
Rwanda Revisualized: Genocide, Photography, and the Era of the Witness

Frank Möller*

Engaging with the literature on visual representations of human suffering, being a witness, and trauma, this article discusses visual representations of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda, and especially the art photography of Alfredo Jaar, Robert Lyons, and Jonathan Torgovnik of the aftermath of the genocide. It explores the conditions in which photography can succeed in disrupting stereotypical political interpretations of the killings. Art photography, it is argued, may help transform the viewers from being consuming spectators into being participant witnesses who self-critically reflect upon their own subject positions in relation to the conditions depicted in the image. By discussing photography of the aftermath of the genocide, the article acknowledges the unrepresentability of genocide; by focusing on visual representations, it reflects the extent to which political space is nowadays constituted by means of images; by concentrating on Rwanda, it contributes to the necessary process of examination and self-examination in connection with the killings. **KEYWORDS:** Rwanda, genocide, aftermath, photography, witnessing

The memory of war, however, like all memory, is mostly local.

—Susan Sontag¹

This article contributes to the literature on the 1994 Tutsi genocide in Rwanda by discussing three photography projects on the aftermath of the killings. Engaging with the literature on visual representations of human suffering, being a witness, and trauma, the article analyzes the art photography of Alfredo Jaar, Robert Lyons, and Jonathan Torgovnik

*Tampere Peace Research Institute, University of Tampere, Finland. E-mail: frank.moller@uta.fi

and explores the conditions in which photography can succeed in disrupting stereotypical political interpretations in connection with the genocide. Art photography, it is argued, may help transform viewers from consuming spectators into participant witnesses who self-critically reflect upon their own subject positions in relation to the conditions depicted in the image while simultaneously being aware that an adequate response to the image is not possible. By discussing photography of the *aftermath* of the genocide, the article acknowledges the unrepresentability of genocide; by focusing on *visual* representations, it reflects the extent to which political space is nowadays constituted by means of images; by concentrating on Rwanda, it contributes to the “process of self-examination” demanded by Kofi Annan regarding the ways “we collectively remember this tragedy.”²

The article is organized as follows: the first section discusses the representation of the 1994 genocide in photojournalism, especially the absence of images of the actual killings. Derived from this discussion, the unrepresentability of genocide and the need to focus attention on the aftermath are acknowledged. The second section sketches the presence of the genocide in recent scholarly work, autobiographical writing, literature, film, and photography and links this work to the literature on memory, witnessing human suffering, and trauma. Engaging with Walter Benjamin’s famous essays on film and photography and especially with the stereoscopic effect that allegedly characterizes the word-image relationship, the third section explores the merits and limitations of the approximate in connection with visual representations of genocide. The article then zooms in on the photography of Jaar, Lyons, and Torgovnik and connects this photography with the theoretical concepts introduced in the earlier sections of the article. It is concluded that art photography can transform viewers into participant witnesses who become aware of their own involvement in the scenes depicted.

Representing the Aftermath

You’re right. I’m a photojournalist. I collect images of wars, of hunger and its ghosts, of natural disasters and terrible misfortunes. You can think of me as a witness.³

Current academic, journalistic, and artistic work on Rwanda, the Tutsi genocide, and the Hutu politicide of 1994 and its aftermath is part of a larger cultural movement reflecting what Annette Wieviorka has called “the era of the witness.” In the era of the witness, testimonial discourse “has become stereotypical [and] is embedded in the surrounding political discourse, which is, as it were, superimposed on

the testimonies that it in turn instrumentalizes.”⁴ Verbal and visual discourses revolving around genocide and mass killings are decidedly intimidating and powerful inasmuch as they are derived from and inevitably connected with the “never again” often postulated in connection with Holocaust testimony. These discourses are also highly ambivalent: mass killings should never happen again but they do occur regularly—Cambodia, Bosnia, Sudan, Burundi, Somalia, the Congo, Rwanda, and so on. In addition, there is a tension between the survivors’ often articulated need to tell their stories and the moral imperative to bear witness, thus emphasizing the individual’s agency, on the one hand, and the experience of being reduced, in the process of giving testimony, to a victim and hence being denied agency, on the other hand.⁵ The “never again” discourse is also ambivalent because the act of giving testimony aims among other things to liberate individuals from their traumatic memories. However, it may actually undermine their subject positions in the postgenocide environment within which testimony is given and with which the act of testifying is intimately connected: the past may become bearable (to some extent), but the present may become unbearable. The Rwandan *gacaca* system, for example, is said to increase the witnesses’ feelings of insecurity and vulnerability.⁶ Reportedly, this system has led to “vicious attacks against survivors, witnesses and judges.”⁷

Visual representations, photojournalistic and otherwise, are important components of many genocide discourses.⁸ It may be argued that, in the era of the witness, visual representations and especially photojournalism have contributed a great deal to the delocalization and internationalization of the memory of war and genocide. Photojournalism, however, covers and bears witness (in the sense alluded to in the quotation that opened this section) to different atrocities to different degrees. During the genocide in Rwanda, the number of reporters “never rose above a maximum of fifteen” and after April 14 (eight days after the killings started) only five journalists are said to have remained in Kigali⁹—an absurdly low number, given the media presence that can nowadays be observed in connection with almost any major or minor event.

The few photographers who were actually in Rwanda during the genocide hardly ever took “photos of massacres at the moment they took place. [Rather,] what they got were pictures of corpses.”¹⁰ Survivors welcome the absence of images of the actual killings. In the words of Innocent Rwililiza, the absence of such images “is most fortunate, because images of the killings under way—I could not bear that. . . . Because those pictures would make nothing more explicit to people who did not experience the genocide, and would simply illustrate a dance of death.”¹¹ Neither images of actual killings nor images of

dead bodies explain the killings. Both often leave their audiences “momentarily horrified but largely ignorant.”¹² In the era of the witness, the public are often consumers of crisis and “spectator[s] to crisis,” rather than being witnesses in the more ambitious sense of “responsible, ethical, participant.”¹³ Such a witness would be someone who self-critically reflects upon his or her own subject positions in relation to the conditions depicted in the image, including acknowledgement of one’s own involvement in the conditions depicted in the image, acknowledgement of one’s own responsibility for the conditions depicted, and acknowledgement of the impossibility individually to respond adequately to the conditions depicted.¹⁴

Even if photojournalists had managed to take more photographs of killings in Rwanda at the moment they were committed—in many cases a suicidal endeavor—these photographs would have shown killings, not the genocide: the idea and politics “to make a people extinct” are difficult indeed to envisage.¹⁵ For all journalists working in Rwanda at that time, the circumstances in which they worked were extremely dangerous and their freedom of action was severely limited. The evacuation of foreigners and the stream of refugees into what was then Zaire (including the outbreak of cholera in the refugee camps) attracted much more Western media attention than the genocide proper, the one owing to direct Western interest in the evacuation of its citizens, the other because “the images were simple and recognizable: Africans on the move, living in camps, at the mercy of the generosity of the outside world.”¹⁶ Images are recognizable if they appeal to the images that the viewers already carry with them as visual memories, but this form of contextualization also means that the new image is perceived in terms other than its own. This, in turn, arguably contributes to the standardization of the discourse revolving around genocide and mass killings noted above.

