at the University of North Carolina who is a native Serbo-Croatian speaker. The coding categories for the content analysis were derived from the scholarly literature on nationalism,¹⁹ and the techniques of propaganda described above. All the records were coded by Oberschall.

Coding the stereotyping and labeling dimension distinguished negative instances denoted "negative labeling/stereotyping" and positive instances, denoted "glorification of the in-group." A "dehumanization" (some call it "demonization") category was added separately to measure extreme negative stereotyping. Deliberative discourse on nations and nationalities as one finds in European parliamentary debate was coded simply as "nations and nationalities." As with Brustein's research on anti-Semitism, an unbiased content analysis measures positive and supportive ethnic statements as well as negative ones. Threat content was coded into "external threat," "internal threat," "victimhood and past atrocities," which are commonly dredged up in threat discourse. Harmful and eliminationist actions against other ethnic groups distinguished "advocacy and expectation of violence," "no compromise/omits non-violence as an option," "revenge and retribution," "expulsion and exchange of population," "other threats against nations and nationalities," and "denies responsibility/plays the blame game." Šešelj frequently employed these modes of discourse to justify aggressive actions against adversaries. Last but not least was a category for "falsehood and misinformation" which distinguishes propaganda. Here is a summary of the findings.

On stereotyping, in the 242 records, there are 40 negative labels and stereotypes for non-Serbs, including some extreme negative ones, for example, Croats are "vipers." That compares with 29 records where Serbs are glorified (e.g. courageous). In Šešelj's discourse, the Serbs' adversaries in the former Yugoslavia are inferior to the Serb nation because they are not genuine historical nations like the Serbs.

Šešelj claims that Serbs are under severe and multiple threats. In 40 instances, Serbs have been and are continuing to be victimized by other peoples, nations, foreign states and international organizations. Serbs and Serbia are threatened and surrounded by enemies and internal traitors who want to dismantle its territory and marginalize the Serb people. There are 42 "threats against Serbs" statements, and an additional 29 specific external threats and 28 internal threats. Altogether, 38 per cent of all records contain at least one threat, and often more than one. On harmful and eliminationist responses against adversaries like the Croats and the Muslims, Šešelj advocates "no compromise" and rejects non-violent options in 32 records, favors coercive and violent measures, such as "amputation" of Croatia and the expulsion of Albanians from Kosovo, in 47 records, blames Serbia's adversaries in 27 records, and justifies harmful and eliminationist actions by the principles of retribution and revenge in 21 records.

On misinformation and falsehood, the stuff of propaganda, Oberschall checked sources cited by reputable historians against Šešelj's exaggerations and allegations, specifically the number of Serb deaths at the Jasenovac concentration camp in the Second World War, the claim that Dubrovnik has a predominantly Serb population, that Macedonia is an "artificial nation," that several hundred thousand Albanians immigrated illegally to Kosovo in the Second World War, and that international treaties in the First World War justified greater territory for Serbia.

These instances were a few of many false claims that exceeded the bounds of rhetorical exaggeration.

Šešelj developed a Serb nationalist narrative that he repeated again and again, with small variations. Serbs are a heroic and peace loving nation who have been betrayed by external enemies (Croats, Germany, the USA . . .) and by internal traitors (Serbian liberals and democrats . . .) and who keep threatening Serbs and Serbia. The answer to the constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia in 1989–92 is the formation of a Greater Serbia on all lands and districts where Serbs are living or have lived in the past. That means Croatia will be “amputated” and Bosnia partitioned. There is no compromise on these goals. The Serbs’ enemies are blood-thirsty and genocidal, as the Croat Ustasha was in the past and is again under Tuđman, or are the tools of Islamic fundamentalists as the Muslims are, or should not even rightfully live in Serbia, as the Kosovars do. Šešelj and his Volunteers will defend the Serbs everywhere against aggressors with violence if necessary (“rivers of blood will flow”), which is justified by self-defense and the principle of retribution. Because mixed ethnic populations with ancient hatreds cannot exist in peace, a stable society and state has to be mono-ethnic and mono-national, except for some compliant minorities. Therefore, expulsion of peoples who do not fit into a majority state is justified, can be implemented through voluntary steps, and benefits all, even those who are forced to leave their homes and country.

In its totality, Oberschall characterized Šešelj’s discourse as “xenophobic Serb nationalism.” In his opening statement to the court at his trial on 8 November 2007, Šešelj claimed that in the 1990s he influenced people by logical, intelligent and well-founded argument, which he also repeated in his rejoinder to Oberschall’s expert report.²⁰ In a reply, Oberschall writes that the content analysis proved to the contrary that Šešelj “massively used stereotypes, threat discourse, falsehoods, fear inducing discourse, victimhood and other propaganda techniques that appeal to the emotions and were calculated to deceive and manipulate.” But as Oberschall testified at the trial, Šešelj was not alone with xenophobic nationalist discourse in Yugoslavia at its breakup (see Figure 5.1). Bogdan Denitch writes that “Much of the intellectual underpinning and respectability for the xenophobic nationalist developments among Serbian intellectuals and academics continued to come from the Serbian Academy of Sciences and Arts.”²¹

In the cross examination by Šešelj at the ICTY in January 2007, Oberschall declined to characterize Šešelj’s ethnic discourse as “hate speech” because it was not based on racial categories and biologically anchored justifications for superiority and inferiority, as was true for Nazi anti-Semitism. The eliminationist actions Šešelj advocated fell well short of the mass killings and genocide of the Nazis and that were advocated by Hutu extremists during the Rwanda genocide. Šešelj’s discourse was filled with negative stereotypes, but referring to other groups as poisonous snakes, animalistic, dregs, trash, primitive, dishonest, cowardly, and so on was similar to the insulting ethnic language of some other Balkan nationalists and fell short of how Oberschall defined “dehumanization.” Šešelj’s threat discourse was much exaggerated but was not a total fabrication




Figure 5.1 Testimony of the prosecution expert witness for propaganda, Anthony Oberschall, in *The Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj*, Case No. IT-03-67.

The photographs depict the participants in ICTY courtroom on 11–13 December 2007. Above (from left to right): Jean Claude Antonetti, presiding judge, Anthony Oberschall, witness. Below (from left to right): Christine Dahl, prosecutor, Vojislav Šešelj, accused.

Courtesy of Mirko Klarin and Sense Tribunal – Sense News Agency.

since ethnic massacres and atrocities had occurred against Serbs as well as other nationalities in the twentieth century during two Balkan wars and two World Wars.

Whether or not Šešelj's propaganda reached the intensity of "hate speech," his goal was to turn ethnic groups and nationalities violently against one another and to undermine non-violent modes of conflict management. Aleksa Đilas noted that "The nationalist ambitions, fears and frustrations of Yugoslavia's constituent groups . . . were not the invention of nationalist intellectuals or political elites. However the Yugoslav civil war would not have happened if elites . . . had not irresponsibly and deliberately manipulated nationalist sentiments with their propaganda and policies."²² The Balkan media analyst Mark Thompson writes that fear of Croatian nationalism, anti-Muslim prejudice, and other ethnic animosities were widespread and had many sources, including popular culture and family history. But "without media, Serbia's leaders could not have obtained public consent and approval for its extreme nationalist politics."²³

