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FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK

TO AMEMBASSY PARIS IMMEDIATE

SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7153

INFO JOINT STAFF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

SECDEF WASHDC IMMEDIATE

WHITEHOUSE WASHDC IMMEDIATE

AMEMBASSY KAMPALA

AMEMBASSY ISLAMABAD

AMEMBASSY BUJUMBURA

AMEMBASSY TUNIS

AMEMBASSY ACCRA

AMEMBASSY KINSHASA

AMEMBASSY NAIROBI

AMEMBASSY DAR ES SALAAM

AMEMBASSY ADDIS ABABA

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WHITEHOUSE PASS TO NSC FOR RICE AND STEINBERG; JOINT STAFF FOR CHAIRMAN, DIR JS, J3; SECDEF FOR OSD/ISA

PARIS FOR PERLOW

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF STATE REVIEW AUTHORITY: ARCHIE M BOLSTER

CLASSIFICATION: CONFIDENTIAL REASON: 1.4(B), 1.4(D)

DECLASSIFY AFTER: 10 JUN 2016

DATE/CASE ID: 06 MAY 2011 201005065

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E.0.12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MARR, PREL, PHUM, MOPS, FR, RW, UN

SUBJECT: FRANCE READY TO SEND TROOPS TO RWANDA

- 1. CONFIDENTIAL ENTIRE TEXT.
- 2. SUMMARY: THE FRENCH PERMREP INFORMED THE PERMFIVE THEY ARE READY TO DEPLOY TROOPS INTO RWANDA FOR TWO MONTHS TO PROTECT THREATENED CIVILIANS IF FOUR CONDITIONS ARE MET, THE MOST IMPORTANT OF WHICH IS FINDING ANOTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY TO GO IN WITH THEM. THE OTHER P-5 HAD PRELIMINARY QUESTIONS AND RESERVATIONS. JUST PRIOR TO THE P-5 MEETING, THE FRENCH INFORMED THE NEW SRSG AND THE STAFF OF DPKO OF THEIR DECISION TO DEPLOY. END SUMMARY.
- 3. FRENCH PERMREP MERIMEE CALLED A MEETING OF THE PERMFIVE TO DISCUSS THE GOF DECISION TO DEPLOY TROOPS INTO RWANDA. HE EXPLAINED THERE WERE FOUR CONDITIONS TO FRENCH DEPLOYMENT -- A) NO CEASEFIRE HOLDING, B) CONFIDENTIAL

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USUN N 02513 01 OF 02 170206Z PAGE 03 KILLINGS CONTINUING, C) OTHER TROOPS HAVE NOT YET ARRIVED, D) FINDING A EUROPEAN PARTNER. MERIMEE EMPHASIZED THAT FRANCE WOULD NOT SEND TROOPS IN UNLESS ANOTHER EUROPEAN COUNTRY ALSO SENT TROOPS. SENEGAL IS ALSO READY TO GO, AND FRANCE IS LOOKING FOR AN ANGLOPHONE AFRICAN COUNTRY AS WELL.

- 4. THE OBJECTIVE WOULD BE PURELY HUMANITARIAN, AS SET OUT IN RESOLUTION 925, PARAGRAPH 4(A), TO PROTECT THREATENED CIVILIAN POPULATIONS. FRANCE, SAID MERIMEE, HAS ABSOLUTELY NO POLITICAL AGENDA IN MIND. THE MISSION WILL BE RISKY, BUT FRANCE WILL NOT HESITATE TO FIGHT, IF NECESSARY, TO PREVENT FURTHER MASSACRES. THE RULES OF ENGAGEMENT MUST BE EXTREMELY ROBUST. MERIMEE STRESSED THAT THE TROOPS MUST BE UNDER NATIONAL COMMAND, ALTHOUGH THEY WOULD COORDINATE CLOSELY WITH UNAMIR AND GENERAL DALLAIRE. HOWEVER, FRANCE COULD NOT PUT ITS TROOPS INTO A SITUATION WHERE THEY WOULD HAVE TO FIGHT UNDER A UN CHAIN OF COMMAND. FRANCE IS READY TO FIGHT TUTU MILITIAS IN ORDER TO PROTECT TUTSIS, AND IS ALSO READY TO PROVIDE PROTECTION FOR UNAMIR, IF NECESSARY.
- 5. THE MAXIMUM DURATION OF THE MISSION WOULD BE TWO MONTHS. THE FRENCH TROOPS WOULD FILL THE GAP UNTIL

UNAMIR COULD BE FULLY DEPLOYED, AT WHICH TIME FRANCE COULD LEAVE. MERIMEE TOLD THE FIVE THAT UN SYG BOUTROS-GHALI WELCOMED THE INITIATIVE AND WANTED THE KILLINGS TO STOP. THERE ARE TWO FORMULAS TO GIVE THIS FRENCH OPERATION THE UN'S BLESSING: A) A SHORT SC RESOLUTION AUTHORIZING MEMBER STATES TO TAKE ALL NECESSARY MEASURES UNDER CHAPTER VII OF THE CHARTER TO CONFIDENTIAL