Regarding most of the works produced nowadays in connection with Rwanda and the 1994 genocide, their producers are not witnesses in the strict sense of “one who is or was present and is able to testify from personal observation,”¹⁷ as they arrived in Rwanda only after the genocide. They bear witness to what was already past or witness the genocide indirectly by interviewing people who personally experienced the hundred days from April 6, 1994, when the plane carrying President Habyarimana of Rwanda and his entourage, including President Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, was shot down and mass violence against the Tutsi minority and moderate Hutus was unleashed, until July 18, 1994, when the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) declared military victory—the notorious hundred days during which time the genocide, embedded in war, was committed. Representing the aftermath is a possible response to the impossibility of representing

such events as the Tutsi genocide emphasized by survivors such as Innocent Rwiliza and Berthe Mwanankabandi.¹⁸ It is hoped that by representing the aftermath, something can also be revealed about the original event, which, to some extent, is being constructed retrospectively in a process of visually and verbally reflecting upon it.

A good starting point for discussing the relationship between an event and representations of its aftermath is the work of the photographer Joel Meyerowitz on the aftermath of the attacks on the World Trade Center of September 11, 2001.¹⁹ Meyerowitz started this work on September 23, 2001—he stubbornly disregarded the ban on photography established by the city authorities immediately after the attacks—and completed it on June 21, 2002. His work, rather than documenting the attacks, is intended as a photographic archive of the rescue and recovery work in lower Manhattan.²⁰ According to Meyerowitz, such an archive was not only important but “essential”:

I wanted people to experience the site viscerally, to see for themselves what they couldn't experience in actuality. You can't go back in time but you can explore the past through photography. I could capture the site the way it looked to me and the people who were working down there day after day. A photo archive could make visible for the entire country, and the rest of the world, the consequences of a national disaster and the incredible response by the hundreds of people that worked at the site.²¹

The idea that a photographic archive can adequately represent the aftermath of traumatic and, therefore, nonrepresentable events such as 9/11 is intriguing. (It will be addressed again below in connection with Robert Lyons's photography.) If we agree with Diana Taylor that trauma is “anti-archival by definition,”²² then the potentialities of a photo archive to help the viewers understand traumatic events would seem to be very limited indeed: antiarchival trauma and archival photography operate according to different mechanisms. Meyerowitz, however, argues that a photo archive can adequately represent not the original, traumatizing event but its consequences, its aftermath. A photo archive may be able to help the spectator/consumer become a responsible, participant witness as defined above if it succeeds in resisting the tendency of photography to depoliticize the viewers. This trend, reflecting the tendency of photography to reproduce rather than disrupt dominant forms of knowledge production, has been emphasized in many critical approaches to photography. Perhaps, however, it has been overemphasized, as photography is equally capable of “open[ing] up forms of questions about power and authority which are closed or silenced within the most frequently circulated and authoritative discursive practices.”²³

Indeed, as Jill Bennett has shown in her work on trauma art, works of art including art photography, decoupled from the pressures under which photojournalism normally operates, are capable of raising political awareness and making the viewers think about both the conditions addressed in the works of art and their own involvement in and responsibility for these very conditions. Bennett suggests that the question should be asked “of what art itself might tell us about the lived experience and memory of trauma . . . and [about] the experiences of conflict and loss.” With Bennett then the question arises “what it is that art itself *does* that gives rise to a way of thinking and feeling about [trauma].”²⁴ In what follows, this question will be discussed in connection with the art photography of the aftermath of the Tutsi genocide by Alfredo Jaar, Robert Lyons, and Jonathan Torgovnik: what does it do to engage the limits of representation, to disrupt stereotypical testimonial discourses, and to enable the viewer to become a participant witness? Before so doing, some reflections on the presence and the visualization of the genocide are necessary.

The Presence of the Genocide

A genocide is a film which unfolds every day before the eyes of he who came through it and it is pointless interrupting it until the end.
— survivor Sylvie Umubyeyi²⁵

In their work on photojournalistic icons, Robert Hariman and John Louis Lucaites argue that the “daily stream of photojournalistic images . . . defines the public through an act of common spectatorship.”²⁶ In a Habermasian discursive-action approach applied to images, they suggest that political space is nowadays constituted mainly through images. This argumentation contributes to the debate about the ethics of representing human suffering since it seems to imply that human suffering has to be visually represented, because otherwise the victims would be excluded from the political and no response to the conditions depicted in a given image would be possible. Without visual representation, victims would literally become invisible.

The degree to which the Tutsi genocide is visible in current European and North American scholarly work, the media, and the arts is inversely proportional to the extent to which the mass killings were noticed when they were perpetrated. During the genocide, Western political and media coverage of the first multiracial elections in South Africa and the wars in the former Yugoslavia (not to mention the O. J. Simpson trial) effectively marginalized Rwanda in Western perception, just as did the absence of direct Western interest (with the

possible exceptions of Belgium and France). Images and written reports of people resorting to such seemingly primitive but highly effective killing instruments as machetes, spears, and clubs seemed to support the misleading but powerful impression that the killings resulted from archaic tribal hatred.²⁷ They helped disguise that what was happening in Rwanda was a state-sponsored, well-organized, and very efficient genocide primarily targeting people socially constructed as Tutsi—"a job," in survivor Claudine Kayitesi's words, "meticulously prepared and efficiently carried out."²⁸ Rather than mobilizing political action in order to stop the killings and, thus, testifying to the anti-war potentialities of photography as expected in early writings on photography and experienced during the US war in Vietnam, these images seemed to show that "Rwanda was a madhouse, a primitive torture chamber where rival tribes were busy settling ancient scores,"²⁹ that the nature of the killing was "atavistic,"³⁰ and that, therefore, there was nothing the West could possibly do. Today, the genocide is arguably more present in the West than it has ever been before, given the quite considerable number of recent academic studies on the genocide and its aftermath,³¹ autobiographical writing,³² the attention paid to Rwanda in literature,³³ and film, both mainstream and independent,³⁴ and the work on the genocide and its aftermath in contemporary art photography.³⁵