A somewhat different method of measuring hate speech in incitements to ethnic violence and during acts of violence by John Hagan and Wenona Rymond-Richmond for Darfur.²⁴ In underdeveloped societies, the mass media are few and the audience is small in relation to the total population, which limits the use of media content analysis. To get around this obstacle, from the narratives provided by refugees in camps about what they experienced and witnessed during attacks by armed militias (called the Janjaweed) and the Sudanese Army, they coded and counted racial epithets of hatred against black Africans and expressions of Arab supremacist ideology. For instance, one victim of rape reported that the rapist said: "You blacks are not human. You are like monkeys."²⁵ Other epithets heard during attacks were "you donkeys, you slaves, we must get rid of you," "black prostitute, whore, you are dirty," "all the people in the village are slaves, you make this area dirty, we have to clean the area." The researchers found from a monthly count in 2003 to 2004 that 20–40 per cent of victims reported hearing such racial epithets during attacks. Other witnesses reported hearing the militias chant during training exercises "We are the lords of the land. You blacks do not have any rights here," and similar slogans. Refugees also reported hearing speeches by militia leaders and Sudanese officials inciting Arabs to violence against the Fur and other black Africans. In a speech on market day, in June 2003, the Arab leader Musa Hilal told the people "we are going to kill all blacks in this area and if you kill people, nobody will be prosecuted. Also if you burn homes, nobody will question you. Animals you find are yours . . ." Eyewitnesses provided accounts of subsequent attacks and burnings by the Janjaweed in the area, who attacked only black villages, and no Arab villages. Hagan and Rymond-Richmond document the racial hate epithets during the recruitment and training of Arab militias, the incitement to violence by their leaders, and the expression of racial hatred during attacks on black African villages and other acts of violence like rape. In addition to racial hatred in incitements to violence, other motives were gaining possession of the land and cattle left by the victims who were killed and forced to flee.

In summary, hate discourse and hate propaganda can be measured by reliable techniques that are not subjective, i.e. two researchers with the same codes and coding instructions agree a high percentage of the time, for example, 90 per cent and above, about how to classify the same content. Content is sampled randomly from a complete record of discourse, and is not cherry-picked for occasional and atypical utterances. For hate discourse, three dimensions have to be present: extreme negative stereotypes, fear and threat discourse, and eliminationist actions. There are differences of opinion about the level of intensity, frequency, context, falsehood and extremeness that puts the discourse over the "hate speech" threshold. I view ethnic discourse on a continuum on which one can benchmark the location of historic instances of hate and genocidal speech (like Nazi anti-Jewish propaganda). The benchmark serves for making comparative judgments about other ethnic discourse.

How is ethnic violence organized?

Although there are specific studies of genocide, especially the Holocaust, social scientists embed explanations of such extreme events in a larger theory of ethnic relations, conflict and mass violence. Ethnic nationalism and animosities are neither an invention of political leaders nor an artificial creation of mass media propaganda, but leaders and propaganda amplify them, manipulate them and legitimize ethnic aggression.

Irish nationalism, including its violent Republican variety, was not an invention of mass media propaganda. In Northern Belfast, Scott Bollens shows that the policy to break down sectarian segregation by building public housing for mixing Catholics and Protestants at sectarian borders repeatedly failed because of clashes, raids and riots during which houses were damaged, arsoned and abandoned.²⁶ Security concerns became foremost, and eventually the residents and the authorities built fences and so-called "peace walls" as a permanent physical barrier between the two communities. Sectarian militants established control in the segregated housing estates, public parks and shopping areas, which are filled with huge murals glorifying their militants and martyrs and demonizing their adversaries. Children raised in such a sectarian environment learn ethnic prejudices, stereotypes, animosities and hatreds in daily life, which feeds their disposition for ethnic aggression and facilitates recruitment into militant groups. Whatever the role of provocateurs and militants in ethnic clashes, Republican animosities against Protestants and vice versa has a long history in Ireland. The clashes and riots that some participate in and others witness in the media becomes yet another chapter that extends that long history and confirms the reality of ethnic antagonism. It is also the case that in middle class neighborhoods of Belfast Catholics and Protestant families cohabit peacefully. Although the Catholics there tend to be Nationalists and the Protestants Unionists, they do not subscribe to the ethnic violence of Republicanism and Loyalism.

Although there has been animosity and conflict between some ethnic groups who live in the same state and/or are neighbors, throughout history, coexistence, cooperation and non-violent conflict management have been the rule in ethnic relations. The occasions for ethnic violence are real conflicts between religious, ethnic, nationality, and language groups (hereafter referred to as "ethnic"), be it competition for political power, territory, jobs, land and other resources, the assertion of fundamental rights like non-discrimination, the expression of collective identity and dignity like use of own language, and similar contentious issues between a government and an ethnic group or between two ethnic groups. Contentious issues serve to mobilize the adversaries, but other conditions are also present for violence.

According to Michael Mann, who studied ethnic cleansing, genocide and mass purges, the worst ethnic violence in the twentieth century occurred under particular political circumstances: there is a political regime advocating ethnic violence with an ideology that promotes and justifies it; the leaders of organized bands and

militias for ethnic aggression (that I refer to as "violence cadres"); and the leaders ~~lead~~ their ethnic kin about real and imagined threats from ethnic adversaries and in turn get their support for eliminating the threat.²⁷ Regime ideology disseminated in the mass media justifies violent and destructive actions that are viewed as immoral and criminal under ordinary circumstances. The majority of the people do not actively participate in the aggression, but approve the ethnic violence, do not oppose it because they fear the regime, or are confused by regime propaganda. In a study of ethnic riots around the world, Donald Horowitz writes that "... actual killing is the work of a relatively small fraction of the people ... But a great many group members ... condone the violence and provide a sympathetic explanation of it, because it is an extreme manifestation of their own feelings ... without such support, ... deadly ethnic rioting could be very much less frequent than they are."²⁸ There are thus three principal actors in mass violence: the leaders, the violence cadres and the public.

Eliminationist violence takes time to become persuasive and to organize. Michael Mann writes that "Murderous cleansing is rarely the initial intent of the perpetrators."²⁹ For Benjamin Valentino as well mass violence and killings are chosen as a last resort by political and military leaders who want to suppress an insurgency or other real and imagined threats, or implement a radical or racist state policy (e.g. achieve a homogeneous nation-state purged of other peoples).³⁰

Mass violence is not inevitable. When ethnic tensions rise beyond customary levels (e.g. by the invasion of the RPF army in Northern Rwanda and the Arusha agreement that recognized the right of return of Tutsi refugees; mounting insurgency and violence in South Africa; the constitutional crisis in Yugoslavia), political leaders make choices. Some draw on conciliatory institutions for ethnic conflict management, as the South African government and the African National Congress (ANC) leaders did. Other leaders manipulate divisions and tensions and organize mass violence when it serves their purposes, as the militant Hutu leadership did in Rwanda.

What is true for countries is also true for sub-state entities. Studies of Hindu-Moslem communal riots in Indian cities compared cities with frequent and major communal riots with cities with no, fewer and lesser violence. The religious animosities, religious fervor, and demographics of these cities was similar, but in the low-violence cities like Lucknow, local Hindu/Muslim political alliances and civic cooperation are robust and both sets of leaders intervene early and decisively when religious tensions mount. Varshney calls them "institutionalized peace systems."³¹ In the high violence cities like Hyderabad, religious rivalry is manifest in politics and in competitive temple and mosque building organized by Hindu nationalists and Muslim fundamentalists. These rivalries and animosities keep getting activated by political leaders. The violence cadres are indoctrinated with hate and contempt for the rival religion and loyalty for their leaders and peers, but other motivations fuel communal rioting as well: looting of homes and businesses, and gaining possession of the land from which inhabitants have been forcefully expelled and to which they are afraid to return or prevented from doing so. When

tension mounts, armed bands from Hindu temple and Mosque communities, known as "warriors" trained in body building, weaponry, and religious fervor, lead the attack on defenseless civilians and their properties. These cities possess "institutionalized riot systems." Communal rioting is not simply an inevitable result of deep rooted religious animosities. As Varshney writes, "Without the involvement of organized gangs, large scale rioting and tens and hundreds of killings are most unlikely."³²

