

RE: INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNAL FOR RWANDA

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CONTRIBUTION OF RAF TO THE SEARCH FOR THE TRUTH ON  
THE RWANDAN TRAGEDY

The War of October 1990 and the Tragedy of April 1994

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## INTRODUCTION

The Rwandan tragedy has been the subject of books by many authors, who have adopted various viewpoints depending on their objectives and based on reports from human rights organizations, non-governmental organizations and the threadbare testimonies of people who were not directly involved in the Rwandan conflict.

Thus, the international community was forced to swallow a version of events concocted and served up by RPF following the media embargo that was imposed on those persons that RPF had named "genocidaires". The absence of a juxtaposition of views did not allow the international community to consider the Rwandan tragedy in a calm and objective manner.

Similarly, some of the works written by Rwandans did not sufficiently discuss the role of RPF army, which was in fact responsible for the Rwandan conflict. Thus, several authors dwelt on politics, while military matters escaped their notice or were simply ignored. This work, written for the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda contains revelations about crimes committed by RPF, along with supporting documents, which will serve as appreciable proof. It also includes documents proving the actions carried out by RAF during the war.

As an institution that directly confronted the RPF during the Rwandan conflict RAF [Forces Armées Rwandaises] cannot remain silent about the events that plunged Rwanda into bereavement from the outbreak of war on 1 October 1990, and which degenerated into the disaster of April 1994. RAF consider that their opinion and contribution are indispensable to the enlightenment of the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda.

In this book, RAF accuse the RPF of the following:

1. Invading Rwanda from Uganda on 1 October 1990 in violation of international treaties and conventions governing refugee status.
2. Planning and executing the genocide of Hutu with the objective of eliminating the political and intellectual Hutu elite, reducing their numbers to establish a Hutu-Tutsi ethnic balance and by this means putting an end to the myth of Hutu as a majority.
3. Committing crimes against humanity, war crimes and crimes against peace.
4. Assassinating Presidents Juvénal Habyarimana of Rwanda and Cyprien Ntaryamira of Burundi, as well as Major General Déogratias Nsabimana and other distinguished persons who were accompanying them.

5. Causing the disaster of April 1994 by starting the war, interethnic massacres and the exodus of people and exposing them to epidemics.
6. Destroying infrastructure, public and private property.

RAF also accuses some UNAMIR elements of being RPF accomplices or being directly active on the battlefield.

I. RAF's Account of the Rwandan Tragedy

RPA, the armed wing of RPF, is the root cause of the Rwandan tragedy, insofar as it invaded Rwanda on 1 October 1990, and resumed the war. RPF carried out the selective killing of Hutu political leaders and systematically massacred Hutu wherever it passed. The massacres of April to July 1994 were simply the end-result or culmination of the war. Therefore, those massacres must be viewed in the context of the war. That is why RAF are of the view that ITR's jurisdiction should be extended to cover the period of conflict all the way through to the conclusion of the investigation. Indeed, such is the wish of both parties to the conflict. One therefore wonders why the UN Security Council limited ITR's jurisdiction to the year 1994. (*AJPR RWANDA. L'autre face du genocide, chapter 4, Section 4*). Was the aim to simply ignore the crime?

As concerns the characterization of the offences, it is the opinion of RAF that reports prepared by human rights organizations, which were instrumental in the creation of ITR, were conspicuously biased with regard to the concept of genocide. In fact, their focus is on the scope and nature of the massacres, or *actus reus* rather than *mens rea*.

For RPF, the ethnic massacres were deliberately termed the genocide of the Tutsi at the hands of the Hutu in order to mislead public opinion and cover up the Hutu genocide, which was carefully prepared by RPF before and during the war and even currently, but about which the international community remains silent.

RAF are also of the view that during both the turmoil and the war, many more Hutu than Tutsi were massacred. Moreover, the Tutsi were killed as a consequence of the civil war started by those who attacked Rwanda and assassinated President Habyarimana, and not an intent or general plan of the Hutu to decimate the Tutsi. Without *mens rea*, the claim of Tutsi genocide, as touted by RPF, is unfounded.

If, indeed, there was a genocide plan that RAF must have been aware of, or a plan by RAF to resume hostilities in early April 1994, then:

The G3, Chief of Operations of the Rwandan Army General Staff would not have been sent on mission to Egypt in late March 1994.

**RAF Command in Exile**

The Minister of Defence and the G2, Chief of Military Intelligence of the Rwandan Army General Staff would not have been sent on mission to Cameroon to participate in a Conference of the Inter-Ministerial Committee on Security in Central Africa, which took place in Yaounde from 4 – 8 April 1994, and proceed to Ghana for two weeks. Moreover, the airline tickets for the two aforementioned individuals were provided by the Kigali office of the UNDP.

The Rwandan Army Chief of Staff would not have traveled to Dar es Salaam with the President knowing that he would perish with him in the 6 April 2004 assassination.

On the contrary, this is proof that RAF were seeking peace and were not on the warpath. This was a view espoused by all RAF units. No Operations Sector Commander or Unit Commander could take part in drafting a plan which existed neither in MINADEF nor in the army headquarters.

## II. Responsibility for the Rwandan tragedy

RPF and other RAF detractors blame the latter for all the crimes committed in Rwanda. Yet, in spite of the continuous attacks by RPF from October 1990, in spite of the difficult adjustment of the Rwandan people to multiparty system, which led to violent demonstrations and other acts of destruction and intimidation, in spite of the limited means and irresponsible opposition to self-serving politicians, RAF made every effort through operations to restore and maintain order, pacification during political or ethnic unrest, crime fighting, protection of persons displaced as a result of war, and the international conspiracy. It is known that RPF is the tool of some major powers, which, from the creation of the Republic of Rwanda, withed to bring Rwanda under their sphere of influence, but that the regimes that followed the 1959 revolution had opposed this. This is why the Rwandan tragedy has international ramifications.

For RPF, the objective is to conquer the country, kill as many Rwandans as possible and subjugate the remaining few, and destroy all development works that bring honour to the Habyarimana regime. All this means that RPF has never been an army for the liberation of the people, but a tool to conquer a country and surreptitiously annex it to Uganda. RAF, on the contrary, facing many attacks from RPF, have always acted as a real army of the Rwandan people who, today, trust and esteem their army.

Thus, RAF denounce the complicity of certain foreign figures of authority who are the allies of RPF and who took part in the planning and implementation of the invasion and occupation of Rwanda by RPF, who provided it with political, diplomatic, media, technical, material and military assistance and ordered the Rwandan tragedy. These include particularly President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni of Uganda and NRA, President Bill Clinton of the United States and his government, Mrs. Linda Chalker of Great Britain, certain Belgian authorities, Major Pierre Buyoya, who was then President of

Burundi, and the Burundian army as well as President Ali Hassan Mwinyi of Tanzania. RAF also accuse Major General Roméo Dallaire, Commander of UNAMIR and Colonel Ben Marchal, Commander of the Belgian Contingent in UNAMIR, for conspiring with RPF to assassinate President Habyarimana, preparing and prosecuting the war of April 1994, and the genocide of the Hutu.

Lastly, RAF denounces the conniving and irresponsible attitude of the international community and especially the UN and the OAU, which ignored the Rwandan conflict when it was still possible to contain the damage. This community is held responsible because the Government kept it continually informed of the killings and other acts of barbarism visited on the Rwandan people by RPF all through the offensives of unacknowledged intent. The UN and the OAU should look back and adjust their sights so as to grant the people of Rwanda, who have been forced into exile, their rights once more.

Indeed, as the invading force, RPF is the root cause of the Rwandan tragedy. RAF are of the view that RPF must be prosecuted for the Hutu genocide and for the other war crimes and crimes against humanity it committed in Rwanda during the war and the ones it continues to commit up to the present day.

There is no denying that as it has done in the past, RPA is still executing the Hutu genocide by way of commanded operations and isolated incidents. Moreover, RPF's practice has always been to hide the bodies of the people it kills in order to cover up the crime, and whenever exposed, it justifies itself by cunningly misleading the public and masking its true genocidal nature. In fact, President Bill Clinton proved that he was an accomplice of the RPF criminals when he sent his special envoy to Kigali in a conspiracy of silence over the massacre of over 8,000 Hutu in Kibeho at the hands of the RPA.

The truth on the Rwandan tragedy must be established without melodrama and emotiveness. Those who are responsible for the Hutu genocide must be prosecuted without leniency, or fear of ruffling RPF's allies or the manifestly biased UN Security Council. The diktat of certain super-powers, of which the Rwandan people were victims, should not weigh on the International Tribunal for Rwanda.

The *Forces Armées Rwandaises* support an independent, fair and impartial International Tribunal for Rwanda. They believe that no one should be made a scapegoat simply because the real culprits have not been identified, as it is up to every individual to answer for his criminal acts.

### III. Content of the present document

This document, intended for the International Tribunal for Rwanda, sets out accusations against RPA. It also provides corroborated evidence to show that the accusations against

RAF are false. It cites military intelligence which clearly shows that the President's assassination was carefully planned by RPF.

Considering that the Arusha Peace Agreement provided for an end to the war opposing the Government of Rwanda to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Article 1) and that RAF were totally in favour of the said Agreement, this document mainly sets out the acts of genocide, war crimes, and crimes against humanity committed by RPA between 4 August 1993 and 6 April 1994, during the war of April-July 1994, and from the time RPF seized power in Kigali to the present.

Nevertheless, the document contains flagrant examples of acts carried out by RPF before 4 August 1993, which cannot be dissociated from the ones committed later on and which built up to the final assault.

Chapter 1 deals with the various aspects of the war and demonstrates RPA's sadism on the one hand, and RAF's bravery, on the other. Chapter 2 is about the accusations against RPA and its accomplices for their responsibility in the conflict and the Rwandan tragedy, due to the numerous acts they committed during the war. Chapter 3 is about the activities of RAF during the conflict; Chapter 4 is about the civilian self-defence.

As aforementioned, the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* as an institution cannot remain silent about the events which plunged Rwanda into the mourning, as they were directly involved in the Rwandan conflict. That is why RAF command has compiled incriminating evidence against RPF in general and RPA in particular, as well as materials that bear out the activities of RAF during the conflict.

However, it should be mentioned that the information provided in this document is only a sampling, because some of the evidence either disappeared or was destroyed, either during the war or by the bad weather during the exile. It is based on memory. However, the fact of the matter is that it existed or is still available somewhere, and is authoritative.

As regards the passages that are not cited in this paper, the reader should refer to the content of RPF documents, particularly the messages, in which RPF attributes certain acts to the Government side. This is simply propaganda, something it was known to resort to in order to mobilise its combatants. Furthermore, it is a mistake to believe that the Rwandan tragedy started on 6 April 1994. The April-July 1994 massacres were simply the end result or culmination of the war *per se*, for which RPF and its allies are responsible.



Section 1: The RPF invasion of Rwanda from Uganda on 1 October 1990

§1. The RPF attack of 1 October 1990

Since the end of the *Inyenzi* incursions of 1960s, Rwanda has not suffered any outside attack. On 1 October 1990, RAF and the people of Rwanda were surprised by news of the attack against the Kagitumba border post by troops from Uganda. Indeed, the war came as a surprise, because, despite certain warning signs in the Mutara region (robberies, cattle rusting and extortion, disappearances), the Ugandan President had stated several times that no attack on Rwanda could be launched from his country. However, while on a visit to the United States, President Museveni declared simply that his "boys" had slipped out of his control since he could not have been unaware of the attack considering the following obvious coincidences:

- RPA chief was none other than his Assistant Minister of Defence
- Several RPF officers belonged to NRA and had helped President Museveni seize power in Kampala
- RPF troops had NRA equipment, including heavy weapons

The war, started jointly by NRA and RPF-*INKOTANYI* from outside, upset the peace and unity of the Rwandan people, who had been living in harmony for 17 years, and reignited the four-hundred-year-old resentment.

§ 2. Reaction of RAF

As of October 1990, RAF contributed to warding off the enemy and providing security to the civilian population. They liberated the entire Mutara region, which had been captured by RPF. In the interior of the country, they participated in deterring ethnic unrest along with the other security forces. In the combat zone, they participated in the resettlement of the people who had fled the *Inyenzi* and protected the displaced people in the camps.

§ 3. Causes of the war

Following the outbreak of the war, RPF inundated the world media with misleading information in a bid to legitimise its aggression. The present document does not claim to be an exhaustive account of what some have referred to as the real causes of the war. In fact, only RPF and its accomplices (close friends of the allies) know the real causes. In the press, RPF often invoked two main reasons: the return of the refugees and the democratisation of Rwanda. However, on closer look, it is clear that RPF had entirely different designs. In fact, prior to the October 1990 war, it made the return of the refugees a key issue. Whereas the Rwandan authorities were quite prepared to tackle this problem

head-on, as arrangements to reach a negotiated settlement were underway between the Rwandan Government, the UNHCR, the Ugandan Government and representatives of the refugees, RPF elected to launch an armed struggle in violation of international conventions (UN, OAU) prohibiting refugees from taking up [arms against their country <<<<<missing segment>>>>]

In reality, what the RPF, particularly RPA, wanted was absolute power. The return of the refugees and democratisation were simply a ploy aimed at misleading public opinion. Indeed, after its military victory, RPA had assumed absolute control in Kigali, Paul Kagame has made himself Vice President and Minister of Defence. He is the strongman in Kigali. Military personnel are everywhere: in the National Assembly, the Government, the administration, even the judiciary. The political parties have been muzzled. The RPF carries the majority in all the institutions. The judiciary is ineffectual. In fact, its decisions are not binding on RPA. The RPA was commended RPF political officials for massacring people during the war and after seizing power in Kigali. In fact, those political officials have commended it for the massacres it is committing currently.

Certain parameters changed because of the way the situation unfolded, as, having failed to attain immediate military victory, RPF accepted to participate in the negotiations that led to the agreement on RPA's integration into the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*.

However, because of the lack of provision negotiations for absolute power or the integration of all its troops, it felt that it had no choice but to continue the war regardless of the consequences.

Due to RPF's plan, the war degenerated into the catastrophe of April 1994. However, RPF had attained its goal despite costing thousands of lives and destroying the country. It enjoys absolute power in Kigali and the current Army comprises all its soldiers.

The military leadership can assign themselves property, but the civilian authorities cannot do likewise. For example, brigade commanders are entitled to two houses (one at their duty station and another one in Kigali). Such was never the practice with RAF. Also, some soldiers unlawfully occupy the homes of people who have either gone into exile or have been killed and refuse to vacate them, with impunity. That shows that RPF (RPA) massacred the Hutus and forced them to go into exile in order to take over their property.

It was not satisfied with the Arusha Peace Agreement, as the said Agreement did not provide them such benefits. That is why it violated and resumed the war.

Even as it demonised President Habyarimana, RPF was not unaware that the people were very fond of him. It appeared impossible to oust him politically. Even the internal opposition had recently become divided. The RPF killed the President in order to clear the way to seizing power.

In addition to craving for power, the problem of the resettlement of the military refugees as part of the peaceful repatriation would ultimately crop up. With the peaceful repatriation, apart from the soldiers who had actually become citizens of the countries which had enlisted them in their armed forces, all non-military refugees were to be resettled in their respective fields of activity without difficulty. All the farmers/herders simply needed was land for their crops and animals. Skilled workers were expected to compete for jobs on the open market. Adjustments could be made in order to absorb civil servants in the public sector, while others sought employment on the job market. As the political reforms and the implementation of the multiparty system were underway, each refugee could join a party of his choice and engage in political activities without further negotiations. However, military personnel requesting to be reintegrated in the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* had to relinquish the rights acquired in the foreign armies, because, as refugees, they could not justify being members of a foreign army.

They thus took up arms against their country in order to justify their military status.

As RPF was sure of victory, its strategy being to drive the Hutus out of the country and exterminate them (See *Impuruza*, No. 17), it expected to take absolute power and create an army made up of refugee-soldiers who were serving in the armies of their host countries.

As regards democratisation, it should be recalled that a commission had been formed to seek the people's views on the best form of government for our country. The commission recommended the introduction of a multiparty system in Rwanda. However, that did not prevent or stop the RPF from launching attacks. That is when the Rwandan people in general and RAF in particular realised that RPF's hidden agenda was to seize power in Kigali using force. Indeed, that view is shared by well-informed observers and those who are familiar with the history of Rwanda (Mr. Jean Paul Harroy, *Dernier Résident du Ruanda-Urundi*; television debate in Belgium, October 1990).

The people of Rwanda are the victims of the current state of affairs viewed from a geopolitical standpoint, and the superpowers' fight for domination.

Although RPF wanted to seize power, in a sense, it helped further the plan of certain superpowers for a presence in the heart of Africa to enable them to not only have easy control over the rest of the continent but also to spread their culture and influence.

The RPF readily conspired with them, because they had a common goal. The uncalled-for defence of RPF's interests by the United States and Anglo-Saxon presence in Rwanda speak for themselves.

Moreover, everyone knows those who sponsored the war against Rwanda, with Uganda as an intermediary. Indeed, the Arusha Peace Agreement did not provide for the repayment of the debts contracted by RPF. The RPF had no choice but to resume the war

– if only because it was instigated or threatened by its sponsors – seize power and exploit the Hutus in order to settle its debts. Evidence of that is the current plundering of the country's reserves.

Section 2: November 1990 – December 1992

§1. Resumption of hostilities by RPF

Having been defeated in the Mutara region, RPF retreated to Uganda and later opened up a new front at Byumba (Gatuna, Kivuye and Cyungo) on 3 November 1990, and continued shelling Rwandan territory from Uganda. All the attacks from Byumba were also quickly repelled and the assailants driven back into Uganda. By the time the head of State visited Gabiro, on 7 December 1990, there were no more enemies on Rwandan soil.

Dissatisfied with ensuing negotiations (clearly, what RPF wanted was not peace, but seizing power by force), it launched an attack on the town of Ruhengeri on 23 January 1991 and carried out the selective killing of the Hutu civilian population and several gendarmes at the Muhoza gendarmerie station; it opened the doors of Ruhengeri prison, took "its people". That is when the escaped convicts seized the opportunity to disperse and create insecurity throughout the region. The RPF's selective killings caused ethnic clashes and anger among the population.

Moreover, RPF engaged in torture and mutilation. It gathered people in houses or public places and massacred them by shooting them, throwing grenades at them or by torching the houses.

Moreover, it violated the ceasefire agreement signed in N'sele on 29 March 1991 by launching several attacks and shelling Ruhengeri, Byumba and Mutara. The Ministry of Defence letter (No. 075/01.1.9 dated 4 February 1992) vividly describes the situation during the months of December 1991 and January 1992; so does the fax addressed to the MINAFEET as regards the period 3-18 June 1991. The killings and destruction of the camps for displaced persons at Rwebare and Rukomo reflect RPF's brutality. Because of the June 1992 attacks on Byumba, 300,000 people were forced to leave their homes and flock to camps for displaced persons. The RPF mistreated war prisoners and the many civilians who were kidnapped in the buffer zone and/or forcibly enlisted in RPA ranks (letter No. 2201/06.1.9 dated 6 October 1992, Ministry of Defence). Moreover, RPF stepped up its recruitment and infiltration of the opposition parties (Joint Declaration, Brussels, 29 May 1992). That led to an increase in political demonstrations, as well as ethnic and political clashes.

Shyongu and Kigali-Ville: November 1992 – Gisenyi, Ruhengeri, Kibuye, and Cyangugu: November – December 1992, January 1993.

In addition to that, it launched grenade and bomb attacks and laid mines with the clear intent of causing chaos in the country. The negotiations enabled RPF to prepare new attacks rather than seek durable peace (letter No. 1661/01.1.0 dated 16 August 1992, Ministry of Defence). Hence, while the Government's efforts were focused on the negotiations (in compliance with the Arusha ceasefire protocol, repeated concessions), RPF engaged in subversive activities (letter No. 2098/06.1.0 dated 23 September 1992, Ministry of Defence). Even as that was going on, recruitment and sensitisation were in full swing and young Tutsis were organizing clandestine training in archery and other military skills (letter No. 2460/06.1.0 of 28 October 1992, Ministry of Defence and letter No. 2894/06.1.9 of 17 December 1992, Ministry of Defence).

§ 2. Activities of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*

When the October 1990 war ended, RAF provided security at the borders and played a role in preventing and cracking down on ethnic unrest in the areas concerned. They also intervened in Kabaya *sous-préfecture*, Mutara *Commune* and Ruhengeri *prefecture* when RPF attacked Ruhengeri town on 23 January 1991. While RPF violated the N'sele [ceasefire] Agreement as amended in Gbadolite, RAF were engaged in warding off its attacks, providing security for the civilian population and protecting the integrity of the country's borders. That was the case during RPF's widespread attacks on Ruhengeri, Byumba and Mutara, in June 1992. The Gendarmerie also participated in missions to restore and maintain order during political demonstrations in the wake of the introduction of the multiparty system (Constitution of 10 June 1991) and the installation of the coalition Government in April 1992 made up of the MRND, CDR, PSD, PL and PDC parties.

Section 3: January 1993 – 4 August 1993

§ 1. Resumption of hostilities by RPF

While RAF were engaged in the important task of restoring law and order following the ethnic unrest of late 1992 and had dispatched elements to protect displaced persons, RPF launched a large-scale attack on Ruhengeri town, as well as on Ruhengeri and Byumba *prefectures* on 8 February 1993, in violation of the N'sele Ceasefire Agreement, of 29 March 1991, as amended at Gbadolite on 16 September 1991 and at Arusha on 12 July, 1992. During the attack, it massacred tens of thousands of Hutus (intellectuals, administrative, political and judicial officials, as well as peasants). As the attack was severely condemned by both the people of Rwanda and the international community, the RPF was ordered to return to the positions it occupied before 8 February 1993 and a buffer zone was created to separate RPF from the Government forces (RAF). However, RPF did not fully evacuate the zone. It continued to engage in terrorist activities there, setting up roadblocks and conducting patrols. It massacred elected officials after suffering humiliating defeat in the elections for *bourgmestres* and *conseillers* in the said zone. It

continued violating the ceasefire agreement so as to provoke RAF into launching a counter-attack and use that as a pretext for resuming the war.

§ 2. Activities of the Forces Armées Rwandaises

While continuing with the mission of protecting displaced persons and restoring order, RAF resisted and warded off RPF attack. After the creation of the buffer zone, RAF went about raising awareness about the Arusha peace negotiations and the measures aimed at ensuring the successful implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, including the demobilisation and integration of the Armed Forces of both parties. They strictly abided by the ceasefire (See related directives).

They supported the coalition government's efforts to restore peace.

Section 4: 4 August 1993 – 6 April 1994

§1. Violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement by the RPF

After the 4 August 1993 signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, putting an end to the war, RPF continued on the course that would inevitably lead to war:

- It violated the ceasefire
- It set up combat positions
- [Supplies in material (weapons *missing segment*) and ammunition] did not cease despite the presence of UNOMUR, deployed at the Rwanda-Uganda border
- It engaged in large-scale infiltration of the government zone
- It recruited personnel
- It increased sensitisation and incitement of hatred and violence by Radio Muhabura
- Its infiltrators, in collaboration with UNAMIR's RPF team, engaged in widespread acts of terrorism and selective killings of political leaders in order to, once again, provoke ethnic unrest

The Arusha Peace Agreement provided for the pre-positioning of RPF battalion charged with providing security for RPF authorities in Kigali. The battalion, based at the CND, turned out to be a Trojan horse and prepared the war (recruitment, infiltration of men and weapons, distribution of weapons to Tutsis, setting up of combat positions, etc.). Vehicles traveling to Mulindi would take recruits and bring back more soldiers and arms on their return trip. At the end of March, there were an estimated 3,000 RPF infiltrators in Kigali. That is how heavy weapons, including SAM 7 missiles, were introduced into the CND.

§ 2. Approach of the Forces Armées Rwandaises (RAF)

In addition to performing the task of protecting displaced persons and maintaining order, RAF were coping with terrorist acts carried out by RPF infiltrators in the rear. At the

front, RAF strictly complied with the ceasefire. The command at all levels focused on raising the awareness of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* to the benefits of the Arusha Peace Agreement and preparing the men for demobilisation and integration. Demobilisation and integration committees were formed and criteria for demobilisation were formulated and communicated to the troops.

Directives on the rules of procedure were issued and well received.

Section 5: 6 April – 17 July 1994 (Rwandan tragedy)

§ 1. Real causes of the Rwandan tragedy

The Rwandan tragedy was caused by the war that RPF imposed on the people of Rwanda; the war upset the peace of a people who had been living in harmony for 17 years, thanks to the Peace and Unity policy; it reignited resentment and inflamed violence, hatred, and intolerance. Furthermore, RPF prosecuted the war by systematically killing the Hutus as it advanced.

The RPF dug in its heels throughout the war, as its intent in starting the war was to destroy whatever had been achieved in the political domain and the repatriation of the refugees, as those achievements were viewed as an obstacle to its quest for power. It considered the ceasefire and negotiations as an opportunity to reorganise itself in order to launch a more deadly offensive.

Despite the benefit of the lion's share and the concessions made by the Rwandan Government in the Arusha Peace Agreement and, RPF was not satisfied, because the Agreement did not provide for its having absolute power; it therefore stayed on the war course. It meddled in the internal affairs of the government and the political parties in a bid to obstruct the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and use that as a pretext to resume the war.

The RPF's tactic prompted renewed awareness among the political parties, which had become allies out of self-interest. The parties realised that RPF was double-faced and that they had been taken in for quite some time. The signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement ended the marriage of convenience contracted in Brussels between RPF and the parties united under the umbrella of *Forces Démocratiques du Changement* [democratic forces for change].

The renewed awareness led to the formation of a common front in keeping things in check, because RPF wanted it all. In a bid to thwart this move, RPF assassinated influential political leaders and threatened others. The assassination victims included Félicien Gatabazi, National Secretary of the PSD party, who was assassinated during the night of 21 to 22 February 1994, and Martin Bucyana, CDR party Chairman, who was assassinated on 22 February 1994. The people threatened included Stanislas

Mbonampeka of the PL party, Donat Murego, National Secretary of the MRND party, and Justin Mugenzi, PL party Chairman.

It will be recalled that on 18 May 1993, RPF assassinated Emmanuel Gapyisi, leader of the MDR party for Gikongoro *prefecture*, president of the *Forum Paix et Démocratie* [peace and democracy forum], which was formed after RPF's February 1993 bloody attacks on the Hutu civilian populations in Ruhengeri and Byumba *prefectures*. The *Forum* condemned RPF's crimes and urged the Hutus to form a common front to fight it. The assassination intimidated the members of the *Forum*, as they did not pursue their goals.

However, they were not intimidated by the assassination of Félicien Gatabazi and Martin Bucyana or by threats and failed attacks directed against other political party leaders.

As President Habyarimana symbolised unity, despite his being calculatingly demonised by RPF and its sponsors in a bid to tarnish his image, RPF assassinated him on 6 April 1994 and resumed hostilities in order to, once again, impair the renewed awareness of the Hutus and seize power by force. It was not unaware that by assassinating the President, it would trigger ethnic unrest and clashes which would enable it to massacre the Hutus during what it termed "punitive expeditions". However, it was unaware that its heinous act would spark things off and set the entire country ablaze.

As the country could not deploy soldiers on every square inch, RPF personnel, dressed in military uniform or civilian clothes, would circumvent [RAF positions to go and massacre the civilian population. This aroused the people's instinct to self-preservation *missing segment*]. The same night, RPF elements who had infiltrated the city of Kigali, began carrying out killings in the various parts of the city and to fire shots in order to cause panic and confusion. Already, in the morning of 7 April 1994, RPF battalion based at the CND went out and took strategic positions in the city of Kigali, particularly in Remera, Kicukiro, Gikondo, Gatsata, and Gisozi. Groups of infiltrators in the city emerged from their hiding places. In the afternoon, the bulk of RPF battalion at the CND attacked the Presidential Guard barracks at Kimihurura, while the pre-positioned detachments started to fire shots and barricade the roads leading into the city.

The RPF battalion at the CND unleashed its heavy artillery and began pounding the Kacyiru gendarmerie barracks and certain parts of the city. At the front, RPF troops started advancing, crossed the buffer zone and attacked *Forces Armées Rwandaises* positions in Byumba, Ruhengeri, and Mutara. Everywhere they passed, the FPR indiscriminately massacred more Hutu peasants, intellectuals, women, elderly people and children than it done before. During the three and a half months of fighting and after, RPF steadfastly carried out its plan consisting in the genocide of the Hutus, with the view to establish a numerical Hutu-to-Tutsi balance and the end of the "myth of the majority Hutu ethnic group". It therefore rejected the ceasefire RAF proposed on 7 and 12 April 1994 in order to free up military personnel for law enforcement duties, and opposed the



negotiations undertaken to that effect. The RPF thus thwarted the efforts of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* by preventing them from intervening to put end to the ethnic massacres.

§ 3. Reaction of the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*

On hearing the news of the attack on the Presidential plane, the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* issued a message to the Nation through the ministry of defence, urging the people to remain calm. The message was broadcast in the early morning hours on 7 April 1994. A crisis committee was formed 7 April 1994 in the morning, and was charged with the task facilitating the putting in place of institutions and functions.

The committee, in turn, addressed a pacification message to the Nation in the evening of 7 April 1994. The message also urged RPF to cease hostilities they had resumed in order and allow the restoration of peace. Pacification orders were given to units. Despite the resumption of hostilities by RPF, the gendarmerie provided protection to the people under their care (parishes, hotels, etc.) in the places it could reach, and went on pacification tours in the places where it had not come under attack by pre-positioned RPF groups.

On 11 April 1994, it issued another pacification message to the population.

On 12 April 1994, RAF command proposed a truce to RPF in order to negotiate a ceasefire, free up troops for law enforcement duties and embark on the putting in place of the Broad-Based transitional institutions [*missing segment*] massacres at the expense of the population. On several occasions, the Ministry of Defence and the Army and Gendarmerie General Staffs urged the members of the public to remain calm. All the efforts were in vain until RPF threatened to sequester the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* delegation to the UNAMIR Headquarters at the Amahoro Hotel, on 17 June 1994. The negotiations were suspended. During three and a half months of fighting, the military authorities issued repeated pacification messages by means of communiqués and interviews. The RPF ignored the recommendations made at the OAU Summit held in Tunis according to which the warring parties were to mark an immediate ceasefire.