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CARRY OUT THE MANDATE OF RESOLUTION 925, OR B) A LETTER
FROM THE SYG TO THE SC APPOINTING A FRENCH COMMANDER AND
INTEGRATING THE FRENCH FORCES INTO UNAMIR. FRANCE DOES
NOT FAVOR THE SECOND APPROACH, SINCE THEY WILL NOT PUT
THEIR FORCES UNDER THE UN'S CHAIN OF COMMAND, EVEN WITH
A FRENCH FORCE COMMANDER, SINCE HE WOULD HAVE TO ANSWER
TO THE SRSG AND THE SYG. FRANCE SEEKS THE SUPPORT OF
THE P-5 FOR A FUTURE SC RESOLUTION, WHICH WOULD BE
INTRODUCED AS SOON AS THE FRENCH FOUND A EUROPEAN
PARTNER.

QUESTIONS AND EXPRESSED CONCERNS. RUSSIA ASKED HOW MANY TROOPS FRANCE WOULD SEND, BUT MERIMEE DID NOT KNOW.

USUN AMBASSADOR INDERFURTH ASKED WHICH EUROPEANS HAD BEEN ASKED, AND WHAT THE LIKELIHOOD WAS OF FINDING ONE WILLING TO GO. MERIMEE SAID ITALY, SPAIN, BELGIUM, UK, AND ALL THE EU MEMBERS HAD BEEN APPROACHED. HE DID NOT KNOW THE LIKELIHOOD OF A POSITIVE RESPONSE. THE UK QUESTIONED THE RPF'S RESPONSE.

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TRYING TO CONVINCE THEM THEY WOULD PROTECT TUTSIS AGAINST THE HUTUS, AND WOULD NOT INTERFERE IN THE POLITICAL OR MILITARY SITUATION. MERIMEE HOPED THAT WITH INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT, THE RPF COULD COME TO UNDERSTAND AND ACCEPT THE OPERATION.

7. THE UK WENT ON TO POINT OUT THE DIFFICULTIES OF RUNNING TWO SEPARATE INTERNATIONAL MILITARY OPERATIONS, WITH DIFFERENT RULES OF ENGAGEMENT, AND DIFFERENT COMMANDS, IN THE SAME COUNTRY. AMB HANNAY FOUND IT HARD TO SEE HOW THE CHAPTER VI UN OPERATION COULD TAKE OVER AT THE END OF THE FRENCH OPERATION, WITH A MANDATE AND MEANS WHICH WOULD BE SEEN AS INADEQUATE. HE POINTED TO THE EXPERIENCE IN SOMALIA AS A LESSON IN THE PITFALLS OF SWITCHING FROM A NATIONAL TO A UN OPERATION. MERIMEE EXPLAINED THAT THE FRENCH WOULD FIGHT THEIR WAY IN,

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AMB INDERFURTH NOTED THAT FM JUPPE AND SECRETARY CHRISTOPHER WERE TO HAVE SPOKEN TODAY, BUT THAT USUN HAD NO READ-OUT ON THE CONVERSATION AS YET. IN THE ABSENCE OF FEED-BACK ON THAT CONVERSATION, HE COULD ONLY REGISTER SOME PRELIMINARY CONCERNS. INDERFURTH OBSERVED THAT THE FRENCH OFFER MIGHT SLOW DOWN THE MOMENTUM THAT WAS JUST STARTING TO BUILD AROUND DEPLOYMENT OF UNAMIR. HE EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT TROOP CONTRIBUTORS OR EQUIPMENT DONORS MIGHT HESITATE NOW, WAITING TO SEE WHAT WOULD DEVELOP IN RELATION TO FRENCH DEPLOYMENT. HE ARGUED FORCEFULLY FOR CONTINUING UNABATED ALL EFFORTS TO GET UNAMIR EQUIPPED AND DEPLOYED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. | THE FRENCH DEPUTY PR WRYLY NOTED

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9. RUSSIA REASONED THAT IF FRANCE HAD TO FIGHT ONE SIDE, HOSTILITY TOWARDS UNAMIR COULD ARISE, MAKING IT NECESSARY TO CHANGE UNAMIR FROM A CHAPTER VI TO A CHAPTER VII OPERATION. CHINA QUESTIONED WHY FRANCE COULD NOT GO TO RWANDA AS PART OF UNAMIR, AND ASKED ABOUT THE REACTION OF THE INTERIM GOVERNMENT OF RWANDA.

THAT, ONCE IN RWANDA, IT WOULD BECOME FRANCE'S HIGHEST PRIORITY TO ENSURE THAT OTHERS MADE AVAILABLE THE TROOPS

THAT WOULD ALLOW FRANCE TO DEPART.

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