Violence cadres

Who participates in ethnic violence, and why? Scholarly research has shown that "under particular circumstances most people have the capacity for extreme violence and the destruction of human life."³³ A recent book on ethnic cleansing finds that "ordinary people are brought by normal social structures into committing murderous ethnic cleansing."³⁴ The social psychologist Albert Bandura agrees: "Over the centuries much conduct has been perpetuated by ordinary, decent people in the name of righteous ideologies, religious principles and national imperatives . . . it requires conducive social conditions rather than monstrous people to produce heinous deeds."³⁵

Recent research on the perpetrators of extreme collective violence, such as suicide bombers, perpetrators of war crimes and torturers for security agencies, supports the "ordinary man" hypothesis. Scott Atran, of the University of Michigan and CNRS in Paris summarizes the findings on suicide bombers thus: "If you look at the history of these kinds of extreme acts, they are directed pretty much by middle class or higher individuals. They have always been. Never have they been directed by wacky, crazed, homicidal nuts . . . they give up well paying jobs, they give up their families . . . to sacrifice themselves because they really believe that is the only way they are going to change the world."³⁶ Marc Sageman, a forensic psychiatrist and sociologist, profiled al Qaeda and jihadist group members and found that "two thirds came from solid upper and middle class backgrounds . . . (they) were relatively well educated . . . three quarters were married and had children. I detected no mental illness in this group or any common psychological predisposition for terror."³⁷

Research on the recruitment and indoctrination of suicide bombers and terrorists stresses the role of fanatical religious ideologists and support communities for making ordinary people into willing killers who believe they are sacrificing themselves for a higher cause, i.e. martyrdom. A comprehensive study of 624 suicide assaults from 29 countries perpetrated by 25 terrorist organizations from 1982 to 2005 found that recruitment and radicalization of suicide bombers and terrorists takes place in a community that instills a culture of death and hatred, and praises and glorifies suicide attackers; "The marketing of a death culture is conducted via three main avenues: (1) the glorification of suicide attackers themselves; (2) the glorification of the ideology and ideas in whose name they carried out the suicide attacks; (3) the dehumanization of the enemy and therefore

the reinforcement of the moral legitimacy of the suicide attacks."³⁸ Marc Sageman studied a large data set on 400 al Qaeda terrorists and ~~found that~~ their conversion to jihad is not a solitary decision but is nurtured in interpersonal relations and with social support.³⁹ Al Qaeda members formed links with others like themselves, congregated in the same mosques, student associations, neighborhood centers and Islamic bookshops and often lived together. It is in these communities that they become radicalized by militants and imams.

These studies find that hate and hate ideology against an ethnic target incite violence cadres, but hate does not have to be the sole and main motivation. Some mass killings take place under state authority and military command. Christopher Browning studied the German army troops (*Einsatzgruppen*) in Second World War Poland who were called-up to serve behind the Russian front and were ordered to round up and kill unarmed Jewish civilians, children, women, old people, in village after village and town after town.⁴⁰ They had been exposed to Nazi anti-Semitic propaganda as the rest of the German people had for the past decade, but they did not particularly hate the Jews. They killed because they were ordered to, and there was no way out. It was a wartime military command situation. Many found it stressful to kill, and their officers handed out alcoholic drinks generously on killing days. Some killed because of peer solidarity and loyalty to the battalion: if you did not do your quota, other comrades would have to kill more. Some killing was delegated to non-German auxiliaries. A few could not bring themselves to kill and were assigned to truck driving and other non-killing tasks. A few, maybe 5 per cent, actually took pleasure in killing, but that was exceptional. In the end, regardless of the complexity and diversity of motives and reasons, the battalion was an efficient execution machine of Jewish civilians. Hate was not necessary for killing the Jews.

The police chief of Prijedor in the Republika Srpska told the journalist Tim Judah that "the assets of fifty thousand Muslims and Croats expelled from the region had amounted to several million DM [Deutsche Mark] . . . the greater part of these resources have either been transferred to Serbia or here."⁴¹ Elderly non-Serb interviewees in Banja Luka in 1998, who were allowed to remain in the city on account of their age, told Oberschall that their Muslim and Croat relatives had to pay high fees for permits and documents and transportation in Deutsche Marks for leaving the city, which stripped them of foreign exchange, and had to leave behind houses, apartments, furniture and other personal possessions, sometimes even an automobile, seized by Serb militants and officials. The Bosnian Serb leader Biljana Plavšić was asked the reasons for the ethnic cleansing and mass violence against non-Serbs, and explained at her ICTY trial (December 17, 2002) that "The reason lies in the word fear, fear that renders people blind. Driven by the obsession never to be reduced to the status of victims again (a reference to World War II), we allowed ourselves to become makers of victims."⁴²

Ethnic aggression is a group activity, organized and often planned, and not random, spontaneous and individual. One mode of organization is when state and regime authorities recruit, finance, train and indoctrinate violence cadres, as was

true for military forces, special forces, paramilitaries, volunteers, militias and other armed bands in the Rwanda genocide, in the Yugoslav wars, in Darfur, and for the German Army in the Second World War. In all these instances, the regime leaders have command control responsibilities for the actions of the violence cadres. Another mode is when religious leaders and political ideologues enjoy leadership, prestige and visibility in their community, have access to communications media and recruit, indoctrinate and help organize violence cadres, as is the case for jihadists, suicide bombers and terrorist groups. A third mode of organization for ethnic violence is embedded in the ethnic political culture, as Irish Republicanism was in Ireland, North and South. Violence cadres form, but do not have to be recruited and indoctrinated because the population learns the ideologies, justifications, models and precipitating incidents for violent ethnic action as a byproduct of living in a particular culture milieu.

The violence cadres are motivated by a variety of emotions, animosities, ideas and justifications for violence against an ethnic adversary among which hate and fear are prominent, but so are compliance to authority, conformity to peers, revenge, strategic calculation (preemptive deterrence or "defensive warfare"), anger from frustrated goal attainment and economic gain. They are ordinary human beings, often above average in education and social status, and are not psychopaths, anti-social and morally warped, though a few may well be.

The effects of nationalist propaganda in Serbia in the 1990s: a case study

The gold standard for causal analysis is the randomized, controlled experiment as used in testing the efficacy and side-effects of medication. To study the effects of propaganda on national populations with controlled experiments is not practicable. Researchers cannot keep a sample of the population from being exposed to political communications in the media, as a jury can be ordered to be sequestered by a judge during a criminal trial. The subjects cannot avoid exposure during the experiment, but in real life, many who disagree with content avoid it. The amount of nationalist content that an experiment exposes subjects to pales by comparison to what citizens are exposed to, day in day out, over the course of election campaigns and daily political reporting. Last but not least, there is an ethical dilemma. Suppose that propaganda is effective, is it ethical to risk increasing the ethnic stereotypes, fears and eliminationist disposition of subjects? In the absence of experimental findings, I examine and triangulate other evidence on media propaganda impacts: public opinion and elections; media content; anecdotal evidence about what people believe and say that mirrors propaganda; and knowledgeable opinion about mass media political discourse.

Ethnic relations before the Yugoslav crisis

Survey research on ethnic relations in 1990 found that in a national sample of 4,232 Yugoslavs in 292 localities, only 7 per cent believed that the country would break up into separate states, and that 62 per cent reported that the "Yugoslav" affiliation was very or quite important for them. On ethnic relations in workplaces, 36 per cent described them as "good," 28 per cent as "satisfactory" and only 6 per cent as "bad" and very "bad;" similar sentiments were expressed for neighborhoods.⁴³ On constitutional choice, 70 per cent expected a Yugoslav federation and confederation to continue, and only 7 per cent expected "separate states." In another all-Yugoslav survey with over 10,000 respondents, in the summer of 1990, to the question "Do you agree that every Yugoslav nation should have a national state of its own?," 61 per cent answered "Do not agree at all" and only 16 per cent chose "agree fully."⁴⁴ Except for the responses in Kosovo, for the majority of Yugoslavs, on the eve of the civil wars, national sentiments did not translate into hostile interpersonal ethnic relations and a yearning for the breakup of Yugoslavia and its replacement with national states.