CHAPTER II: ACCUSATIONS AGAINST THE RPF: PLANNING AND EXECUTION  
OF THE GENOCIDE BY RPA

Section 1. Genocide of the Hutus at the hands of RPA

§ 1. The RPA plan for the Hutu genocide

I. Incitement of hatred and violence

The RPF planned the Hutu genocide by inciting ethnic hatred and violence, fostering aggressiveness and conceit amongst the Tutsis and putting the Hutus on the defensive:

- Already in the 1980s, in his review, *Impuruza* (mobilisation for combat, warning) edited in California, Alexandre Kimenyi embarked on a campaign aimed at mobilizing the Tutsis all over the world against the Hutus in Rwanda
- In December 1990, in Issue No, 17 of *Impuruza*, Kimenyi stated that the Tutsis had to expel the Hutus from Rwanda or exterminate them (physical and genetic extermination)
- Since 1990, the RPR radio station, *Radio Muhabura*, has instigated and exacerbated ethnic tension
- In February 1993, the pro-RPF newspaper, *Kanguka*, wrote: "When will RPF arrive so that the Hutus can also go into exile for 30 years."
- In a special communiqué issued by the MDR party on 24 October 1992, Faustin Twagiramungu, RPF accomplice, who had infiltrated the MDR and later became RPF Prime Minister, incited the people to rise up, use force and challenge the authorities
- The war RPF started on 1 October 1990, the incessant ceasefire violations, the violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the massacre of the Hutu populations wherever it passed and often on the indication of Tutsis, the assassination of Hutu political leaders by RPF, the infiltration of combatants and equipment, the arming of Tutsis, the 6 April 1994 assassination of the heads of state of Rwanda and Burundi and their delegations, including the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff; RPF's simultaneous resumption of the war on all fronts on 7 April 1994...those were all factors that caused a great deal of suffering among the people and forced them to defend themselves out of despair.

Throughout the war, the Tutsis cheered every RPF achievement while the Hutus were left in mourning and anxiety. That was particularly the case in urban areas, where the Tutsis feasted while the Hutus grieved. The Tutsis provoked the Hutus in public and private schools, threatening them by saying that they were bound for exile and that the RPF were coming. The worst was avoided thanks to President Habyarimana, whom the people regarded as the symbol of unity and peace despite the aspirations of RPF and their

accomplices, from among the power-hungry politicians. In that sense, President Habyarimana's assassination destroyed the very foundation of peace and unity.

I. The RPF's misleading media campaign

The RPF's strategy had always consisted in stirring up ethnic unrest, because it was aware that the Tutsi majority ethnic group would ultimately be the victims thereof. Its aim was to claim that it was a "genocide," that way it could set the international community against the Hutus and thus justify its attacks. It will be recalled that already in 1990 and January 1993, RPF had attempted to accuse the Rwandan Government of genocide following the clashes which took place in the *Communes* of Kibilira, Mutara, Kayove, Rutsiro, and Ndusu. The RPF used genocide as a trump card in order to win support from the international community. In every case, the regime in place and RAF averted clashes and thereby torpedoed RPF's evil designs. The RPF massacred Hutu elected officials and political leaders in order to rouse anger and unrest; once again, the regime in place and RAF were able to deal with the situation. The aim of RPF in assassinating political leaders was to cause unrest and use that as a pretext to resume hostilities, massacre the Hutus in what it termed "punitive expeditions," and thereby realise its genocide plan consisting in trimming down the Hutu majority without attracting the attention of the international community.

Hence, RPF's lists, on the basis of which certain countries to issue arrest warrants before the completion of the ITR investigations, contain names of people that RPF wants to "put out of action" because it considers them to be a problem.

Examples:

- Major General Augustin Bizimungu is an RPF target, because, while he was commander of the Ruhengeri Operation sector, RPF suffered many a humiliating defeat and loss. He makes Kagame feel insecure because the Rwandan people are very fond of him; besides, he is educated and properly trained. Kagame does not want him in the National Army provided for under the Arusha Peace Agreement, because he would become the chief of staff, and Kagame would only be his assistant. Major General Bizimungu was appointed army chief of staff on 17 April 1994 but did not take up his duties until 21 April 1994, i.e. two weeks after the outbreak of the war and the massacres that his predecessor, Brigadier General Marcel Gatsinzi, had failed to stop. Moreover, RPF had rejected the ceasefire and was pursuing the war, thus preventing RAF from freeing up personnel for law enforcement duties. Nevertheless, RAF's efforts as well as their pacification messages to the people and RAF show that they were genuinely pursuing peace.
- Likewise, Brigadier General Gratien Kabiligi is an RPF target, because, while he was commander of the Byumba Operation sector, RPF suffered many losses (he inflicted severe losses on RPF, which did not to have him in the national army

either. And yet, this is a trained officer known for his valour...*missing segment*) +  
[*unintelligible segment*]

- Retired Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, *Directeur de Cabinet* of the Ministry of Defence, assumed his responsibilities as a politician in collaboration with RAF command during the difficult moments and the institutional void created by the assassination of the President, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana. Thanks to his determination, the coup d'état RPF was preparing to carry out within three days was foiled. Kagame does not want to see him as long as he lives.
- Lt. Colonel Anatole Nsengiyumva, who was head of the military intelligence service of the Rwandan Army General Staff until June 1993, possesses a great deal of information of RPF's brutality, deceit, bad faith and weaknesses. He is another person Kagame does not want to see in the National Army.
- All the officers who served with the Presidential Guard Battalion. Kagame hates and demonises them in the same way as he hated and demonised President Habyarimana.

In the final analysis, RPF drew up the list of alleged genocide perpetrators as a part of his intellectual genocide plan consisting in eliminating the entire Hutu elite, as it was the obstacle to establishing the regime of the minority Tutsi ethnic group. As regards the Presidential Guard Battalion, which RPF, the media, and all the other detractors accuses of all the crimes, one wonders how it could have gone all across the country massacring the Tutsis while at the same time defending against the UNAMIR-backed RPF attacks on its Kimihurura barracks. The RAF recognise that some people in military uniform committed massacres. It should be mentioned that it was not possible to distinguish the Presidential Guard from the rest. It is therefore unfair to point the finger at the Presidential Guard, particularly its officers. The fact of the matter is that RPF harbours hard feelings against the Presidential Guard, as explained earlier. In fact, it suggested its dissolution during the Arusha negotiations. The RPF does not want to have the Presidential Guard personnel in the National Army ranks.

- It (RPF) killed the head of State knowing that ethnic unrest would ensue, and immediately launched hostilities on all fronts in order to keep the *Forces Armées [Rwandaises]* from cracking down on the unrest. Indeed, if RPF had accepted the ceasefire proposed by RAF right after the resumption of hostilities, on 7 April 1994, and put down its arms, RAF would have had troops available for law enforcement duties and stopped the unrest without difficulty.
- Thanks to its misleading military campaign, RPF convinced the international community that President Habyarimana was a tyrant who was disliked by his people and that his political and/or physical elimination would be greeted with a sense of relief. That is how it won allies who helped it to realise its evil plan. However, President Habyarimana's death proved the contrary.
- The RPF and its sponsors claim that the Tutsi genocide was prepared by President Habyarimana, his circle and RAF. However, logic would dictate that the person

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who plans genocide also expects to carry it out. Now, given that the President's assassination is what triggered the ethnic massacres, the question is: did the President play martyr in order to trigger the genocide by personally ordering his assassins to shoot down his plane on his return from Dar es Salaam? Did the President's circle, specifically his wife, order his assassination? And why would she have acted in that manner? Could the Rwandan Army deprive itself of its supreme Chief, Major General Juvénal Habyarimana, and Chief of Staff, General Déogratias Nsabimana, who were well liked and respected by the *Forces Armées* as a whole, knowing that their death would create chaos in the army and that RPF would make capital thereof?

The RAF were in favour of President Habyarimana, whom they liked and respected as their elder brother and supreme chief.

Furthermore, the Presidential plane was shot down using a Soviet-made SAM-7 missile, which the *Forces Armées* never had; besides, no one within the *Forces Armées* knew how to use them. Moreover, since the October 1990 war, RPF had shot down RAF planes using projectiles (one reconnaissance plane at Matimba on 3 October 1990, one Gazelle helicopter at Nyakayaga on 23 October 1990, one Ecureuil helicopter in Cyeru *commune*, Ruhengeri *prefecture* on 13 March 1993). Captain Barril obtained eyewitness testimony. Also, a Belgian UNAMIR soldier told the Rwandan army military intelligence service that RPF battalion at the CND had SAM-7 missiles. Only RPF soldiers and the Belgian UNAMIR contingent knew how to use them. Furthermore, when the war started, RPF swore to eliminate President Habyarimana both politically and physically.

- Considering the presumptions, the assassin is the one who benefits from the crime. There is no foundation for accusing RAF of this crime, as they had nothing to gain from it even if they had defeated RPF militarily in the April-July 1994 war. Indeed, the successive RAF victories since October 1990 did not bring an end to the conflict. For their part, RAF welcomed the Arusha Peace Agreement despite the substantial concessions made to RPF. They did not expect any benefit besides the reestablishment of peace in the country, something the people of Rwanda thought they had achieved with the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, on 4 April 1994. Indeed, it will be recalled that RAF have always supported the Arusha Peace Agreement and, in fact, they demand its implementation *mutatis mutandis*. On the other hand, the fact that RPF stands to benefit from the crime needs no further proof. It not only afforded it an opportunity to fulfill its long-standing craving for absolute power, but it also enabled them to carry out, by means of successive reactions, the annihilation of the Hutu ethnic group as a form of revenge.

## § 2. The Hutu genocide

### I. 1 October 1990 – 4 April 1993

RAF Command in ExileA. *Massacre of the civilian population*

In the early days of the fighting, RPF encountered few problems, as the Mutara region was inhabited mainly by ethnic Hima herders, a pro-RPF component of the Tutsi ethnic group. As they advanced, the *Inkotanyi* quickly became disillusioned, because the people put up fierce resistance. They thus started to carry out all manner of brutal acts: looting, forced recruitment, including that of children, kidnappings, massacres, torture and mutilation (ripping people's stomachs open, cutting off women's breasts, lopping off genitals, gouging people's eyes out, cutting people's tongues, etc.)

Already in 1990, in a bid to justify the massacre of thousands of Hutu civilians, Jacques Bihogagara, then RPF spokesperson in Europe, stated this: "Everyone must pay, even those who are not directly concerned" (*Africa International*, No. 260). Hence, RPF executed the plan to exterminate the Hutus, including children, old people, disabled people and pregnant women. Hundreds of people were grouped together in houses and public places and brutally massacred using guns, grenades, bayonets (breasts cut off, eyes gouged out, genitals lopped off, pregnant women's wombs ripped open, old people's stomachs ripped open, etc). Patients were atrociously killed in hospitals and health centres during raids or shelling. People displaced by war were pursued in their camps and savagely massacred. During the bloody attack of 8 February 1993, over 150,000 Hutu civilians were segregated and massacred, and over 1,000,000 victims were displaced (AJR: "*Rwanda l'autre face du genocide*," p. 25). In fact, according to *Radio Muhabura*, the resumption of hostilities on 8 February 1993 was "an RPF punitive raid on the Hutus following the massacre of the Bagogwe, a people of Tutsi origin." The following examples illustrate how the plan was executed:

- In October 1990, RPA massacred tens of thousands of Hutu civilians (mainly peasants) in and around the Mutara region during an invasion that began on 1 October 1990
- Between 23 January 1991 (invasion of Ruhengeri town) and April 1991, tens of thousands of Hutus were massacred by RPF-*Inkotanyi*
- On 23 January 1991, it is estimated that tens of thousands of civilians were savagely massacred. In fact, a number of Tutsis of Bagogwe descent, who did not favour the RPF, were massacred by RPF combatants in the *Communes* of Kinigi and Nkuli
- On 19 February 1991, three hundred civilians were executed in the localities of Kinigi and Kigombe outside Ruhengeri
- In March 1991, RPA attacked a camp for Rwandan refugees in Tanzania killing around ten people
- The RPF has carried out bomb attacks since 1992, killing dozens of people

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- In June 1992, during RPF attack on Byumba, it killed tens of thousands of innocent civilians. Up to 350,000 people were displaced and more than 50 of them died from starvation or disease each day
- In September 1992, RPA attacked Nyabwishongwezi in Mutara, massacring thousands of [missing segment?] Hutus, causing the exodus of hundreds of Hutu displaced persons
- Between 8 and 26 February, during a NRA-backed RPA attack on Ruhengeri town, the Base area, Byumba and Ngarama, Hutu civilians (peasants, civil servants, teachers, traders and students) were systematically massacred. More than 150,000 were killed and up to 1,000,000 people were displaced
- At the Gasiza health centre (Kigali *Commune*), over 50 patients, including a one-day old baby, and the entire staff were executed on 12 February 1993
- At Musanze secondary school (Kigombe *Commune*), 22 Hutu pupils were grouped together and killed with grenades on 8 February 1993
- At Nyamagumba (Kigombe *Commune*), 18 women and five babies were grouped together in a house and killed with bayonets on 8 February 1993
- On 10 February 1993, several people were tortured, mutilated (tongues cut, eyes gouged out) and killed with grenades after being grouped together in houses at Nyamagumba, Ruhengeri.
- On 11 February 1993, 1,500 people were grouped together in the Kidaho *Commune* office compound and mowed down with a machine gun
- During the night of 11 to 12 February 1993, more than 500 people were grouped together and killed in Nyarutovu *Commune*
- Between 8 and 15 February 1993, more than 185 people were massacred at Base trading centre (Byumba), in Bwesige *Commune*
- On 17 February 1993, three hundred persons seeking safe haven from war were massacred at Rebero camp, Bwesige *Commune*
- In the *Communes* of Cyungo, Buyoga, Kibali, Tumba and Ngarama, more than 10,000 peasants were killed in February-March 1993
- A mass grave containing more than 157 bodies was discovered in RPF zone in March 1993
- The Hutu leaders assassinated during that period include:
  - GAPYISI, Emmanuel, MDR leader, who was assassinated on 18 May 1993 outside his residence at Kicukiro, Kigali; his family believes that he was assassinated by RPF and Faustin Twagiramungu
  - RWAMBUKA, Fidèle, MRND *bourgemestre* of Kanzenze *Commune*

B. *Reference Documents*

- Near Ruhengeri town, people were grouped together in houses and killed with grenades or edged weapons. Some of them had their eyes gouged out (Telegram OPS/93/311, of 11 February 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Commander). Those

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atrocities were observed by, among others, Ministry of Defence and ORINFOR journalists who visited the area on 14 February 1993 (Telegram OPS/93/340 of February 1994 from the Ruhengeri Ops Cmd). They also discovered a mass grave containing an estimated 70 bodies in Gashangiro *secteur*, Mukingo *Commune* (Telegram OPS/93/670 of 25 March 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Command). That same night of 7 to 8 February 1993, RPF attacked camps for displaced persons, including Kisaro and Rebero. Several displaced persons were killed there.

- The massacres continued in the zone RPF had recently occupied. For example, in Nkumba and Kidaho *Communes*, around 15 February, RPF called the population to attend rallies. Once the people were grouped together, willingly or forcibly, it killed them using grenades (Telegram OPS/93/340 of 14 February 1993 from Ruhengeri Ops Command). Likewise, during the night of 15 to 16 February 1993, no less than 500 civilians were killed around Mucaca and Kabuye. During the night of 23 to 24 February 1993, RPF elements kidnapped an estimated 100 people who had taken refuge at the Mugali Adventist church, Shingiro, Mukingo *Commune* (Telegram OPS/93/434 of 24 February 1993 from the Ruhengeri Ops Command).

The said kidnappings took place in Ruhengeri and Mutara. In fact, in early March 1993, a large number of people (over 2,000), mainly women and children from Kigasha, Rufunda and Ruyonza, poured into Nyagatare in the wake of the kidnappings of the previous nights (Telegram OPS/93/1134 of 3 March 1993 of the Kibungo Operations Commander). Such unlawful activities continued, the victims being people who were trying to return to their homes in search of their belongings (Telegram OPS/93/1228 of 7 March 1993 from the Mutara Ops Command). Some people were deported to Uganda. Others were taken to Gisoro from Nkumba (Telegram OPS/93/596 of 15 March 1993 from the Ruhengeri Operations Commander).

- On 9 March 1993, RPF fired on Byumba town with multi-barreled rocket launchers, killing two prisoners (Telegram INT/OPS/93/730 of 9 March 1993 from the Byumba Operations Commander).
- During the night of 9 to 10 March 1993, another massacre took place at Shingiro (Telegram OPS/93/542 of 10 March 1993 from the Ruhengeri Operations Commander).
- Other mass graves were discovered much later. For example, on 19 March 1993, the local civilian population found an estimated 20 bodies in a mass grave near the convent in Ngarama (Telegram OPS/93/1450 of 19 March 1993 and OPS/93/1505 of 21 March 1993 from the Mutara Operations Commander). Likewise, on 6 April 1993, the people of Rukore *secteur*, Cyeru *Commune*, reported a mass grave near the primary school. More than 100 civilians were buried there (Telegram OPS/93/1198 of 6 April 1993, from the Rulindo Operations Commander).



II. 4 August 1994 (signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement) – 6 April 1994

C. *Massacre of the civilian population*

There is evidence that following the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, on 4 August 1993, RPF undermined the nascent peace process. That is evidenced by the many reprehensible acts that were consistent with RPF's strategy and *modus operandi*.

Such acts included violence against the people in the DMZ (buffer zone), repeated attacks to massacre the civilian population, preparations for the resumption of hostilities, including, procurement of arms and ammunition, and political assassinations, and led to the inefaceable Rwandan tragedy and violated the Agreement RPF had signed freely.

- The Hutu leaders assassinated during this period include:
  - GATABAZI, Felicien, PSD party leader, during the night of 21 to 22 February 1994, in Kigali, outside his residence in Kimihurura, Kigali
  - BUCYANA, Martin, CDR party leader, on 22 February 1994 in Butare
  - The director of the Cyohoha-Rukeli tea factory, his assistants and part of their families, in RPF zone, in March 1994
- Massacres in the *Communes* of Kidaho, Nkumba, Nyamugali, Cyeru and Butare during the night of 17 to 18 November 1993 which left 51 dead and several wounded.
- Massacre in Mutara *Commune* during the night of 29 to 30 November 1993, and broad-daylight massacre in Ngenda *Commune*, on 29 November 1993.
- A mass grave containing over 80 bodies was discovered in the Cyohoha-Rukeli tea plantations in March 1994.
- Throughout the war, RPF tried to incite ethnic unrest so it could use it as a pretext to resume the war [sic] and claim to be liberators. Each time, the security forces were able to halt the unrest and restore order.
- Moreover, as the perpetrator of the ignominious assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana on the fateful day of 6 April 1994, the RPF, are responsible for the Rwandan tragedy and the situation in which the majority of the Rwandan population has been languishing since then.
- The RPF realised its genocide plan by assassinating the head of State, the ultimate form of provocation.

- In order to prevent the authorities from achieving pacification (and the actions of RAF aimed at restoring order, it immediately launched an all-out offensive [missing segment] + [unintelligible segment]. The offensive enabled them to massacre a large number of Hutus and make it look like revenge before the ill-informed international community, whereas it was part of the plan. Public opinion was blinded, brainwashed and misled thanks to the sensational media campaign on the massacres of the Tutsis. It was claimed that all the dead bodies exposed by RPF were those of Tutsis killed by Hutu militia, whereas the civil war touched all the ethnic groups. One cannot overlook the fact that, often, the victims were Hutus who had been surrounded and killed by RPF in the conquered zones under its control. The RPF rejected RAF's proposal for a truce and ceasefire in order to free up troops for restoring order. Yet, according to the study conducted by the International Centre for Peace Initiatives and Conflict Resolution in Africa (ICPCRA), the Belgian Ambassador to Kenya revealed RPF plan in its entirety. He stated that "thanks to the Rwandan tragedy, it was possible to make a fresh start and build a brilliant future for an ethnically-balanced country led by the new RPF government." That shows that RPF's systematic massacre of the Hutus was aimed at attaining numerical ethnic balance.

#### D. Reference Documents

- Telegram INT/OPS/93/13909 of 2 September 1992, at 0900 hours, from the Army General Staff, for the Ruhengeri Operations Commander). Condemnation of RPF violation: "(...) The matter of the violation of the buffer zone by RPF combatants will be brought to the attention of NMOG authorities for investigation."
- Letter No. 065/G2/2/4 of 10 November 1993 (memo from the Army Chief of Staff): Paragraph 4: "As RPF (Kayitare battalion) is threatening and killing people in Bwisige Commune, the *bourgemestre*, with the support of the people of Bwisige Commune, has requested the commander of the UN forces in Rwanda that his forces take full control of security. Please be informed that the *Commune* staff has fled because of the deplorable situation."
- Letter No. 3601/06/1/9 of 12 November 1993 from the Ministry of Defence to the Commander of the United Nations Assistance Mission to Rwanda (UNAMIR): "During the night of 6 to 7 November 1993, around midnight, RPF elements killed an instructor at the CERAI, Bwisige (DMZ), named Ildéphonse Bizimana, of Mukarange Commune, wounded the CERAI director, named Mbaruta, and kidnapped the *consellier* of Bwisige Secteur, named Ndagije; the latter managed to escape and take refuge in Butare. His wife was reported missing and the children sustained grenade wounds. Other unidentified persons were kidnapped; in fact, there are continuing reports of kidnappings... We request your assistance in ensuring that RPF combatants stop massacring defenceless civilians..."
- Ministry of Defence press release of 21 November 1993: "The *Forces Armées Rwandaises*, through the Ministry of Defence, severely condemn [the atrocities

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perpetrated on the night of 17 to 18 November 1993 in Kidaho, Nkumba, *missing segment*] Cyeru and Nyamugali *Communes* in Ruhengeri *Préfecture*... The *Forces Armées Rwandaises* state that according to reliable sources, more than 40 people lost their lives there; they were cold-bloodedly stabbed or clubbed to death. The victims include Callixte Kanyamihigo, who had been vying for the post of *bourgemestre* of Kidaho *Commune*; he was beheaded; dozens of others were seriously injured." (The commission of inquiry report established RPF's responsibility, but General Dallaire did not publish the results so as not to offend the RPF).

- Letter No. 070/G2.2.4 of 21 November 1993 (Memo to the Army Chief of Staff): Sub-paragraph 1(a): "Hence the massacres in Kidaho, Nkumba, Nyamugali and Cyeru targeted only the *bourgemestres*, *conseillers*, those vying for the post of *bourgemestre*, intellectuals and traders belonging to the MRND party..." (The victims' names are mentioned in the memo).
- Letter No. 073/G2.2.4 of 23 November 1993 (Memo to the Army Chief of Staff): "The RPF has also decided to massacre all those in the buffer zone who allegedly reported the killings it committed in Ruhengeri to UNAMIR. That is why it killed Sebihararo, son of Senzoga, a native Kidaho *Secteur*, Butete, on 22 November 1993."
- Intelligence from RPF: "(...) In the buffer zone, we are continuing to track down the trouble-makers and to protect the supporters to RPF and parties other than the MRND-CDR..." (For RPF, MRND-CDR means all Hutus).
- Telegram OPS/93/1689 of 30 November 1993 from the Commando Company to the Army General Staff "UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT attacked positions at Kabatwa last night, around 2330 hours. (...) We have also learned of the disappearance of nine civilians who had gone to fetch water in the volcano forest and are believed to have been kidnapped by the *Inkotanyi*. Many civilians have been killed; others have taken refuge around the Mutura *Commune* office and in Gisenyi."
- Telegram OPS/93/18159 of 30 November 1993 from Army General Staff to MINADEF: "Night of 29 to 30 November 1993. UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT believes that ± one P1 attacked a local civilian population in Mutara *Commune*, Gihorwe *Secteur*, Rumaranyoni *Cellule*, and Rugarama (.) UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT massacred the local civilian population. Seventeen people were reported killed, including 11 men, 4 women, and 2 children." (Their names are mentioned in the telegram).
- Telegram No. 084/G2.2.2.2 of 1 December 1993 (to the Army Chief of General Staff): Page 1 point A.2: "During the night of 18 to 19 November 1993, RPF massacred civilians in the buffer zone, in the *Communes* of Kidaho, Cyeru, Nkumba, and Nyamugali; at least 40 victims." Page 2, point 5: "On 23 November 1993, RPF killed one Mpagazehe, *responsable de cellule* for Cyimbugu, Ngarama *Secteur*, Ngarama *Commune*, Byumba [*missing segment*] *prefecture*. Page 3, point

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- 7: "RPF elements from Burundi raided Ngenda *Commune*, Nyarugenge *Secteur*, and killed 12 people, on 29 November 1993, between 1200 and 1400 hours.
- Intelligence from RPF:
    - "(...) You must rid the buffer zone of civilians with MRND-CDR affiliations (...)"
    - "... We have "news" from the enemy country; a bomb explosion in the central southern part of the enemy country has left several fatalities and scores of wounded...Encourage terrorism in the enemy country..."
  - Telegram OPS/93/1709 of 4 December 1993, 1140 hours, from the commando company to the Army General Staff: "Today, 4 December 1993, at 0910 hours, the UNAMIR patrol went up the Kalisimbi volcano, accompanied by the local people, to recover the bodies of children killed by the UNIDENTIFIED ELEMENT. Just outside Uruguno, a peasant named Iyamuremeye stepped on an anti-personnel mine (foot amputated). The UNAMIR patrol chief cancelled the mission and took the wounded individual to the hospital".
  - Intelligence from RPF: "...Our elements all across the enemy country have been instructed to intensify terrorist acts there."
  - Letter No. 2862/G2.2.2.2 of 17 December 1993 from the Gendarmerie General Staff to MINADEF: "In the 'demilitarized' zone, RPF massacred more than 40 people in cold blood during the night of 17 to 18 November 1993, in the Kidho (sic), Cyeru, Nkumba, Nyamugali and Butare *Communes*. The main targets were MRND party members: men and women of all ages and from all walks of life. On 20 November 1993, four people were stabbed to death with bayonets in Buyonga and Tumba *Communes*."
  - Letter No. 005/G2/2/4 of 5 January 1994 (note to the Army Chief of Staff): Sub-paragraph 1 (d): "The RPF is still killing people in the DMZ. Indeed, its combatants have just killed Mr. Kalimunda, *conseiller de secteur* for Gakoma, Ngarama *Commune*, and Byumba *Préfecture*."
  - Letter No. 0076/G2.2.2 of 10 January 1994 from the Gendarmerie General Staff to the Minister of Defence): Paragraph 3: "The same day, a UNAMIR patrol discovered the bodies of six children strangled during an RPF attack at Kabatwa-Mutura, on 6 December 1993." (Once again, General ~~Dallaire~~ neglected to publish the investigation report implicating RPF).
  - Letter No. 025/G2.4 of 21 January 1994 (note to the RA Chief of Staff): Page 1, point2: "Around 1050 hours, RPF soldiers left the CND aboard a Toyota Hilux and headed towards Chez Lando hotel, after driving through the group of demonstrators. On their way back, they fired at the demonstrators and the houses along the road, which belong to CDR party members. The demonstrators dispersed...The RPF soldiers entered the CND [*missing segment*] compound. Several persons, as yet unidentified, were wounded."
  - Letter No. 027/G2.2.4 of 19 January 1994 (memo to the Army Chief of General Staff): Paragraph 1, point (g): "The *Inkotanyi* were carrying on with acts of

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violence against the people in the buffer zone. Indeed, on 18 January 1994, they killed the wife of Deny Ndayobotse, a native of Nyabihanga *Secteur*, Bwisige *Commune*, after raping her; they later killed her husband when he came to enquire about the situation."

- Letter No. 15/MINUAR/LN/SITREP/94 of 31 January 1994, from RAF/UNAMIR liaison officer to the Minister of Defence: Page 2, point 2: "Gishushu *Cellule* (Remera *Secteur*, Bwisige *Commune*) is opposite the entrance RPF battalion uses to enter the CND...In other words, the struggle in this *cellule* is ethnic in nature and is exacerbated by the presence of RPF battalion...Another factor is the unrestrained movement of RPF battalion." Point 3: "According to the Hutus in the *cellule* the Tutsis provide intelligence to RPF battalion with the aim of eliminating those who do not share their ideology. Some RPF supporters, such as (1) Busangwa...(2) Ngarama used to spend the night with RPF battalion so as to conduct operations in the *cellule*."
- Letter No. 062/G3.4.6 of 10 March 1994 from the Byumba squad to the Minister of Defence: "...The gun murder committed reported during the night of 15 to 16 February 1994 in Mutara, on Nyagatare ranch, specifically the one at Kinihira, targeted certain families in Muhire town; they were the main targets of the murder."
- Intelligence from RPF: "Inform the national and international audience that the MRND-CDR and their death squad are responsible for all the violence that has occurred in the buffer zone. The killings in the neutral corridor and elsewhere are due to the reign of terror and the squad."
- "...Kisoro, Gatuna, Kamwezi must step up the hunt for MRND-CDR elements in their respective buffer zones..."

### § 3. Tragedy: April 1994 - present

#### I. Massacre of the civilian population

The RPF ascribes responsibility the acts it committed on RAF, whereas it specifically massacred members of opposition parties in order to cause turmoil. As from 6 April 1994, the night of the attack on the Presidential plane, RPF infiltrators, who had been pre-positioned in various parts of Kigali, began massacring Hutus they had on file using a pre-established list. UNAMIR had previously been informed of RPF squads which scouted the residences of Hutu authorities, intellectuals, political leaders and businessmen. All across the country, infiltrated RPF squads spread terror amongst the people and started the civil war caused by the assassination of the President of the Republic [*missing segment*]. As will be shown later, in some places, the Tutsis were even incited by RPF infiltrators to attack security forces who were there to assist them...