The construction in the West of memories of the Tutsi genocide is indicative of the curious workings of memory: people can collectively remember an event that they had decided to ignore when it took place. This, however, does not explain why people would want to remember an event that they had decided to ignore when it happened, and this question refers back to Wiewiorka: visual representations of the genocide and its aftermath are part of the current political and academic discourse and cultural movement revolving around such issues as witnessing, testimony, victimhood, truth commissions, restorative justice, reconciliation, and collective memory. Indeed, "as long as a past event continues to be stipulated as important for the present, collective memory of it will persist and evolve the way all memory evolves."³⁶ The connection established here between collective memory and stipulation echoes Susan Sontag's assessment that collective memory "is not a remembering but a stipulating: that *this* is important, and this is the story about how it happened, with the pictures that lock the stories in our minds."³⁷ However, it is important to note that, contrary to Suleiman's argumentation, not all memory evolves. People experiencing traumatic memories especially suffer from the reenactment of memories that stubbornly refuse to evolve. It is also important to note that stipulation is part of remembering. Consider in this context the need to remember the 1959 revolution permanently

emphasized in the radical anti-Tutsi newspaper *Kangura*, which aimed to “superimpose 1957 values on 1990 Rwandan society.”³⁸ This superimposition aimed, among other things, to criticize alleged Tutsi hegemony, legitimize anti-Tutsi politics and actions, and denounce the war conducted by the RPF as a contrarevolutionary one aiming to reconquer the country. Remembering, however, cannot be reduced to stipulating as it is indispensable to the construction of human identity, collective and individual. Memory is glue connecting otherwise disconnected points in time into a meaningful narrative without which human identity cannot be thought of.³⁹ Especially in societies based on oral tradition, “a power which, in the Great Lakes context, often translates as the ability to reproduce history through well-memorized narratives,”⁴⁰ both elements of memory—stipulating and identity-constructing—join hands. The above assessments underline the markedly political character of both the discursive construction of collective memory and the visual ingredients of such discourses.

Merits and Limits of the Approximate

So how do you transfer this into a work of art? I have no idea.⁴¹

—photographer Alfredo Jaar

As pictures cannot give the viewers the assurance they might like to be given, their contribution to this discourse appears limited. However, it is limited only as long as contribution is equated with explaining and understanding, which are normally regarded as the core concepts underlying academic knowledge production.⁴² The meaning of pictures, however, is intangible and ephemeral, open to interpretation, and changeable over space and across time. Images are unsuitable for generalization and theory building; their relationship to any prior reality is highly problematic and their truth-value is limited. This helps explain why Western culture, although obsessed with images, simultaneously exhibits some degree of uneasiness about them, often translated into the need to explain pictures rather than accept them for what they are—even though we do not know what they are exactly.⁴³ Consider, for example, the numerous attempts to explain what Robert Capa’s famous photograph “Fallen Soldier” *really* shows.⁴⁴ While some of these interpretations complicate Capa’s involvement in the scene and increase his responsibility for the soldier’s death, the exact conditions under which the photograph was taken are almost irrelevant for the picture’s continuing iconic power: “the more one learns about the circumstances in which Capa made his famous photograph, the less those circumstances matter.”⁴⁵ Indeed, this photograph

and many other photographs that are nowadays regarded as icons operate on a level other than that of explanation.

Without language, pictures get arrested in what Walter Benjamin famously called “the approximate.”⁴⁶ In this view, the approximate is not seen as an asset but as a liability, a deficiency to be remedied by means of language (in order to give the viewers the assurance they allegedly long for). The combination of words and pictures is said to generate a mutually supportive “intellectual stereoscopic effect” by means of which “the image gains in profile through the verbal information conveyed in the caption; from the accompanying image the information gains persuasive power.”⁴⁷ Benjamin therefore suggested that the caption might become the most important ingredient of a photograph. Remember also Sontag’s assessment quoted above that pictures, rather than telling their own stories, lock the verbally constructed story in our minds. *Without* captions, then, pictures do not explain much. *With* captions, however, it is often the words, not the picture, that do the explaining, controlling and narrowing the viewer’s range of interpretive options. These options are limited, anyway, owing, among other things, to the diverse ways through which “language (in some form) usually enters the experience of viewing photography or of viewing anything else,”⁴⁸ viewing practices relying on and following established discursive patterns and each viewer’s visual memory.

However, a picture and its subject(s) are nonidentical, even though they often seem to be the same thing⁴⁹ and the visual and the verbal are also nonidentical: “what we see never resides in what we say.”⁵⁰ Pictures cannot simply be translated into words; such a translation, like every translation, is the construction of something new because “pictures and writing produce two quite different accounts of human existence.”⁵¹ As the photographer William Eggleston, a master of both color photography and laconic commentary, notes, it “wouldn’t make any sense to explain [pictures]. Kind of diminishes them.”⁵² In this reading, captions and other forms of accompanying text violate the surplus of meaning that pictures invariably carry with them. They infringe upon the autonomy of the visual by addressing it in terms other than its own, thus effectively marginalizing or suppressing the accounts of human existence produced by means of pictures. Words not only translate the seeable into the sayable and by so doing reduce the former to the latter; they also translate the seeable into a particular form of the sayable: “Written descriptions express what can be grasped in their own languages and are thus effectively blind (or inhospitable) to things outside them.”⁵³ This blindness—approaching subjects in terms and languages other than their own and thus necessarily misrepresenting them—has always been a part of the colonial

production of knowledge, and it continues to some extent in the (post)colonial present.⁵⁴

From this it follows that the approximate—disrupting standard expectations regarding knowledge production (that this is *so* and not otherwise) without aiming to provide definitive answers on its own—can also be seen as an asset and not only as a liability. Neither the merits nor the limits of the approximate should be absolutized but questioned in connection with specific cases. Returning to Rwanda, then, images of the Tutsi genocide and its aftermath should at the very least be regarded as vehicles with which to visualize the unbridgeable gap between an observer's perceptions of the depiction of another's pain, on the one hand, and the other's physical and emotional (i.e., lived experience of) pain, on the other hand. Indeed, as the survivor Sylvie Umubyeyi elaborates, "those who have not been through a genocide, even [sic] with great effort they will through time understand a mere fraction."⁵⁵ Images render difficult a simplistic approach to the concepts of understanding, evidence, and empathy and testify to, respect, and communicate to the viewers the irreducible uniqueness of everybody's experience in extreme situations. In addition to this, art, including art photography,

in its specific (often highly mediated, indirect, darkly playful, powerful but other than narrowly documentary or informational) forms of bearing witness or testifying to that [traumatic] past, might assist in partially working that past over and through, thereby making more available other possibilities in the present and future.⁵⁶

One does not necessarily have to adhere to the psychoanalytic approach used by Dominick LaCapra in this quotation in order to recognize that images might raise awareness among the viewers of the degree to which they, the viewers, are implicated in the conditions depicted in the image, thus transforming the viewer into a participant witness. How this can be done will now be discussed in connection with the photography of Alfredo Jaar, Robert Lyons, and Jonathan Torgovnik respectively.