Public opinion research is confirmed by anecdotal evidence. Misha Glenny writes that in Knin, later a hotbed of aggressive militia activity, "Before May 1991 Croats and Serbs lived together in relative contentment . . . nobody in their wildest fantasy would have predicted that within twelve months . . . Croat soldiers would massacre innocent Serbs while Serb fighters would mutilate innocent Croats."⁴⁵

Revival of nationalism

Fueled by the plight of the Serbs in Kosovo in the 1980s, Serb nationalism was revived by nationalist intellectuals and academicians and was exploited by Slobodan Milošević and his followers for seizing power in Serbia. Concern for kith and kin is common in national sentiment. In Kosovo, Serb nationalist propaganda was filled with exaggerations, fabrications and lies that magnified the threat to Serbs. Although the evidence on the extent of anti-Serb intimidation and violence by Albanians is disputed, there was a real problem and many Serbs in Kosovo believed they were under siege and/or decided to leave Kosovo.⁴⁶

Judith Mertus researched ethnic incidents in the 1980s in Kosovo and found the media and conversations filled with stories of "old women and nuns are being raped, youngsters beaten up, cattle blinded, stables built from gravestones, churches and old shrines being desecrated" yet no specifics were given about who, where, when.⁴⁷ For 1981 to 1987, there had been only five interethnic murders, yet Serb intellectuals created a case of an Albanian genocide against Serbs. Charges of sexual assault and rape by Albanians against Serbs were highlighted in the Serb news media. An analysis of crime statistics in Kosovo in the 1980s by Serb social scientists found that rates of sexual assault in Kosovo (0.96 per 100,000 adult males) were lower than in central Serbia (2.43) and in all Yugoslavia (1.63), and that sexual assaults and rapes tended to occur within, not across nationalities.⁴⁸ Truthful figures were available but ignored.

The Serb nationalist campaign for saving Kosovo was a classic example of the manipulation of threat and fear propaganda, and it was effective. Milošević seized control of the communist party of Serbia with mass rallies all over Serbia displaying Serb flags, folk costumes, Serb music and symbols. Speakers attacked communist party officials and called for their resignation, which many did. The first and largest mass meeting commemorated the 600th anniversary of the Battle of Kosovo in 1389, which turned into a nationalist extravaganza. Between July 1988 and the Spring of 1989, an estimated 100 rallies and demonstrations took place with 5 million participants. The media called it an "anti-bureaucratic revolution." These events were covered on television and in other media. Milošević emerged as the standard bearer for Serbdom and was lionized in the media.⁴⁹

Milošević, Serb intellectuals and these campaigns did not create Serb nationalism. Branimir Anzulović notes that "The Serbian elite could not succeed on mobilizing the support of large masses of the population . . . had they not been already under the influence of old national myths."⁵⁰ What leaders and intellectuals did is to revive and amplify the old myths, and link the myths to contemporary ethnic threats and fears, which were magnified out of proportion with reality. Serb nationalism was used to discredit the peacetime frame in Balkan ethnic relations and revive the crisis frame.

In Croatia and Bosnia, the 1990 election was an opportunity for nationalists to link traditional nationalism with threat and fear-mongering against other nationalities. Every city and town experienced the founding of political parties, often at huge rallies in a sports stadium or public building during which speaker after speaker gave vent to exaggerated nationalist rhetoric and hostile pronouncements and verbal attacks against other nationalities. A content analysis of electoral events from *Oslobodjenje* news stories in 1990 finds them full of affirmations of national symbols and identities, the renaming of localities, the reburial of alleged bones of Second World War ethnic massacre victims; nationalist graffiti on churches, mosques, monuments and cemeteries and other ethnic vandalism; fights over flags and other symbols; ethnic insults voiced in public places; nationalist songs; some rallies precipitated fights that ended with teargas and police arrests; elsewhere, speakers were prevented from addressing the crowd.⁵¹ Bigotry, ethnic hatred and falsehoods about nationalities were voiced freely and reached millions of people nightly on television. Bogdan Denitch recalls: "Everyone was traumatized by all the talk of World War II atrocities . . . even those who had seemed to be immune to nationalism . . . Old personal ties and friendships crumbled . . . as families and friends rallied to the defense of their own nation. The pressure to do so was immense."⁵² To many, these were signs that peaceful times were sliding into ethnic crisis, and that the authorities were losing control or unwilling to enforce the law against nationalist excesses.

There was some opposition to ethnic nationalism: youth and veterans' organizations, trade unions and some municipalities protested against ethnic polarization. A Youth Association proclaimed that "there is no place for the ghosts of the past . . . we condemn the spread of ethnic hatred."⁵³ But these protests

from the waning loyalty to Titoist communist institutions and failed to slow the surge of ethnic nationalism. Threat and fear propaganda and talk of rape and genocide became commonplace in political speech and in the media. Biljana Plavšić, a professor of biology at Sarajevo University before she became a Bosnian Serb leader, wrote in the newspaper *Borba* "... rape is the war strategy of Muslims and Croats against Serbs. Islam considers this something normal. . ."⁵⁴

Political leaders who engaged in nationalist propaganda knew full well that television was a key tool of persuasion and how threat and fear discourse conditioned ordinary people to support mass violence. Vojislav Šešelj proclaimed that "The one who takes the TV stations has taken political power."⁵⁵ Mira Marković said in an interview on March 15, 1991 that "Civil war is already happening in Yugoslavia. For the time being it is not an armed conflict . . . this civil war is one of information . . . its purpose is to cause national animosity to the point where an armed conflict is unavoidable."⁵⁶

Nationalist propaganda does not have to persuade everyone so long as a large enough number of voters confers the authority of the state to nationalist leaders. In Croatia, Tuđman and the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ) got 41.5 per cent of the vote, but 58 per cent of the legislative seats, which conferred control of the state institutions: the media, in particular state television, the police, schools, the territorial forces, state enterprises and much scope for patronage.

My interpretation of the revival of xenophobic nationalism in the late 1980s and 1990s is that Yugoslavs experienced ethnic relations through two frames or mental structures: a peacetime frame and a crisis frame. People possessed both, but in peacetime the crisis frame was dormant, and in crisis and war the peacetime frame became irrelevant. In the peacetime frame which prevailed in Tito's Yugoslavia, ethnic relations were cooperative among school mates, in workplaces, and between neighbors. Intermarriage was accepted. Institutions like the armed forces and sports were shared by all groups. Holidays were spent everywhere. Public opinion on ethnic relations in the surveys of 1990 mirrors the peacetime frame. The crisis frame was grounded in the experiences and memories of the twentieth century wars and collective myths rooted in history. In the crisis frame, civilians, old people, women and priests are not distinguished from combatants. Old people, women and priests were not spared. Atrocities, massacres, torture, rape and ethnic cleansing were common. All members of a nationality or religion were held collectively responsible for the actions of some in their group and became targets for revenge and reprisals. The nationalist threat and fear propaganda about the Kosovo crisis in Serbia and elsewhere starting with the 1990 elections discredited the peacetime ethnic frame, awakened the crisis mentality on ethnic relations, and put aggressive nationalist leadership into power.