Whereas RAF went to great lengths to try and negotiate a ceasefire, RPF did everything not to have one, as though it was unconcerned about the innocent victims of the war and

the massacres. Below are a few examples of massacres committed during the war during the period of April – July 1994 and thereafter. This shows that RPF is responsible for the Hutu genocide:

- When hostilities resumed in April 1994, hundreds of people were massacred with grenades after being grouped together in schools in Shangasha and Gipfuso, in Mugambazi *Commune* (Kigali).
- Between 7 and 20 April 1994, RPA systematically massacred thousands of Hutus at Kacyiru, Kimihurura, Remera, Gatsata and Rugenge, in Kigali City.
- Between 10 and 25 April 1994, RPA massacred more than 200 Hutus in the Kiziguro area, Murambi *Commune*, Byumba *Préfecture*. Moreover, such killings were carried out in the *Communes* of Gikoro, Gikomero, Bicumbi and Rubungo, Kigali *Préfecture*.
- In the Kabuga area (Rubungo-Kigali), over 5,000 Hutus were massacred by RPA.
- Around the end of April 1994, over 30,000 Hutus (Rwandan and Burundian) were massacred by RPA at Sake (Kibungo), Bugesera (Kigali) and Mugina (Gitarama).
- Similar killings took place in Ruhango, Nyanza, Gitarama, during RPA advance.
- On 30 April 1994, RPF threw a bomb into the Kigali General Hospital (*Centre Hospitalier de Kigali*) operating theatre. Hundreds of children were killed and several patients, general staff nurses and medical staff were injured.
- Thousands of bombs were dropped on the neighborhoods of Kigali, including the market, killing tens of thousands of civilians.
- During the night of 23 to 24 June 1994, RPF battalion based at the CND attacked the *Centre Pastoral Saint Paul* and massacred more than 200 people who had sought safe haven there.
- On 1 May 1994, RPA dropped six bombs onto a crowd of displaced persons at the *Sainte-Famille* parish, killing 13 and injuring hundreds.
- The RPA massacred tens of thousands of Hutus at the Amahoro National Stadium and at the Roi Faycal Hospital within view of the UNAMIR Blue Berets [*missing segment*].
- On 3 May 1994, RPA closed the border at Rusumo and massacred more than 20,000 Hutus as they fled to Tanzania. Thousands of bodies were dumped into the Akagera River. That happened at the beginning of the exodus toward Tanzania.
- The same day, RPF shelled the *Sainte-Famille* church, killing hundreds of people.
- On 3 June 1994, RPA massacred the Archbishop of Rwanda, Bishop Vincent Nsengiyumva, Bishops Joseph Ruzindana, Thaddée Nsengiyumva, and 13 priests at Kabgayi. Other priests had been massacred prior to that, including: Father Joaquim Valimato (Spanish) and Alexis Havigimana, Athanase Nkundabanyanga, Christian Nkuliyehe, Joseph Hitimana, Ladislav Muhayemungu, Fidèle and Gaspard Mudashimwa, all Hutus.
- After the capture of Butare, RPA massacred over 3,000 Hutus in Butare market.
- After RAF pulled out of Kigali, RPA massacred over 8,000 Hutus that they found in the city.

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- On 4 July 1994, RPF massacred several dozen civilians who had fled to the Nyabarongo-Nzove valley, Shyorongi *Commune*.
- Between 14 and 16 July 1994, RPF massacred tens of thousands of Hutus in *Communes* of Nyakabanda (Gitarama), Kibilira, Satinsyi and Ramaba (Gisenyi *prefecture*). Its main targets were the intellectuals and soldiers' families.
- More than 200 people were killed at Bweramana parish (Ramba).
- Several dozen Hutus were killed after being grouped together at Ngororera *sous-préfecture* (Gisenyi).
- Shells fired from Ndiza killed more than 5,000 civilians at Satinsyi (Gisenyi) and Ndusu (Ruhengeri).
- From 7 to 17 July 1994, RPA chased people from Ruhengeri to Gisenyi by shelling them. On 17 July 1994, RPA fired shells at refugees as they fled to Goma (Zaire), killing more than 100 of them.
- After seizing power, RPA carried out ethnic cleansing by massacring tens of thousands of Hutus on the pretext of pacifying the country.
- In August 1994, a mass grave containing more than 1,500 bodies was discovered in the volcanoes on the border between Rwanda and Zaire by the Japanese reporter [*missing segment*] Takuji-Tahara and his photographer, Yushoka, with survivors of the hecatomb, found at Jomba, Zaire (North Kivu) acting their guides. (Reporter's address: The Chunichi Shimbun – The Tokyo Shimbun No. 6-1,1-Chome, Sannomaru Nakaku, Nagoya, Japan T460-11).
- On 29 August 1994, thousands of bodies of recent victims were discovered at Mbyo, between Gako camp and Nyamata, in Bugesera.
- In September 1994, 1,750 people were killed in the Save communal forest, according to UNAMIR observers.
- In September 1994, a UNAMIR team reported finding an estimated 100 bodies at Kayumba, Bugesera.
- According to the testimony of Aimable Karekezi, a former RAF soldier, who joined RPF and subsequently deserted after hearing gruesome accounts of its atrocities:

More than 2,000 Hutus were killed by RPA near Lake Ihema and their bodies were burned. Others were dumped into Lake Ihema.

Several people were massacred between the Akagera hotel and the Akagera River, and their bodies were dumped into the river.

More than 5,000 people were killed at Nyarubuye; indeed, RPF showed Nyarubuye to the international community so as to create a diversion.

Many people were killed at Ntarama, Bugesera, near Gako camp.

Other killings took place in Camp Kigali, the Kabarondo trading centre and Sake (Kibuye), Kabgayi (Gitarama), Kibeho (Gikongoro), the Ministry of Agriculture office at Kinigi, Kabwende *Secteur*, Kagano, Mubona and Mukamira barracks (Ruhengeri), and Bigogwe barracks (Gisenyi).

- For example, RPA mass graves are reported in the following places: Ngarama, Buyoga, Kisaro, Rwamagana, Murambi, Rusomo, Nyarubuye, Kabutare, Ngororero, Tumba, Mugambazi, Bugesera, Kibali, Kabgayi, Kabagali, Gikoro, Ramba (Bweramana parish), Gikomero, Bicumbi, Kibungo (Chinese construction site), etc.
- Several thousand Hutus were massacred at Mulindi (Kibungo) and their bodies taken to Nyarubuye. Curiously, the Kigali Government turned the mass grave at this location into the prominent place of pilgrimage in memory of the Tutsi victims, whereas it contains more Hutu victims of RPA than Tutsis killed during the ethnic clashes.
- The Kigali authorities put on an act consisting in exhuming and reburying the dead. It is [therefore] possible to distinguish the graves where RPF concealed the remains of Hutu massacre victims from the ones where the local population has buried the dead due to lack of access to the cemeteries during the fighting. They did not bury those remains there in a bid to hide them, but rather to prevent the spread of disease. One such example is the mass grave near Kigali Hospital, where RPF exhumed the remains of RAF soldiers and those of the victims of RPF shelling of the Kigali General Hospital. Moreover, it is no secret that RPF had arranged to have Tutsis prepare deep graves for hiding the bodies of its victims. That is why there are still reports of disappearances.
- All across the country, RPA continues its systematic extermination of the Hutus they call "*Interahamwe*" and raids on the refugee camps in the neighboring countries. Indeed, it has made incursions into Burundi and massacred over 200 refugees there; it has attacked Birava camp in South Kivu (Zaire) and massacred 37 Hutu refugees and injured 54 others; there is also the hecatomb at the Kibeho camp for displaced people, where over 8,000 Hutus were massacred, and in Kanama *Commune*, where more than 110 people were brutally murdered. People were also massacred on Wahu Island (over 300) and Musasomwa (over 30).
- It has cunningly set the international community against the Hutus. Indeed, the world has paid little attention to the Hutus' continued appeal for help. The fact that all Hutus are gratuitously labeled "*genocidaires*", genocide perpetrators and *Interahamwe* suffices to play down the atrocities committed by RPF.
- In order to disguise its genocide plan, RPF has influenced the international community by brandishing a pre-established list of Hutu intellectuals, businessmen, political leaders, as well as administrative, military and religious authorities whom it accuses of being "*genocidaires*." It should be noted that this list was drawn up in March 1994, that is, before the tragedy of April 1994. The



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well-informed observers will have noted that this list was pre-established in relation to the date on which the President was scheduled to carry out the crime before March, RPF forgot to change the date on the list.

### I. Reference Documents

As it had done in the past, RPF illustrated itself by committing acts of violence, in deliberate violation of war conventions:

- Chemical weapons were used against soldiers and civilians. On 4 April 1994, RPF command listed the toxic products that were to be distributed to its units by a Central African national. On 13 April, RPF [*missing segment*] stated that it possessed stocks of hyperite with the complicity of Belgian elements. Highly sensitive hyperite was subsequently used against the Rubungo Military Police battalion; it caused swelling of the digestive organs. On 1 May 1994, it announced the development of nerve agents. On 18 May 1994, RPF elements demanded the use of substances that caused [a form of] diphtheria [*diphthérie tendancieuse ?*].
- Several innocent civilians were massacred in several locations, including Gikondo, during the night of 22 to 23 April 1994 (Letter No. 095/G2.2.4 of 23 April 1994 from the Army General Staff G2)/

Throughout the conflict, RPF encouraged ethnic massacres and many other forms of violence in order to incite genocide.  
Intelligence from RPF:

The death squad has been decapitated and, obviously several innocent people will follow in its demise; that is to be expected, as history has shown. However, it is not enough to eradicate the reign of terror in the enemy country. The [entire] system must be annihilated; it is not by eliminating two, three, four individuals that one can claim victory. This is a statement made by the Belgian community in the enemy country... Our elements in the enemy country have been instructed to carry out our project in the enemy country; the beginning looks promising. The people assigned in the second town (Gisenyi), 1<sup>st</sup> town (Ruhengeri) and those still on the main town (Kigali) list must be eliminated forthwith in order to remove the obstacles to the peace process in the enemy country.

"...Take full advantage of the insecurity in the second region (Gisenyi). Organize looting in the second town (Gisenyi), as well as violence and robberies in the No. 1 community (Hutu) so as to further discredit the MRND-CDR, the single ruling party."

It also advocates "torture, killings to make the war look like a genocide."

- Several indicia show that when RPF devised the genocide plan, it drew up lists of key figures, with whom to begin. For example, on 7 April 1994: "...Our elements in the enemy country have been instructed to carry out our project...the people assigned in the second town (Gisenyi), 1<sup>st</sup> town (Ruhengeri) and those still on the main town (Kigali) list must be eliminated forthwith..."
- The RPF did not hesitate to attack public buildings and facilities in which civilians had taken shelter: hospitals, schools, churches, camps for displaced persons...Hence, on 27 April 1994, RPF fired rockets with a multi-barreled rocket launcher, killing several people in Kigali General Hospital; the AIDS project buildings were damaged; similar projectiles were fired at Kanombe hospital. In the afternoon of 1 May 1994, RPF fired an 88mm mortar shell from the Egyptian Embassy at the *Sainte-Famille* school, where 6,000 persons displaced by war were staying. The provisional death toll as of 4:00 PM was 13 dead and 113 wounded, several of whom were in a critical state (Letter No. 0678/G3.3.3 of 2 May 1994 of the Army Chief of Staff to Dr. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh) [*missing segment*]. Likewise, on 2 May 1994, RPF fired at the Rubingo refugee camp, killing five people and injuring dozens of others. (Telegram INT/OPS/94/1240 of 2 May 1994 from the Rulindo Operations Commander).

Section 2: The 6 April 1994 Assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana by RPF with the assistance of UNAMIR elements

§ 1. Indicia of RPF's planning of the President's assassination

Under Article 72 of the Protocol of Agreement on the Integration of the Armed Forces of two Parties regarding the security arrangements for the establishment of transitional institutions in Kigali, RPF brought to Kigali a unit that was to provide security for its dignitaries. The size of the unit was to be equivalent of one (1) battalion of six hundred (600) troops armed with light weapons.

The Battalion was based at the parliament building [*Conseil National de Developpement*] or CND.

On the day it arrived, the battalion had more than 600 troops, because unregistered soldiers traveled in private vehicles (minibuses) that UNAMIR allowed to join the convoy despite objections by the *Forces Armées* officer, who was part of the escort team (Letter No. 0597/G3.3.0 of 29 December 1993 from the Military Police battalion Commander).

Moreover, according to the officer, the battalion brought heavy weapons. The Rwandan Army General Staff complained to General Roméo Dallaire, UNAMIR Commander, but to no avail.

The RPF continued to reinforce the battalion and bring in more heavy weapons. This is how it proceeded:

Troops: vehicles would travel from Kigali to Mulindi (RPF headquarters) and return with more soldiers that they took on the outbound trip. In theory, they were dropped off at the CND, from where they would disperse and join pro-RPF families in Kigali City.

During the same operation, the young people (recruits) would go to the CND on the pretext of visiting their relatives, and not return home. They would dress in military uniforms and travel in trucks to Mulindi, purportedly for relief duty. The trucks would return with soldiers to augment the troop strength at the CND. That is how RPF succeeded in recruiting personnel and introducing infiltrators.

The matter was brought to UNAMIR's attention, but it failed to take action. At the end of March 1994, military intelligence reports indicated that  $\pm$  3,000 RPF soldiers had infiltrated Kigali, the capital.

As for weapons, they were transported in tarpaulin-covered vehicles or in vehicles that were purportedly "carrying firewood from Mulindi," whereas it was possible to purchase wood farther inland, just outside Kigali.

The *Forces Armées Rwandaises* protested, but to no avail. When the *Forces Armées Rwandaises* attempted to check the cargo at their checkpoints and roadblocks, UNAMIR refused under the pretext that it would be present and the loading and unloading [*missing segment*].

The following military intelligence reports provide evidence of RPF's plan and resolve to assassinate President Juvénal Habyarimana:

- According to the intelligence report dated 21 November 1993, a group of RPF infiltrators were in Kigali for the purpose of kidnapping and assassinating the head of State (Letter No. 070/G2.2.4 of 21 November 1993).
- According to the intelligence report dated 31 December 1993, RPF planned to assassinate the President in order to force Rwanda into the same situation Burundi was in following the assassination of President Melchoir Ndadaye (Letter No. 102/G2.2.4 of 31 December 1993).
- According to the intelligence report dated 5 January 1994, RPF at the CND possessed Sam 7 missiles (Letter No. 005/G2.2.4 of January 1994).
- According to the intelligence report dated 11 January 1994, RPF's plan was to assassinate the President on 5 January 1994 at the swearing-in ceremony. The plot was foiled due to the massive presence and vigilance of the Presidential Guard. The Tutsis themselves admitted that their plan had failed (Letter No. 012/G2.2.4 of 11 January 1994).

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- According to the intelligence report dated 12 January 1994, a Ugandan [female] member of staff of the Uganda Embassy in Kigali, who had close links to RPF, revealed to a young woman who had lived in Uganda whom she thought to be pro-RPF that RPF had attempted to assassinate President Habyarimana while he was traveling by road, but failed due to the security measures put in place by the Presidential Guard. She went on to say that President Habyarimana was due to be killed inside an aircraft, adding that the act would go unnoticed (Letter No. 013/G2.2.4 of 12 January 1994).
- According to the intelligence report dated 22 January 1994, in a letter to Kagame, which was intercepted at Byumba, one Zubere (possibly a code name) stated that it was not easy to assassinate Habyarimana, unless one had at least 100 men in civilian clothes (Letter No. 022/G2.2.4 of 22 January 1994).
- According to the intelligence report dated 14 February 1994, a Belgian UNAMIR soldier told a *Forces Armées Rwandaises* officer that RPF battalion in the CND was over armed and had heavy weaponry; recoilless canons, various rocket-launchers and machine guns of all sorts [*missing segment*]...He also said that it was certain that the battalion possessed SAM 7 missiles. Indeed, RPF had previously shot down a RAF reconnaissance plane and a helicopter with the SAM 7 missiles (Letter No. 041/G2.2.4 of 14 February 1994).
- According to the intelligence report dated 25 February 1994, Twagiramungu (then Prime Minister-designate of the transitional Government) was to fulfill his promise to RPF to incite ethnic and regional clashes in order to trigger a civil war and allow RPF to masquerade as liberator of an oppressed people (Letter No. 048/G2.2.4 of 25 February 1994).
- According to the intelligence report dated 26 February 1994, the murder of Félicien Gatabazi, executive secretary of the PSD party and Minister of Public Works and Energy, and that of Martin Bucyana, CDR party chairman, did not trigger a civil war, contrary to what RPF had hoped. That is why RPF wants to assassinate the President of the Republic in order to rouse the anger of the Hutus (Letter No. 047/G2.2.4 of 26 February 1994).
- According to the intelligence report dated 2 April 1994, RPF's aims are believed to be: to kill civilian and military officials, leaders of pro-MRND parties and, in particular, the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff, and to simultaneously launch an all-out offensive on Kigali. The attacks were scheduled to be carried out between 3 and 9 April 1994. Indeed, that is what happened! (Letter No. 082/G2.2.4 of 2 April 1994).
- During the negotiations UNAMIR organized at Ngondore (Byumba) between RPF and RAF on the demarcation of assembly zones, Colonel Stanislas Biseruka and Lieutenant Colonel César Kayizari, both of RPF, took an RAF officer aside and revealed to him that President Habyarimana was to be killed, because he constituted the only obstacle to RPF's quest for power, adding that, unfortunately, they had failed to find an accomplice within RAF.

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- On 3 April 1994, while President Habyarimana was in his residence in the north of the country, he received a death threat from Kagame himself.

§2. Proof that RPF assassinated President Juvénal Habyarimana

The following intelligence from RPF and the other aspects of the plan, described earlier, are ample proof that RPF assassinated President Habyarimana:

- “Be informed that the mission of our *“escadron renforcé* [reinforced squadron] against the MRND-CDR and FRODEBU-PALIPEHUTU was highly successful. Be advised that the head of state of the country to the south [Burundi] was killed, along with his Ministers of Planning and Communications. In the main city, Kigali, there is shooting in the streets [*missing segment*]... We are still waiting for reaction from our friends in the country to the south to give you further instructions. The Chief (Museveni) returned to Kampala safely and communication between his services and our elements in the country to the south went without a hitch thanks to the assistance of the Belgian community and elements in the country to the south, who have contributed a great deal to the success of our mission, because it was not easy to pull off. Our sincere thanks go to all those who have contributed a great deal to the success of the mission of our *“escadron renforcé*.” Our special thanks go to the specialists who infiltrated Kigali in order to reorganise the squadron. Each of you must rest assured of receiving significant reinforcements any minute now. As always, the Chief (Museveni) is prepared to lend us a hand and promises to see us through to the main town... Hold firm, your success is irreversible and we can say that we shall all meet in the main town.
- “It is a memorable day for us and our entire ethnic group... If the President is killed we can say that we are assured of victory...”
- “We heard the Radio Rwanda announcement that both the tyrant and the Burundian President died in an unanticipated crash. We find it hard to believe. We find it hard to believe that *Ikinai Cyananiye Abagome N’Abagambanyi* [the invincible] is dead. Anyhow, we commend the reconnaissance groups. Victory means winning an advantage at war. Keep it up!”
- “Telegram of 6 April 1994, 0900 hours: the meeting scheduled to take place at Mulindi today, 7 April 1994, has been cancelled. I wish to thank and commend you for yesterday’s operation. The reward is yours for now. All the units must be in a state of alert. The war is due to begin...”
- “You are charged with the mission of carrying out the project, as instructed. The plan is in its final stages. The gorillas (Hutus) have failed and the wagtails (Tutsis) have won the game...”
- “We thought that the 6 April 1994 plan had been carried out successfully in accordance with the institutional framework, but the measures taken by the authorities and the white people during the night of 5 April were standard

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procedure. Unfortunately, the measures aimed at averting failure were only partially followed. There you have it.”

- In late April 1994, two Soviet-made SAM 7 missiles were discovered in the bushes at the location where the first shots came from. (Report by Lt. Munyaneza and statement by Gabriel Ntamumaro). It will be recalled that RPF shot down RAF plane at the beginning of the war using the same devices, and that a Belgian UNAMIR soldier revealed the existence of SAM 7 missiles at the CND. The planes shot down by RPF were:
  - 1 Reconnaissance plane shot down at Matimba in Mutara on 3 October 1990 [*missing segment*].
  - 1 Gazelle helicopter shot down at Nyakayaga (Mutara) on 23 October 1990.
  - 1 Ecureuil helicopter shot down in Cyeru Commune (Ruhengeri) on 13 March 1993.
- Claiming that presidential plane was shot down by RAF members opposed to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement is only meant to create a diversion, because RAF did not possess surface-to-air missiles. No Rwandan soldier knew how to use such devices. Some have hinted that it was a coup d'état organized by RAF! Is it really possible to think in terms of a coup d'état considering the current situation in Rwanda, with the controversy regarding the multiparty system and the risk of alienating the West and exposing ourselves to defeat? The truth of the matter is the President's assassination was planned and executed by RPF with the help of its sponsors and accomplices. As far as the security forces are concerned, there is no doubt that President Habyarimana was assassinated by RPF with the assistance of UNAMIR elements.

Section 3. Violation of the ceasefire and the Arusha Peace Agreement by RPF§ 1. Violation of the ceasefire

Throughout the conflict, RPF displayed its bad faith by violating all ceasefire agreements. The Arusha peace negotiations, begun on 10 July 1992, led to a new ceasefire agreement on 12 July 1992. That superseded all previous agreements, including the one signed at N'sele, on 29 March 1991, and the one signed at Gbadolite, on 16 September 1991. However, RPF did not stop dispatching infiltrators to carry out reconnaissance missions, raids, ambushes, murders, and kidnappings. The most flagrant violation was the simultaneous, deadly attack of 8 February 1993 on Ruhengeri (Muhoza barracks, Muhoza, Mubona, Rugarama, Kidaho, Ntaruka, Nyamagaumba, Kadogo, Kinigi, Nkumba), Byumba, Kitazigurwa, Kisaro, Nyabishambi, Kibali, Karambi, Miyove, Bwisige), Kirambo (Gifurwe, Kirambo, Tumba, Base, Rulindo trading centre, Nyamugali, Cyungo) and Mutara (Ngarama, Nyagatare, Kabongoya).

Thanks to this attack, RPF was able to occupy a large portion of Rwandan territory. The joint communiqué issued at the Dar es Salaam meeting of 5 – 7 March 1993 called for an

end to the fighting. The RPF was to return to the positions it occupied prior to 8 February 1993, and the zone it had recently captured was to become a "buffer zone," with no military activity by either RAF or RPF. The RPF did not comply with this provision; instead, it made the "buffer zone" its private property by regularly conducting patrols, committing murders, carrying out kidnappings targeting mainly MRND-CDR, and engaging in political activities.

I. Reference Documents

- Intelligence from RPF
    - "In the meantime, we must step up our reconnaissance activities in the buffer zone..."
    - "...while the hunt for MRND-CDR elements continues in the buffer zone..."
  - Telegram INT/OPS.94/184 of 3 April 1994 (from the Byumba Squad to the Gendarmerie General Staff): "...Moreover, we have learned from various sources that some RPF elements are occupying houses of displaced persons who have not returned so as to kill them secretly and take over their property and thereby secure total control over the displaced persons entering the buffer zone..."
- § 2. Violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement and preparation for the resumption of hostilities

- I. The signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement was not accompanied by an improvement in the social and political situation in Rwanda.

Indeed, political divisions and ethnic clashes further weakened the already shaky security situation. The situation continued to deteriorate, as what started as simple political demonstrations ended in death.

Corroborative testimonies show that while RAF were making every effort to restore law and order and prepare for the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, RPF seized the opportunity to engage with impunity in political and bellicose maneuvering with the aim of realising its criminal plan of causing an unprecedented bloodbath in the country.

Hence, RPF's actions, particularly those of its army, during the period from 4 August 1993 to 6 April 1994, were quite damaging to the nascent peace process it agreed to honour by signing the Arusha Peace Agreement; moreover, in more ways than one, such actions are indicative of its unquestionable responsibility for the Rwandan tragedy.

Moreover, RPF is responsible for the resumption of hostilities after 6 April 1994. By assassinating the heads of State of Rwanda and Burundi and their entourage on 6 April 1994, it created tension with predictably catastrophic consequences. Infiltrators took up positions in the various neighborhoods of Kigali from the morning of 7 April 1994.

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On 7 April 1994, around 1530 hours, it launched the hostilities when its CND-based battalion attacked Kimihurura barracks. That evening, on Radio Muhabura, it declared war (Telegram INT/OPS/94/0503 of 7 April 1994 from the CE Cdo):

On 15 April 1994, the RPF set "conditions for a meeting to negotiate a ceasefire." The negotiations were visibly unworkable (See letter of Dr. Bihozagara).

The RPF once again displayed its bad faith by flouting the Gbadolite Ceasefire Agreement of 23 April 1994, despite having signed it.

When General Roméo Dallaire contacted him regarding a ceasefire and truce, Paul Kagame said that he was not prepared for a ceasefire and that he intended to continue fighting (Letter No. 0676/G3.3.0 of 1 May 1994 RA General Staff).

During the 30 May 1994 meeting between RAF and RPA representatives at the UNAMIR headquarters in Remera, under the auspices of UNAMIR, RPF delegation resorted to delaying tactics in order to evade the ceasefire issue. They claimed that it was more important to discuss and end to the massacres and the propaganda programs on RTL and Radio Rwanda than the ceasefire. Yet the ceasefire was the only item on the agenda, and entailed both issues in question. Finally, the refusal to recognise or negotiate with the Government put in place in accordance with the obtaining legal provisions at the time was and remains a serious obstacle to peace.

## II. Reference Documents

- Letter No. 041/G2.1.3 of 7 September 1993 to the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff. Page 2, point 2: "Intentions and activities of the enemy: overthrow the Habyarimana regime and seize power; reinforce defence positions; prepare for the resumption of hostilities; sensitize the civilian population about RPF cause."
- Letter No. 424/G2.2.4 of 20 October 1993 from the Rulindo Ops Commander to the Rwandan Army General Staff. "The report on the RPF's recruitment of members of the public, especially in Ndusu *Commune*, Ruhengeri *prefecture*."  
 "On 9 October 1993, a group of 14 people who were heading over to RPF side were stopped by the MP element at Gakenke. Thirteen of them were apprehended, and one escaped. The latter lost his identity card at Gakenke. The card was found by the element PM. The Thirteen apprehended persons were taken to Kigali and over to the G2 EM AR Service [*missing segment*].  
 "On 12 October 1993, the same Gakenke Military Police Detachment arrested one Théoneste Mivumbi, son of Ildephonse Habiyaambere and Daphrose Mukadigi, a native of Kabingo, Ndusu, Ruhengeri. According to the information obtained, the person charged with recruitment in Ndusu *Commune* is Mpendwanzi, MDR chairman for that *Commune*..." The annex to



the letter contains a list of the 13 persons arrested and the record of Théoneste Mivumbi's questioning, summarized as follows: Asked in Kinyarwanda: "*Mu Nkotaryi ninde wali ugiye kukujyana? Yari agiye kukujyana yon go ujye gukora ki?*" (Who brought you for recruitment into RPF? For what mission?), Théoneste Mivumbi answered: "*Twali tujyanye n'umugabo witwa Mpendwanzi...ubwo yatubwiraga youko ngo n'ibya politiki*" (It was a man named Mpendwanzi...who told us that we were to receive training in weapons and politics.)"

- Intelligence from RPF:
  - "...Prepare for the resumption of the war with courage, and beware of the presence of peacekeepers...Make your requests for men and equipment by the end of the week."
  - "...Reorganise your troops in the rear and form joint RPF-NRA groups in order to launch a large-scale attack on the designated targets in the second town and the town centre..."
- Letter No. 084/G2.2.2 of 1 December 1993 to the Army Chief of Staff. (53) Point A: "In recent days, there has been an increase in RPF violence and military activity in the buffer zone and elsewhere in the country. Moreover, RPF is continuing its joint military training exercises with NRA in preparation for an imminent attack. Furthermore, it has not ceased recruiting personnel, despite the Arusha Peace Agreement. These important facts were obtained in the various operation sectors recently."

Gisenyi operation zone

The RPF is still conducting reconnaissance missions and infiltration of the Gisenyi region in preparation for an imminent attack, because RPF elements are still in the mountains and are waiting for the signal [*missing segment*].

Ruhengeri operation sector

"...Moreover, recently, a great deal of RPF movement from Nkumba to the Kinigi area has been noted."

Rulindo operation sector

"In the Rulindo sector, RPF activity has been reported particularly at Ndago (7937)...The RPF conducts patrols up to Base. The RPF still has a presence on the Tumba ridge (9413) (Demilitarized zone).

Byumba operation sector

"The RPF is continuing physical and military (shooting) training at Mukarange (on 6 November 1993). The RPF is continuing to reinforce its positions in Byumba. Three artillery guns with tractors are currently positioned at Gihuke (1629)."

Mutara operation sector

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The RPF set up an ambush in our lines in Mutara, killing one person and wounding another among our elements of the 94<sup>th</sup> battalion, on 11 November 1993.

Reports of RPF military movements opposite our position in Muvumba *Commune*.

Reports of intense RPF activity in Nyagahita (2236), Nimuli (2840), and Rurenge (3052).

Kibungo operation sector

The RPF's activities in this sector consist mainly in large-scale recruitment. Indeed, a recruitment official named Abdallah Sentama, who felt he was being trailed by RAF, fled, leaving behind a pair of night vision goggles (*Birenga Commune*, Kibungo *prefecture*).

- Intelligence from RPF: "...The Chief will provide sufficient personnel for the country to the south, but not the number requested for the operations, because NRA is due to intervene in Liberia. We have embarked on a recruiting campaign in the enemy country, among our allies, the country to the east and the one of the Chief for the additional personnel needed for the country to the south..."
- Letter No. 089/G2.2.4 of 10 December 1993 (note to the RA Chief of Staff) Point 1 (b): "The people of Bwisige have recently noticed the presence of young RPF recruits speaking Ikirundi and Ikigande in their *Commune*."
- Letter No. 086/G2.2.4 of 11 December 1993 (note to the Army Chief of Staff) Page 2, point (g): "The taxi, JB 1545, serving on the Kigali-Nyanza route, belongs to RPF and transports its agents [*missing segment*]. Point (h): "All the young Tutsis who have fought with RPF go back and forth between Kigali and RPF zone. These young people stay with their families after their reconnaissance missions all across the city."
- Telegram INT/OPS/93/2728 of 27 December, at 1100 hours, from the Gisenyi Ops Commander to the Rwandan Army General Staff: "From reliable sources: according to Tutsi circles in Goma, RPF is expected to seize power from Kigali very soon...but [sic] the Tutsis are of the view that RPF victory is inevitable and that our head of State will certainly meet the same fate as President Ndadaye..."
- Letter No. 587/G3.3.0 of 29 December 1993 from the MP Battalion to the Rwandan Army General Staff: Page 3, point 1: "When the passengers embarked at Mulindi, six extra vehicles joined the convoy...(list of vehicles)...All the vehicles had been in Mulindi overnight and returned with unidentified people." Point 2: "The ten minibuses (page 1, point 2b) authorized to join the convoy were overloaded (= *gutendeka*) with people and luggage that had not been checked by UNAMIR." Point 3: "Along the way, especially between Gaseke and the CND, the passengers aboard the minibuses exchanged packages with people in the crowd. A flagrant example was noted at Nyabugogo-Kinamba, where there was not UNAMIR presence whereas the gendarmerie was totally overwhelmed. The *Inkotanyi* caps and RPF banners and posters were seen, especially among the

people in the crowd at Nyabugogo. That facilitated the illicit introduction of military materials, such as grenades, mines, and disassembled weapons.”