Photography of the Aftermath

Alfredo Jaar, Let There Be Light

Alfredo Jaar's work on Rwanda is essentially a work of skepticism.⁵⁷ Based on photographs taken in Rwanda in the autumn of 1994, it displays skepticism about the representability of genocide in the arts;

skepticism about the ability of photography to represent experience; and, ultimately, skepticism about the human condition. Several parts of the Rwanda project are designed according to Jaar's conviction that in order for an image to communicate a story to the audience, words are required: "a balance between information and spectacle, between content and the visuals."⁵⁸ This position is reminiscent of the stereoscopic effect of words and images referred to above. In "Real Pictures" (1995), for example, selected photographs taken in late August 1994, documenting the aftermath of the genocide, are each put in black boxes on top of which a silk-screened description of the photograph inside reveals to the viewers what they cannot see. Real pictures, thus, are not pictures in the sense that the "reality" captured in the pictures can become comprehensible only by hiding the photographs: photographs cannot picture reality; when representing genocide, a balance between the contents and the visuals cannot be found. In "Signs of Life" (1994), Jaar sent to friends and colleagues two hundred tourist postcards that he happened to find in an abandoned post office in Rwanda, celebrating the beauty of the country. By adding notes on the reverse, simply stating that selected people, acknowledged by their names, were "still alive," Jaar appealed to the recipients to engage with what had happened in Rwanda. The number of survivors acknowledged on the postcards, while facilitating the recipients' identification with an individual survivor rather than being paralyzed by the overwhelming overall number of victims, pales in comparison with those who perished. And the mere fact that selected people are still alive does not mean that they are not suffering.

Regarding different versions of "The Eyes of Gutete Emerita" (1996), text-image hybrids culminate in an image of the eyes of Gutete Emerita, a survivor who, as the text explains, witnessed the killing of her husband and her two sons in Ntarama Church. What is shown visually is not what happened, but only eyes that have seen what happened. In "The Silence of Nduwayezu" (1997), a million slides are stacked on top of one another. All of these slides depict the eyes of Gutete Emerita. They are connected with an introductory text, telling not Gutete Emerita's story but the story of five-year-old Nduwayezu, who lost both parents during the genocide and who responded to this trauma by maintaining silence for four weeks. Here, the tropes of eyes and silence are powerfully connected with one another: these eyes are not silent.

A critical reading of the Rwanda project, however, cannot but notice that it fails to appreciate the merits of the approximate. While "The Eyes of Gutete Emerita" "engages the limits of representation in situations of extremity"⁵⁹ it also represents the limits of engagement. The viewers of the work are involved, but the text, and thus the artist,

limit the extent to which they are implicated: it has already been decided for them what “The Eyes of Gutete Emerita” shows and how it should be understood. The text gives the viewers the assurance that they are supposedly looking for and that the photograph cannot give them, but it is a false assurance because text and image never tell the same story. The text already gives the answers to the questions the viewers might have, and might, by so doing, depoliticize the viewers.

Regarding “The Silence of Nduwayezu,” the text infringes upon the boy’s inability or unwillingness to speak about his experience. This is not entirely a bad thing, since it has always been a part of the postcolonial agenda to give voices to marginalized and silenced people. At the same time, however, it is the artist’s, not the boy’s voice that speaks to the viewers. As such it reflects, rather than challenges, that we are living in societies “where individuals are spoken *for*, much more than they speak in their own name.”⁶⁰ In addition, the text speaks to the audience in English, rather than in Kinyarwanda; that is, in a language other than the boy’s. The Rwanda project, while being an important artistic project that visualizes human suffering only by implication and makes it possible for the viewers to engage with the conditions addressed in the artwork,⁶¹ also largely operates within a fairly conventional framework of meaning assigned to images by language.⁶² To the above-noted skepticisms underlying Jaar’s work may thus be added one more: skepticism about the power of images.

Robert Lyons and Scott Straus, Intimate Enemy

While Jaar’s work on Rwanda consists of a variety of word-image hybrids, the collaboration of the photographer Robert Lyons and the political scientist Scott Straus in *Intimate Enemy* displays an approach more appreciative of the approximate. In addition to a map of Rwanda and a glossary, the book consists of five parts. It starts with a short introduction by Straus to the history of the genocide (including thoughts on the use of interviews and photography in this book). The introduction is followed by Lyons’s notes informing the readers, among other things, that the photographs were taken between 1998 and 2001. The third part consists of Straus’s interviews in 2002 with anonymous convicted male perpetrators serving sentences for their crimes. The interviews are furnished with small-format photographs depicting people as well as local scenes and objects. The interviews are followed by Lyons’s black-and-white portraits, without captions, of men and women facing, in most cases, the camera directly—an “archive,” in Lyons’s word, “in which individuals would be more democratically represented.”⁶³ The fifth part, a list of plates, located between the photographs and the glossary, provides information about the people

depicted in the style of classical documentary photography: the subject's name, the location and the year when the photograph was taken, biographical information on the subject, and in most cases short descriptions of the subject's involvement in the genocide as a perpetrator, alleged perpetrator, or victim/survivor. This information was collected from the subjects at the time when the photographs were taken and was translated into English.

The reader will habitually read the book from beginning to end, thus starting with the introduction, then the interviews, then the photographs, then the list of plates; or the reader may jump from the text to the glossary in order to understand the text better, and then go back to the text, or from the photographs to the list of plates in order for the plates to explain what the photographs show, and then back to the photographs. However, that the text provides a context within which the photographs can be read does not mean that the photographs are in fact being read within this context. The readers can contextualize the photographs differently; for example, in accordance with the reservoir of images they already carry with them as visual memories. Likewise, that the book contains a list of plates need not mean that the readers in fact consult that list. Although the organization of the book seems to invite a standard reading practice of paying attention first to the text in search of a context within which the following photographs are then to be read, it also disrupts such a reading practice. First, it starts rather unconventionally with six plates before any text is provided (except the title, but not the subtitle). This beginning is reminiscent of one of the classic examples of the photographic essay, James Agee and Walker Evans's *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (1939), which presented the whole body of photographs before the text without giving any clue as to what and whom the photographs depict (and even after reading the text the reader does not know much more because the names mentioned in the text are fictional).⁶⁴

Second, there is no obvious connection between the text and the images, or more precisely, between the interviews and the photographs: the book presents Straus's interviews with people whose photographs have not been taken and photographs of people interviewed by Lyons during the photographic session; these interviews, however, are not reproduced in the book. The book co-presents the verbal (transcribed interviews) and the visual (photographs) without claiming that there necessarily is any connection between the verbal and the visual. By so doing, the authors accept that the visual and the verbal give different accounts of human existence. As Straus puts it, the book is "a marriage of two separate projects of disparate origins, one written and academic, the other visual and aesthetic."⁶⁵ Approached in terms of the stereoscopic effect referred to above, Lyons's images

may gain in profile through the verbal information conveyed in the interviews, but arguably they gain even more in profile when approached independently of the text. Owing to the formalized photographic approach, the limited depth of field, and the obscure background, Lyons's photographs strongly involve the viewers; indeed "viewers will have little room for escape."⁶⁶ At the same time, these photographs do not give the viewers the answers they might like to be given: to what extent and in what functions was the depicted subject involved in the genocide? What is the depicted person's subject position at the moment the picture was taken? What are the conditions under which the pictures were taken? Why were they taken? Eggleston complains that "people always want to know when something was taken, where it was taken, and, God knows, why it was taken."⁶⁷ Lyons's photographs do not provide any answers to such questions but what *do* they provide?