Propaganda in the Serb media

There are many analyses of the Serb media in the 1980s and 1990s. Svetlana Slapšak analyzed the first six months of "Echoes and Reactions" in *Politika* for

1990 on Kosovo and concluded that negative stereotypes and hate speech against Albanians, and later against Croats, was the principal way in which the public was being prepared to accept war as a resolution of ethnic problems.⁵⁷ Another researcher content analyzed three illustrated magazines—*Duga*, *TV Novosti* and *Ilustrovana Politika*—and concluded that the narrative of the magazine stories in 1990–91 was “linkage of the past (when Serbs were victims) with the present (when they have to be awakened to the dangers and to resist them (and the future (when Serbs are called to become avengers, heroes, and victors)).”⁵⁸ A Belgrade team of social scientists and journalists content analyzed the main daily news programs of Belgrade Radio–Television/Serbian Radio Television (RTB/RTS) from August 1992 to July 1993 and concluded that “what really happened was not reported, for example, compared to what was reported in the media of other countries; only that was reported which the regime found acceptable. One is dealing with a radical mode of reality construction.”⁵⁹ In his *Special Report on the Media*, former Polish prime minister and special rapporteur for the UN Human Rights Commission, Tadeusz Mazowiecki, writes that “the media have served as an effective tool for the dominant political forces in formulating a new agenda based on Serbian nationalism and in fomenting hatred against other nationality groups in the former Yugoslavia.”⁶⁰

War reporting was filled with falsehood and misinformation. The Serb attack on Zvornik, a border city with a 60 per cent Muslim population, its capture by the Yugoslav People’s Army (JNA), special forces and paramilitaries in April 1992, and the resulting killing, rape and ethnic cleansing of Muslim civilians was reported in *Politika* as “Muslim extremist forces planned to enslave the local Serbs and were thwarted.”⁶¹ A group of writers analyzed the discourse on RTB/RTS about the Bosnian war and found that the Muslims were described as jihad warriors, criminals, slaughterers, Islamic Ustashas, mujahedeen, terrorists and extremists, whereas the Serbs were described as protecting their homes, wives, children and home grounds.⁶² False atrocity stories were typical. One repeated story was about Serb children fed to animals in the Sarajevo zoo by Muslims.⁶³ The Serb political scientist Vladimir Goati summarized war coverage in the Serb media as follows: “The strict selection of information on civil war in Bosnia and Herzegovina and Croatia created a kind of virtual political reality, a world of fiction that many citizens saw as more realistic than the world of reality . . . The majority of the population, being deprived of alternative sources of information, has accepted the persistent repetition of official statements as the truth.”⁶⁴

Nationalist media monopoly

Regime media propaganda is more effective when it enjoys monopoly access to the audience rather than competing in a plural media environment. Even cultural programming was brought under nationalist control. Musical program editors were fired from Radio Belgrade for broadcasting more Slovene and Croat than Serb music, and the general manager of Radio Sarajevo fired his staff into “reliable

Serbs" and "bad Serbs." Before long, the "unreliable Serbs" journalists and media professionals were pressured out of their jobs, put on "compulsory leave" or marginalized.⁶⁵ The largest purge took place in January 1993. Radio and TV reporters and staff resisted, but were harassed, demoted, furloughed and banned from the TV building, and fired. Eventually 200 journalists and 1,000 staff were purged. Because of mass protests in Belgrade for media freedom, the regime allowed some opposition media with limited means—circulation, viewers and listeners—to survive. The regime assumed that control of state TV and the three largest newspapers was sufficient for decisively shaping public opinion. Even so, Studio B and other independent media were harassed and targets of attacks. By 1995, the independent media were largely restricted to Belgrade. The result was that the vast majority of Serbs got biased, slanted regime news, filled with falsehoods.⁶⁶

Research by the Belgrade Institute of Political Studies found that RTS was watched by 70 per cent of all adults. The regime supporter *Politika* had 200,000 circulation, compared to the independent newspaper *Borba*, with 30,000 readers. The report concluded that the Milošević regime had 90 per cent mass media penetration, i.e. 90 per cent of public affairs information reached the public through regime media. The regime used its control of the state media for winning elections. A 1994 study of media coverage in recent Serbian elections found that the regime party, the Socialist Party of Serbia (SPS), received 227 minutes' coverage on regular RTS news in the "election chronicle," compared to 58 minutes for all the other parties.⁶⁷

Nationalist control of the mass media was decisive in the Serb majority areas elsewhere, as in Bosnia. On August 1, 1991, eight months before the start of war in Bosnia, Serb paramilitaries supported by the Yugoslav army seized the Kozara mountain transmitter, shortly followed by other seizures. It cut off Sarajevo TV signals to what later became the Republika Srpska and exposed the Bosnian Serbs and others living there to Belgrade TV and other Serb, controlled TV only.⁶⁸

Persuasion through nationalist propaganda

How persuasive was Serb mass media nationalist propaganda in the 1990s? There are three sources to examine. First, changes in attitudes and opinions that reflect changes in mass media content. Second, beliefs voiced by individuals which mirror, sometimes word for word, what they hear and see in the media. Third, voting changes that occur when a candidate or party's coverage in the media changes.

According to a study of public opinion trends in Serbia, "under the influence of civil war, economic collapse and the activities of the official propaganda, in May 1993 xenophobia was observed in 76 per cent of the population compared to the earlier years' average of 10–15 per cent."⁶⁹ In a survey by the Institute of Psychology at the University of Belgrade in 1993, the researchers found a lot of hostility towards Croats (89 per cent), towards Albanians and Muslims (85 per

cent) and towards national minorities in Serbia, which contrasts starkly with the 1990 survey of Yugoslav ethnic relations described earlier.⁷⁰ Disinformation and falsehood were persuasive to a large segment of the Serb public. The Institute of Political Studies in Belgrade conducted a poll of 1,380 respondents in Serbia in July 1992 and asked the following questions about the siege of Sarajevo: "Who bombarded Sarajevo from the surrounding hills in May and June?" The answers were "Muslim and/or Croat forces," 38.4 per cent; "Don't know" 22.5 per cent and "Serb forces" 20.5 per cent. At the time, Serb forces controlled all the hills around Sarajevo and their artillery shelled the city regularly. The standard news story on Belgrade TV was "the siege of Sarajevo is carried out by Muslims, not Serbs" and "the Serbs are protecting their own hills around the city."⁷¹

Ordinary people echoed the ethnic discourse in the mass media promoted by nationalist leaders, intellectuals and media journalists. A young Serb soldier in his barracks tells an American reporter "the Muslims expelled us from Kosovo with their sexual organs . . . they want to do the same here (Bosnia) . . . the way they reproduce they need room."⁷² The words, the narrative, the threat all echo the mass media, Biljana Plavšić and other leaders. Peter Mass, another journalist, asks a Serb refugee couple why they fled their village. They answer: Muslims planned a takeover, a list of names has been drawn up, Serb women were to be assigned to Muslim harems after the men are killed. They had heard about it on the radio.⁷³ A Muslim survivor of a detention camp described how his interrogators kept asking the Muslim detainees of plans to turn Bosnia into an Islamic Republic, a favorite threat message of the Serb media.⁷⁴ Islamic Republic, Serb women into harems breeding Muslim fighters, killing all Serb males—these threat stories were standard fare on the Serb media.

Propaganda and voters

It is possible to estimate the effects of mass media on the Serb electorate when the same party or candidate has access to the media and positive coverage compared to when they do not, so long as the time interval is short and the appeal of the candidate and party is to the same voters. There were 2.5 to 2.8 million strongly nationalist voters in the 1990s in Serbia. They distributed their votes to the SPS headed by Milošević, the SRS headed by Šešelj, and some smaller allied parties. In the December 20, 1992 elections to the National Assembly of Serbia, SPS and SRS were allies in government, and both parties got lots of access and positive media coverage. The SPS came in first with 1,359,000 votes; the SRS was second with 1,067,000. In mid-1993, the two parties became adversaries over the Vance-Owen plan for Bosnia. The SRS submitted a motion of no confidence in the National Assembly of Serbia, which toppled the government and elections for a new Assembly were called. In the campaign leading up to the December 13, 1993 election, Šešelj and the SRS were presented in an extremely negative manner in the regime-controlled media, i.e. close to all the media. The election outcome was SPS 1,576,000 votes to SRS 595,000 votes, a loss of 475,000 votes, or 44 per cent

of the 1992 SRS vote.⁷⁵ That is a huge loss for a party. Further analysis showed that the SRS loss came from a switch within the strongly nationalist voting bloc, from SRS to SPS. The loss measures change due to favorable versus unfavorable mass media coverage upon the electorate, within the same nationalist voter pool.