- Letter No. 102/G2.2.4 of 31 December 1993 (note to the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff): Point 1 (b): “Reports of RPF officers going all across Kigali in UNAMIR vehicles and buying items in shops...” (= Part of reconnaissance missions).
- Letter of 31 December 1993 from the Presidential Guard Battalion: “RPF activities at CND”: “The entire day of 30 December was spent preparing gun trenches all along the defensive perimeter.”
  - “It would appear that three quarters of RPF battalion personnel are dressed in civilian clothes and are seeking intelligence all across Kigali. This is because very few *Inkotanyi* in the CND are dressed in fatigues [missing segment].
- Letter No. 001/G2.2.4 of 4 January 1994 (note to the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff): Point 1 (b): “According to a member of staff of the Rwandan Embassy in Uganda, RPF is continuing to purchase both heavy weapons and individual weapons and taking them to its positions.”
- Telegram OPS/94/0043 of 6 January 1994, at 2115 hours, from the Byumba Ops Commander to the Rwandan Army General Staff: “Reports of machine gun (0.50mm) fire in the Gakubo area around 1345 hours. A convoy consisting of two vehicles and one truck full of girls and *Inkotanyi* with UNAMIR escort headed towards RPF zone around 1300 hours. The vehicles returned empty. It asks to keep an eye on RPF’s activities, which have appeared suspicious in recent days.” (UNAMIR colluded with RPF as regards recruitment. That concerned the recruits UNAMIR took to Mulindi).
- Intelligence from RPF: “Kisoro-Gatuna and Kamwezi (code words) have stepped up their reconnaissance activities in the respective buffer zones and will oppress all MRND-CDR elements in their sectors...”
- Letter No. 018/G2.2.4 of 19 January 1994 (note to the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff): Point 1(b): “On 9 January 1994, 26 *Inkotanyi*, escorted by a Belgian UNAMIR jeep, forcibly entered the Rebero L’Horizon hotel, saying that they were looking for one Buroko, a native of Ruhengeri...”
  - “On 13 January, around 0800 hours, the *Inkotanyi* group, who were participating in a seminar organized by the Americans at ESM and were escorted by Belgian UNAMIR officers, went from Diplomates hotel to ESM via the Rwandan Army General Headquarters and Kigali barracks.” N.B. It was all done in a bid to gather intelligence on the aforementioned places.
- Letter No. 026/G2.2.4 of 27 January 1994 (note to the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff): Page 2, point (m): “On 21 January 1994, around 1000 hours, RPF First Vice-President, Patrick Mazimapaka, escorted by the *Inkotanyi* without UNAMIR, tried to force his way into the Radio Rwanda compound with his escort; the latter almost got into a fight with the gendarmes guarding the

compound. The *Inkotanyi* turned around and left, while hurling insults. This appears to be enemy reconnaissance.”

- Intelligence from RPF: “For the moment, we have instructed our friends in the main town to protect the civilian population which is sympathetic to RPF and enroll those who wish to work behind the scenes [*missing segment*].”
- Letter No. 0214/G3.3.0 of 1 February 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff to General Roméo **Dallaire**, Commander of the UNAMIR forces: “I have the honour to inform you that the movements of RPF soldiers between Kigali and Mulindi continue to obstruct the [implementation of] Arusha Peace Agreement. In fact, in addition to the incidents reported to you previously, a convoy of seven UNAMIR vehicles carrying 21 RPF soldiers crossed the roadblock at Ngondore and headed towards Mulindi on 25 January 1994; it returned with 10 additional RPF soldiers dressed in civilian clothes... The current reinforcements, which appear to have UNAMIR’s blessing, are contrary to the spirit of Article 72(4) of the Protocol on the Integration of the Forces of the two Armies.”
- Telegram INT/OPS/94/188 of 4 February 1994, at 0900 hours, from the Ruhengeri Ops Commander to the Rwandan General Staff: “Be advised that a UNAMIR commission has been charged with the task of investigating the recent massacres of civilians in Kirambo and Mutura. The said commission is marauding around every location close to our current positions asking the people which routes the *Inkotanyi* used to launch attacks in Ruhengeri... According to some, the *Inkotanyi* are taking advantage of the absence of RAF officers to conduct reconnaissance missions or, simply, misrepresent the facts of the investigation. Indeed, they act as interpreters, because the other members are foreigners and do not speak Kinyarwanda...” N.B. the fact that UNAMIR went there without RAF liaison officer is also suspicious.
- Intelligence from RPF: “...”All operational teams all across the enemy country continue to make the most of whatever can incite the civilian population and the soldiers to revolt; we are awaiting the outcome...”
- Telegram INT/OPS/94/339 of 5 February 1994, at 2140 hours, from the Rulindo Ops Commander to the Rwandan Army General Staff: “We stopped two vehicles at Rulindo; they were carrying young people from the CND to RPF zone. The vehicles had been searched on their outbound trip. After they had gone by, it was reported from a UNAMIR vehicle that the said vehicles had picked up people at the CND. The vehicles returned without passengers. They were: 1. A Daihatsu taxi, No. AC 3241, belonging to Innocent Sebudandi of Nyamata, Kanzenze, Kigali; 2. A Toyota Hiace taxi, No. BB 2942, belonging to Eugène Mungwariho, a resident of Kacyiru, PVK.
- Letter No. 036/G2.2.4 of 8 February 1994 (note to the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff): Point 1(a): “The *Inkotanyi* have made *Interahamwe* uniforms for themselves at Gitarama and Cyangugu. They were envisaging its use in their future maneuvers [*missing segment*]. 1(b): “We have learned that each *secteur* and *cellule* in Kigali-Ville is controlled by an *Inkotanyi* chief. He provides intelligence

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on all the activities of the MRND-CDR parties and the Rwandan soldiers. In fact, one Ntaganda, who lives very near MAGERWA, in Gikondo, Kicukiro, PVK, draws up a list of *Interahamwe* and reports to RPF."

- Intelligence from RPF: "...Be prepared to act as soon as you are told, because, for now, we have decided to resume the war, considering that the war of October will only be settled by means of military confrontation culminating in the victory of one of the parties..."
- Letter No. 314/G2.2.2.5 of 16 February 1994, from the Rwandan Army General Staff to the Ministry of Defence. (*Op. cit*)
- Letter No. 314/G2.2.2.5 of 18 February 1994, from the Rwandan Army General Staff to the Kigali-Ville and Butare Ops Sector Commanders: "I am transmitting to you the case of an *Inkotanyi* who has infiltrated our lines for espionage purposes. He is Jean Bosco Mujiyambere, alias Boss, RPF corporal, son of Laurent Ugirashebuja, owner of a VW Jetta vehicle currently at Kamwezi. The subject was apprehended on 16 December 1993, while he was, once again, spying on the camps for Burundian refugees..."
- Intelligence from RPF: "Our infiltrators must camouflage both themselves and their military equipment."

"...Bring the military elements closer to the commanders, as usual, in order to provide us with military intelligence from a reliable source."

"All the assignments are proceeding well throughout the buffer zone. The hunt for MRND-CDR elements is continuing with intensity..."

"As usual, we are continuing our joint exercises all across the designated zone. The NRA elements are participating with less enthusiasm due to problems related to their pay. (Reply). Continue to work together with NRA..."

"Our reconnaissance elements are very active and are pursuing their activities successfully. At all the positions, our elements are continuing with the joint exercise, as agreed. Our elements in the interior are providing support as regards preparations for war rather than count on a negotiated settlement of the conflict. In the meantime, the activities initiated in the enemy country are pursuing their course [*missing segment*]

"Our supporters all across the country are demanding the immediate resumption of hostilities. The assigned activities in the enemy country are proceeding well..."

"...The date of your choice for the super-action. Ultimately, you stand to benefit from the final reward. Good luck!"

- Telegram INT/OPS/94/185 of 3 April 1994, 0845 hours, from the Byumba squad to the Gendarmerie General Staff: "...Many people have also expressed doubt about the festivities held in Mulindi. Those festivities are an opportunity for RPF

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to infiltrate Mulindi with its agents from all across the country and bring other agents into the country once they return to Kigali... The same also applies to its countless trips to Mulindi, which constitute a real threat..."

- Intelligence from RPF: "Reference is made to your communication. I have the honour to request you to double check and let me know whether our weapons stocks in Gatsata and Gisozi have been discovered. If negative, do all you can to protect them..."

"...Continue with the weapons transfer in the enemy country, and with the infiltration of specialized agents who are already with you there so as to enable them to reorganise our death squad. Good luck!"

Section 4. Destruction of national assets and public facilities

The war started by RPF caused massive destruction of national assets and privately owned properties.

§ 1. Destruction of national assets and public facilities

Examples:

I. As of the very early days of hostilities, RPF did everything to destroy public facilities, especially in Byumba *Préfecture*, including:

- The customs buildings at the Gatuna border post, on 3 November 1990; several international hauling trucks were torched there.
- Several primary and secondary schools were destroyed and rendered unusable in the *Communes* of Cyumba, Kiyuve, Mukarange and Kiyombe, including the Rushaki secondary school (Kiyombe).
- The guest-house at Gabiro.
- The customs buildings at the Kagitumba customs post.

II. Between January 1991, with the attack on Ruhengeri and resumption of fighting Mutara (Byumba), and 4 August 1993 (signing of the Aréthé Peace), RPF destroyed the following:

- The Ntaruka hydro-electric plant (Ruhengeri)
- The Gatuna bridge
- The Mulindi and Cyohoha-Rukeri tea factories
- The Tumba polytechnic school (Byumba)

III. During the attack on the *préfectures* of Byumba, Ruhengeri and Kigali, on 8 February 1993, many public and private schools were destroyed and closed by RPF. As a consequence, 6,336 secondary school students in the three *préfectures* were displaced; in Byumba *Préfecture*, 89,308 primary school pupils were displaced. During the attack, RPF

destroyed health facilities, electric and hydro-electric infrastructure (see annexed report on the damage).

IV. As the conflict spread and set the entire country ablaze, particularly beginning on 6 April 1994, the following was reported:  
A. *Byumba*

- Destruction of Byumba hospital
- Destruction of several primary and secondary schools, including Byumba secondary school
- Destruction of the *Commune* offices of Cyumba, Kiyuve and Mukarange

*B. Kigali-Ville and Kigali-Rural*

- The Jali telecommunications relay station
- The Mount Nyanza earth station
- The Kicukiro soft-drink factory
- The TABARWANDA facilities at Kicukiro
- Serious Damage to the buildings and facilities at Kigali General Hospital
- The Rwabusoro bridge

*C. Destruction was also reported in the préfectures of:*

- Ruhengeri, Gisenyi, Butare and Gitarama

V. RPF is continuing to set fire to wooded areas and forests, purportedly to prevent incursions from neighboring countries or simply to destroy Habyarimana's accomplishments.

§ 2. Destruction of private property

During the conflict, RPF also displayed its cynicism by destroying private property. The main examples include the following:

- Kabuga's flour mill
- Kabuga's depot at Gikondo (Kigali)
- MIROPLAST factory at Gikondo (Kigali)
- Several private residences and businesses at Remera, Kacyiru and Kanombe (Kigali)
- Several buildings along the Gitarama-Kabgayi road

Section 5. Accusations against individual RPA soldiers

§ 1. Common accusations

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The RAF accuse Paul Kagame and members of his army's high command who came from Uganda of the following:

Conspiring, inciting, ordering, directing and/or committing crimes against the rights of people including: Invading and occupying of Rwanda by means of an armed attack, which constitutes a war crime and a crime against humanity, as well as occupying and/or destroying private property; Committing the Hutu genocide by taking up arms against Rwanda with the intent of destroying, in whole or in part, the Rwandan people, namely the Hutus, selectively massacring them, causing them bodily and mental injury, *inter alia*, by torturing them and depriving them of education, causing them bodily harm by detaining some of them in prisons under inhumane conditions and forcing others into exile, where the living conditions led to the death of over 60,000 refugees at Goma in less than two months, and more continue to die there; Provoking a civil war in Rwanda and of other crimes (Article 1 of the 26 November 1948 Convention on the Non-Applicability of Statutory Limitations to War Crimes and Crimes Against Humanity, and Articles 1,2,3 and 4 of the 9 December 1948 Convention on the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide. Rwanda became thereof by means of Legislative Degree No. 08/75 of 12 February 1975), in preparation for the taking over of the Government of Rwanda.

§ 2. Specific accusations: Paul Kagame, RPA Commander-in-Chief

- He planned and ordered the genocide of the Hutus, the assassination of President Juvénal Habyarimana and members of his entourage, as well as the murder of many Hutu political officials and Catholic priests. He created and trained death squads which infiltrated the entire country in order to cause division, ethnic unrest, terror and tremendous suffering. He devised techniques for torture, mutilation and inhumane treatment. He violated international treaties and refugee conventions by attacking Rwanda, his mother country. He declared war in April 1994 in violation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, thus setting the country on a course to disaster. He rejected the ceasefire proposed by RAF because all he wanted was power and the people did not count. He is responsible for the destruction of Rwanda's infrastructure and assets, as well as private property.
- In 1990, in an interview with the reporter Marie France Cros, who asked him whether pursuing the war would not expose the Tutsis in the country to extermination, General Kagame replied that it was inevitable to have victims. (See *Journal Libre*, Belgium).
- In another interview, he stated that he would reduce the number of Hutus to 250,000 and thereby debunk the myth of the majority Hutu ethnic group.
- On his return from a mission to China, on 29 March 1995, Paul Kagame stated that the camps for the war displaced in southern Rwanda were to be destroyed by all means. Shortly thereafter, on 22 April 1995, he ordered the bloodbath in Kibeho during which over 8,000 Hutus perished under the bullets, grenades,



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rockets and bombs of RPF. Those who survived the carnage were massacred on their way home.

- In a speech he made at Kibuye, on 14 June 1995, Kagame said that he would pursue the refugees in the host countries. What ensued was an attack on the Birava refugee camp during the night of 11 to 12 April 1994 was carried, where dozens of refugees were massacred. Moreover, Panzi Camp, Bukavu, came under fire on 9 August 1995 as part of this plan.
- He created a criminal organization, which destroyed Rwandan society, whereas it was Africa's model of peace, development and national unity at the time.
- Paul Kagame and his men, some of whom are listed below, must be prosecuted for all the war crimes and crimes against humanity committed in Rwanda from 1 October 1990 to the present.
  1. Colonel Frank Mugambage, member of RPA High Command, Political Commissioner and Commander of RPA operations, currently *Directeur de Cabinet* in the Office of the President. He ordered the shelling of hospitals in Kigali (CHK and ICRC) and the markets at Nyarugenge and Nyabugogo, as well as the killings at the Amahoro Stadium and the King Faysal Hospital. Same accusations as Kagame, except the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
  2. Colonel Steven Ndugutuye, member of RPF high command, deputy coordinator of RPA operations. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
  3. Colonel Samuel Kanyemera, alias Sam Kaka, member of RPA high command, currently Chief of Staff of the Rwandan Patriotic Front. As commander of operations for the *Communes* of Buyoga, Mugambazi, Rutongo, Mbogo and Tumba in April 1994, he planned and ordered the execution of systematic massacre of the Hutus. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
  4. Colonel Samuel Twahira Dodo, member of RPA high command, currently Operations Commander for Kibungo-Byumba. Responsible for the ethnic cleansing in Kibungo and Mutara *préfectures*. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
  5. Colonel Kayumba Nyamwasa, member of RPA high command and RPF chief of intelligence and security, currently Gendarmerie Deputy Chief of Staff. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
  6. Colonel Charles Muhire, member of RPA high command. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.

7. Colonel Doctor Joseph Kamera, member of RPA high command. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
8. Colonel Thadéo Gashumba, member of RPA high command. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
9. Colonel Charles Ngoga, member of RPA high command, Commander of Ruhengeri-Gisenyi sector. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
10. Colonel Théogène William Bagire, member of RPA high command and RPA commander of operations for Mugambazi Rutongo. Responsible for planning the massacres of Hutus in Mbogo, Mugambazi and Rutongo in April and July 1994. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
11. Lieutenant Colonel Charles Kayonga, Commander of the battalion charged with security for RPF officials based at the CND, which turned out to be a "Trojan horse." In addition to that:
  - He was the head of RPF death squad, whose members infiltrated the country in order to carry out political assassinations, causing division, ethnic unrest, terror and tremendous suffering.
  - He planned and carried out the assassination of Hutu political leaders.
  - He planned and carried out the assassination of the President of Rwanda, the President of Burundi, and their entourages [*missing segment*].
  - He is responsible for the systematic massacre of Hutus in the vicinity of the CND and throughout Kigali beginning on 6 April 1994.
  - He is responsible for the massacre of Hutu peasants in February 1993 while he was RPF commander of operations in Byumba.
  - He is responsible for the destruction of the nation's infrastructure and assets, as well as private property.
  - As head of the delegation to the ceasefire negotiations that RAF had requested in order to free up troops for law enforcement duties, he categorically refused the request and pursued the fighting and massacres in order to satisfy his thirst for power at the detriment of the people.

- He planned and ordered the massacre of over 200 war displaced persons at the Saint Paul Pastoral Centre, in Kigali.
  - He organized the massacres at Kibeho, which left over 8,000 dead.
12. Lieutenant Karenzi Karake, Head of RPF NMOG and UNAMIR liaison team. In addition to that:
- He was a spy
  - He headed RPF death squad, which he formed, trained and arranged for it to infiltrate the country in order to cause division, incite hatred and violence among the population, spur on ethnic unrest, carry out political assassinations, and cause terror and tremendous suffering.
  - He planned the assassination of political leaders and particularly targeted Catholic priests.
  - He planned and executed the Hutu genocide.
  - He planned and executed the assassination of the Rwandan and Burundian heads of state and members of their entourage.
  - He planned and sponsored the massacre of over 200 Hutu war displaced at the Saint Paul Pastoral Centre in Kigali.
13. Colonel Charles Musitu, member of RPF high command. Same accusations as Kagame, except for the [latter's] speeches and interviews.
14. Colonel Stanislas Biseruka, member of RPA high command. At a meeting of RAF-RPF joint committee at Ngondore, he revealed to Colonel [BEMSG] Ntiwiragabo, then Rwandan Army G2, that President Habyarimana was to be killed, as he was the obstacle to RPF's quest for power, adding that the problem was that they lacked an accomplice among RAF.
15. Lieutenant Colonel César Kayizari, currently commander of the Butare-Gikongoro-Cyangugu sector. At a meeting of RAF-RPF joint committee in Ngondore, he revealed that to an RAF officer that President Habyarimana was to be killed because, he said, he was an [missing segment] obstacle to RPF's quest for power, but the problem was that they lacked an accomplice among RAF.
16. Lieutenant Colonel Fred Nyamurangwa. Second in command for operations and, subsequently, operations commander who replaced Lieutenant Colonel Kiiza in Ruhengeri in February 1993. He ordered the Hutu genocide in the Ruhengeri region,

where over 40,000 Hutus were massacred, tortured and mutilated [sic]. As head of operations at Rutongo and Jali during the April 1994 war, he ordered the massacre of Hutus in both locations. He used chemical agents against both the local population and the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*. He was responsible for the destruction of infrastructure (telecommunications equipment at Jali, sugar factory at Kabuye), national assets and private property.

17. Lieutenant Colonel Gadafi Kazintwali. As commander of operations for Tumba-Base during the April 1994 war, he ordered the massacre of civilians at Tumba, Tare, and Nyamugali.

18. Lieutenant Colonel Edouard Karangwa and

19. Major Fred Mugisha and

20. Major Amuru.

- As operations and until commanders, they planned and carried out the massacre of Hutus in Buyoga *Commune*, particularly in Nyabisaga, Burega and Butangampundu *secteurs*, in April and May 1994, including (See *L'autre face du génocide*, Witnesses 12, 13, and 14).
- The systematic massacre of displaced persons at the Shagasha school.
- The massacre of children who were burned alive.
- More than 50 people killed in Bunyana *cellule*, Nyabiswa *secteur*.
- The grenade attack which killed 1,000 people at Nyabirangu's home, in Gatara *cellule*.
- The extermination of people at Burega, Butangampundu and Nyabisiga *secteurs*.
- The mass murder at Kisaro.
- The massacre of 46 people at the home of *Conseiller de Secteur* Buzikola.

21. Lieutenant Colonel Gasana and

22. Lieutenant Béata Mushayija. They planned the massacre of Hutus in Kibali *Commune* in October 1994 (See *L'autre face du génocide*, Witnesses 14 and 20):

- 750 Hutus grouped together at Muhihi and massacred.
- 600 Hutus grouped together at Munturo and killed.
- 200 Hutus grouped together at Nyande and killed.
- 212 Hutus killed in the homes of ordinary people.
- 3,000 Hutus massacred at the Episcopal church.

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- 3,500 Hutus killed at the homes of the *conseillers* for the *secteurs* of Yaramba, Muhondo, Byumba, Buhambe, Mukarange and Rubona.
- 15,000 Hutus massacred in the Byumba regional stadium.
- 43 state employees massacred all across the Kibali *Commune*.

23. Lieutenant Colonel Ibingira. He planned and ordered the massacres in Kibehe camp.
24. Lieutenant Chantal. While she was at Ruhondo school, Kibali *Commune*, on 28 April 1994, she ordered the massacre of people who were assembled in the classrooms.
25. Major Jackson Nziza. In May 1994, while he was unit commander for Kabgayi (Gitarama) region, he killed the Archbishop of Kigali, Bishop Vincent Nsengiyumva, [as well as] Bishop Joseph Ruzindana of Byumba, Bishop Thaddée Nsengiyumva of Kabgayi and President of Rwanda Episcopal Conference, and 13 priests who were staying with persons displaced by war.
26. Major Yoswa Mbaraga. As an engineer officer, he dug graves for massacred Hutus. By doing so, he participated in the planning of the Hutu genocide in Kisaro, Ngarama, Rwamagana, Rusumo, Bicumbi Bugesera
27. - 41. Colonel Théoneste Lizinde.
28. Lieutenant Colonels Emmanuel Gahutu.
29. Peter Mugabo,
30. Fred Kabera,
31. James Kaberebe,
32. Mubarka-Muganga,
33. Eric Murokore,
34. Patrice Nyamvumba,
35. André Rwigamba,
36. Emmanuel Nyamvumba,
37. John Bagabo,
38. Turata-Kayumba,
39. Dieudonné Karangwa,
40. G. Rwahama, and
41. M. Nzaramba,
42. Lieutenant Colonel Gashugi,
43. Major Philbert Rwigamba,
44. Major Birasa,
45. Major Sarto,

46. Major Butare, and
47. Major Ruzibiza. As members of RPF-NMOG liaison team and using NMOG as a cover, they were:
  - Spies
  - Members of RPF death squad, which infiltrated the country in order to sow the seeds of division, incite violence and hatred, ethnic unrest, spread terror and tremendous suffering, and carry out political assassinations.
48. Major Frank Kamanzi,
49. Captain Gédéon Hodali,
50. Captain Peter Kalimba,
51. Captain Damascène Sekamana,
52. Lieutenant David Murenzi,
53. Lieutenant Joseph Ndahiro, and
54. Lieutenant Georges Rumanzi. As members of RPF-NMOG liaison team and using NMOG as a cover, they were:
  - Spies
  - Members of RPF death squad who infiltrated the country in order to sow the seeds of division, incite ethnic unrest, spread terror and great suffering, and carry out political assassinations.
55. Major Wilson Rutayisire, currently director of ORINFOR. As director of Radio Muhabura, he incited hatred and violence. He is responsible for the torture of Hutu peasants who were kidnapped from the Byumba area in February and March 1993, and April 1994.
56. Jean Zigura. He organized the massacre of over 8,000 people in Butare in July, August and September 1994; he organized the massacre of Rwandan refugees in Burundi; he organized the extermination camp in Kabutare, Butare.
57. Major Rose Kabuye. She planned and ordered the genocide of the Hutus. As *préfet* of Kigali, she organized the massacre of the Hutus who remained in Kigali and were surrounded by RPF. She organized the massacre of the bishops at Kabgayi. She organized summary executions in Kigali-Rural *Préfecture*, including Bugesera, where she created concentration and execution camps.
58. Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi. He collaborated with RPF in its Machiavellian plan of seizing power at the cost of thousands of lives. He was appointed Rwandan Army Chief of Staff at midnight, but did not take up his post immediately so as to allow RPF time to carry out the coup d'état. Whereas he was

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expected at the General Headquarters on 7 April 1994, at 0700 hours, he did not report until the afternoon of 8 April 1994 and gave no explanation for his tardiness. Hence, he did not report to the Rwandan Army Headquarters until he learned that the coup d'état had failed. Indeed, RPF integrated him without a problem whereas the Rwandan tragedy unfolded during his term acting as Rwandan Army Chief of Staff. He is therefore guilty of treason.

59. Colonel Anselme Nshizurungu. As a member of RAF who collaborated with the aggressor, the RPF, and is thus guilty of treason.
60. Major Mugisha and
61. Captain Agawa. They massacred thousands of Hutus in Bugesera, particularly at Ntarama (testimony of Aimable Karekezi).
62. Captain Joseph Ntambara. He massacred thousands of Hutus between the Akagera hotel and the Akagera River and dumped the bodies in the river (testimony of Aimable Karekezi).
63. Lieutenant Murokore and
64. Lieutenant Rwigamaba. They led the killing of over 8,000 Hutus at Kibeho (testimony of Aimable Karekezi). N.B. They may have changed ranks since RPF came to power in Kigali.

RPA soldiers who were members of the death squad and participated in the special operations during which systematic massacres, politically-motivated attacks and terrorist acts were committed:

1. Capt. Gérard Ntashamaje
2. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Epimaque Kayitare
3. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Jones Munani
4. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Richard Musengimana[*illegible*]
5. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Joseph Simbankabo[*illegible*]
6. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Justin Twagirayezu
7. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Chantal Damasi
8. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Léonard Mpambara
9. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Ntagozera
10. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Béatrice Mukamana
11. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Sadiki
12. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Ninja
13. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Cyotsi
14. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Fikili
15. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Gatemayose
16. 2<sup>nd</sup> Lt. Paluku
17. Sgt. Major Munyakazi
18. Sgt. Major Kabuji
19. Sgt. Major Cyumba

20. Sgt. Francois Sebirayi
21. Sgt. Kanakuze
22. Cpl. Kamanzi
23. Cpl. Uzabakiliho
24. Cpl. Sentabire
25. Sgt. Bagabo (72<sup>nd</sup> battalion)
26. Sgt. Bucyana (73<sup>rd</sup> battalion)
27. Pvt. Nsengiyumva (73<sup>rd</sup> battalion)
28. Cpl. Ruterana (HQ)
29. Pvt. Nkusi (HQ)
30. Innocent Kabibi (MP)
31. Nkuranga (MP)
32. Pvt. Murekezi
33. Pvt. Emmy Nkusi J.M.V. (C battalion)
34. Pvt. Hassan Kayigire (Responsible for the attack at Kigali Night during the night of 25 to 26 December 1992)
35. Lt. Abubakar (Idem)
36. Lt. Mukanyiwa (Idem)
37. Lt. James Musafili (Idem)

N.B. They may have changed ranks since RPF came to power in Kigali.

Added to the list above are the members of RPF "think tank," including Patrick Mazimpaka, Jacques Bihozagara, Tite Rutaremara and Professor Alexandre Kimenyi, all extremist Tutsis.



CHAPTER III: COMPLICITY OF THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY

Section I. Responsibility of the international community

The international community has a huge burden of responsibility for the events which plunged Rwanda into mourning. Certain countries did not hesitate to participate in the war on RPF's side (training, logistical support, recruitment, financial support, rear bases, media support, reinforcements). By their reactions and decisions, others were overtly pro-RPF. They sinned by omission.

Although it was unjustified, the war had the support of the international community, intended or otherwise. The international organizations (UN, OAU, etc.) closed their eyes to the violation of international refugee conventions prohibiting refugees from bearing arms or attacking their country. They declined to condemn Uganda, RPF's main sponsor.

The Arusha Peace Agreement was a diktat imposed on those who challenged RPF's designs. Due to complicity and the lack of understanding of the Rwandan problem, only on the Government side was pressurized. The pressure continued after the signing of the Agreement. Indeed, RAF had their weapons impounded while RPF continued to acquire arms.

With the attack of 6 April 1994, the international community became an accomplice in the assassination of the three Hutu presidents of Rwanda and Burundi, and even today, it appears disinterested in identifying those responsible for the said assassinations.

During the ensuing tragedy, UNAMIR pulled out of the country as soon as the situation became more involved. The international community therefore failed to face up to its responsibilities. While the war was raging and preventing the security forces from reestablishing peace, it was unwilling to accept a ceasefire that would have enabled RAF to free up forces for the restoration and maintenance of law and order. On the contrary, it was quick to impose a unilateral embargo on the new Government, while it was defending itself, whereas RPF was the aggressor, continued to acquire arms at will through Uganda; it thus helped RPF to easy military victory.

Section 2. Accusations against UNOMOR-UNAMIR, particularly Dallaire and the Belgian contingent

§ 1. UNAMIR's responsibility in the President's assassination

In a bid to further the plan to assassinate President Habyarimana while he was traveling by road or attending a public event, General Roméo Dallaire, commander of the UNAMIR forces, went to great lengths to make sure that the General Staff downsized the presidential escort detail. Having failed to achieve that, he asked to be informed of the President's schedule, number of uniformed and plain-clothes men along the president's route, number of troops deployed at events attended by the President, etc.

As all the aforementioned requests were denied, General **Dallaire** demanded the withdrawal of the jeep fitted with a machine gun from the presidential escort, whereas UNAMIR used it to escort RPF dignitaries. Once again, he was unsuccessful. His moves were viewed with suspicion by the security services.

In November and December 1993, Belgian UNAMIR soldiers would grab from MRND party members medals bearing President Habyarimana's effigy and trample on them. That shows how bitterly the Belgian soldiers hated President Habyarimana.