Gérard Prunier notes that many academics discussing Rwanda were "eager to prove the virtue of their adopted camp and the evil of the opposite one."⁶⁸ In addition to the reasons for siding with either Hutu or Tutsi discussed by Prunier, most of them anterior to the genocide, it should also be noted that the search for clear dichotomies such as I/you, order/disorder, good/evil, and Hutu/Tutsi is as characteristic of the Western way of ordering the world⁶⁹ as is skepticism of ambiguities, ambivalences, and gray zones.⁷⁰ As Prunier notes, Western attempts to make the genocide understandable by applying to it Western thought patterns show that "citizens of postmodern times cannot accept the radical heterogeneity of their world."⁷¹

Although social mobility should not be overemphasized, Lee Ann Fujii, in her microstudy on lowest-level participants in the genocide, local networks of violence, social ties, and group dynamics in Rwanda, notes that as a result of economic developments or strategic considerations, Tutsi could, in certain cases, become Hutu and Hutu could become Tutsi.⁷² In any case, "Hutu and Tutsi were socially constructed ethnic categories" that were not the product of, but "which assumed their full emotive force under European colonialism."⁷³ Prior to the genocide, politicians and politicized intellectuals, threatened by the Arusha Accords with the loss of their privileges, capitalized on and to some extent invented "ethnicity" in order to defend these very privileges. Fujii also points out that in rural areas "ambiguity and contradiction were central features of the violence." Such standard categories as "perpetrator," "victim," "bystander," "witness," and "rescuer," assuming stable and exclusive membership of one of these categories, ignore the fluid and changing character of the violence:

Genocides are dynamic, while categories are static. In dynamic settings, contexts and conditions change, sometimes in an instant.

These changes, in turn, can shift actors' relations, perspectives, motives, and identities. Static categories cannot capture these shifts. Neither can they capture endogenous sources of change—transformation that occurs through the unfolding of the process itself.⁷⁴

Stable categories “smooth over tensions that exist both within and between categories”⁷⁵ and, therefore, hide at least as much as they reveal. The Tutsi genocide, as Straus argues, is “an aggregate category” consisting of singular and specific incidents of violence.⁷⁶ Likewise, a term such as *perpetrator* is an aggregate category that fails to grasp the specific circumstances in which and the extent to which an individual became involved in the genocide. Individual experience cannot be adequately grasped through aggregate terms. By presenting photographs without captions and, thus, refusing to reveal to the viewer the subject trajectories⁷⁷ of the depicted individual during the genocide, Lyons's work alerts the readers to the existence of the tensions, ambiguities, and contradictions inherent in such dynamic processes as a genocide. Lyons's photography belongs to the category of images that “do not sit comfortably within the corpus of naturalized opinions . . . of the society in which they are presented.”⁷⁸ As such, it encourages the viewers self-critically to reflect upon their own viewing practices and the categories on which they habitually and most often unwittingly rely in order to make sense of what they see.

As Lyons's mission is precisely to cast doubt on stable interpretive codes and to denaturalize taken-for-granted categories, it is manifestly misleading to assign to the viewer the task of “discern[ing] if [an] individual is a perpetrator, victim or witness, by reading their facial expressions and posture.”⁷⁹ Instead, the photographs invite acknowledgment that no one can be reduced to a perpetrator or a victim, a witness, or a rescuer. For, in addition to the above categories (or a subcategory or a hybrid category) each individual simultaneously inhibits many more subject positions, some of them reflecting this individual's involvement in the genocide, while others do not. This is another advantage of the photograph: while interviews with human beings introduced to the readers as perpetrators will be read first and foremost as interviews with perpetrators, photographs of individuals who may or may not be perpetrators will be read first and foremost as photographs of human beings with whom the viewers inevitably have something in common. Straus writes in the introduction that the book “does not attempt to make sense of this raw material but allows readers to make their own discoveries.”⁸⁰ If the readers discover in this book what David MacDougall calls “the commonalities of being human,”⁸¹ then the book's mission has arguably been accomplished. Furthermore, just as Agee and Evans are said to have made sure that their project was one of “subverting what they saw as a false

and facile collaboration with governmental and journalistic institutions,”⁸² Lyons and Straus make sure that their project cannot easily be integrated into “Western ideological quarrels”⁸³ or contribute to the overidentification of certain strands of journalistic and scholarly work on Rwanda with simplifying and romanticizing interpretations of Rwanda’s precolonial and, by implication, postgenocidal social order as promulgated by the postgenocide government.⁸⁴

However, some degree of uneasiness remains regarding the inevitable nondifferentiation between perpetrators and victims in the photographs. Fujii tells the story of a Tutsi survivor who, installed after the genocide as new *conseiller*, contributed, in collaboration with former militias, to the imprisonment and killing of many people, Hutu as well as Tutsi, while threatening others. This experience taught her “the importance of not assuming (as I often did) that ‘genocide survivors’ had nothing to hide, for here was a genocide survivor who has as much, if not more, to hide than many of the confessed killers we had interviewed.”⁸⁵ What is disturbing here is not Fujii’s claim that subject positions are changeable and fluid; that victims may become perpetrators and perpetrators become victims; that motives may change, and so on. All of the above occurs and can be observed in abundance. However, as the reader, for example, of Jean Hatzfeld’s collection of survivors’ and killers’ voices or Révérien Rurangwa’s memoirs cannot but feel,⁸⁶ there are many cases where insisting on the differentiation between perpetrator and victim makes a lot of sense and where the blurring of the boundary between perpetrator and victim (and with it appreciating the approximate) becomes morally problematic. It is in this sense—and not following Hron’s suspicion that Lyons’s photography “may also serve to reaffirm the racist stereotype that any Black person could be a threat”⁸⁷—that the list of plates is useful and indeed indispensable.

Jonathan Torgovnik, Intended Consequences

What has just been said about the limits of the approximate is especially applicable to the work of the photographer Jonathan Torgovnik on Tutsi women raped during the genocide and their children, born of rape.⁸⁸ These survivors’ “pains go beyond words,”⁸⁹ and certainly beyond images, the more so since “survivors’ wounds are internal, sometimes invisible, wounds.”⁹⁰ The women interviewed and photographed by Torgovnik have experienced unimaginable and indescribable horrors that no form of representation can adequately capture. In many cases, their families have been killed in front of their eyes, while they have been spared only in order to suffer even more. Nowadays many of them suffer from HIV/AIDS and from both

a deeply problematic relationship with their children and their failure to offer them a decent life including education, health, and future prospects. Many of the women have been expelled from their own communities. During the genocide, the perpetrators considered their victims as “people to throw away,” as “less-than-nothings”⁹¹ and dehumanized them as cockroaches and snakes. Nowadays, mothers of children born of rape often do not exist in the eyes of their communities and even their own families “because of the stigma associated with a child born of rape”⁹² and also because in a patriarchal society like Rwanda, “children are identified with the lineage of their fathers”⁹³ and, thus, with the (former) enemy. This is fulfillment of the *génocidaires*’ most heinous intentions.