Another instance of voter change due to media persuasion occurred in the difference of the October 5, 1997 presidential election for Serbia with the December 21 run-off only ten weeks later. In October Šešelj, the nationalist candidate, got 1,734,000 votes to Zoran Lilić with 1,475,000, who headed the opposition. The regime media were non-partisan. Due to a realignment of alliances, the regime decided to run its own candidate Milan Milutinović against Šešelj in December. A content analysis of the RTS election campaign coverage for the last week showed that Milutinović got 81 per cent of broadcast time for presidential candidates, compared to Šešelj with 19 per cent. Milutinović was presented in a positive way whereas a negative disqualifying media campaign was conducted against Šešelj. The outcome was 2,182,000 for regime candidate Milutinović, and 1,384,000 for Šešelj, a loss of 350,000 or 20 per cent compared to October. In view of these two election outcomes, access to and favorable coverage in the state media made a difference of 20 per cent to 40 per cent of the vote, a decisive advantage (or liability) for a political leader or party.

Limits to propaganda effectiveness

There are limits to the power of propaganda; not everyone becomes a puppet of the regime. As noted earlier, selective attention, confirmation bias, opinion leaders in a social milieu, peer support, cognitive dissonance, and political mobilization are mechanisms that insulate against regime media persuasion and preserve opposition political culture. In Serbia, and especially in Belgrade, throughout the Milošević regime years, there were repeated mass protests for freedom of the news media and against regime election fraud. At one of the largest and longest protests, started on March 9, 1991 (known as the "Battle of Belgrade"), thousands of peaceful demonstrators were attacked by the security forces, resulting in hundreds of arrests and many injured, and was followed by thousands of protest marchers the following day and a week-long vigil that was attended by half a million people and became a public forum for opposition speeches. In the December 1996 to January 1997 mass protests against election fraud, one to two hundred thousand protesters marched every evening in Belgrade for 87 days after the regime annulled the election outcome that was won by the opposition Zajedno (Coalition Together) alliance.⁷⁶ The Belgrade opposition rallies rivaled the Monday evening marches in Leipzig and elsewhere in East Germany in 1989–90 that toppled the East German communist regime, and the huge Czech protests in Wenceslav square in Prague in support of the democratic movement that ended communism there in December 1989.⁷⁷

Some Serbs opposed the Croatian war in 1991. A "call-up crisis" occurred when large numbers of young men refused to be drafted into the army and reservist units

refused to serve beyond the borders of Serbia. A report estimates that between one and two hundred thousand young men evaded the draft, many leaving Serbia; soldiers serving in the army deserted; reserve units refused to serve beyond the borders of Serbia, for example, to attack Dubrovnik.⁷⁸ At a closed session of the Serbian Assembly, it was announced that "the response of reservists in Serbia as a whole was 50 per cent, but in Belgrade only 15 per cent." Faced with a manpower shortage for fighting war, armed forces chief General Kadijević called for volunteers, and as an inducement, paramilitary units were given all the benefits soldiers enjoyed in the armed forces.

In summary, the evidence examined shows threat messages and falsehoods stimulating Serb fears of rival ethnic groups saturated the media, mass meetings and electioneering, revived a crisis mentality and xenophobic nationalism, and persuaded the voters to put the Milošević regime into power and keep it there. Xenophobic nationalism became persuasive when authorities, intellectuals, academicians, religious leaders, public figures and politicians all voiced similar crisis messages, when threat discourse heightened suggestibility to nationalist propaganda, and when the regime achieved near monopoly of public affairs media messages. The evidence also shows that Serbs became more hostile and aggressive towards other nationalities after they were exposed to intense nationalist propaganda, and that ordinary people voiced regime propaganda themes. Unfavorable coverage in the media cost even nationalist candidates who were regime rivals a substantial amount of votes. Despite the effectiveness of regime propaganda on the majority of Serbs, a not inconsiderable minority of Serbs remained opposed to xenophobic nationalism.

Concluding thoughts on criminalizing hate speech

For some, hate speech is public communications "that express profound disrespect, hatred, and vilification of the members of specific minorities."⁷⁹ For others, including myself, extreme negative stereotyping is one of three dimensions of hate discourse or hate ideology. The other two dimensions are threat and fear discourse, and advocacy for eliminationist actions, i.e. harmful, destructive and violent actions. My view on criminalization focuses on how proximate or how removed from actual ethnic violence the dimensions of hate discourse are in the chain of causation. There is a temptation of overreach when it comes to criminalizing behavior that has many and complex causes. Extreme negative stereotyping of an ethnic group is found in conversation, literature, politics, international relations, and in the media but does not necessarily incite to violence. Avoidance and exclusion are common responses to hatred and prejudice. Threat messages in political discourse are also common. There are threats to health, to the environment, to financial well-being, to national secrecy, and threats to the dominant group and culture from ethnic groups who do not assimilate, increase in numbers through immigration and high fertility, want their language and traditions recognized officially, and so on. The dominant group may feel threatened, yet advocates for

limiting immigration and group autonomy who give vent to negative stereotypes usually stop short of calling for ethnic violence to eliminate minority. Despite unfavorable stereotypes and ethnic fears, and in some cases insurgency, Canada, South Africa, Tanzania, Northern Ireland, the successor states to the Soviet Union and some other countries created a constitutional design and power sharing political institutions to accommodate ethnic pluralism. It is the third, eliminationist dimension of hate discourse that should be the focus of criminalization, because it incites to violence against civilians, not just disrespect and hostility, and because it dismisses compromise, accommodation and non-violent conflict management. Mass media hate discourse that is criminalized should contain advocacy for ethnic violence, not just extreme negative stereotypes, threat and fear.

How would such a ban on hate discourse deter or hinder ethnic violence? The bulk of violence is perpetrated by violence cadres, and banning hate discourse is likely to interfere with their recruitment, indoctrination and organization. A ban has a better chance of hindering violence under some circumstances. Some violence cadres, as was the case for the Irish Republican Army (IRA), are recruited through interpersonal, family, and community ties and loyalties that are embedded in Irish Republicanism. Banning media hate discourse would not interfere with formation of the IRA and its offshoots. The strategy for decreasing ethnic violence is long-term education and conciliation, and short-term political conflict management through power sharing, as in the Northern Ireland Peace Agreement.

Other violence cadres, especially military, are under a tight command structure. The evidence shows that ordinary men in the military will obey orders to kill innocent people, as the German Wehrmacht reservists did in the Second World War, regardless of how much they have been exposed to hate discourse and agree with it. The strategy for decreasing ethnic violence and killings by hierarchic organizations is to enforce laws against war crimes and crimes against humanity on the leadership that commands killing.

In the third mode of recruitment and organization of violence cadres, a non-state organization or coalition of militants, sometimes in alliance with state organizations, recruits and indoctrinates volunteers by means of hate discourse, as is the case for suicide bombers and terrorists, and as was also a pattern for paramilitaries and volunteers in the Yugoslav wars, in Darfur, in the Rwanda genocide, in Hindu-Muslim riots, and other instances. Criminalizing ethnic hate discourse and prosecuting the disseminators of hate propaganda would silence some militants, make others less accessible to the audience, or moderate their hate messages. Criminalizing hate speech should be one step within a larger set of measures to deter and prosecute violence cadres in ethnic violence. Recent antiterrorist legislation in the UK includes specific hate speech crimes like glorification of terrorism with the intention of promoting attack, distribution of terrorist publications, deportation of foreign clerics who incite terror acts together with other actions that impede recruitment, indoctrination and training like attending terrorist training places and funding terrorist activity.⁸⁰ It is a minimalist use of hate speech

laws against ethnic violence that can be enforced, lead to prosecutions and have been part of an effective deterrent package in the UK. It might serve as a model for deterring and prosecuting violence cadres elsewhere.