On 28 January 1994, a vehicle of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent traveled from Mukamira to Birembo via Rambura and Gasiza (tarmac road). On their way back, they took the old dirt road and when they reached the head of State's residence, the people in the vehicle asked the local population (in French), "Where are the armored vehicles?" (Telegram/94/156 of 29 January 1994 from Ops Commander, Ruhengeri).

On 1 February 1994, around 0815 hours, the Belgian UNAMIR helicopter flew four times over the President's Kanombe residence (Telegram OPS/94/065 of 1 February 1994, Pres. Guard Battalion). Both [sic] were clearly reconnaissance missions on the set-up and defense systems at the head of State's residence.

Two days prior to President Habyarimana's assassination, General **Dallaire** and Colonel **Marchal**, commander of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent, asked a representative of the Ministry of Defence: "Who would succeed President Habyarimana in the event of an accident?"

UNAMIR failed to secure Kanombe airport and to prevent the attack on the presidential plane. Therefore, they were RPF accomplices.

The presidential plane was shot down on 6 April 1994, around 2030 hours. The next morning, General **Dallaire** described it as an accident whereas no inquiry had been conducted. Why was he in such a hurry to make it look like an accident? In the end, he was proved wrong thanks to the testimonies of the local people who heard the detonation that accompanied every impact.

On 6 April 1994, around 1930 hours, a Belgian UNAMIR jeep fitted with a machine gun passed by the Mulindi trading centre, near Masaka. It returned a few minutes after the crash of the presidential plane. When it reached the 15-km crossroads near Ndera, it opened fire. When it reached Remera, it fired on the civilians. It then broke the gate to Amahoro National Stadium, guarded by the Bengali UNAMIR contingent, instead of going to Amahoro Hotel. The jeep must have been carrying those who had carried out the attack.

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According to inhabitants of Mulindi, below Kanombe, the sound of detonations came from the vicinity of Masaka, where there was a UNAMIR position occupied by the Belgian detachment.

On 6 April 1994, around 2200 hours, the Belgian UNAMIR soldiers held a champagne party at the Méridien Hotel. They told their girlfriends to leave their homes with their families and move into the hotel and, once there, not to leave their rooms. The circumstances of the party and aforementioned measures are unclear!

"While in a bar in Nyamirambo (Kigali) on 3 April 1994, a Belgian UNAMIR lieutenant named Hebron said that President Habyarimana was to be killed." (AJPR)

"Witnesses saw UNAMIR planes flying repeatedly over Masaka hill prior to the attack on the President's plane." (*Inquisiteur Républicain*, No. 003/95, September 1995)

Moments before the attack on the President's plane, UNAMIR ordered all planes taking off and landing at Kanombe airport to do so from the east, purportedly, because RPF suspected planes flying from the west of spying on their positions, meaning the CND compound. And yet, the Colonel Mayuya barracks, which housed several RAF units and facilities situated along the runway from the east did not raise the same concerns with UNAMIR. Though UNAMIR gave in to RPF threats, it was well aware that it was capable of shooting down airplanes both in the CND zone and elsewhere. This measure was simply aimed at preventing the presidential plane and those of RAF planes from going undetected.

Statements by residents of Masaka regarding the preparation and execution of the attack on the presidential plane:

"That day, Belgians belonging to UNAMIR, who were traveling in all-terrain vehicle, entered and left the location several times, especially in the evening. Those same Belgians – there were two of them – went back and forth between the small bridge at Cumi N'Icyenda (kilometre 19) and the Kabuga trading center. They stopped at Cumi N'Icyenda three times."

"At 8:30 p.m., the two Belgians stopped at Cumi N'Icyenda, after two or three minutes, a shot rang out from Masaka hill (Rusheshe). Two or three minutes thereafter, two UNAMIR jeeps driven by Belgians came down from Rusheshe and headed towards downtown Kigali. The vehicles were traveling at very high speed."

"Immediately after the presidential plane was shot at, we saw Belgians passing by in two jeeps; they had their guns at the ready through the windows. It was around 8:30 p.m.! Indeed, I saw those jeeps going back and forth at that location. Moreover, the Belgians had been going to the location for sometime to survey it. We did not know what they were looking for. It was therefore easy to recognize those Belgians, especially considering that after the plane crash, no other vehicle passed there, except the one of the two Belgians."

"It was reported that it was Belgian soldiers who shot at the presidential plane...It is safe to say that it was the Belgians who shot at the plane, because the local people told us that they saw them aiming sophisticated weapons that evening. Moreover, their vehicle was there...Usually, they were accompanied by gendarmes, but that day, they had been alone since morning. Besides, the Belgians were the only white soldiers in UNAMIR who spoke French."  
"Right after the President's plane caught fire, six Belgians who had been moving about in the zone since 6 p.m. suddenly took off and headed towards Kigali...Neighbors saw the vehicles and the Belgians who were driving them."  
"I affirm that they are missile launchers, because I know how they are described in books. Moreover, when the Belgians came to Rwanda at the beginning of the war in 1990, they set one up near my house...As I was their house employee, I had easy access to their positions...The missile launchers were portable...Therefore, I can categorically say that the attack was carried out by the Belgians."

All this information was provided them in good faith, but it was after it had been used that RAF realized that it was a gift to the enemy.

At all the meetings of the joint RAF-RPF commission on the Assembly and Cantonment points, it was openly pro-RPF. It always presented RPF position and favored it in the opinions expressed.

At the end of March 1994, UNAMIR accumulated huge stockpiles in Byumba. They were evacuated; but instead, they were ceded to RPF when the hostilities resumed.

## II. Complicity after 6 April 1994

1. When hostilities resumed on 7 April 1994, instead of protecting people and maintaining law and order while RAF was dealing RPF attacks, UNAMIR pulled out at a time when its presence was warranted. The absconding of the international peacekeeping force caused panic and despair, which boiled over and culminated into ethnic massacres.
2. The absconding compounded the hear-nothing-do-nothing approach of the UN. Indeed, for three years, it had ignored the atrocities committed by RPF and the Rwandan people's denunciation of the genocide of the Hutus at the hands of RPF, which brutally massacred tens of thousands of Hutus as it advanced.
3. Soon after the resumption of the fighting, UNAMIR prepared positions for RPF. For instance, it set up platforms for support weapons at APEHOT in Gikondo (See intelligence note from the G2 bureau of the Rwandan Army General Staff, 9 April 1994). In fact, before it withdrew, UNAMIR made sure that RPF occupied and defended all the said positions. Examples include Mount Rebero, *Centre Christus*, as well as the Amahoro and Méridien hotels.

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4. UNAMIR facilitated RPF's pre-positioning in Kigali, notably at l'Hôtel Rebero L'Horizon, by transporting RPF elements in tanks. It did likewise in Bugesera. Whenever an RPF member was isolated by RAF and unable to defend a position, UNAMIR sent reinforcements under various guises, including search for expatriates. That happened several times in Kimihurura, Remera...
5. UNAMIR stockpiled arms and ammunitions at strategic positions; those arms were subsequently ceded to RPF. Examples: at Byumba, Rutongo, Mount Rebero, Kicukiro (ETO) and MAGERWA (Letter No. 085/G2/5 of 15 April 1995, G2 bureau, RA General Staff).
6. UNAMIR shot at civilians in Kigali and at RAF soldiers. On 14 April, a Belgian patrol killed Chief Warrant Officer Rangira and Sgt. Muruta of the transmissions company outside ATS in Kimihurura. The same day, a member of ESO, who was escorting two trucks carrying rice to Kigali, was shot at near Kanogo, Kimihurura by a Belgian UNAMIR soldier: Sub-Lt. Ntaganda and private Ntibangirirwa were hit (Letter No. 085/G2.5 of 15 April 1994 from the G2 EM AR Office [missing segment]).
7. UNAMIR readily backed up RPF in the attacks on barracks and positions occupied by RAF, including our Presidential Guard barracks, which came under mortar fire from the *Ecole Technique Officielle* in Kicukiro. It took great pleasure in denying access to and controlling Kanombe airport (Letter No. 085/G2.5 of 15 April 1994, G2 bureau, RA General HEADQUARTERS). On 24 April 1994, UNAMIR soldiers were once again seen assisting RPA on Mount Rebero (Letter No. 93/G2.4 of 22 April 1994, G2 bureau, statement of Witness Gabriel Mazimpaka, who had spent four days at Rebero with the *Inyenzi*).
8. UNAMIR tanks shot at the paratrooper battalion at the Sonatubes crossroads and IAMSEA crossroads in Remera to prevent them from attacking RPF positions.
9. Thousands of displaced Hutus were selectively massacred in the Amahoro Stadium, the *Centre Christus* and the Kind Faysal Hospital, whereas all three locations were under the control of UNAMIR troops.
10. As concerns the commander of the UNAMIR forces, General **Dallaire**, it can be said that during that phase of the war, his main activity was backing up RPF:
  - On 21 April 1994, he lied to the RA Chief of Staff that RPF had pledged in writing to abide by the new status of Kanombe airport proposed by UNAMIR. (Letter of 22 April 1994, from General **Dallaire**). However, it was not until 22 April 1994 that he asked RPF for its cooperation and written pledge to comply with the said status (Letter of 22 April 1994, from General **Dallaire**).
  - In a series of letters on the violation of the secure zone created between UNAMIR's facilities and the warring parties' troops (RAF and RPF), General **Dallaire** accused RAF of having a shot at Amahoro Stadium, which housed the Bengali troops and 4,000 refugees, and Amahoro Hotel (UNAMIR HEADQUARTERS), in violation of the security zone (Letter of 20 April 1994 from General **Dallaire** to the RA Chief of Staff). The shooting allegedly left 25 dead and 52 wounded. The security zone was 100m from UNAMIR facilities for

troops, 500m for direct fire weapons and 1,000m for indirect fire weapons (Letter No. 30001 Ops of 15 April 1994 from General **Dallaire**). In his reply, the RA Chief of Staff said that it was in reaction to the mortars fired by RPF elements positioned at the Chez Lando crossroads, a mere 200m from the UNAMIR Headquarters (Letter No. 0651/G3.3.0 of 21 April 1994 from the RA Chief of Staff). General **Dallaire** recognized that such was the case (Letter No. 0/MINUAR/FC of 22 April 1994 from General **Dallaire**). This incident shows that RPF was at liberty to violate the UNAMIR commander.

- When nine UNAMIR photo identity cards were found on the dead bodies of *Inkotanyi*, General **Dallaire** denied UNAMIR's involvement. He claimed that the cards were incomplete and fake and should be destroyed by the Ghanaian contingent secretariat. They were [missing segment] stolen when they moved from Byumba to Kigali" (Letter of 25 April 1994 from General **Dallaire**). Despite those claims, it is clear that RPF elements were able to pose as UNAMIR staff.
- General **Dallaire** once went to the Rwandan Army Headquarters. He discreetly asked the soldiers where the first shell fired at the headquarters had landed. It had landed on the photo lab. He said: "If it were me, I would have aimed at the RA Chief of Staff's office." (He is an artilleryman by training). He left thereafter. The next day, the transmission centre was hit by a shell. That means that he had given RPF information enabling it to adjust its aim.
- As from the end of April 1994, he increasingly resorted to delaying tactics. For instance, he arrogantly asked the RA Chief of Staff to inform him of every attack RAF were planning to launch along the road from Remera to the Méridien via the CND. In reality, his aim was to transmit that information to RPF (Letter No. 0669/G3.3.3 of 29 April 1994 from the RA HEADQUARTERS, and Letter of 1 May 1994 from General **Dallaire**).
- He requested that the Méridien remain United Nations facility, but he did not urge RPF to comply with the UNAMIR directives on deploying troops and weapons in close proximity to United Nations facilities, whereas such facilities included the hotel (Letter No. 3001/1 Ops of 15 April 1994 from General **Dallaire**, and Letter No. 0669/G3.3.3 of 29 April 1994 from the RA HEADQUARTERS).
- On 6 May 1994, the RA Chief of Staff was obliged to express strong disapproval for General **Dallaire**'s unfounded suspicions of RAF, for wrongly accusing them of having fired at Kanombe airport: "Our men and equipment are there to defend the facility, and our elements cannot shoot at it. For us, the airport is crucial for the procurement of supplies and humanitarian aid... We believe that it would be wrong to defend a place while at the same time destroying it..." (Letter 0693/G3.3.3 of 6 May from the RA HEADQUARTERS).
- Weary of the fact that General **Dallaire** and some UNAMIR officers were conniving with RPF, the Rwandan Government felt that it was time to file a complaint with the United Nations (Letter No. 168/03.00/CAB/AP of 31 May 1994 from the Ministry of Defence to the United Nations Secretary General, and Letter No. 63/16/06/E/05 of 15 June 1994 from the Rwandan Ambassador to the

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United Nations). After the United Nations Secretary General expressed his support for General **Dallaire**, the latter arrogantly reaffirmed that he was "determined to remain the UNAMIR commander," implying that he was ignoring the accusations against him. He insulted the Minister of Foreign Affairs by branding him discourteous in the discharge of his diplomatic duties as Minister of Foreign Affairs in MINAFFET (General Dallaire's Letter of 21 June 1994 [missing segment]).

- The following revelations by UNAMIR liaison officers provide a broader, clearer view of General Dallaire's personality and shady activities as an accomplice:
  1. General **Dallaire** collaborated with RPF. On several occasions, he facilitated the infiltration of RPF elements posing as women.
  2. Although Booh-Booh was his direct supervisor, he would hide from him the reports he personally prepared and sent to both his government and the United Nations.
  3. He assumed Jacques Roger Booh-Booh's political role.
  4. He created tension between the Belgian peacekeepers and the rest of UNAMIR. He treated black officers with contempt.
  5. He refused to publish the results of the investigations into the massacres committed in November 1993 in the buffer zone (Bwisige, Ngarama, Nyamugali, Kidaho, Nkumba, Cyeru and Mutura *Commune*) because the commission report incriminated RPF.
  6. When he returned to Canada, he stated that RPF was exerting pressure in the North but did nothing to stop it.
  7. From the moment UNAMIR arrived in Rwanda until March 1994, he pressurized the Rwandan Government to allow RPF room for maneuver. Instead of creating UNAMIR operation commands on both sides, he created one on the Government only side in order to halt supplies, recruitment and training, while RPF continued its activities and preparations for combat.
  8. At the end of March 1994, UNAMIR accumulated huge stockpiles in Byumba, which were ceded to RPF.
  9. When RPF took Kanombe airport, General **Dallaire** was visibly delighted.
  10. UNAMIR stockpiled weapons at Rutongo, Mount Rebero and Kicukiro (ETO), which it ceded to RPF.
  11. The weapons of the Bengali contingent, which was based at the Amahoro National Stadium, were ceded to RPF.

Section 3. Responsibility of prominent, foreign RPF allies

RAF Command in Exile§ 1. Complicity of President Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda

## I. Complicity in the Rwandan conflict

A. *Responsibility of President Museveni*

Ugandan President, Yoweri Museveni, bears a great deal of responsibility for the Rwandan tragedy. In a bid to realize his hegemonic plan of creating a Hima-Tutsi empire in the Great Lakes region, he prepared and oversaw the execution of the attack on Rwanda and all the ensuing crimes.

The preparations had been going on for a long time. Indeed, after losing the presidential elections to Milton Obote, Museveni went into the bush and recruited many Tutsi refugees with whom he signed a pact to attack Rwanda after having conquered and consolidated power in Uganda. After capturing Kampala, he appointed Tutsi refugees to top positions within NRA.

Tutsi refugees around the world welcomed the opportunity, as it enabled them to fulfill their long-term aspiration to return to Rwanda by force and take over the government.

Therefore, they were not interested in the peaceful return of the refugees, as it was likely to hamper the plan concocted by RPF and Museveni. The 1 October 1990 attack was aimed at annihilating President Habyarimana's accomplishments.

Whereas at the outset, President Museveni claimed that the "boys" had escaped from him, on 16 October 1990, while speaking to diplomats in Kampala, he stated this: "After all, how do you arrest people because they are discussing going back to their country?...if there is one issue on which opinion in Uganda is unanimous, it is the view that Banyarwanda should go back to their country" (Shyirambere J. Barahinyura, *Rwanda: Trente deux ans après la révolution sociale de 1959*, page 11). Whereas, on 13 November 1990, his Minister of State for Special Affairs in the President's Office, Mr. Atekar Ajahu, told Soroti district officials, "...It is true that the people of Uganda are happy to see the Rwandan refugees turn their guns on Rwanda and not on the Ugandan Government" (*Ibid*, page 11, published in the *New Vision* [newspaper], 14 November 1990).

As OAU Chairman, President Yoweri Museveni displayed bias in favour of RPF throughout the succeeding negotiations and went to great lengths to prevent the peaceful settlement to the Rwandan crisis. Indeed, at the Mwanza Summit of 17 October 1990, he was asked to urge RPF to stop its attacks and opt for dialogue. Museveni did nothing and gave no instructions to the OAU Secretary General to seek a solution to the conflict as the Rwandan party had wished [*missing segment*].



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In fact, President Museveni did not participate in the CEPGL Summit of 23 October 1990, on ways to restore peace in Rwanda. He had been invited, not because he was OAU Chairman, but also, and especially, because he was involved in the conflict (AJPR, page 111). From the outset, during Museveni tenure as OAU Chairman, the OAU ignored the Military Observer Group (MOG) that was formed at the CEPGL Summit at Gbadolite, on 26 October 1990 and charged with the task of monitoring the observance of the ceasefire by both warring parties. The OAU thus delayed its deployment so as not to expose Uganda and its President as parties in the conflict (AJPR, page 112).

#### B. NRA attack on Rwanda

After Yoweri Museveni seized power in Uganda, Rwanda's border *préfectures* of Ruhengeri and Byumba came under constant attack.

The various multi-level meetings failed to stop the incursions, which were aimed at killing the Hutus and looting their property; they culminated in the large-scale attack of 1 October 1990 (AJPR, page 110).

Although most of the aggressors were Tutsi refugees, who had enjoyed overwhelming support from Yoweri Museveni, their Hima cousin, they were actually members of NRA, the Ugandan National Army. As a matter of fact, RPA leadership was made up of high-ranking NRA officers (Executive Intelligence Review, 19 August 1994):

- Fred Rwigema, the former RPF president, was a former NRA major general, Assistant Minister of Defence and later Deputy Chief of Staff.
- Paul Kagame, Rwanda's current Vice President and Minister of Defence, was formerly an NRA major and Chief of intelligence.
- Pierre Bayingana, member of RPF, was formerly an NRA major and chief of medical services.
- Christ Bunyenyezi was formerly an NRA major and commander of its 306<sup>th</sup> brigade.

As though to confirm that the aggressors were members of NRA, when asked for his views on how the fighting between the terrorist Tutsi army and the Rwandan Army would pan out, President Yoweri Museveni answered that he knew his "boys" and their fighting capacity quite well, because he had trained them: "I doubt very much that the troops that are there can defeat the rebel force by force. Some of them are the best people" (Shyirambere J. Barahinyura: Rwanda: trente deux ans après la révolution sociale de 1959, page 11; Press conference, 10 October 1990).

Each time RAF warded off RPF attacks, the assailants would retreat to Uganda but would not give up their sinister quest for power in Rwanda. The Ugandan government continued to "provide protection to RPF leadership which traveled with Ugandan passports [*missing*

segment] ...RPF combatants stayed in the same camps as NRA, and NRA participated actively in the attacks on Rwanda" (Baranyihura, page 94).

In addition to personnel, NRA also provided with all the material and supplies from its stocks.

*C. Reinforcements and support provided to RPF*

The resumption of the conflict, on 7 April 1994, was accompanied by closer collaboration between NRA and RPF. NRA units (e.g. Simba Battalion) participated in an attack on Kigali (Note of 9 April 1994, from the G2 bureau, statement of an escaped war prisoner).

On 28 May 1994, an *Inkotanyi* named Jean de Dieu Habimana, who was captured near MAGERWA, said that there were 23 Ugandans in his unit, Alpha Battalion, most of whom worked on combat weapons (Letter No. 118/G2.2.4 of 28 May 1994 from the G2 RA HEADQUARTERS bureau).

The following intelligence from RPF provides evidence of NRA's involvement in the fighting:

- "Our troops and those of NRA in our sectors are on the alert."
- "You will continue to receive reinforcements, weapons and food from NRA without difficulty."
- "You will receive reinforcements and you are requested to collaborate closely with NRA in your sectors."
- "We shall hold on to NRA battalion as long as Belgium is not in a position to provide us with a force capable of backing us up against Rwanda... We have already received NRA helicopters and buses."
- "The NRA is with us and troop morale is high. Being supplied by air is very efficient and must be continued... The presence of aircraft has been observed and reported by the enemy... camouflage your positions and the presence of mercenaries..."
- "...Overall the situation in the Chief's country (Uganda): The political and socio-economic situation has not improved. However, that does not affect the assistance the Chief (Museveni) provides to RPF. The Chief is still with us and will see us through to final victory in the enemy country..."
- "...Supplies and evacuation of the wounded are the responsibility of the Chief's special services, but will be provided whenever requested by our authorities..."
- "Mayaga for Kabarore. Thanks to the immediate deployment of new government troops and the many patrols they conducted, the counter-attack attempted last night from Kigali-Ville by Ugandan captain Musengo, and Lieutenant Ndayamabaje was foiled... 16 Ugandan soldiers were forced to flee during

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yesterday's skirmish in Kicukiro – Karambo... Two soldiers, one of them a Ugandan, were killed by carelessness [*missing segment*].

## II. Complicity in the assassination of Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira

The day of the Summit, 6 April 1994, President Museveni was 2 ½ hours late, which meant that the meeting ended later than scheduled.

During the meeting, he held up the deliberations by pretending to be asleep, and by cracking jokes. Whenever he awoke, he would oblige his colleagues to start over, claiming that he had not followed the discussion. His aim was to hold up the meeting and force the Rwandan and Burundian presidents to travel at night.

Since President Habyarimana's assassination, President Museveni's reaction has been unequivocal. The magazine Africa International (Issue No. 272, of May 1994...) has published a number of telling statements. Speaking before the Panafrican Congress, President Museveni did not even pretend to be upset about the passing of both his counterparts, whom he had seen and embraced the day before...he did not even request to observe a minute of silence. Speaking to someone on Sunday, 10 April 1994, he stated: "You know, it was time to solve the matter" [sic] (AJPR, page 126).

### § 2. Complicity of President Ali hassani Mwinyi of Tanzania and his collaborators:

The complicity of the Tanzanian Government and President Ali Hassani Mwinyi is obvious, particularly as regards the assassination of Presidents Habyarimana and Ntaryamira.

According to the invitation letter, the meeting was due to be held in Arusha. Two days prior to the Summit, the venue was changed without explanation, and the meeting moved to Dar es Salaam, which is farther away than Arusha from Kigali and Bujumbura. Wasn't that meant to lengthen the return trip so as to allow for the putting in place of the operational element?

The French version of the deliberations was published quite belatedly. It was obtained thanks to the perseverance of the Rwandan delegation. It was signed at the airport just as the heads of State were preparing to board the plane.

The decisions reached at the meeting were not communicated to the Rwandan Government, despite the fact that, normally, the President's death should not have prevented the continuation of the negotiations.

The Tanzanian Government did not offer condolences to the people of Rwanda and Burundi, whose Presidents died on their way back from Dar es Salaam.

The Tanzanian Government seized Rwandan aircraft on behalf of RPF, despite the fact that RPF had not taken over the government.

The Tanzanian Government was the first to recognize RPF Government in Kigali.

§ 3. Complicity of Major Pierre Buyoya, President of Burundi

I. Complicity of the Burundian Army and Buyoya Government

The Burundian army actively participated in the recruitment and training of *Inkotanyi* in collaboration with businessmen, who were refugees in Burundi. This is the case for the commander of the Kirundo army camp, where recruits from Rwanda were taken in [missing segment]. Major Buyoya's government arranged charter flights on Air Burundi, the national airline, to fly recruits from Bujumbura to Kampala.

The Burundian soldiers did everything to try and open up a front in southern Rwanda to enable them to assist the *Inkotanyi*; they thus attacked RAF positions at Nemba, Bugesera in 1992.

After the fall of Gako camp (Bugesera), the Burundian army, under cover of Lt. Col. Bikomagu, the RAB Chief of Staff, operated alongside several Tutsi militiamen, who were refugees in Burundi, providing RPF with reinforcements and machine guns. It (the FAB) participated in the capture of Butare town on 3 July 1994, and that of the entire central and southern Rwanda.

II. Reference documents

On 15 April 1994, information from Burundi indicated that six trucks carrying an estimated 500 soldiers had left Burundi for Uganda via Tanzania. Several Burundian soldiers had left their barracks in order to back up RPF (See intelligence not of 15 April 1994 from the RA HEADQUARTERS, G2 bureau).

The following intelligence from RPF points to the FAB's involvement in the Rwandan conflict:

"...In the South, preparations have been finalized and we are waiting for the opportune moment to order their intervention..."

"...The countries to the south and east are still at our disposal..."

"...We have been waiting for elements from the South since this morning..."

§ 4. Complicity of prominent Belgian figures

I. Political backing and support by the media

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At the beginning of the October 1990 war, the Belgian government blocked the weapons ordered by the Rwanda government. The refusal to provide Rwanda with those weapons was simply aimed at depriving it of the means to defend itself at a time when the country was under attack.

Belgium prepared the war with RPF, because the Belgian media covered RPF's 1 October 1990 attack and entry onto Rwandan territory at Kagitumba.

Instead of condemning the invasion of a friendly, independent country from and by a neighboring country, the Belgian media spoke so highly of the RPF's exploits that the international community was under impression that RPF had launched a swift attack on Rwanda and crossed Rwanda. Indeed, in their television broadcasts, those media deliberately confused Kivuye Commune, situated along the border with Uganda, with Kibuye Préfecture, along Rwanda's western border.

When Belgian Prime Minister, Wilfred Martens, met President Habyarimana in Nairobi on 15 October 1990, he said that Belgium would provide aid only on condition that there was democracy in Rwanda. He thus held the same discourse as RPF, which claimed to have attacked Rwanda in order to introduce democracy.

The *Agence Generale de Cooperation and Developpement* (AGCD) organized orientation courses for aid workers that were due to be sent to Rwanda, but did not consult the Rwandan Embassy in Brussels. Mr. Gasana Noba, an eminent RPF member, was one of the instructors on African History. He thus brainwashed his students; therefore, aid workers were already sold to RPF cause before they even left for Rwanda.

It should be noted that several high-ranking Belgian political figures sided with RPF. Indeed, Jean Gol, MP and PRL party official made no secret of that when the war broke out (See television debate, October 1990); Cuypers, MP, merely made tendentious statements in a Belgian daily newspaper after touring the line of contact.

The Belgian government sent several eminent ministers to visit Rwanda after the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement in order to speed up its implementation. Such officials included Minister of Defence, Léo Delacroix, the Secretary of State for Cooperation and Development, Eric de Rijke, and the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Willy Claes. The sensational statements he made in Kigali in March 1994 about the President's assassination speak for themselves. Speaking to reporters in a threatening tone, he said: "I gave him (President Habyarimana) up to 5 April to put in place Broad-Based transitional institutions." That spelt death for President Habyarimana.

Belgian reporters, such as Colette Braekman of the newspaper *Le Soir*, and Marie France Cros of *La Libre Belgique*, facilitated RPF's misleading media campaign in their newspapers.

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Belgium weighed heavily in favour of RPF during and after the Arusha negotiations. Indeed, in May 1992, with the assistance of some MPs, it allowed a meeting of RPF representatives and opposition party officials to be held in the Belgian Parliament; the meeting was to discuss the overthrow of the then regime in Kigali. This, among other matters, was confirmed in March 1994 in statements made by the Belgian Foreign Affairs and of Defence ministers.

Belgium was one of the first countries to request joining UNAMIR, and demanded that its troops be stationed in Kigali in separate location, despite opposition from the majority of Rwandans. That is why, prior to their withdrawal, in April 1994, they facilitated the capture of Kigali by actively participating in the attack on the presidential plane and ceding to RPF the positions they had been occupying and some of their weapons.

## II. Technical assistance

There is firm evidence of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent's participation in the attack which took place on 6 April 1994, the planning and execution of the genocide and the resumption of the war. In their statement, the Belgian community in Gisenyi said: "The death squad has been decapitated and, obviously, several innocent people will follow in its demise; that is to be expected, as history has shown. It is necessary to do away with the entire system; it is not by eliminating two, three, four individuals that one can claim victory" (Intelligence about RPF). This statement shows that the Belgians were well aware that the assassination of the President of the Republic would lead to massacres [missing segment]... Throughout the war, the Belgian community provided intelligence to RPF, including information about the situation at the Zairian border.

Belgium provided mercenaries as instructors; the latter provided training in Mulindi. Others participated in the fighting at Jali, Rutongo, Kabuye, Rebero, Kabuga... and in the installation of combat weapons. Several of the mercenaries arrived in Rwanda at the same time as the UNAMIR replacements, in March 1994, while others arrived in RPF-controlled zone via Nairobi and Uganda. The visit by the Belgian Minister of Defence was simply aimed at preparing the ground for those reinforcements...

Belgium was quite insistent as regards using the Kigali-Rusumo route for the withdrawal of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent, with the sole aim of ceding part of the military hardware it had taken to Kigali.

## § 5. Complicity of President Bill Clinton and his Administration

### I. Technical assistance

After the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the United States did a great deal for RPF. For instance, claiming to contribute to the demobilization and integration of RAF and RPF forces, several US officials visited Rwanda to assess RAF troop strength,

number of units and, especially – as expected – the type and quantity of weapons available to RAF. They included Lt. Col. Vuckovic, US Military Attache, Major Tom D. Marley of the Department of Defence, who was based in Cameroon. Moreover, the attack on the presidential plane took place on Wednesday, 6 April 1994, which coincided with “another visit” by Lt. Col. Vuckovic to Kigali, a visit that had been postponed several times. (Initially, it was scheduled to take place on 21 February 1994). And, as though by coincidence, that was the day when the *Inkotanyi* announced on their radio network that the coup d'état was fast approaching.

After the capture of Kigali by RPF, US President Bill Clinton dispatched soldiers and military equipment there; officially, the aim was to facilitate the distribution of humanitarian aid (even as people were fleeing to Zaire, Tanzania and Burundi); however, in reality, it was to back up RPF regime so as to deter a possible surprise counter-attack. President Clinton did not succeed in convincing the US Senate of the need for US military presence in Kigali.