Torgovnik’s book consists of thirty portraits of children born of rape during and, in some cases, after the genocide. Each portrait consists of one photograph of the mother and her child or children and, in some cases, other relatives, a smaller portrait of the child or one of the children, and a transcribed and translated interview with the mother. Torgovnik’s photographs of mothers and children, mostly taken close to or inside the place where they were living, are stunningly beautiful and unbearably sad. As beautiful images, they invite the standard criticism articulated in connection with the work, for example, of James Nachtwey and Sebastião Salgado, according to which aestheticization and depoliticization go hand in hand. In its crude version, the criticism that some forms of photographic representation aestheticize that which they depict while others do not is obviously flawed, as representation cannot *not* aestheticize; when representing something or someone, the option not to aestheticize does not exist.⁹⁴ In its refined form, the criticism refers to images of human suffering that, due to their formal structure or to what in a given situation is understood as beauty, are assumed to be “used as resources for gratification” and to offer the viewer “disinterested pleasure.” Such images are said to abstract from the sources of the suffering depicted and the conditions under which it occurred and to obscure the “meaning and implications” of suffering.⁹⁵ They are accused of depoliticizing the viewers by diverting their attention from the depicted conditions of suffering to the quality of the image and the beauty of what it depicts. It is often assumed that there is a causal nexus between the formal structure and beauty of an image and the lack of political engagement with its subject on the part of the viewer.

Somewhat paradoxically, the same result—depoliticization—is also said to follow from raw, unedited representations of human suffering that are often alleged to have a desensitizing effect. With respect to Holocaust representations, for example, it has been argued that processes of technological, political, and moral habituation have caused

people to lose their willingness to confront visual depictions of human suffering.⁹⁶ By not confronting such depictions, people position themselves outside the visually constructed realm of the political, and, therefore, cannot hope to exert much political influence. Confronting such depictions, however, would also be problematic. As Mark Reinhardt has argued with respect to the notorious Abu Ghraib photographs, “the faces of the tortured stare out at us in a moment not only of fear and pain but also of shame, as we, by looking, prolong the shaming.”⁹⁷ Exposed, in pain, to our look, people endure “a second suffering” as long as we are looking and, by so doing, contribute to their exploitation and the “theft of their subjectivity”: “Looking at their pain is, in this sense, a secondary exploitation.”⁹⁸

While these arguments certainly have some merits, they pale against the fact that in Torgovnik’s project the people depicted *wanted* to be visually represented and to represent themselves and their experiences by talking about them. Indeed, not being represented and keeping silent would mean becoming invisible and inaudible and thus falling completely into oblivion; this, in turn, would imply the ultimate success of the *génocidaires*. To show the world the killers’ failure—to proclaim that they, the victims, are still alive—Torgovnik’s subjects wanted to tell their stories. Any attempt to summarize the interviews, to translate the survivors’ voices into academic language, or to use them as a point of departure for academic theory-building cannot but trivialize the voices. Such attempts would be a secondary exploitation. The voices should be respected for what they are: personal, intimate truths. Being aware that we are living in a world dominated by images⁹⁹ and that the political is nowadays to a large extent constituted by images,¹⁰⁰ Torgovnik also wanted to show their stories to the world, thus combining truth-telling with truth-showing. Ultimately it is for the subjects to decide whether or not they feel adequately represented in Torgovnik’s work. In any case, to assume “a second suffering” is rather patronizing; it is well-meant, but nevertheless patronizing.

While Lyons and Straus present photographs of people who have not been interviewed (at least not for the purposes of their book) and interviews with people whose photographs have not been taken, and Jaar, in “The Eyes of Gutete Emerita” and “The Silence of Nduwayezu” presents photographs and his own words, Torgovnik presents photographs of women and these women’s own voices. Thus he gives voices to people normally silenced, and by so doing disrupts, and directs the attention of the viewer to, the social, cultural, and political processes through which some are marginalized by others. Torgovnik’s photography affects the viewer because it challenges the convention that representations of experiences of horror are of necessity horrific. It is precisely the contrast between the beauty of the images and the horror

of the experiences of the subjects that fundamentally disrupts the expectations of the viewers and increases their involvement: “To be compelling, there must be tension in the work; if everything has been decided beforehand, there will be no tension and no compulsion to the work.”¹⁰¹

* * *

“So what do you think, Félix—is it more important to bear witness to beauty, or to denounce horror?”¹⁰² As Torgovnik’s work shows, the question in José Eduardo Agualusa’s *The Book of Chameleons* poses a false alternative: it is possible to bear witness to beauty while simultaneously denouncing horror. This article has investigated the claim that the merits and limits of the approximate with respect to visual representations have to be shown in connection with specific cases rather than posited a priori. To this end, the article analyzed the photography of Alfredo Jaar, Robert Lyons, and Jonathan Torgovnik on the aftermath of the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. By so doing, it has made an original contribution to the growing body of scholarly literature on the genocide. The article has argued that this photography can help transform spectators into participant witnesses who, by looking at art photography, become aware of their own involvement in the scenes depicted. This sense of involvement may also increase their feeling of responsibility as spectators who, by looking at photography, contribute to the visual-discursive construction of political space that is increasingly based not only on common spectatorship but on global spectatorship.

Notes

Earlier versions of this article were presented at the Second Nomadikon Meeting “Images of Pain/Painful Images,” University of Bergen, Norway, June 19–21, 2009, and at the symposium “Arts, Violence, and Imagination” organized by the Finnish Center of Excellence, Political Thought, and Conceptual Change, Research Team Politics and the Arts, London, October 23–25, 2009. Helpful comments by Peggy Heller, Jens Petter Kollhoj, Mark Ledbetter, Diana Meyers, Mark Reinhardt, and Marquard Smith are gratefully acknowledged.

1. Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (New York: Farrar, Straus, & Giroux, 2003), p. 35.

2. Kofi Annan, “Message to the Symposium on the Media and the Rwanda Genocide,” Carleton University School of Journalism and Communication, Ottawa, March 13, 2004,” in Allan Thompson, ed., *The Media and the Rwanda Genocide* (New York: Pluto Press, 2007), p. ix.

3. José Eduardo Agualusa, *The Book of Chameleons* (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2008), p. 17.

4. Annette Wiewiorka, *The Era of the Witness* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2006), p. 138.

5. *Ibid.*, pp. 139–140.

6. See Karen Brounéus, “Truth-Telling as Talking Cure? Insecurity and Retraumatization in the Rwandan *Gacaca* Courts,” *Security Dialogue* 39, no. 1 (2008): 55–76. The *gacaca* (literally “soft grass”) courts are a form of traditional, community-based justice under the chairmanship of persons of integrity. The courts were reestablished in order to cope with the huge number of suspects.

7. Ros Wynne-Jones, “A Rwandan Genocide Survivor Speaks Out: ‘Now, I Must Be the Narrator,’” *Guardian*, April 8, 2009, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/april/08/rwanda-experience>; accessed April 8, 2009.

8. See, for example, Barbie Zelizer, *Remembering to Forget: Holocaust Memory Through the Camera’s Eye* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1998); James E. Young, *At Memory’s Edge: After-Images of the Holocaust in Contemporary Art and Architecture* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000); Habbo Knoch, *Die Tat als Bild. Fotografien des Holocaust in der deutschen Erinnerungskultur* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 2001).