Notes

- 1 *The Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi*, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-01-72-A, 18 March 2010, para. 50.
- 2 *The Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi*, Judgment, Case No. ICTR-01-72-A, 18 March 2010, para. 170.
- 3 A. Pratkanis and E. Aronson, *The Art of Propaganda*, New York, NY: Freeman, 2001, p. 11.
- 4 F. Toennies, *Kritik der Offentlichen Meinung*, Leipzig, 1922, preface.
- 5 J. Steiner, A. Bächtiger, M. Spörndli and M.R. Steenbergen, *Deliberative Politics in Action. Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- 6 W. Gamson, *Talking Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- 7 C. Lindblom, *Inquiry and Change*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990, pp. 78–79.
- 8 T. van Dijk, 'Discourse and Manipulation', *Discourse and Society*, vol. 17, no. 2, 2006, pp. 359–383.
- 9 C. Hovland et al., *Communication and Persuasion*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963.
- 10 Pratkanis and Aronson, *The Art of Propaganda*, pp. 210–215.
- 11 J.P. Derrienic, *Les Guerres Civiles*, Paris: Presses de Science Po, 2002, p. 102.
- 12 Quoted in S. Carruthers, *The Media War*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2000, p. 76.
- 13 J. Waller, *Becoming Evil. How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- 14 E. Katz and P. Lazarsfeld, *Personal Influence*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955; D. Mutz, *Impersonal Influence*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- 15 W. Brustein, *Roots of Hate. Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2003.
- 16 Brustein, *Roots of Hate*, p. 25.
- 17 Brustein, *Roots of Hate*, pp. 46–47.
- 18 A. Oberschall, *Vojislav Sešelj's nationalist propaganda: contents, techniques, aims and impacts, 1990–1994*, an expert report for the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-03-67.
- 19 A. Smith, *Chosen Peoples*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003; E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- 20 Official Notice Concerning the Expert Report by Anthony Oberschall, August 5, 2006.
- 21 B. Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996, p. 117.
- 22 Aleksa Đilas, 'Fear Thy Neighbor', in C. Kupchan (ed.), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995, p. 85.
- 23 M. Thompson, *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia Hercegovina*, London: Article 19: International Center Against Censorship, 1994, p. 128.
- 24 J. Hagan and W. Rymond-Richmond, *Darfur and the Crime of Genocide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- 25 *Ibid.*, p. 109.
- 26 S. Bollens, *Urban Peace Building in Divided Society*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999, p. 113.

- 27 M. Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy, Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 8.
- 28 D. Horowitz, *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA and London: University of California Press, 2001, p. 14.
- 29 Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, pp. 6 and 23.
- 30 B. Valentino, *Final Solutions. Mass Killings and Genocide in the 20th Century*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- 31 A. Varshney, *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.
- 32 Ibid., p. 11.
- 33 E. Staub, *The Roots of Evil. The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- 34 Mann, *The Dark Side of Democracy*, p. 9.
- 35 A. Bandura, *The role of selective disengagement in terrorism and counterterrorism*, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Department of Psychology, 2004, pp. 5 and 24.
- 36 S. Atran, 'The Surprises of Suicide Terrorism', *DISCOVER*, vol. 24, no. 10, October 2003, pp. 1-2.
- 37 Statement by Marc Sageman to the National Commission on Terrorism Attacks upon the United States, July 9, 2003. *Publishing on the Internet*. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-sageman.htm> (accessed 5 January 2011).
- 38 A. Pedhazur, P. Arlie and L. Weinberg, 'Explaining Suicide Terrorism', in C. Ankersen (ed.), *Understanding Global Terror*, Cambridge: Polity, 2007, p. 6.
- 39 M. Sageman, 'Explaining Terror Networks in the 21st Century', *Footnotes*, May/June 2008, p. 7.
- 40 C. Browning, *Ordinary Men. Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1992.
- 41 T. Judah, *The Serbs*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997, p. 204.
- 42 Quoted in I. Wesselingh and A. Vaulerin, *Raw Memory: Prijedor, Laboratory of Ethnic Cleansing*, London: SAQI, 2005, p. 46.
- 43 'Public Opinion Survey on the Federal Executive Council's Social and Economic Reforms', *Yugoslav Survey*, 1990, No. 1, p. 25.
- 44 L. Sekelj, *Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration*, Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1993, p. 277.
- 45 M. Glenny, *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin, 1992, p. 19.
- 46 US Helsinki Watch Committee, *Yugoslavia: Crisis in Kosovo*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1990.
- 47 J. Mertus, *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA and London: University of California Press, 1999, p. 108.
- 48 S. Popović et al., *Kosovski čvor: odrešiti ili seći*, Belgrade: Biblioteka Kronos, 1990.
- 49 R. Thomas, *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999, p. 45.
- 50 B. Anzulović, *Heavenly Serbia: From Myths to Genocide*, New York, NY: New York University Press, 1999, p. 146.
- 51 A. Oberschall, 'The manipulation of ethnicity: from cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 23, no. 6, 2000, pp. 982-1001.
- 52 Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism*, p. 181.
- 53 Oberschall, 'The manipulation of ethnicity: from cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia', p. 292.
- 54 R. Cohen, *Hearts Grown Brutal*, New York, NY: Norton, 1998, p. 22.
- 55 Interview with Vojislav Šešelj in *Duga*, 13 April 1993.
- 56 M. Marković, *Answers*, Kingston: Quarry Press, 1996, p. 58.
- 57 S. Slapšak, *Ogledi o bezbrižnosti*, Belgrade: Radio B92, 1994.

- 58 Z. Marković, 'Die Nation: Opfer und Rache', in Bremer, T., et al., *Serbiens Weg in den Krieg*, Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998, pp. 86–89.
- 59 D. Reljić, *Killing Screens*, Dusseldorf: Droste, 1998, p. 48.
- 60 T. Mazowiecki, Special Report on the Media, United Nations, E/CN.4/1995/54, Dec. 13, 1994, para. 165.
- 61 Thompson, *Forging War*, p. 81.
- 62 R. Veljanovski, 'Die Wende in den Elektronischen Medien', in Bremer, T. (ed.), *Serbiens Weg in den Krieg*, Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998, pp. 312–313.
- 63 L. Lalić, *Three Years in TV Serbia*, Belgrade: Independent Media Union, 1995, pp. 106–107.
- 64 V. Goati, *Elections in FRY from 1990 to 1998*, Belgrade: CeSID, 2000, p. 120.
- 65 Thompson, *Forging War*, p. 93.
- 66 E. Gordy, *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.
- 67 K. Kurspahić, *Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003, p. 56.
- 68 *Ibid.*, p. 98.
- 69 Goati, *Elections in FRY*, p. 78.
- 70 I. Spasić, 'Symbolization and collective identity in civic protest', *Sociologija*, vol. 34, no. 1, Jan/March 1997.
- 71 Thompson, *Forging War*, p. 126.
- 72 Cohen, *Hearts Grown Brutal*, p. 434.
- 73 P. Mass, *Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War*, New York, NY: Knopf, 1995, p. 113.
- 74 Thompson, *Forging War*, p. 264.
- 75 Goati, *Elections in FRY*, chapters 2–4.
- 76 Spasić, 'Symbolization and collective identity in civic protest'.
- 77 A. Oberschall, 'Protest demonstrations and the end of communist regimes in 1989', in M. Dobkowski and I. Wallimann (eds), *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1994, vol. 17.
- 78 'Who wants to be a soldier? The call up crisis – an analytic overview of media reports', *Republika*, vol. X, no. 198–9, October 1998, reprinted in B. Magaš and I. Žanić, *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, London: Frank Cass, 1991–1995, pp. 329–345.
- 79 J. Wadron, 'Free Speech and the Menace of Hysteria', *New York Review of Books*, May 29, 2008.
- 80 J. Beckman, *Comparative Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007, chapter 2.