That is also why, in order to cover up US unconditional support, “American instructors” wore UNAMIR caps, officially, to train Rwandans in demining techniques. In fact, according to corroborative reports, there were Marines – they all happened to be black – in the Gisenyi region when Rwandan refugees were forced to leave Zaire in August 1995. The US feared an attack from Zaire by RAF, as it believed that it was possible to disguise it during the forced repatriation.

## II. Media and political support

On 1 May 1994, during a telephone conversation between RA Chief of Staff with Ms. Prudence Bushnell, US Under-Secretary for African Affairs, the latter stated President Clinton's demands:

- A ceasefire; it was as though she was unaware that RAF had done everything to negotiate a ceasefire only to be turned down by RPF.
- An end to hostilities, whereas she knew that RPF refused to end hostilities so as to free up security forces.
- The disarming of civilians and militia, whereas RPF had deployed armed elements all across the country; moreover, the large number of weapons in civilian hands was a consequence of the war.
- And end to RTL M broadcasts: The RAF had gone to great lengths to stop the incendiary broadcasts, but as RPF's *Radio Muhabura* continued with their provocation, RTL M was forced to respond.

Bushnell further stated that Hutu civilians were fleeing to Tanzania because of the massacres perpetrated by RAF. When the RA Chief of Staff asked for an international mission be dispatched to Rwanda to monitor the situation on the ground, she answered

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that it required a ceasefire, whereas, in fact, RPF had refused to accept a ceasefire. As RPF had initiated the war, those conditions should have been imposed on them.

The US government also played a major role in influencing the Security Council to impose an embargo on the Rwandan government. Speaking about the Rwandan crisis before the Congressional Sub-Committee on Africa, George E. Moose, Assistant Secretary of State, expressed satisfaction, saying, "... We have supported the idea of a touch statement by the President of the Security Council on 30 April 1994...urging all States to stop sending arms to Rwanda... We are looking at other ways to increase the pressure. Mainly, an official UN arms embargo against Rwanda." (Statement by George Moose, 4 May 1994, pages 4-6).

It is also known that the wicked newspaper, *Impuruza*, published in Sacramento, California, USA, since 1985, by Alexandre Kimenyi, is an organ whose function is to asphyxiate [sic] international opinion by means of bellicose, misleading articles that are fraught with insults against the Hutus (see RDR Cameroon document). The media war against Rwanda began in 1987. It was declared at the infamous Tutsi Conference in Washington with the creation of the International Conference on Rwandan Refugees, whose clandestine president is none other than Professor Alexis Kimenyi (Shyiyambere Barahinyura, *Rwanda: Trene deux après la révolution sociale de 1959*, page 49).

#### § 6. Complicity of the British Government

The British Government backed RPF through Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni. It is believed that one of the main reasons is the British Government's interest in Museveni's expansionist ideas. Indeed, making Rwanda a satellite country of Uganda means expanding and strengthening the zone of influence of Britain and the Commonwealth in East and Central Africa. To that end, Great Britain pledged its diplomatic support, including before the United Nations Security Council, the European Community and the Commonwealth, and provided logistical, financial and military backing.

The results of this British-style colonization are already visible: children are to be taught the English language from an early age; courses at Rwanda's National University (*Université Nationale du Rwanda - UNR*) are to be taught in both English and French. In fact, French is bound to disappear from Rwanda, as evidenced by an article in *Imboni* (No. 003, January 1993): "...They (Faustin Twagiramungu, Francophone, Paul Kagame, Anglophone) must no forget that French is what provoked the genocide in Rwanda...Shouldn't we drop the language? Would we die? Moreover, language adie, of what use are the French to us?..." (AJPR, page 129).

According to research conducted by the EIR (Executive Intelligence Review), whose results were published by David Hammer and Linda De Hoyos in the EIR review of 19 August 1994, the Rwandan tragedy and its consequences "are the consequence of the Britain's policies in Africa as introduced by its intelligence service and implemented by



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Yoweri Museveni, with the assistance of Lady Linda Chalker, Minister of Overseas Development, former British Colonial Office...Rwanda has served as a stepping stone for the destruction of the whole of Africa...President Museveni and RPF are merely the executioners thereof...The dismemberment of states and draining of the African continent of its people will not stop. The events in Rwanda will be repeated in other countries in the sub-region. According to the plan, once Rwanda and Burundi become satellite countries of Uganda (under British domination), Kenya and the mineral-rich region of eastern Zaire will be next, followed by Tanzania, the Horn of Africa and Southern Africa.

As regards support in terms of military personnel, the same source stated that "In January 1994, British strategists from the Department of Defence for Africa will leave Angola and concentrate on Rwanda."

#### Section 4. Responsibility of members of religious faiths

The RPF used members of the clergy for propaganda and fund raising. The Tutsi members of the clergy were in favour of the war. Below are some testimonies that corroborate that:

- According to Barahinyura, a former high-ranking RPF official, Msgr. Innocent Gasabwoya and Father Crysologue Mahame were not only key RPF figures but also the brains behind it (Barahinyura p. 79).
- During a search of Father Augustin Ntagara's house at the beginning of the war by Detective Théophile Sebigege and the commander of the Gisenyi squad, several documents were seized, including a letter to Msgr. Faustin Ngabo urging him not to confide in Charles Shamukiga (key RPF sponsor), as the latter was suspected of being a double-agent; the reflections of five Nyundo priests, a group which Father Ntagara himself was head and rapporteur, recommending the purging of the seminary of the elements Archbishop Nsengiyumva introduced there in order to sow the seeds of tribalism in "our seminaries"; several subversive documents (N.B. "The elements to be excluded are the Hutus"). Father Ntagara spent his time driving subversive elements, including RAF deserters, to various military positions for the purpose of distracting the soldiers from their missions or stealing arms and ammunition.
- At Rutongo parish, the ammunition and individual weapons were kept in the residence of Fathers Sylvestre and Eustache, the sacristy, the convent and the youth hostel (see note of 9 April 1994 from the RA HEADQUARTERS G2 bureau).
- At the Saint Paul Pastoral centre, RPF military uniforms were found in the rooms of priests and seminarians.
- In Father Sekebaraga's house at Muhororo parish, a consignment of RPF military uniforms, albums containing photographs of all RAF officers each with the

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drawing of the weapon that was to be used to kill him, a description of how the battalion that was due to liberate Kingogo was to be received and a large quantity of provisions for the said battalion were discovered.

- Nuns were apprehended in North Kivu Province in a vehicle carrying recruits from Burundi to Uganda, RPF hideout.
- Some clergy members received military training at Mulindi (see statement of Father Kanyenzi, who claimed that to be going on vacation). In fact, some of them were at the front.

Although the Vatican is beginning to understand the Rwandan problem and to adopt a more realistic approach, it has been criticized for failure to condemn the war. On the contrary, the Vatican engaged in pro-RPF propaganda. Monsignor Berthelot, then Vatican Ambassador to Rwanda, was pro-RPF. Because of the bias, he was unable to help the international community understand the Rwandan problem as Dean of the diplomatic corps in Kigali. When three bishops were murdered at Kabgayi by RPF, the Vatican's reaction was half-hearted, as though the murder was to be expected.

The Catholic Church therefore failed to discharge its duty as a moral guide and elected to side with RPF in the war, despite the fact that war is considered to be the worst, most immoral act in society.

## CHAPTER IV: ACTIVITES OF THE RAF

Section I. 1 October 1990 – 31 December 1992

§ 1. The RAF carried out missions to restore and maintain law and order in the rear despite having fewer men, warded off enemy attacks in the North (Mutara), liberated expatriates (Telegram INT/Ops/90/34, 14 October 1990) and was involved in helping the people who had fled RPF advance to return to their homes. The Gendarmerie intervened in the *Communes* of Kibilira, Ramba and Satinsyi (Gisenyi), Kivumu and Rutsiro (Kibuye) in October 1990; they also intervened in secondary schools.

The documents below show that the security forces cracked down on ethnic unrest and helped displaced persons return to their homes in Ngororero *sous-préfecture*. The Gendarmerie remained around until the displaced persons had been resettled in their homes:

- Telegram INT/OPS/90/371 of 20 October 1990 from the Kibuye company: "Situation back to normal in Kivumo and Rutsiro, bordering Ramba and Kibilira...most of the assailants have been arrested and the investigations are underway to determine the degree of responsibility."
- Telegram INT/OPS/90/531 of 23 October 1990 from the Gisenyi squad: "Situation gradually returning to normal in Ngororero *sous-préfecture*,...Resettlement due to begin on 22 October 1990..."
- Telegram INT/OPS/90/531 of 23 October 1990 from the Gisenyi squad: "...Resettlement of displaced people underway in Satinsyi *Commune*...At Kibilira, displaced people demanding, among other things, that the gendarmerie detachment remain in Ngororero *sous-préfecture* so that they can intervene quickly in case violence erupts once again. Sensitization continuing. The situation is calm elsewhere in the locality."
- Telegram INT/OPS/90/531 of 24 October 1990 from the Gisenyi squad: "...Ngororero: Over 500 people have now returned to the hills in Satinsyi *Commune*. Operation continuing. At Muhororo: entourage (Tutsi priests and civil servants among the displaced people) hampering the return to the hills. Seven families have now returned to their home *secteurs*...Sensitization continuing..."
- Telegram INT/OPS/90/531 of 25 October 1990 from the Gisenyi squad: "...Satinsyi *Commune*: resettlement of displaced people due to end on 25 October 1990...Kibilira and Ramba *Communes*: resettlement scheduled to begin with Rongi and Ntaganzwa *secteurs*..."
- Telegram INT/OPS/90/531 of 29 October 1990 from the Gisenyi squad: "...skirmishes involving Rambura school students (boys) in the evening of 28 October 1990. The officer in charge of the gendarmerie team dispatched to the scene reports five people injured. Meeting to discuss the situation scheduled for 29 October at 0730 hours..."

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- Message INT/OPS/909/550 of 29 October 1990 from the Gisenyi squad: had decided that [missing segment] a delegate of the Ministry of Primary and Secondary Education is there in an acting capacity because the students have been protesting against the current director for quite some time.
- Message Ops/90552 of 29 October 1990, 1120 hours, from the Gisenyi squad: *Préfet* has arrived in Rambura; situation there is critical and a gendarmerie section has been dispatched there for restoration and maintenance of law and order.
- Telegram OPS/90/554 of 30 October 1990 from the Gisenyi squad: "...Situation relatively calm at Rambura school. Classes have resumed. Situation calm elsewhere in the areas. Return to Gisenyi of the teams dispatched to Kibilira on 31 October 1990 and Rambura on 1 November 1990."

§ 2. While holding off RPF *Inkotanyi* attacks in Byumba and Mutara, RAF continued to provide security in the country and to crack down on ethnic unrest until January 1991. The main targets of the attack on Ruhengeri town were the Muhoza and Mubona gendarmerie barracks and Ruhengeri prison. Despite lack of personnel and having to deal with the attack, the gendarmerie was able to pacify and reassure the people during the ensuing ethnic unrest in Kinigi, Mukingo, Nkuli and Mutara *Communes*, as well as Kabaya *sous-préfecture* in January and February 1991.

## Reference documents:

- Telegram INT/OPS/91/693 of 26 January 1991 from the RA HEADQUARTERS to the Operations Commander for Ruhengeri and Ruhengeri Commando battalion: "Prevent ethnic unrest from getting out of hand. Report to me and give me names of presumed *Inkotanyi* accomplices, as well as the charges against them."
- Telegram INT/OPS/91/160 of 29 January 1991 from Ruhengeri Operations Commander: "...Ethnic tension in Kinigi has not subsided..."
- Telegram INT/OPS/91/212 of 5 February 1991 from Ruhengeri Operations Commander: "...Ethnic tension continuing to rise in Nkuli and Mukingo *Communes*."
- Reference SITREP of 9 February 1991 from the Ruhengeri Operations Commander: "...Ethnic tension in Kinigi, Mukingo, and Nkuli continuing to rise... administrative authorities trying their best to restore calm."
- Telegram OPS/91/274 of 5 February 1991 from the Commando Company: "...Ethnic unrest reported in Mutara *Commune*. Military patrol dispatched there attacked. Section, commanded by an officer, dispatched there."
- Telegram INT/OPS/91/264 of 5 February 1991 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander: About the same subject as above.
- Telegram INT/OPS/91/274 of 6 February 1991 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander: "...clashes in Mutara *Commune* have ended. Sensitization and pacification campaign underway."

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- Telegram INT/OPS/91/274 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander: "...Sensitization for self defense and prevention of public clashes [*missing segment*] conducted in Mutura...No improvement in situation in Kabaya *sous-préfecture*..."
- Telegram OPS/91/118 of 31 October 1991 from the Gisenyi squad: Reports of ethnic unrest in Kabaya *sous-préfecture*: "...Homicide and arson continued throughout the night in Mwando (Gaseke) *secteur* despite sensitization meeting held in the area yesterday, on 31 January 1991, by the Minister of the Interior and Communal Development and the *préfet* of Gisenyi...Because of the prevailing situation in Gisenyi, Gisenyi squad is unable to intervene in Kabaya..."
- As the tension was spreading, gendarmerie reinforcements were dispatched there: Telegram INT/OPS/91/126 of 5 February 1991, 1700 hours, from the Gisenyi squad: "...In Mutura and Rwere *Communes*, clashes reported since yesterday, 4 February 1990, following the attack on the commando company by *Inkotanyi* elements...gendarmerie section dispatched to the scene under Lt. Ngerageze...Nyundo *secteur* (Kanama): the local population is threatening those who are suspected of being enemy accomplices...dispatching a gendarmerie section headed by a non-commissioned officer to protect the seminary from being invaded..."
- Telegram OPS/91/194 of 29 January 1991 from the Kibungo Operations Commander: "...Strike by Tutsi students at the Rwamagana school of economics, on 19 January 1991, put down."
- SITREP of 3 February 1991 from the Byumba Operations Commander: "...Ethnically-motivated incidents at Rwesero Minor Seminary during the night of 2 to 3 February 1991. Bishop of Byumba has ordered [its] closure and students have been sent home on the Byumba Operations Commander. Bus."
- Telegram Ops/91/54 of 5 February 1991 and Ops/91/068 of 6 February 1991, both from the Butare squad: ethnic tension at Save school: "...Student strike at Save school on 5 February 1991. Reason: ethnic tension due to formation of rival Hutu/Tutsi groups. Intervention of the Butare *préfecture* authorities...According to several students...After restoring calm, the *préfet* of Butare put security measures in place and a gendarmerie section will remain at the scene overnight to monitor the situation."
- Telegram OPS/91/059 of 4 February 1991 from the Butare squad: "...Ethnic tension at the Kansi *Ecole Economique et Sociale*. Each group suspects the other of wanting to exterminate it...No casualties or damage reported so far. The ring-leaders must be identified and dismissed from the school. *Préfecture* and school authorities working on restoring order..."
- Telegram OPS/91/129 of 6 February 1991 from the Gisenyi squad regarding the clashes at Rambura school: "The director has reported that about 20 children are harassed by fellow students. A gendarmerie detachment is proposed to restore and maintain law and order and avert incidents."

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- Telegram OPS/91/513 of 10 February 1991 from the Kigali squad regarding the ethnic tension at APACE in Kabusunzu: "The director has taken two of the ring-leaders to the gendarmerie brigade at Nyamirambo. A search party was [missing segment] dispatched to the school to assess the situation and a platoon is on stand-by."

§ 3. The Gendarmerie also conducted missions to restore and maintain law and order during the ethnic tension and political demonstrations, while the Rwandan Army continued to provide security at the borders. The people displaced by war were also channeled to camps and provided protection there.

§ 4. The RAF resisted and warded off several enemy attacks in Ruhengeri, Byumba, and Mutara in June 1992, while conducting missions to restore and maintain law and order in the interior because feelings were running high, as certain political parties collaborated with RPF; because of such collaboration, the people felt they were facing two enemies, namely RPF and the disorganized multiparty system. The coalition government (5 political parties) was installed after a series of demonstrations by the opposition during which the gendarmerie discharged its duties (Letter No. 0119/G3.10.2.0 of 24 January 1992 from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS). Indeed, it managed to stop the practices known as "kuhohoza" (forced deliverance) and restore order in the country. Likewise, it maintained order when the population engaged in certain acts to show their disapproval of some of the provisions of the Protocols of the Arusha Peace Agreement, and when clashes erupted between members of different political parties.

## Reference Documents:

- Telegram OPS/92/2743 of 15 November 1992 from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS, regarding ethnic unrest in Kagano, Cyangugu. Gendarmerie reinforcements dispatched for restoring and maintaining law and order.
- Telegram OPS/92/4070 of 20 November 1992 from the Kigali squad, Telegram OPS/92/4352 of 8 November 1992 from the Kigali squad and minutes of Gendarmerie General Staff meeting of 11 December 1992: "Clashes between political parties (*Interahamwe*-PSD and PL) in Kigali. The gendarmes intervened, dispersed and arrested some of them for investigation." "...In Shyongi, clashes between *Interahamwe* and members of other political parties: the gendarmerie intervened and is still at the scene."
- Telegram INT/OPS/92/1235 of 24 November 1992 from the Cyangugu squad: "...lawlessness due to the ethnic unrest and banditry." Gendarmerie and prosecutor's office investigation underway."
- Telegram OPS/92/2999 of 6 December 1992 from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS, Telegram OPS/92/531 of 6 December 1992 from Mbare barracks and Telegram OPS/92/1377 of 6 December 1992 from the Butare

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Operations Commander, all relating to law enforcement and security along the road from Kigali to Butare, in order to prevent clashes and blockades during the CDR rally at Butare.

- Telegram INT/OPS/92/278 of 30 November 1992 from Kibungo to barracks: "...clashes between members of the MRND and PSD parties in Birenga Commune, on 30 November 1992. Security forces intervened; seven MDR and 11 MRND members arrested."
- Letter No. 1881/G2.2.2.2 of 6 November 1991, Letter No. 1929/G2.2.2 of 11 November 1992, Letter No. 2051/G2.2.2 of 19 November, Letter No. 0041/G2.2.2.2 of 7 January 1993 and Letter No. 0215/G2.2.2 of 3 February 1993 all from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS and to the MINADEF regarding weekly security reports. They mention gendarmerie interventions.

### Section 2. 1 January - 4 August 1993

The beginning of 1993 was marked by a great deal of tension. Indeed, there was a lot of controversy following the signing of the Protocol of Agreement on Power Sharing on 30 October 1992 and 9 January 1993. The majority of the people thought that too many concessions had been made to RPF. That led to demonstrations and ethnic unrest. The RPF used that as a pretext to massacre many civilians during the night of 7 to 8 February 1993, and to launch a large-scale attack during which several people were killed and over 1,000,000 displaced (AJPR, *Rwanda: L'Autre face du genocide*, p. 25). Hence, the negotiations in Arusha were suspended and, once again, guns got the upper hand. Negotiations resumed after the joint communiqué issued after the Dar es Salaam meeting on 5-7 March 1993. On 4 August 1993, the Arusha Peace Agreement was signed between the Government of the Republic of Rwanda and the Rwandan Patriotic Front putting an end to the war that had been raging for nearly three years.

#### § 1. The fight against banditry, terrorism and lawlessness

- During the month of January, acts of banditry were reported, especially in Kigali, forcing the gendarmerie to intervene on several occasions (Telegram No. 0351/G2.2.2 of 24 February 1993, from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS).
- In February 1993, more people were displaced due to the resumption of hostilities. Many of them moved to Nyacyonga, near Kigali, increasing the insecurity there. There were many incidents involving pickpockets, as enemy infiltrators, thugs and juvenile delinquents mingled with this ill-defined group and spread all across the city, particularly in the market. Furthermore, a network quickly formed comprising soldiers, who had deserted or been discharged and remained in the city, and escaped convicts; the number of armed criminals thus increased. In dealing with this situation, the gendarmerie, especially the Kigali squad, did its duty effectively and was well appreciated (Letter No. 0936/G2.2.2 of 23 April 1993 from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS).

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- The banditry, terrorism and lawlessness by the aforementioned individuals continued in April 1993 especially in Kigali and in areas removed from the combat zones. Such acts were instigated by enemy infiltrators and accomplices with the aim of inciting lawlessness among the population. There were reports of demonstrations and strikes by students, workers, and other groups. In each case, the gendarmerie intervened with efficiency (Letter No. 1218/G2.2 of 15 May 1993 from the Gendarmerie headquarters) [*missing segment*].
- The poignant events of May 1993 included the heinous murder of Emmanuel Gapyisi, MDR chairman for Gikongoro *Préfecture* and the President of the *Forum Paix et Démocratie*, outside his Kicukiro residence, on 18 May 1993, and the terrorist bomb attacks, including the ones on the markets in Gisenyi and Kirambo (Cyangugu) on 29 May 1993. The gendarmerie immediately undertook investigations to find the culprits. In that same month, bands of criminal elements engaged in armed robbery and lawless acts. Each time, the gendarmerie responded to track down, arrest and initiate legal proceedings against the thugs, and recover any items stolen (Letter No. 1461/G2.3.3 of 30 June 1993 from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS).
- With regard to the few incidents of armed robbery in Kigali in June 1993, the gendarmerie was asked to back up the patrols set up by the local civilian population. The exercise proved successful (Letter No. 1577/G2.2.2 of 22 July 1993 from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS).
- During the period leading up to the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, the situation was calm all across the country. As such, there were fewer reports of criminal acts. The gendarmerie acted quite effectively with backing from the civilian defense initiative (Letter No. 1751/G2.2.2 of 14 August 1993, Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS).

## §2. Restoration of law and order, pacification and protection of the civilian population

## I. During the ethnic unrest

As they had done in the past, RAF intervened to halt the ethnic unrest, particularly in the northwestern part of the country in late 1992 and early 1993, as demonstrated below:

- On 29 November 1992: during the clashes in Kayove, 32 aggressors were arrested, and 3 cows, 26 machetes and 2 spears seized (Telegram INT/OPS/92/2993 of 29 December 1992 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander).
- During the bloody ethnic clashes in Gisenyi, Ruhengeri and Kibuye, the Gendarmerie dispatched detachments to various *Communes* to restore law and order and protect Tutsis who were threatened by Hutus (Letter No. 351/G2.2.2 of 24 February 1993, from the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS).



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- In Mutura *Commune*, the Gendarmerie intervened on 5, 13 and 24 January 1993 whenever ethnic unrest was reported there (Daily report of the Army HEADQUARTERS duty officer of 5, 6, 13, 24, and 25 January 1993, and the Telegram INT/93/220 of 24 January 1993 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander).
- The Gendarmerie was able to monitor and contain the situation at a time when tension was about to spread to the other [missing segment] *Communes* (Telegram INT/OPS/93/0222 of 25 January 1993 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander).
- When the social unrest started brewing, the Gendarmerie was instructed to conduct pre-emptive surveillance missions (Telegram OPS/93/164 of 24 January 1993 from the Ruhengeri Operations Commander).
- On 25 January 1993: with rumors of imminent ethnic clashes in the Nkuli and Mukingo *Communes*, the Ruhengeri Commando Battalion received the order to dispatch elements there. The clashes did not take place perhaps due to fear of those elements (Telegram OPS/93/175 of 25 January 1993 and Telegram OPS/93/175 of 26 January 1993 from the Ruhengeri Operations Commander).
- The Army Chief of Staff visited Ruhengeri Ops sector and had the opportunity to discuss the situation prevailing there at the time with the *Préfet* of Ruhengeri. Recommendations for restoring law and order were made (Telegram OPS/93/172 of 25 January 1993 from the Ruhengeri Operations Commander).
- The Ruhengeri squad monitored the tension between the Tutsis who were accommodated at ISAE Busogo and the Hutus displaced by the fighting of 8 February 1993. The Hutus thought that the Tutsis were treated with favour, because they had better accommodation (Telegram OPS/93/409 of 1 March 1993 from the Ruhengeri Operations Commander).
- The Operations Commander for Rulindo intervened during the unrest in Mbogo *Commune* (Telegram INT/OPS/93/693 of 1 March 1993 from the Rulindo Operations Commander).
- In his remarks at the meeting of RAF sector and unit commanders, on 12 July 1993, the Minister of Defence summarized the aforementioned interventions thus: "Our gendarmes have also restored order and security in the areas which have experienced ethnic tension, such as Bugesera in Kigali, Ramatamu in Kiyuve, Kibilira, Santinsyi, Kayove, Ramba, Giciye and other *Communes* in Gisenyi.
- Moreover, in his letter, Ref. 250/G3.3 of 21 July 1993, the Gisenyi squad commander referred to numerous interventions by the Gendarmerie during the ethnic unrest in February 1993 (Kayove, Giciye, Ngororero, Kabaya, Mudende, Nyundo, Muhororo, Rutsiro, Muramba, Satinsyi, etc...)

## II. During political demonstrations

The RAF intervened on several occasions during demonstrations by members of various political parties in late 1992 and early 1993. The Ruhengeri squad intervened to remove barricades and prevent damage to vehicles stopped at roadblocks

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(Telegram OPS/93/119 and OPS/93/114 of 18 January 1993 from the Ruhengeri Operations Commander).

- The Gendarmerie intervened during political demonstrations which took place in most of the country's regions at the beginning of 1993 [*missing segment*].
- Several demonstrations regarding social and political issues took place in June 1993. They were peaceful for the most part and there were not reports of lawlessness (Telegram No. 1577/G2.2.2 of 22 July 1993 from the Gd N HEADQUARTERS).
- In his opening remarks at the meeting of 12 July 1993, the Minister of Defence referred to this matter: "...if people are grateful, they must have appreciated the superb job done by our Gendarmerie in maintaining law and order. They have performed remarkably well. Here are a few examples: The Gendarmerie has intervened several times in situations where tempers had flared during clashes between political parties, particularly at large demonstrations and rallies. The actions undertaken have been successful, the few exceptions being mainly due to the lack of means rather than partisan considerations. The Gendarmerie has been able to cope with the serious problems that have plagued certain parts of the country, including the repulsive practice known as '*kuhoboza*' where the local authorities are either overwhelmed or simply absent. It has intervened in Gikongoro: Nshili and Kivu *Communes*; several *Communes* in Gitarama and Cyangugu, and a few *Communes* in Butare."

### III. Protection of civilians and respect for human rights

The RAF always ensured that military personnel acted with respect for human rights. The following examples speak for themselves:

- In his opening remarks at the sector commanders' meeting of 13-17 March 1993, the Chief of Staff himself underscored the matter, saying: "I always find it painful to condemn the behavior of a few soldiers whose actions cause a great deal of harm. Indeed they engage in unlawful acts, including looting, rape, and various acts of vandalism, and thereby hurt innocent people. I urge you all...to make sure that this disciplinary matter is urgently addressed...judicial system must also do its part to eradicate this evil" (Letter No. 0960/06.1.9 of 16 March 1993 from MINADEF).
- Various speakers at the meeting emphasized this point, as shown by the following excerpt from the final recommendations: "Deploring the improper treatment of the civilian population by certain soldiers, the meeting recommends that tough action must be taken forthwith against anyone found guilty of such behavior regardless of his/her rank, to seek out and prosecute all [*missing segment*] soldiers who commit various unlawful acts against civilians. The *Forces Armées* must

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behave in such a manner as not to expose themselves to criticism or accusations of human rights abuses. Therefore, all cases must be thoroughly investigated and anyone found guilty must be severely punished (Letter No. 1410/06.1.9 of 20 April 1993 from MINADEF, Annexes II and III).

- On 28 April 1993, the Rwandan Army General Staff met to discuss organizing military raids, "...Such raids may restore the people's confidence in their armed forces, as it has been on the wane. Many armed robberies are committed by people in military uniform...Such raids have been conducted in some military barracks in Kigali with positive results" (Letter No. 030/G3.9.2 of 10 May 1993 from the Army HEADQUARTERS G3).
- Speaking to the sector and unit commanders at the meeting held on 12 July 1993, the Minister of Defence recalled that, "at some point in the war, the Ministry of Defence has taken keen interest in another important aspect due to the very nature of the war, i.e., respect for human rights. Accordingly, our department has made every effort to raise the men's awareness as regards respect for human rights...Respect for human rights not only safeguards the people's confidence in their armed forces, but it also prevents us from getting caught in the enemy's trap, as the enemy is always on the lookout for an opportunity to make capital of our shortcomings in order to, among other things, further its campaign consisting in making accusations and engaging in propaganda before the international community."

Section 3. 4 August 1993 – 6 April 1994

## § 1. Implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement

With the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement, on 4 August 1993, the majority of the people of Rwanda felt relieved, as they had had enough of the war. For the *Forces Armées Rwandaises*, it was a happy event; indeed, the command issued clear, precise orders to refrain from anything that was likely to interfere with the implementation of the Agreement:

- There were meetings, conferences and commissions to examine ways of facilitating the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.
- The numerous RPF provocations: incessant killing of civilians, kidnappings, burglary, rape, shelling of RAF positions, etc...did not shake RAF's commitment to the Arusha Peace Agreement.
- Chronologically, the content of the telegrams, letters, minutes of meetings held by the Command and units shows how seriously RAF took the implementation of the [missing segment] Agreement in all its aspects, including demobilization, integration of the two forces, observance of the buffer zone, the ceasefire, etc...
- As regards demobilization and integration, the Minister of Defence met the unit commanders at the ESM on 16 August 1993, at 0900, to explain the Agreement

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between the Government of Rwanda and RPF signed at Kinihira on 15 July 1993 (Telegram ADM/OPS/93/1961 of 7 August 1993 from the RA HEADQUARTERS). The various units sent RAF command their views on the tenor of the Agreement. For example, Kami Camp sent the Rwandan Army HEADQUARTERS the suggestions of the Military Police battalion on the criteria to be applied as regards demobilization (Telegram ADM/93/678 of 10 August 1993 from Kami Camp). Likewise, the Presidential Guard battalion sent a telegram to the Rwandan Army HEADQUARTERS on the criteria to be applied as regards demobilization (Telegram ADM/93/614 of 10 August 1993 from the Presidential Guard battalion). For its part, the Ministry of Defence set up a committee on demobilization. The committee members were: Colonel Bagosora, Lt. Colonel Ndengeyinka, Lt. Colonel Rwabalinda, Lt. Colonel Ntiwiragabo, Gendarmerie Major Karangwa, Gendarmerie Commander ~~Bizimana~~ and Captain Munyaruguru. The committee held its first meeting at MINADEF on 14-16 August 1993 (Telegram No. ADM/OPS/93/1249 of 13 August 1993). In fact, even the military academies were affected by the demobilization. That is why MINADEF set up a committee to examine the issues facing officer cadets and examine ways of handling their demobilization (Telegram No. OPS/93/1389 from MINADEF of 30 August 1993).