9. Linda Melvern, *A People Betrayed: The Role of the West in Rwanda’s Genocide* (London: Zed Books, 2000), pp. 163, 178.

10. Anne Chaon, “Who Failed in Rwanda, Journalists or the Media?” in *Thompson, Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, p. 163. The only known footage showing actual killing is included in Juan Rein and Eric Kabera’s documentary *ISETA: Behind the Roadblock*, using original footage by Nick Hughes; see <http://rwandacinemacenter.wordpress.com/iseta-the-story-behind-the-road-block/> accessed April 19, 2009. Survivor Edith Uwanyiligira, however, reported that in Kabgayi, “there were Hutu ministers, Tutsi civil servants, Hutu and Tutsi bishops and international photographers come [sic] to take photographs, without any danger to themselves, of how they [sic] were killing Tutsis in the streets.” Cited in Jean Hatzfeld, *Into the Quick of Life—The Rwandan Genocide: The Survivors Speak* (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2005), p. 122.

11. Quoted in Jean Hatzfeld, *The Strategy of Antelopes: Rwanda After the Genocide* (London: Serpent’s Tail, 2009), p. 99.

12. Fergal Keane, *Season of Blood: a Rwandan Journey* (London: Penguin, 1995), p. 7.

13. Diana Taylor, *The Archive and the Repertoire: Performing Cultural Memory in the Americas* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 2003), p. 243.

14. See Frank Möller, “The Looking/Not Looking Dilemma,” *Review of International Studies* 35, no. 4 (2009), pp. 781–794.

15. Phillip Gourevitch, *We Wish to Inform You that Tomorrow We Will Be Killed with Our Families* (New York: Picador, 1998), p. 202.

16. Lindsey Hilsum, “Reporting Rwanda: the Media and the Aid Agencies,” in *Thompson, Media and the Rwanda Genocide*, p. 173.

17. *The Shorter Oxford English Dictionary on Historical Principles*, vol. 2, p. 2562.

18. Hatzfeld, *Strategy of Antelopes*, pp. 99–100.

19. Frank Möller, “Photographic Interventions in Post-9/11 Security Policy,” *Security Dialogue* 38, no. 2 (2007), pp. 187–189.

20. Joel Meyerowitz, *Aftermath* (London: Phaidon, 2006).

21. Questions and answers with Joel Meyerowitz at <http://www.phaidon.com/aftermath/qanda.htm>; accessed March 6, 2009.

22. Taylor, *Archive and Repertoire*, p. 193.

23. Michael J. Shapiro, *The Politics of Representation: Writing Practices in Biography, Photography, and Policy Analysis* (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1988), p. 130.

24. Jill Bennett, *Empathic Vision: Affect, Trauma, and Contemporary Art* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2005), p. 2 (both quotations). See also Michael J. Shapiro, "Slow Looking: The Ethics and Politics of Aesthetics," *Millennium* 37, no. 1 (2008): 188–191.

25. Survivor Sylvie Umubyeyi, quoted in Hatzfeld, *Into the Quick of Life*, p. 162.

26. Robert Hariman and John Lewis Lucaites, *No Caption Needed: Iconic Photographs, Public Culture, and Liberal Democracy* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 42.

27. Scott Straus, *The Order of Genocide: Race, Power, and War in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2006), pp. 18–19.

28. Quoted in Hatzfeld, *Into the Quick of Life*, p. 146.

29. Keane, *Season of Blood*, p. 6.

30. Melvern, *A People Betrayed*, p. 5.

31. Gérard Prunier, *The Rwanda Crisis: History of a Genocide* (London: Hurst, 1998); Melvern, *A People Betrayed*; Mahmood Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers: Colonialism, Nativism, and the Genocide in Rwanda* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2002), pp. 185–233; Johan Pottier, *Re-Imagining Rwanda: Conflict, Survival, and Disinformation in the Late Twentieth Century* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2002); Straus, *Order of Genocide*; Thompson, *Media and the Rwanda Genocide*; Prunier, *Africa's World War: Congo, the Rwandan Genocide, and the Making of a Continental Catastrophe* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2008); Lee Ann Fujii, *Killing Neighbors: Webs of Violence in Rwanda* (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2009).

32. Roméo Dallaire, *Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda* (London: Arrow Books, 2004); Révérien Rurangwa, *Genocide: My Stolen Rwanda* (London: Reportage Press, 2009).

33. For example, Gil Courtemanche, *A Sunday at the Pool in Kigali* (Edinburgh: Canongate, 2004).

34. See, for example, *ISETA; Shake Hands with the Devil*, produced by Peter Raymond and Lindalee Tracey, directed by Peter Raymond (CBC/White Pine Pictures, 2004); *Hotel Rwanda*, produced by A. Kidman Ho and Terry George, directed by Terry George (United Artists, 2005); *Den sista hunden i Rwanda* (The last dog in Rwanda), produced by Anna Carlsten, directed by Jens Assur (AB Svensk Filmindustri in coproduction with Salt Film AB, SVT with support from Swedish Film Institute, Film I Västernorrland, Film I Väst, 2006); *Shake Hands with the Devil*, produced by Michael Donovan, directed by Roger Spottiswoode (Barna-Alper Productions 2007).

35. Alfredo Jaar, *Let There Be Light: The Rwanda Project* (Barcelona: ACTAR, 1998); Robert Lyons and Scott Straus, *Intimate Enemy: Images and Voices of the Rwandan Genocide* (New York: Zone Books, 2006); Jonathan Torgovnik, *Intended Consequences: Rwandan Children Born of Rape* (New York: Aperture, 2009).

36. Susan Rubin Suleiman, *Crises of Memory and the Second World War* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), p. 4.

37. Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others*, p. 86.

38. Marcel Kabanda, "Kangura: the Triumph of Propaganda Refined," in Thompson, *Media and the Rwandan Genocide*, p. 63.

39. Eviatar Zerubavel, *Time Maps: Collective Memory and the Social Shape of the Past* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003), p. 40.

40. Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda*, p. 50.
41. The quotation is from an ART:21 interview with Alfredo Jaar, <http://www.pbs.org/art21/artists/jaar/cli1.html>; accessed April 14, 2009.
42. See Martin Hollis and Steve Smith, *Explaining and Understanding International Relations* (Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press, 1991).
43. See W. J. T. Mitchell, *Picture Theory: Essays on Verbal and Visual Representation* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1994), p. 13.
44. Jon Clarke, "Falling Soldier 'Real,' but it was Taken by Accident," *Olive Press* 2 (October 2008): 5; Giles Tremlett, "Wrong Place, Wrong Man? Fresh Doubts on Capa's Famed War Photo," *Guardian* (June 14, 2009), <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/jun/14/robert-capas-spain-photography>; accessed June 15, 2009.
45. Geoff Dyer, "I Was There," *Guardian*, October 18, 2008, at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/artanddesign/2008/oct/18/war-photography>; accessed October 18, 2008.
46. Walter Benjamin, "Little History of Photography," in Benjamin, *The Work of Art in the Age of Its Technological Reproducibility and Other Writings on Media*, ed. Michael W. Jennings, Brigid Doherty, and Thomas Y. Levin (Cambridge: Belknap, Harvard University Press, 2008), p. 294.
47. Peter Gilgen, "History After Film," in Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht and Michael Marrinan eds., *Mapping Benjamin: The Work of Art in the Digital Age* (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2003), p. 56.
48. Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, p. 282.
49. See John Szarkowski, *The Photographer's Eye* (New York: Museum of Modern Art, 2007), n.p.
50. Michel Foucault, *The Order of Things: An Archaeology of the Human Sciences* (New York: Vintage, 1994), p. 9.
51. David MacDougall, *Transcultural Cinema*, ed. with an introduction by Lucien Taylor (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), p. 246.
52. Quoted in Sean O'Hagan, "Out of the Ordinary," *Observer*; at <http://www.guardian.co.uk/print/0,3858,4976291-110428,00.html>; accessed July 25, 2004.
53. MacDougall, *Transcultural Cinema*, p. 246.
54. "The colonial present" is Derek Gregory's term; see Gregory, *The Colonial Present: Afghanistan—Palestine—Iraq* (Oxford: Blackwell, 2004).
55. Quoted in Hatzfeld, *Into the Quick of Life*, pp. 158–159.
56. Dominick LaCapra, *History in Transit: Experience, Identity, Critical Theory* (Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, 2004), p. 43.
57. Jaar, *Let There Be Light*. See also David Levi Strauss, *Between the Eyes: Essays on Photography and Politics* (New York: Aperture, 2003), pp. 79–105.
58. ART:21, interview with Jaar, available at <http://www.pbs.org/art21/artists/jaar/cli1.htm>; accessed April 14, 2009.
59. Mark Reinhardt, "Picturing Violence: Aesthetics and the Anxiety of Critique," in Mark Reinhardt, Holly Edwards, and Erina Duganne, eds., *Beautiful Suffering: Photography and the Traffic in Pain* (Williamstown, IL: Williams College Museum of Art/University of Chicago Press, 2007), p. 33.
60. Nick Couldry, *Inside Culture: Re-imagining the Method of Cultural Studies* (London: Sage, 2000), p. 58.
61. Möller, "The Looking/Not Looking Dilemma," pp. 788–793.
62. In "Field, Road, Cloud" (1997), however, the cloud deserves special attention because it helps the viewer enter what Ernst van Alphen calls "those realms that are visually unrepresentable." The cloud makes present "that

which withdraws from our cognitive power." See Ernst van Alphen, *Art in Mind: How Contemporary Images Shape Thought* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2005), pp. 8–9.

63. Lyons and Straus, *Intimate Enemy*, p. 32.

64. James Agee and Walker Evans, *Let Us Now Praise Famous Men* (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1941). See also Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, pp. 290–300.

65. Lyons and Straus, *Intimate Enemy*, p. 16.

66. Diary entry, Lyons; see Lyons and Straus, *Intimate Enemy*, p. 32.

67. Quoted in O'Hagan, "Out of the Ordinary."

68. Prunier, *Africa's World War*, p. 353.

69. The Belgian colonial state in Rwanda strengthened and institutionally fixed the already existing bipolar racial identities of Tutsi and Hutu: a "single binary opposition split the colonized population into two" (Mamdani, *When Victims Become Killers*, p. 35).

70. See Anna M. Aganangelou and L. H. M. Ling, "The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the *Poiesis* of Worldism," *International Studies Review* 6, no. 4 (2004): 21–49.

71. Prunier, *Africa's World War*, p. 357.

72. Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, pp. 115–118.

73. Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda*, p. 114.

74. Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, p. 8.

75. *Ibid.*, p. 8.

76. Lyons and Straus, *Intimate Enemy*, p. 15.

77. The term *subject trajectories* is used by Christopher Harker in order to emphasize the changeability of subject performances. See "A Close and Unbreachable Distance': Witnessing *Everything and Nothing*," *ACME* 6, no. 1 (2007): 64.

78. Shapiro, *Politics of Representation*, p. 150. Shapiro continues by arguing that images "which challenge the existing set of codes rather than recycle and reinforce them, are impertinent or politicizing inasmuch as they pose questions to what is regarded as appropriate and authoritative."

79. Madelaine Hron, Review of *Intimate Enemy*, in *African Studies Quarterly: Online Journal for African Studies* 10, nos. 2, 3 (Fall 2008), at <http://www.africa.ufl.edu/asq/v10/v10i2a-16.ht>; accessed April 7, 2009.

80. Lyons and Straus, *Intimate Enemy*, p. 14.

81. MacDougall, *Transcultural Cinema*, p. 246.

82. Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, p. 297.

83. Prunier, *Africa's World War*, p. 354.

84. See Pottier, *Re-imagining Rwanda*.

85. Fujii, *Killing Neighbors*, p. 37. A *conseiller* is the administrative leader of a *secteur*; which is the administrative level below *préfecture* and *commune*.

86. Hatzfeld, *Into the Quick of Life*, and *A Time for Machetes—The Rwanda Genocide: The Killers Speak* (London: Serpent's Tail, 2008); Rurangwa, *Genocide*.

87. Hron, review.

88. Torgovnik, *Intended Consequences*. The book also includes a DVD, discussion of which is excluded from this article for reasons of space.

89. Rurangwa, *Genocide*, p. 117.

90. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

91. Quoted in Hatzfeld, *Time for Machetes*, pp. 42, 124.

92. Marie Consolée Mukagendo, "The Struggles of Rwandan Women Raising Children Born of Rape," in Torgovnik, *Intended Consequences*, p. 7.

93. *Ibid.*, p. 8. Survivor Bernadette (name changed) disagrees: "In Rwan-

dese, a child is an angel, is innocent. You can't take the sins of the father and blame them on the child" (portrait 04, p. 29).

94. Strauss, *Between the Eyes*, p. 9.

95. Reinhardt, "Picturing Violence," p. 21 (all of the quotations).

96. See Zelizer, *Remembering to Forget*.

97. Reinhardt, "Picturing Violence," p. 16.

98. Mieke Bal, "The Pain of Images," in Mark Reinhardt, Holly Edwards, and Erina Dugann, eds., *Beautiful Suffering: Photography and the Traffic in Pain* (Williamstown, IL: Williams College Museum of Art/University of Chicago Press), p. 95 (all quotations).

99. Mitchell, *Picture Theory*, p. 2.

100. Hariman and Lucaites, *No Caption Needed*.

101. Strauss, *Between the Eyes*, p. 10.

102. Agualusa, *Book of Chameleons*, p. 100.

Copyright of Alternatives: Global, Local, Political is the property of Lynne Rienner Publishers and its content may not be copied or emailed to multiple sites or posted to a listserv without the copyright holder's express written permission. However, users may print, download, or email articles for individual use.