Bibliography

- Anzulović, B., *Heavenly Serbia: From Myths to Genocide*, New York, NY: New York University Press, 1999.
- Atran, S., 'The Surprises of Suicide Terrorism', *DISCOVER*, vol. 24, no. 10, October 2003.
- Bandura, A., *The role of selective disengagement in terrorism and counterterrorism*, Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University, Department of Psychology, 2004.
- Beckman, J., *Comparative Approaches to Homeland Security and Anti-Terrorism*, Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2007.
- Bollens, S., *Urban Peace Building in Divided Society*, Boulder, CO: Westview, 1999.
- Browning, C., *Ordinary Men. Reserve Battalion 101 and the Final Solution in Poland*, New York, NY: Harper Collins, 1992.
- Brustein, W., *Roots of Hate. Anti-Semitism in Europe before the Holocaust*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001.

- Carruthers, S., *The Media War*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2000.
- ~~Carruthers, S., *The Media War*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2000.~~
- ~~Carruthers, S., *The Media War*, New York, NY: St. Martin's Press, 2000.~~
- Denitch, B., *Ethnic Nationalism: The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia*, Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 1996.
- Derrienc, J.P., *Les Guerres Civiles*, Paris: Presses de Science Po, 2002.
- Dijk, van, T., 'Discourse and Manipulation', *Discourse and Society*, 2006, vol. 17, no. 2.
- Dilas, A., 'Fear Thy Neighbor', in Kupchan, C. (ed.), *Nationalism and Nationalities in the New Europe*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1995.
- Gamson, W., *Talking Politics*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Gellner, E., *Nations and Nationalism*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1983.
- Glenny, M., *The Fall of Yugoslavia*, London: Penguin, 1992.
- Goati, V., *Elections in FRY from 1990 to 1998*, Belgrade: CeSID, 2000.
- Gordy, E., *The Culture of Power in Serbia: Nationalism and the Destruction of Alternatives*, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press, 1999.
- Hagan, J. and Raymond-Richmond, W., *Darfur and the Crime of Genocide*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009.
- Horowitz, D., *The Deadly Ethnic Riot*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA and London: University of California Press, 2001.
- Hovland, C., et al., *Communication and Persuasion*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1963.
- Judah, T., *The Serbs*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1997.
- Katz, E. and Lazarsfeld, P., *Personal Influence*, Glencoe, IL: Free Press, 1955.
- Kurspahić, K., *Prime Time Crime: Balkan Media in War and Peace*, Washington, DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2003.
- Lalić, L., *Three Years in TV Serbia*, Belgrade: Independent Media Union, 1995.
- Lindblom, C., *Inquiry and Change*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1990.
- Magaš, B. and Žanić, I., *The War in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina*, London: Frank Cass, 1991-1995.
- Mann, M., *The Dark Side of Democracy, Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Marković, M., *Answers*, Kinston: Quarry Press, 1996.
- Marković, Z., 'Die Nation: Opfer und Rache', in Bremer, T., et al., *Serbiens Weg in den Krieg*, Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998.
- Mass, P., *Love Thy Neighbor: A Story of War*, New York, NY: Knopf, 1995.
- Mazowiecki, T., Special Report on the Media, United Nations, E/CN.4/1995/54, Dec. 13, 1994.
- Mertus, J., *Kosovo: How Myths and Truths Started a War*, Berkeley, Los Angeles, CA and London: University of California Press, 1999.
- Mutz, D., *Impersonal Influence*, New York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Mutz, D., 'Protest demonstrations and the end of communist regimes in 1989', in M. Dobkowski and I. Wallimann (eds), *Research in Social Movements, Conflict and Change*, Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, 1994, vol. 17.
- Mutz, D., 'The manipulation of ethnicity: from cooperation to violence and war in Yugoslavia', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, vol. 23, no. 6, 2000.
- Oberschall, A., *Vojislav Šešelj's nationalist propaganda: contents, techniques, aims and impacts, 1990-1994*, an expert report for the United Nations International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, Case No. IT-03-67.
- Pedhazur, A., Arlie, P. and Weinberg, L., 'Explaining Suicide Terrorism', in Ankersen, C. (ed.), *Understanding Global Terror*, Cambridge: Polity, 2007.

- Popović, S., et al., *Kosovski čvor: odrešiti ili seći*, Belgrade: Biblioteka Kronos, 1990.
- Pratkanis, A. and Aronson, E., *The Art of Propaganda*, New York, NY: Freeman, 2001.
- 'Public Opinion Survey on the Federal Executive Council's Social and Economic Reforms', *Yugoslav Survey*, 1990, No. 1.
- Reljić, D., *Killing Screens*, Dusseldorf: Droste, 1998.
- Sageman, M., Statement to the National Commission on Terrorism Attacks upon the United States, July 9, 2003. *Publishing on the Internet*. Online. Available HTTP: <http://www.globalsecurity.org/security/library/congress/9-11_commission/030709-sageman.htm> (accessed 5 January 2011).
- Sageman, M., 'Explaining Terror Networks in the 21st Century', *Footnotes*, May/June 2008.
- Sekelj, L., *Yugoslavia: The Process of Disintegration*, Boulder, CO: Social Science Monographs, 1993.
- Slapšak, S., *Ogledi o bezbrižnosti*, Belgrade: Radio B92, 1994.
- Smith, A., *Chosen Peoples*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003.
- Spasić, I., 'Symbolization and collective identity in civic protest', *Sociologija*, vol. 34, no. 1, Jan/March 1997.
- Staub, E., *The Roots of Evil. The Origins of Genocide and Other Group Violence*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989.
- Steiner, J., Bächtiger, A., Spörndli, M. and Steenbergen, M.R., *Deliberative Politics in Action. Analyzing Parliamentary Discourse*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005.
- Thomas, R., *The Politics of Serbia in the 1990s*, New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 1999.
- Thompson, M., *Forging War: The Media in Serbia, Croatia, and Bosnia Hercegovina*, London: Article 19: International Center Against Censorship, 1994.
- Toennies, F., *Kritik der Offentlichen Meinung*, Leipzig, 1922.
- US Helsinki Watch Committee, *Yugoslavia: Crisis in Kosovo*, New York, NY: Human Rights Watch, 1990.
- Valentino, B., *Final Solutions. Mass Killings and Genocide in the 20th Century*, Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2004.
- Varshney, A., *Ethnic Conflict and Civil Life*, New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2002.
- Veljanovski, R., 'Die Wende in den Elektronischen Medien', in Bremer, T., et al., *Serbiens Weg in den Krieg*, Berlin: Berlin Verlag, 1998.
- Wadron, J., 'Free Speech and the Menace of Hysteria', *New York Review of Books*, May 29, 2008.
- Waller, J., *Becoming Evil. How Ordinary People Commit Genocide and Mass Killing*, New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2002.
- Wesselingh, I. and Vaulerin, A., *Raw Memory: Prijedor, Laboratory of Ethnic Cleansing*, London: SAQI, 2005.

Table of cases

ICTR

The Prosecutor v. Simon Bikindi, Case No. ICTR-01-72-A.

ICTY

The Prosecutor v. Vojislav Šešelj, Case No. IT-03-67.