- Contacts on how best to approach the demobilization were underway; in view of that, a UNDP team of experts on demobilization visited the Kibungo operation sector on 28 September 1993 to hold preliminary meetings with the soldiers as part of a socio-professional inquiry. The aim was to fine-tune the plan of the impending inquiry (Telegram ADM/OPS/93/1621 of 25 September 1993).
- For RAF command took keen interest in matters relating to the Arusha Peace Agreement. Accordingly, the Ministry of Defence held a meeting with the committee on demobilization at the ESM, with the [two] Chiefs of Staff present (Telegram OPS/ADM/931706 of 6 October 1993).
- The RAF collaborated with other interlocutors with openness. Hence, as the UNDP had requested at the meeting of 7 October 1993, the members of the committee on demobilization were invited to meet the UNDP consultants, on 12 October 1993, at 1500 hours, at the UNDP Country Office in Kigali (Telegram ADM/OPS/93/1736 of 9 October 1993).
- The orders from the command were transmitted according to the chain of command. Example: the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS telegram, ADM/93/2531, of 8 October 1993, announcing that the committee on demobilization was due to hold its preliminary meeting on 11 October 1993 at the ESM and the chairmanship of the Minister of Defence.
- Moreover, the units had no objections to demobilization, one of the key points of the Arusha Peace Agreement. For example, the Camp Kigali and HEADQUARTERS company soldiers were favorable to the criteria for demobilization and had no objections to the committee that was designated to deal with the matter (Telegram INT/OPS/93/15655 of 12 October 1993).

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- The *Forces Armées Rwandaises* did not only deal with the issue of demobilization, MINADEF set up a committee to devise joint training programs, course outlines, as well as rules and regulations in order to get a head-start on preparing, jointly with RPF, the basic training for the National Army (Telegram ADM/OPS/93/1388 of 30 August 1993).
- The RAF complied with the rules relating to the buffer zone at all times, whereas RPF violated and invaded it several times (Telegram ADM/OPS/93/2181 of 27 August 1993).
- The RAF could not enter the buffer zone even if trouble erupted out there. For example, the sector command could not intervene when the Rulindo operation sector command sent a message that members of the civilian population were demonstrating to demand food and had set up a roadblock on the Rulindo-Base road, and blocking traffic, as it was inside the buffer zone (Telegram OPS/93/2789 of 6 September 1993).
- The RAF always acted in accordance with the Arusha Peace Agreement. Indeed, they even facilitated RPF's entry into Kigali, as shown by the following MINADEF order: "Please facilitate passage for an RPF delegation invited to a donors' meeting in Kigali, on 2 September 1993" (Telegram OPS/INT/1420 of 1 September 1993).
- In an effort to maintain the contact and good understanding between the two parties (RAF-RPF), the *Forces Armées* participated in all meetings as scheduled. Meeting of RAF offices with RPF officials at Kinihira on 14 September 1993, at 1000 hours. The participants were the ESM Commander, the Chiefs of Staff, MINADEF and General Staff HEADQUARTERS department heads, Rulindo and Byumba operation sector commanders (Telegram OPS/93/1485 of 13 September 1993 from MINADEF).
- The RAF command always acted in accordance with the provisions of the Arusha Peace Agreement. UNAMIR received all the information it required from RAF; it could inspect whatever it wanted to inspect. Example: the orders from the command regarding UNAMIR reconnaissance of the defense set-up in Kigali (Telegram OPS/93/1941 of 5 November 1993 and Telegram OPS/93/1959 of 6 November 1993).
- If RAF had not wished to implement the Arusha Agreements, they would not have provided the following information [*missing segment*]: Location of the positions occupied by RAF along the DMZ with coordinates; The type of trenches and number of heavy weapons, troop strength and location of mines (Telegram /93/1986 of 10 November 1993 from MINADEF). It is not known whether RPF acted likewise.
- The RAF command always transmitted UNAMIR's requests to its troops. For example: MINADEF informs the Army and Gendarmerie General Staff that UNAMIR is prepared to hear their comments on the plan for a weapons-secure zone in Kigali City, on Thursday, 25 November 1993, from MINADEF

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(Telegram OPS/93/2082 of 23 November 1993 from MINADEF for the RA and Gn).

- Still with regard to collaboration with UNAMIR for the successful implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, RAF even accepted to move their positions back in certain places. "At the request of RPF and the Rwandan Government, UNAMIR is setting up an assembly point in a village situated near the 64-km signpost along the Kigali-Gatuna road. Instructed to move last position on this road 200 m farther back" (Telegram OPS/93/2176 of 3 December 1993 from MINADEF to RA HEADQUARTERS).
- All UNAMIR requests were transmitted to the units and executed in full. "In order to facilitate the resumption of the work of the committee on rules and regulations, UNAMIR is organizing a meeting with RPF delegation at Ngondore on 7 December 1993, at 0900 hours. The meeting is aimed at assessing what each party has accomplished and draw up a schedule for what's left to be done" (Telegram ADM/93/2177 of 1 December 1993, from MINADEF).
- UNAMIR organized a high-level meeting of RAF and RPF on 8 December 1993, at 1000 hours, at Ngondore. The meeting was to discuss "Principles for future planning and schedule of tasks." Key RPF figures participated in the meeting (RF ADM/OPS/93/2194 of 7 December 1993 from MINADEF to RA HEADQUARTERS).
- UNAMIR visited all RAF military camps in Kigali, including strategic areas. "MINADEF advises that nine UNAMIR observers are due to visit Colonel Mayuya Camp, Kimihurura Camp, Camp Kigali, Kami Camp, the airport, the Kanzenze bridge and Mount Nyanza, in that order (Telegram OPS/93/2222 of 9 December 1993, from MINADEF to RA HEADQUARTERS).
- The RAF tried to avoid problems at all times. The RAF command always ordered the various command levels to avoid confrontations while crossing from RAF zone into RPF zone (Telegram OPS/93/2237 of 11 December 1993 from MINADEF to the RA and Gn HEADQUARTERS).
- As regards the moving of RPF battalion to Kigali and the installation of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, General Roméo Dallaire, UNAMIR commander, met with both Chiefs of Staff and MINADEF heads of departments. The RPF battalion was to move into the *Hôtel Amajyambere* (CND) on 28 December 1993 (Telegram ADM/93/2352 of 26 December 1993 from MINADEF to RA HEADQUARTERS).
- At meetings prior to the swearing-in of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, security measures were decided and made known to RAF by the command. Example: "MINADEF advises that at the meeting on the swearing-in of the Broad-Based Transitional Government, it was decided that security at the CND would be provided by UNAMIR. No one will be allowed into the compound with a weapon; that includes the bodyguards of the VIPs (Telegram INT/OPS/2368 of 29 December 1993 from MINADEF to RA Gn N HEADQUARTERS).

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- The RAF were always ready to help. Whenever RPF encountered problems, RAF command intervened to provide transport. For example, MINADEF requests RA HEADQUARTERS to provide three buses to UNAMIR on 22 February 1994, at 0500 hours, for use by RPF (Telegram LOG/94/461 of 22 February 1994 from MINADEF to RA HEADQUARTERS, RA Info base).
- Still with regard to compliance with the Arusha Peace Agreement and collaboration with RPF, RAF command assisted RPF (RPF battalion) by providing it with five Hilux pick-up trucks (Telegram ADM/LOG/94/668 of 17 February 1994 from MINADEF to RA and Gn N HEADQUARTERS).
- In order to foster good relations between the various contingents: UNAMIR, FPR and RPF, sports activities between the forces were encouraged. Accordingly, UNAMIR invited the sports officials of the various forces to a meeting at the UNAMIR headquarters on Friday, 25 February 1994. As always, RAF were there (Telegram OPS/94/469 of 21 February 1994 from MINADEF to the AR and Gn N HEADQUARTERS).
- The RAF command investigated all complaints regarding the ceasefire, even when RPF made false accusations. For example: telegram from the RA Chief of Staff asking the Mutara operations sector command to check for ceasefire violations by RAF (Telegram INT/OPS/93/5017 of 20 October 1993 from the RA EM to the Mutara Ops Command).
- A NMOG team composed of Major Munyakazi (RAF), Commander Ruhenda (RPF), Commander Ngoyi (Congo) and Captain Faya (Senegal) verified an RPF complaint about field works by RAF (53<sup>rd</sup> battalion). The team, which was instructed to pass by RPF side, met the commander of the 53<sup>rd</sup> battalion (RAF) and the acting commander of the operation sector at Ruhenda between the two RAF and RPF observations posts, which were  $\pm$  100 m apart. Both parties noted that sheds built by the people manning the observation posts at their usual positions to protect themselves from the elements. By the time the NMOG team, they had verified that there was no intent of provocation by either of the two warring parties (Telegram INT/OPS/93/2394 of 29 September 1993 from the Byumba operation sector commander to the RA HEADQUARTERS).
- Three RPF combatants were released on 20 August 1993 and handed over to RPF by the ICRC the same day. They were: Hakizimana, Mureramanzi and Mutabaruka. An order was issued to facilitate their travel (Telegram INT/OPS/93/3153 of 19 August 1993 from the Army command headquarters to the operations commander of Byumba [*missing segment*]).
- As part of the implementation of the standing operational procedure on the Kigali Weapons-Secure Zone, the command at all levels issued orders to the lower echelons. For example: The commander of Colonel Mayuya Camp instructed the units to collaborate with the UNAMIR team (Telegram OPS/93/6228 of 27 December 1993 from Colonel Mayuya Camp to all Colonel Mayuya Camp units, cc. RA HEADQUARTERS).

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- The RAF command appointed the Army members of the *Haut Conseil de Commandement de l'Armée* (HCCA). They were:
  - Major General Déogratias Nsabimana, Army Chief of Staff
  - Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi, brigade commander
  - Colonel Augustin Bizimungu, brigade commander
  - Lt. Colonel Antoine Sebahire, deputy brigade commander
  - Lt. Colonel Edoard Gasabarabwe, deputy brigade commander
 (Telegram ADM/94/081 of 10 January 1994 from MINADEF to RA HEADQUARTERS, cc. Gn N HEADQUARTERS). It also appointed members of the *Conseil de Commandement de la Gendarmerie Nationale* (CC Gn). They were:
  - Colonel Laurent Rutayisire, Deputy Gendarmerie Chief of Staff
  - Lt. Colonel Innocent Bavugamenshi, squad commander
  - Lt. Colonel J.M.V. Nzafakumunsi, squad commander
  - Major J. Baptiste Nsanzimfura, squad commander
  - Major Joseph Nzabonimpa, squad commander
  - Major Vincent Munyarugerero, squad commander
  - Major Léandre Ndereyimana, squad commander
 (Telegram ADM/94/075 of 10 January 1994). And yet, by the time hostilities resumed, on 7 April 1994, RPF had not yet released the names of the officers who were to be part of the aforementioned command organs. That proves that it did not believe in the Arusha Peace Agreement.

## § 2. Restoring and maintaining law and order

Judging from the activities of RAF both at the front and otherwise, during the period from 4 August 1993 until 6 April 1994, the activities of RAF were focused on law enforcement in general. They included orders to the units by MINADEF and the General Staffs, reports prepared by the units and deliberations of meetings held by military authorities at all levels. Their focus was: Preventing ethnic unrest, pacification during the unrest, cracking down on looting, protecting people and property.

## I. Preventing ethnic unrest

The following examples show that the command showed concern and that the units executed the orders issued to them:

- Telegram OPS/INT/93/13309 of 23 August 1993 from the RA HEADQUARTERS to Gako Camp, order as follows: "Following the resurgence of terrorism and armed banditry in the Bugesera region [*missing segment*]
- Prevent lawless behavior that could lead to ethnic clashes by conducting patrols around the clock and stepping up searches to find and arrest armed bandits...



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- Agenda of the meeting of the military authorities at MINADEF, on 23 October 1993, chaired by the Minister: "Item 4. Prevent acts directed against Tutsis and protect the Burundian refugees in Bugesera."
- Telegram INT/OPS/93/1934 of 5 November 1993 from MINADEF to the Gn N HEADQUARTERS: "Be vigilant to avoid lawless behavior that could lead to attacks on Tutsi families."
- Letter No. 439/G3.9.2 of 5 November 1993 from the Para-commando battalion on the minutes of the meeting of 19 November 1993 of the battalion command with the soldiers of the unit, in response to question No. 2, "There are good and bad Tutsis. By targeting all Tutsis, one falls into RPF's trap consisting in pitting the two ethnic groups against each other in order to provoke a civil war and make capital of it.... The three ethnic groups are represented within RAF. Some of the Tutsi soldiers have conducted themselves properly while others have conducted themselves badly; the same can be said about Hutu soldiers. Nonetheless, it must be recognized that both Burundi and Rwanda have an ethnic problem which must be addressed; it should not be viewed as a taboo or simply ignored. Both Hutus and Tutsis must recognize the problem and try to resolve it together... Tutsis and Hutus are obliged to live together, they form part of the same nation and must unite under the model of a nation instead of highlighting their ethnic differences, as no one chooses to be Hutu or Tutsi."
- Telegram OPS/94/0194 of 26 January from the RA HEADQUARTERS to MINADEF regarding tension and incidents in Gishushu: "...The gendarmerie in collaboration with the other security forces must conduct a search in that location. The local administrative authorities should also organize public awareness meetings."
- Telegram OPS/94/236 of 26 January 1994 from MINADEF to Gd N HEADQUARTERS, the following order is issued: "During this period, step up patrols around the CND-Gishushu-Remera-PVK area in collaboration with UNAMIR."
- Telegram OPS/94/354 of 22 February 1994 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander to the commando company: repercussions of the order given by MINADEF: "According to the directive from MINADEF and in view of the current situation, take necessary measures to prevent massacre of the Bagogwe in your sub-sector. Update me regularly on the situation."
- Telegram OPS/INT/94/355 of 22 February 1994 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander to the RA HEADQUARTERS, "...Following the death of Minister Gatabazi and Mr. Bucyana, there is tension among the CDR party members. Patrols in Gisenyi town have been stepped up to monitor the situation."
- Telegram OPS/INT/94/02260 of 22 February 1994 from the RA HEADQUARTERS to the Ops commanders and all units: "You are instructed to collaborate with the local administrative authorities so as to avoid confrontations between political party youths. Keep me informed."

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- Telegram OPS/94/118 of 22 February 1994 from the Cyangugu squad to the Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS. Report on the measures taken following Martin Bucyana's death: "...It has been decided to step up the patrols in Cyangugu town and Cyimbogo *Commune*, Bucyana's native *Commune*."

## II. Pacification operations during ethnic unrest

Examples of the effort RAF put into the pacification operations during the ethnic unrest:

- Telegram INT/OPS/93/2157 of 30 November 1993 from MINADEF to the Gendarmerie General Staff: "Reports of ethnic tension in Kibungo *préfecture*: Nasho and Rwamagana. It is believed to be instigated and supported by J.B. Sebera, a pharmacist..."
- Telegram INT/OPS/93/787 of 1 December 1993 from the Cyangugu squad to the Gendarmerie General Staff: "There is tension between the Hutus and the Tutsis at the Flank Adamson school at Kibogora, Kirambo, Cyangugu... The Kirambo detachment is monitoring the situation and has dispatched a night patrol to the area."
- Telegram OPS/93/2541 of 21 December 1993 from Gako Camp to the RA HEADQUARTERS: "...Security meeting in Kanazi *sous-préfecture*... on the agenda: reconciliation following the ethnic unrest experienced in the *sous-préfecture*."
- RT/OPS/94/350 of 22 February 1994 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander to the Sector units: "This is to inform you that Mr. Martin Bucyana, Chairman of the CDR party, was murdered this afternoon by the people of Mbazi, Butare. This murder and the heinous assassination of Minister Gatabazi might produce a chain reaction... I once again urge you to pacify the men under your orders. The higher corps is monitoring the situation. Keep me informed of the mood in the *Communes*."
- Telegram OPS/94/290 of 22 February 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander to the Sector units: "Round the clock operations to defuse the tension between the political parties in Butare town... The operation will also apply to vehicle movements – as the trouble-makers move around in vehicles – and to the strict observance of the curfew. You must not manhandle anyone [*missing segment*]."
- Telegram OPS/INT94/464 from MINADEF to RA and Gd HEADQUARTERS: it is ordered as follows: "Monitor the situation in the *préfectures*. Take measures [in collaboration] with the authorities to avert a regionalist conflict between the CDR and the PSD parties."
- Telegram OPS/INT/94/141 of 23 February 1994 from the Cyangugu Camp to RA HEADQUARTERS, report from the squad: "...The situation in Cyangugu *préfecture* is relatively calm. The Mururu-Bugarama road is blocked by demonstrators who are incensed about the murder of CDR Chairman, Mr. Martin

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Bucyana. The Cyangugu squad and the local administrative authorities are trying to deal with the situation."

- Telegram INT/OPS/94/0298 of 23 February 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander to the RA HEADQUARTERS: "The operation to defuse the ethnic and party tensions is continuing in Butare town...we are monitoring the situation."
- Telegram ADM/OPS/0385 of 10 February 1994 from the RA HEADQUARTERS: "Following the demonstration and the unrest in Butare which culminated in the murder of Messrs. Félicien Gatabazi and Martin Bucyana, we have launched a very successful operation to defuse the tension and halt the clashes; it is due to take place from 22 February 1994 until 6 March 1994. In order to have sufficient able personnel, we have decided to suspend the training of the 11<sup>th</sup> session, *Cours C Spécial*, for the said period..."

## III. Crack-down on looting

## Examples:

- Telegram ADM/93/144475 of 15 September 1993 from RA HEADQUARTERS to MINADEF: "A commission on looting beginning of the war in the towns of Ruhengeri, Gisenyi and Byumba... The commission must have submitted its report; it must be examined for appropriate action."
- Telegram OPS/93/16868 of 4 November 1993 from the RA HEADQUARTERS to the MP battalion. Order: "As demonstrations may take place on 5 November 1994, conduct 'mounted' patrols. Put security arrangements in place to prevent looting in Kigali..."

## IV. Protection of people and property

## Examples:

- Telegram OPS/93/15803 of 15 October 1993 from the RA HEADQUARTERS to the MP battalion. Order: "Conduct patrols in Muhura, Giti, and Murambi *Communes* in order to check on discipline and crack down on the increased acts of banditry in those *Communes*. Coordination with the sector commander recommended."
- Telegram INT/OPS/94/027 of 8 January 1994 from the Kigali-Ville Operations Commander to the RA HEADQUARTERS: "...Demonstrations taking place in Kigali since dawn this morning to disrupt the swearing-in of the deputies scheduled to take place at the Prime Minister's Office, today, 8 January. The demonstrators have seized vehicle keys causing traffic jams in several junctions. The Gendarmerie is monitoring the situation [*missing segment*].

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- Telegram INT/OPS/94/028 of 8 January 1994 from the Kigali-Ville Operations Commander to the RA HEADQUARTERS: "The demonstrations ended in the course of the afternoon...A few bandits who wanted to use the demonstrations as an excuse to obtain people's property by threat people's were apprehended by the Gendarmerie."
- Telegram OPS/INT/94/240 of 26 January 1994 from MINADEF to Gendarmerie HEADQUARTERS: "Measures to deal with insecurity and crack down on the acts of violence in Gishushu: reinforce gendarme+UNAMIR presence day and night (increase the number of gendarmerie personnel)."
- Telegram INT/OPS/94/0774 of 22 February 1994 from the para-commando battalion to the RA HEADQUARTERS: "...the soldiers of this unit are infuriated by the heinous murder of Minister Félicien Gatabazi and Mr. Bucyana and demand tough measures to combat such terrorist acts."
- RTL No. 048/G2.2.2 of 12 March 1994 from the Gendarmerie to the Minister of Defence (page 2): "In February, several robberies were carried out, particularly in Kigali. Armed bands set up roadblocks along the roads leading into Kigali (Kigali-Bugesera, and Kigali-Rwamagana) in order to deprive travelers of their belongings. Thanks to the patrol post at Kabuga, assisted by "mounted" patrols by UNAMIR elements, the public were reassured."

In short, activities of RAF during the aforementioned period focused on maintaining and restoring law and order in the country. That does not include the activities relating to the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement, which were covered in the first part of this chapter. In view of the aforementioned, it is false to assert that RAF and/or the Rwandan Government planned the ethnic massacres and the genocide and such an assertion is designed to cover up RPF's sadistic and Machiavellian plan. Indeed, by means of its brutal and anti-democratic schemes, it caused divisions among the Rwandan people, at a time when the government and RAF were spreading the message of peace and peaceful co-existence. Unlike RPF, RAF were set on a course to peace.

#### Section 4. 6 April – 17 July 1994

##### § 1. Continuity of command: the crisis committee and its role

##### I. Meeting at the Rwandan Army HEADQUARTERS

When they heard the sad news of the attack on the plane carrying the President and the Army Chief of Staff, several Army and Gendarmerie officers residing in Kigali spontaneously went to the Army Headquarters during the night of 6 to 7 April 1994 to obtain further details and find out what to do next. They went to the Army Headquarters instead of the Ministry of Defence or the Gendarmerie Headquarters for the following reasons:

- The Army Chief of Staff had died in the crash

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- It was expected that RPF, which was [missing segment] thought to be behind the attack, would resume hostilities. Moreover, the Army General Staff was in charge of organizing military activities on the ground.

Having confirmed that the President and the Army Chief of Staff had died in the attack, the MINADEF, Army, and Gendarmerie senior officers who were present decided to hold a meeting to discuss the following:

- The prevailing situation
- Filling the command void in the Rwandan Army
- Filling the institutional and political void
- Informing and reassuring the people (see attached meeting deliberations)

The following officers attended the meeting:

- Major General Augustin Ndindiliyimana, Gendarmerie Chief of Staff
- Colonel Théoneste Bagosora, MINADEF *Directeur de cabinet*
- Colonel Joseph Murasampongo, Rwandan Army Personnel Bureau Chief
- Colonel Balthazar Ndengeyinka, MINADEF technical adviser
- Ephrem Rwabalinda, liaison officer with UNAMIR
- Augustin Rwamanywa, Chief of logistics, Rwandan Army HEADQUARTERS
- Lieutenant Colonel Cyprien Kayumba, director with MINADEF
- Lieutenant Colonel Jean Bosco Ruhoroza, officer, RA HEADQUARTERS
- Emmanuel Kanyandekwe, officer, RA HEADQUARTERS
- Théophile Gakara, Gendarmerie Personnel Bureau Chief
- Gérard Ntamagezo, officer, RA HEADQUARTERS
- Colonel Léonidas Rusatira, commander of the *Ecole Supérieure Militaire*, as he was a veteran officer with much experience; Major General [sic] Roméo Dallaire, Commander of the UNAMIR forces, were also invited to the meeting. However, the Colonel Rusatira showed little interest. In fact, he left before the meeting ended.

Considering the political and military nature of the topics on the agenda, it was the Minister of Defence who was entitled to chair the meeting. As he was absent, it was his *Directeur de Cabinet*, Colonel Théoneste Bagosora who deputized for him.

## II. Replacement of the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff

As events were expected to unfold swiftly, it was decided to favor experience over the more traditional criteria, such as length of service. Hence, Colonel Marcel Gatsinzi was appointed interim Rwandan Army Chief of Staff by consensus (Telegram OPS/94/743 of 6 April 1994 from MINADEF). He was chosen for the following reasons:

- As he had been in the Army General Staff for 15 years, he was deemed experienced and thus capable of quickly coming to grips with the situation [missing segment].

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- As operation sector commander, he was familiar with the situation on the ground as regards tactics. Moreover, he was the longest serving sector commander.
- Being the longest serving brigade commander designated within the framework of the Arusha Peace Agreement, his appointment was in keeping with the peace initiative that was underway.

A consensus was not reached as regards the other potential choices. Indeed:

- Major General Ndindiliyimana was the Gendarmerie Chief of Staff. He therefore held the same rank as the Army Chief of Staff. Although he had served longer, he did not qualify for the post because it involved replacing the Army Chief of Staff, and not the director of operations. Moreover, it was for the army chief of staff to act in that capacity, because the Army had more troops on the ground.
- Colonel Rusatira was Commander of the *Ecole Supérieure Militaire*. Having been appointed by presidential decree, it was not easy for him to change status and become interim Army chief of chief [sic?]. Moreover, he did not show a great interest. Indeed, he said that he was just a unit commander among others. Besides, he left before the end of the meeting saying that he was going to look after his children.

### III. Message to the Nation

In order to inform and reassure the population and RAF, MINADEF prepared a communiqué at the meeting and aired it on Radio Rwanda in the morning of 7 April 1994. The message was aimed at:

- Announcing to the Rwandan people the death of the heads of state of Rwanda and Burundi and their entourage, including the Army Chief of Staff.
- Urging the Rwandan people not to be discouraged and to avoid acts that could threaten law or order.
- Urging people to remain in their homes pending further directives. That was done mainly in order to prevent crowds from forming and the situation from degenerating into political and ethnic clashes.
- Urging RAF to be vigilant, protect the population and remain strong and focused.

N.B. Only the annexed rough draft was found in the archives.

### IV. The institutional and political vacuum

As the President had died, the people taking part in the meeting wondered whether RAF should step in and fill the institutional and political void. Indeed, the government in place had announced its resignation in December 1993. Moreover, there were still obstacles to the putting in place of the institutions, including the Broad-Based Transitional

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Government. Ultimately, although RAF had lost their leader, they were still the best organized and most credible institution in the people's view. They thus decided to favor the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreement.

It was therefore decided to consult the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative on the matter. The participants designated *Directeur de Cabinet* and Lieutenant Colonel Rwabalinda, who met Jacques Booh-Booh the same night, accompanied by Major General Roméo Dallaire. Booh-Booh recommended to RAF to support the initiative of the political parties as regards the choice of a new President, while conforming as much as practicable to the Arusha Peace Agreement.

As a follow-up on the recommendations of both the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative and the UNAMIR Forces Commander, the MINADEF *Directeur de Cabinet* designated by the participants succeeded in calling a meeting of the MRDN leadership at the MINADEF, on 7 April 1994 at the crack of dawn. Indeed, according to the Arusha Peace Agreement, the Presidency of the Republic was to be exercised by the incumbent President, a member of the MRND, during the transitional period. The MRND leaders present at the meeting rejected the proposal, invoking the following reasons:

- The Arusha Peace Agreement did not provide for replacing the President in the event of the death of the incumbent before the beginning of the transitional period, which was due to start on the day of the putting in place of the BBTG (Arusha Peace Agreement: questions and final provisions, Article 22).
- If the new President was to come from the MRND party, it was necessary to have prior consultation within the party in order to appoint at least two nominees. That required at least one meeting of the party's national congress, something that required time and financial resources.
- The person nominated by the party was to be presented to the other political players, including RPF. That also required time, especially considering that RPF would reject him, judging from recent events.

In conclusion, the MRND party considered that the process would take too long, and that considering the tension, what was needed was an organ capable of quickly bringing the situation under control. It proposed two alternatives:

- That RAF take charge
- That the political parties that were in government meet to find a solution

In view of the position taken by the MRND party, the question was again raised at the meeting [sic] RAF command, operations sector commanders, Rwandan Army units and Gendarmerie squads that held at the ESM on 7 April 1994, at 1000 hour. It was a follow-up of the meeting of the night of 6 to 7 April 1994 (Telegram ADM/OPS/LOG/94/794 of 7 April 1994, at 0300 hours, from MINADEF).

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At the 7 April 1994 meeting, it was decided to follow the recommendations of the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative, i.e. allow the political parties to take charge of political matters, and RPF to deal with solely military operations. It was necessary to facilitate the meeting of political party leaders. However, in the intervening time, it was necessary to create an organ that would take charge. General **Dallaire**, who attended the meeting, described the decision as a "resolution of responsible men" and promised to do everything possible to facilitate its implementation.

After sustained consultations, the crisis committee allowed the politicians to meet and put the government in place on 8 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/ADM/94/04126 of 9 April 1994, Rwandan Army HEADQUARTERS).

#### V. Other measures taken by RAF command

The 7 April 1994 meeting of RAF command and sector and unit commanders also assigned tasks and issued the following directive:

- The MINADEF *directeur de cabinet* was to continue contacts with the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative, the diplomatic and consular corps and the political parties in order to inform them of the decisions taken and seek advice.
- The crisis committee was to prepare a message addressed to the Nation, in addition to the one of the previous night. It was also to monitor the situation, so as to avert lawlessness.
- The units at the front were ordered to avoid doing anything that would be construed by RPF as signaling a resumption of hostilities. The meeting ended abruptly because of the insecurity in Kigali. There were reports that RPF infiltrators had started killing designated people and that members of the Belgian UNAMIR contingent were firing on Kiyovu with heavy weapons from the Belgian headquarters in Kacyiru.

#### VI. The crisis committee

The idea of setting up a crisis committee was developed at the meeting of the night of 6 to 7 April 1994 and discussed at the 7 April meeting, because there was a need to create an organ capable of assuming leadership position while awaiting a political settlement. The composition of the crisis committee was as follows:

- Major General Ndindiliyimana, Gendarmerie Chief of Staff
- Colonel Bagosora, MINADEF *Directeur de Cabinet*
- Colonel Gatsinzi, Acting Army Chief of Staff
- Colonel Rusatira, Commander of the *Ecole Militaire Supérieure*



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- Colonel Renzaho, *Préfet of Kigali-Ville Préfecture*
- Colonel Ndibwami, Director, MINADEF
- Colonel Murasampongo, Chief of the Rwandan Army Personnel Bureau
- Colonel Ndengeyinka, MINADEF technical advisor
- Lieutenant Colonel Rwarakabije, Gendarmerie Operations Bureau Chief
- Lieutenant Colonel Kayumba, Director, MINADEF

The crisis committee held its first meeting in the afternoon of 7 April 1994 and prepared a message to the Nation. As soon as the message was finalized, the meeting ended abruptly due to an attack on Kimihurura and Remera by RPF elements coming out of the CND.

N.B. The text of the message was not found in the archives.

The meeting held in the morning of 8 April 1994 came at a time when the situation had deteriorated tremendously due to the fighting in Kimihurura and Remera. On that occasion, the following was decided:

- A delegation was to meet the Belgian Ambassador to Rwanda to offer condolences and apologies following the death of 10 Belgian UNAMIR soldiers.
- A delegation was to meet RPF to negotiate a truce in order to facilitate the pacification operation and the putting in place of the government. The delegation comprised Major General Ndindiliyimana, Colonel Gatsinzi, who was due to arrive anytime, and Lieutenant Colonel Rwabalinda. The first contacts were made the same day.
- A panel was to be formed to examine RPF proposals as presented by General **Dallaire**.

The resumption of hostilities by RPF did not divert the crisis committee from its original mission. Indeed, Major General Ndindiliyimana and Colonel Bagosora were instructed to carry on with their consultations with the political parties in view of putting in place a new government. On 8 April 1994, the political party representatives held a meeting and chose a government, which was sworn in on 9 April 1994; it was the one with which the population went into exile.

The foregoing shows that, despite what has been said about Colonel Bagosora, no one usurped the authority with the intent of seizing power or causing anyone harm. The sole aim was to break the deadlock in consultation with the Rwandan Army command organs, the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative, the UNAMIR forces Commander and the political parties.

VII. RAF: pacification measures, protection of people and restoring law and order

RAF Command in Exile*A. Protection of people during the ethnic unrest*

The assassination of the Head of State and members of his entourage in the evening of 6 April 1994 provoked a spontaneous show of anger on the part of the people of Rwanda. This degenerated into ethnic clashes from the morning of 7 April 1994. Indeed, as the majority of the Rwandan people were convinced that crime had been committed by RPF, they attacked its supporters and accomplices. Likewise, RPF, particularly its armed elements all across the country, attacked those who were hostile to them. The confrontation began in Kigali and spread to the rest of the country.

In an interview with a Radio Rwanda journalist, on 22 April 1994, Colonel Rutayisire stated this: "Because of this sadness (following the death of the Head of State), some people rioted and attacked others in the grip of anger."

As they had done in the past, RAF made every effort to stop the massacres. To that end, they raised the awareness of the soldiers and the population and took measures to intervene between rival groups.

However, RAF's task was by no means easy. Indeed, the tension was exacerbated by the killing of the MRND and CDR party leaders, which began during the night on 7 April 1994 and continued that morning, and the resumption of hostilities that afternoon. Moreover, as many members of the security forces were involved in the war, they were not available for pacification duties. What's more, RPF infiltrators continued to exasperate the population and even attacked security forces.

In spite of that, RAF continued with pacification and restoring law and order with unflinching determination. The command (MINADEF and the General Staffs) was proactive. Examples:

- On 10 April 1994 MINADEF ordered the General Staffs and the units to strictly prohibit and halt massacres of the civilian population using deadly force, if necessary (Telegram OPS/94/0805 of 10 April 1994 from MINADEF). In an interview with a Radio Rwanda journalist, on 15 April 1994, the Minister of Defence reiterated his opposition vis-à-vis the massacres: "It is all right for the civilian population to organize themselves in order to stop RPF's advance; however, we cannot tolerate people killing one another."
- On 21 April 1994, he ordered the Butare sector commander to protect two ICRC expatriates who had allegedly received death threats (Telegram ADM/OPS/94/902 of 21 April 1994 from MINADEF). The same day, he ordered the Gendarmerie Chief of Staff to "do all in his power to secure reinforcements for Gitarama Camp and the Mbare detachment in order to halt the massacres in Gitarama" (Telegram OPS/94/068 of 28 April 1994 from MINADEF).

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- The Minister of Defence urged the *commandants de place* to collaborate with the *préfets* and local political authorities in cracking down on looting and assassinations (Telegram OPS/94/118 of 28 April 1994 from MINADEF).
- The Rwanda Army General Staff ordered all operation sectors and units to "immediately put an end to the massacres and other ethnic clashes to deal with any such expedition by force of arms [*missing segment*] and to collaborate with the administrative authorities as regards sensitization and pacification (Telegram INT/OPS/94/04165 of 10 April 1994 from Rwandan Army General Staff).
- In a press release dated 18 April 1994 and another published by the AFP, dated 16 April 1994, RAF urged "to track down and arrest vagrant soldiers who engage in violent acts against the civilian population."
- The command's proposals to the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative as regards restoring peace in Rwanda included halting all massacres, *inter alia*, by providing forces for pacification duties and embarking on a sensitization campaign in the public and private media, touring... (Letter No. 0628/G3.3.3 of 17 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff).
- On 20 April 1994, having learned that lawless elements were planning to attack certain families, including those of the *Notre Dame des Citeaux* school teaching staff, the Rwandan Army General Staff asked the Gendarmerie to protect the latter (Telegram INT/OPS/94/04660 of 20 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff).
- In a communiqué dated 22 April 1994, the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff once again spoke out against the massacres; "I call upon the population to stop ethnic violence; when the enemy shoots, he cannot know whether the victim [the target] will be a Hutu, a Tutsi, or a Twa." The same day, the Gendarmerie Chief of Staff reiterated how keenly he felt about pacification: "We are engaged in the process of ensuring security in the country...since some regions are experiencing unrest."
- In reply to the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative's letter of 19 April 1994 regarding the protection and evacuation of refugees in various locations, the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff stated that it was critical to protect the lives of the people at the *Mille Collines* hotel and on UNAMIR premises, who were not directly involved in the fighting, and the at more adequate security measures were urgently needed (letter No. 0650/G.3.3.0 of 21 April 1994 from the Rwanda Army General Staff). On 27 April 1994, he ordered the Gisenyi sector and squad to "do everything possible to protect the orphans at Nyundo" (Telegram INT/OPS/94/05052 of 27 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). Likewise, the Cyangugu camp and squad commanders were urged to "do everything possible to protect the refugees in the Cyangugu regional stadium" (Telegram INT/OPS/94/05053 of 27 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). In a letter dated 2 May 1994 to the UNAMIR forces commander, the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff stated that he agreed with the evacuation of the refugees in a number of locations (*Mille Collines* hotel, *Notre Dame des Citeaux* school, *Saint Michel* church...) to safe zones of their choice and that he was still

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- prepared to do whatever was necessary to ensure the success of the humanitarian operation, as it would save numerous human lives" (Letter No. 0682/G3.3.0 of 2 May 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff).
- On 4 May 1994, having learned that [there would be massacres of the orphans of Kacyiru displaced in Butare, he] ordered the Butare sector commander to "do everything possible to end the barbaric acts" (Telegram ADM/OPS/94/05494 of 4 May 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff).
  - By signing, on 7 May 1994, a document he received from the UNAMIR forces commander on 5 May 1994, the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff signaled his agreement with the safety arrangements for evacuation of displaced persons by UNAMIR. Moreover, on the same occasion, he indicated what was needed for the operation to be conducted safely (Letter of 5 May 1994 from General **Dallaire**, Letter No. 0694/G3.3.3 of 7 May 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff and minutes of the meeting of 21 May 1994).
  - The evacuation of refugees was so successful that, on 5 May 1994, General **Dallaire** expressed to the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff his "sincere appreciation for his very positive contribution to the safe evacuation of displaced persons on 3 May 1994." He thanked him for everything he had done and asked him to convey his "appreciation to all the other officers and men of RAF for their contribution" (Letter No. 017/FC of 5 May 1994 from the UNAMIR commander).
  - On 8 May 1994, the Rwandan Army General Staff ordered the Gisenyi sector commander to personally contact the religious figures taking refuge in various locations and find out which ones wished to be evacuated to Goma under his protection (Telegram INT/OPS/94/05708 of 8 May 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff).
  - Still with regard to pacification, when the Rwandan Army General Staff learned that there was tension between the Hutu population of Bigogwe and the commando training center staff who were married to Tutsi wives, it ordered the commander of the center, on 25 April 1994, to "do everything in his power to defuse the tension to prevent the region from going up in flames" (Telegram INT/OPS/94/04959 of 25 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). By letter to MINADEF dated 1 May 1994, the Rwandan Army General Staff stated that it was "urgent...to stop the massacres all across the country" (Letter No. 0676/G3.3.0 of 1 May 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff).
  - Finally, the Rwandan Army General Staff intervened to stop the airing by public and private media of incendiary programs that were likely to rouse regional and ethnic tension. Hence, when the United Nations Secretary General's Special Representative indicated that the Security Council had requested national and other radio stations (RTL, Radio Rwanda, Radio Muhabura) to air pacification messages in support of RAF command's initiative, the Rwandan Army General Staff asked the Government to immediately convey the message to the management of the national media. Hence, at the 17 April 1994 meeting of the UNAMIR forces commander, the United Nations Special Envoy and the Chiefs of

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Staff, the latter stated that RAF command and officials of RTLM and Radio Rwanda had met on 16 April 1994 and that the radio stations had been asked to air messages urging pacification and unity (Minutes of meeting of 17 April 1994, para 6). Moreover, in a letter sent to the Ministry of Defence on 19 June 1994, the head of RAF delegation [*missing segment*] in the negotiations, noted among the things RAF had done regarding pacification, it was necessary to include "the proscription of incendiary radio programs." Hence, RAF command urged the management of the radio stations to air programs urging reconciliation. Despite that, RPF did nothing and Radio Muhabura carried on with its incendiary campaign.

- The commanders of the operation sectors, as well as the Rwandan Army and Gendarmerie unit commanders also took drastic action against ethnically-, regionally-, or politically-motivated clashes or massacres in their respective areas on orders from MINADEF or on their initiative.
- In the Kigali-Ville sector, where the clashes originated, the Colonel Mayuya Camp unit commanders restored law and order on 7 April 1994, around noon, after a number of families had been killed by individuals in military uniform (Telegram INT/OPS/94/1428 of 7 April 1994 from Colonel Mayuya Camp). In the morning, following the murder of the head of State, angry soldiers went outside the camp and attacked authorities accusing them of being pro-RPF (Telegram OPS/94/356 of 7 April 1994 from the Kigali-Ville Operations Commander). The sector command therefore urged all camps and units in the sector to prevent clashes between the soldiers and the local population (Telegram INT/OPS/ 94/353 of 7 April 1994 from the Kigali-Ville Operations Commander). Gendarmerie and Military Police patrols were stepped up in order to prevent ethnic clashes (Telegram OPS/94/365 of 9 April 1994 from the Kigali-Ville Operations Commander).
- However, sometimes sector units could not cope due to insufficient personnel. That affected the safety of the patients on 1 May 1994 (Telegram ADM/INT/05325 of 1 May 1994, Camp Kigali).
- Gisenyi operations sector: With the outbreak of ethnic clashes in Gisenyi town and its immediate environs, and in certain *Communes*, such as Mutura, Kanama, and Karago, the sector command immediately made every effort to cope with the situation (Telegram INT/OPS/94/696 of 8 April 1994 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander).
- To that end, several public awareness meetings were held with the *préfecture* and *Commune* officials present. Such meetings were held in Gisenyi town on 9 April 1994 (Telegram OPS/94/702 of 9 April 1994 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander) and on 23 April 1994 (Telegram OPS/94/861 of 23 April 1994, Kanama *Commune*), on 11 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/719 of 11 April 1994), Nyamyumba *Commune* on 12 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/734 of 12 April 1994) and Ngororero *sous-préfecture* on 4 May 1994 (Telegram OPS/94/980 of 4 May 1994 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander).

- The same command also assisted in the protection and evacuation of vulnerable persons to Goma town. Example: expatriates, on 9 and 10 April 1994 (Telegram OPS/94/709 of 9 April 1994 and Telegram OPS/94/708 of 10 April 1994 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander) and the 351 children of the Nyundo orphanage with their 20 monitors on 3 May 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/976 of 3 May 1994 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander).
- However, due to insufficient personnel, the security forces in Gisenyi sector were unable to cope with the unruly population. Example: attack on and massacre of the displaced Tutsis in Nyundo on 2 May 1995 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/969 of 2 May 1995 from the Gisenyi Operations Commander).
- In the Kibungo operation sector, the clashes began on 9 April 1994 and spread all across the *Communes* of Gisaka, Migongo and Buganza. The commanders of the sector spared no effort in cracking down on the violence; they organized patrols and public awareness campaigns in collaboration with the administrative authorities (Telegram INT/OPS/94/515 of 9 April 1994 and Telegram OPS/94/529 of 12 April 1994, from the Kibungo Operations Commander).
- In the Butare-Gikongoro operation sector, the security forces intervened several times to halt ethnic clashes. On 12 April 1994, when tension was reported in Maraba *Commune*, the gendarmerie went to the scene, defused the tension and seized several bladed weapons from the rival groups (Telegram INT/OPS/94/588 of 16 April 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander).
- Nonetheless, the task of the security forces was by no means easy. On several occasions, extremist Tutsi groups and armed RPF infiltrators resisted pacification efforts and even attacked the security forces. Thus, despite the intervention of the gendarmerie, on 12 April 1994, some of the displaced people from Rwamiko, Mudasomwa and Nyamagabe *Communes* descended on Kinyamakara and attacked the Hutus, who defended themselves (Telegram OPS/94/565 from the Butare Operations Commander). On 16 April 1994, in Nyakizu *Commune*, displaced Tutsis armed with guns shot at gendarmerie elements that were on a pacification mission. The day before, they seriously wounded two gendarmes and a third was reported missing (Telegram INT/OPS/94/588 of 16 April 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander). On 24 April 1994, it was reported that the clashes in Butare and Gikongoro were provoked by vengeful Tutsis, who attacked ethnic Hutus (Telegram INT/OPS/94/630 of 23 April 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander). In an effort to stop the clashes, the military authorities, in collaboration with the administrative authorities, embarked on a public awareness campaign at rallies specially organized for that purpose. Examples:  
In Butare town, on 17 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/0596 of 17 April 1994 and INT/OPS/94/0600 of 17 April 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander) and on 25 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/635 of 25 April 1994 from Butare);

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In Gikongoro town, on 26 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/0649 of 26 April 1994) and Muyaga on 27 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/652 of 27 April 1994);

In Nyabisindu, Muyaga and Ruhashya and Rusatira *Communes* on 27 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/0657 of 27 April 1994). In order for the message to reach the outlying *Communes*, the pacification teams went all across the region advocating peace (Telegram INT/OPS/94/630 of 23 April 1994, Telegram INT/OPS/94/0642 of 25 April 1994, Telegram INT/OPS/94/0666 of 28 April 1994, Telegram INT/OPS/94/0669 of 29 April 1994, Telegram INT/OPS/94/696 of 31 May 1994 and Telegram INT/OPS/94/709 of 4 May 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander).

### B. Crack-down on looting and acts of violence

Isolated bands of civilian youths and deserters from the front took advantage of the war and ethnic turmoil to unlawfully seize private property, particularly vehicles, foodstuffs and valuable items. The military authorities fought the lawlessness using deadly force, where necessary.

On 10 April 1994, the Minister of Defence instructed the General Staffs and the units to clamp down on looting, using deadly force if necessary (Telegram OPS/94/0895 of 10 April 1994 from MINADEF). The next day, he once again urged the General Staffs to use whatever means necessary to stop the looting (Telegram OPS/94/817 of 11 April 1994 from MINADEF). Moreover, on 14 April 1994, he condemned the looting of the OCIR (Telegram OPS/94/847 of 14 April 1994 from MINADEF). Moreover, on 16 April 1994: "The continuing looting in Kigali is getting out of hand. You must take tough measures, including deadly force" (Telegram IPS/94/35 of 16 April 1994 from MINADEF). On 28 April 1994, he instructed the *commandants de place* to collaborate with the *préfets* and the other local authorities to stop the looting (Telegram OPS/94/118 of 28 April 1994 from MINADEF 01). Furthermore, in a letter to MINADEF, dated 20 April 1994, the CRCD chief proposed measures to be taken against groups of thugs (looters) from the so-called "*Sagesse*" sect, who ruled supreme over their neighborhoods that they were wrongly termed "*Interahamwe*" or "*Zulu*," and had been armed in a suspicious manner (Telegram No. 118/G3.4.6 of 20 June 1994 from CRCD).

On 10 April 1994, the Rwandan Army General Staff instructed all units to fight looting militarily, in collaboration with the administrative authorities (Telegram INT/OPS/94/04165 of 10 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). Already on 7 April 1994, it had ordered the Kigali-Ville sector to take tough measures to restore law and order and made recommendations to that effect (Telegram OPS/94/04099 of 7 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). On 16 April 1994, when it learned that some soldiers were looting houses instead of participating in operations, it issued instructions for them to be returned to camps and positions (Telegram INT/OPS/94/0441 of 16 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). By press release dated 16 April

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1994 and another published by the AFP on 18 April 1994, the command urged for the tracking down and stopping of the vagrant soldiers from looting and committing violent acts against the civilian population. On 21 April 1994, the chief of the Rwandan Army Military Police detachment received from the head of the Intelligence Bureau of the Army command [*missing segment*] the mission to "crack down on looting in Kigali, using deadly force if necessary and recover all looted vehicles" (Letter No. 088/G2.1.4 of 21 April 1994 from the G2 Rwandan Army General Staff). The attached "Reports on the patrols conducted by the MP detachment as part of the crack-down on looting" for the period of 24 April 1994 – 14 May 1994 show what the detachment was able to accomplish. They also contain the names of soldiers and civilians apprehended, and the items recovered.

On 26 April 1994, the Rwandan Army General Staff ordered that the looters were not only to be brought before the disciplinary committee but they were to be arraigned and immediately arrested (Telegram ADM/94/05009 of 26 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). On 29 April 1994, it specifically urged the Huye commando battalion commander, whose soldiers were still looting property and committing violent acts against the civilian population, to take measures aimed at eradicating the problem (Telegram ADM/INT/OPS/94/05145 of 19 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). By letter dated 3 May 1994, it upgraded the disciplinary measures to be taken against people involved in looting or violent acts (murder, rape, ransom...) against the civilian population. Soldiers of all ranks and categories were to be disarmed and deprived of any military items in their possession; the operations commanders were to order the termination of the contracts of privates, send a telegram proposing the termination of contracts for non-commissioned officers, and refer Rwanda Army General Officers to where they would be informed of measures taken against them (Letter No. 0691/OFFR-SOC-MS2.2 of 3 May 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff).

On 23 April 1994, the Rwandan Army Chief of Staff was infuriated by the fact that he commander of the gendarmerie company in Kicukiro was not doing anything about the looting of ETO Kicukiro (Telegram INT/OPS/94/04830 of 23 April 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). On 6 May, he ordered the Kigali-Ville sector to "send a robust team to stop the looting at MAGERWA" (Telegram OPS/94/05586 of 6 May 1994 from the Rwandan Army General Staff). By letter dated 9 May 1994, he urged all the units to support the action of the civilian population adding that all soldiers were to avoid engaging in acts of banditry, violence or looting (Letter No. 0696/G2.2.2 of 9 May 1994 from the Rwandan Army HEADQUARTERS).

The administrative authorities were also proactive. Indeed, on 20 April 1994, the *Préfet* of Kigali-Ville *préfecture* proposed to the Rwandan Chief of Staff measures aimed at combating lawlessness and looting by soldiers, at least in Kigali. Such measures included reinforcing the MP anti-looting unit in order to apprehend soldiers on unauthorized leave; setting up roadblocks to apprehend thieves and recover stolen vehicles, checking vehicle



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documents; designating a team of mechanics to recover all the vehicles abandoned on the streets in the city.

The operation sectors and units took tough measures to crack down on looting and violent acts against the civilian population. One of the many examples is the Kibungo operation sector, which "intercepted an estimated dozen people who attempted to loot shops and a few abandoned homes" [*missing segment*] on 8 April 1994 (Telegram INT/OPS/94/506 of 8 April 1994 from the Kibungo Operations Commander), or that of Butare *Secteur* who had to take "draconian measures to stop the looting" (Telegram INT/OPS/94/0631 of 24 April 1994, Telegram INT/OPS/94/634 of 24 April 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander and Telegram INT/OPS/94/0685 of 28 April 1994 from the Butare Operations Commander).

*C. RAF effort to stop the fighting and establish peace*

After the resumption of hostilities in the afternoon of 7 April 1994, the Rwandan Armed Forces did all in their power to stop the fighting by offering a ceasefire on several occasions, or at least a truce. They needed to withdraw a number of soldiers from the front to quell the ethnic clashes that were plunging the country into grief. Besides, a political dialogue needed to be restarted in a bid to fill the political vacuum created by the assassination of the Head of State and many other senior figures of authority, with as much regard as possible to the Arusha Peace Agreements.

Already, the Crisis committee, in its meeting on the morning of 8 April 1994, had decided to send a delegation to RPF to ask for a truce in order to continue with the pacification and to contact the Special Representative of the United Nations Secretary General, UNAMIR as well as diplomatic and consular representatives so that they would pressure RPF into stopping the fighting. Contact with RPF to negotiate the ceasefire was initiated on that same day (Army Headquarters Telegram INT/OPS/ADM/94/04126 of 9 April 1994).

In an interview granted on 9 April 1994, the acting supreme commander of the armed forces stated that, "the Rwandan Armed Forces urgently request RPF partners to display goodwill in order to foster an atmosphere of peace and dialogue, and that RPF should not resort to war, because recourse to arms cannot pacify, and might be fatal."

In a press release of 12 April 1994, RAF command proposed "a meeting between RAF and RPF commanders to discuss how to pacify the country and contribute to the creation of Broad-Based transitional institutions to avoid the continued shedding of innocent blood." In addition, it proposed a truce as from midday on 13 April 1994.

On 15 April 1994, in response to the letter sent the day before by Dr. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh, which detailed the conditions for a scaled-down (2000 troops) UNAMIR to remain in Rwanda and suggested that UNOMUR remain at the Rwanda-Uganda border,

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the Army chief of staff accepted "a negotiated solution to end the tragic bloodshed in Rwanda." "I am pleased," he added, "to note that they [the conditions] are quite in line with our press release and the objectives that we wish to attain together with RPF, that is, pacification and the contribution to the speedy setting-up of the Broad-Based transitional institutions (Letter No. 0624/G3.3.3 of 15 April 1994 from the Army high command).

On the same day, in an interview granted to a Radio Rwanda reporter, the Defence Minister explained that "we are asking RPF to stop, and this will allow us in turn to pacify, to bring calm to the country." In answer to a question put to him regarding the possibility of negotiations, he explained how "Rwandan soldiers feel that it is not through war that we are going to settle the political problems of Rwanda."

The negotiations proposed by RAF commander began on 15 April 1994, under the chairmanship of Mr. Roger Booh-Booh. During that meeting, RPF handed over "preconditions for a possible meeting to discuss a ceasefire" signed by Dr. Jacques Bihozagara. Although these could not be implemented from a logical standpoint and had every indication of being a diktat, RAF command responded the following day with a proposal of realistic mechanisms to put in place in order to facilitate the return to peace (See letter from Dr. Bihozagara and the manuscript of RPF response). In the same vein, in response to the "preconditions" mentioned above and the note from Dr. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh of 16 April 1994, the Army chief of staff proposed in a 17 April letter a series of actions to be carried out with a view to restoring peace to Rwanda, especially to "stop the fighting so as to free the forces of order for pacification" and the setting up of the Broad-Based Transitional Government (Letter No. 0628/G3.3 of 17 April 1994 from the Army Headquarters).

In an 18 April 1994 press release and one repeating information from a 16 April 1994 AFP release, RAF commander proposed "the immediate cessation of military operations to give room for pacification because the forces of order cannot do anything as long as they are under fire from RPF."

In a 22 April 1994 press release, the army chief of staff return to this issue: "*Ibi nkaba mbisabye n'Umulyango wa FPR; ugomba... kwiyumvisha ko amasasu ataliyo azabaha ubutegetsi bifuzwa... nibaze... turebere hamwe ubulyo bubereye Demokurasi Abanyarwanda bahisemo.*" On the same day, Colonel Rutayisire reaffirmed his intention of the high command to stop the fighting: "*Nkaba mbona ko icyo cessez-le-feu yaboneka vuba.*"

Still in regard to the ceasefire, on 23 April a "ceasefire declaration" was signed in Gbadolite. The Government of Rwanda was represented by Brigadier General Gatsinzi and Colonel BEMSG Ntwiragabo. The agreement provided that "a ceasefire will come into effect on Sunday 24 April 1994 at midday" and that "talks between belligerents will commence 48 hours afterwards" (See Gbadolite ceasefire declarations of 23 April 1994). Similarly, on 29 April 1994, the army chief of staff sent to Dr. Jacques Roger Booh-Booh the Rwandan Government position "agreeing to an immediate ceasefire" (Letter No.

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0668/G3.3 of 29 April 1994 from the army chief of staff). Following their telephone conversation of 1 May 1994, the Army chief of staff wrote a note to the Undersecretary in charge of African Affairs in the US State Department indicating that amongst the conditions for a return to peace, RPF must agree to cease hostilities so as to reduce public anger and resume negotiations to implement the Arusha Peace Agreements.

On 20 May 1994, General Dallaire announced the upcoming visit of Mr. Iqbal Riza, Special Envoy of the United Nations Secretary General, which was slated for 20 to 24 May 1994. He requested a cessation of hostilities for this visit (General Dallaire's Letter No. 32/FC of 20 May 1994). The Army chief of staff replied that he would be willing to receive the Special Envoy and added that he had no objection to a truce being observed (Letter No. 0717/G3.3 of 23 May 1994 from the Army chief of staff).

In a meeting between the representative of RAF and RPA on 30 May 1994 in the UNAMIR headquarters in Remera, under the auspices of UNAMIR, the Rwandan party recalled that "the prime and indispensable condition (for raising public awareness and putting an end to the massacres) is an end to the fighting and the ceasefire." In a 1 June 1994 press release, the Army chief of staff stated that "from the meetings held... there is a crying need for this ceasefire so that together we can work out how to set up the mechanisms that would lead to peace in Rwanda... we also call on RPF to... realize that the war it started and continues to prefer is far from being a solution to the ills that plague Rwanda."

#### VIII. Investigations into the assassination of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the massacre of the Belgian Blue Berets

Information available to RAF command on the assassination of Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana and the massacre of 10 Belgian Blue Berets of UNAMIR is as follows:

##### A. Assassination of Agathe Uwilingiyimana

Security and protection at the home of the Prime Minister were jointly provided by a team of Gendarmes of the security corps (commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Innocent Bavugamenshi, currently in RPA) and a team of UNAMIR soldiers "other than Belgians," assisted by Belgian military escorts from UNAMIR.

According to a statement by a gendarme who was part of the guard, the events that led to the death of the Prime Minister were as follows:

- On the night of 6 April 1994, when gunfire could be heard in the city of Kigali, the Prime Minister became frightened and asked for reinforcements from the Belgian UNAMIR headquarters by two-way radio, since she maintained radio contact with UNAMIR. Around 11 p.m., a team of Belgian soldiers led by a

- senior warrant officer came to the home of the Prime Minister and talked with her in front of the living room. The team then went away.
- The next day, 7 April 1994, at about 7 a.m., another team of Belgian soldiers came, and after they entered the compound of the Prime Minister's residence, there was gunfire from outside and one of the escort jeeps parked on the road was hit. The team immediately left the compound without talking to the Prime Minister. All the Belgian escort soldiers and other UNAMIR soldiers who had spent the night at the home of the Prime Minister also went out. The jeeps that had not been hit took off.
  - This gendarme was inside the compound and does not know what happened outside after the UNAMIR soldiers went out. Those who were not able to leave in the jeeps were certainly captured by the people who had fired on the other jeep.
  - At about 8 a.m., the gunfire around the residence of the Prime Minister increased. The leader of the gendarmes posted there called Lieutenant Colonel Bavugamenshi to request reinforcements and ask him what to do. The latter apparently told him that he could not provide him with reinforcements and suggested that he evacuate the family of the Prime Minister to another location.
  - The gendarme commander cut a cap in the hedge that separated the Prime Minister's home from the UNDP house occupied by a Senegalese who worked in UNDP, and hid the family in the man's house.
  - Since they felt unable to protect the Prime Minister and on the contrary, their presence was a danger to the family because it betrayed their hiding place, the gendarmes agreed to leave the premises and did so singly. The person who gave this information says that he was the first to leave.

As to the circumstances that surrounded the death of the Prime Minister, they remain murky. Apart from the testimony given above, the Prime Minister never indicated either to the Gendarmerie high command or to the Rwandan Army chief of staff who were closer, that she was under threat. Lieutenant Colonel Bavugamenshi, who was the commander of the security company, did not mention it either, even after the head of the security detail phoned in. It was only on 7 April 1994, at about 11 a.m. that the soldiers in ESM during the command meeting extended to include the operations sector and unit commanders heard several gunshots coming from the area of the Prime Minister's residence. The RAF commander was only informed of the death of the Prime Minister at the end of the meeting, at about 1 p.m. The belated visit to the scene did not enable the guilty parties to be identified. In addition, subsequent developments did not favor a complete investigation, since RPF refused the ceasefire proposed in order to conduct investigations.

What is clear is that Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana, her husband and a visitor were pulled from their refuge in the UNDP employee's house and were killed in the Prime Minister's residence. The UNDP employee was evacuated before he could be interviewed by Rwandan security services.

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Even though rumors and certain media outlets or writers blame the crime on members of the Presidential Guard, this is subjective and tendentious, because the sudden resumption of hostilities did not give room for identifying the perpetrators. Angry soldiers from all units stationed in Kigali, now on their own, civil defense militiamen in military uniform, RPF infiltrators disguised as RAF soldiers, all went around striking a blow here, a blow there, in the pandemonium. What is more, the Presidential Guard had no insignia of its own.

The Prime Minister had taken up the cause of RPF and was considered as conspiring against President Habyarimana. Some members of government and political party bigwigs were supposedly killed for the same reason, while others were assassinated by RPF infiltrators disguised in RAF uniforms to cause confusion. Those figures of authority who sought refuge in military camps, especially in the Presidential Guard camp, were spared.

Regarding the mortal remains of the Prime Minister, they were taken to the Kanombe military hospital morgue along with the bodies of the victims of the attack on the Presidential aircraft pending the end of hostilities to organize funerals. By not wishing to end the fighting, RPF did not allow this. The mortal remains were therefore handed over to the victims' families. The remains of the Prime Minister, who had been killed with her husband, remained in the morgue until the fallback of the units to Colonel Mayuya Camp, since the family was not able to make arrangements to recover it.

*B. Massacre of the ten Belgian Blue Berets in Camp Kigali on 7 April 1994*

From the statement of the gendarme mentioned above, we suppose that when the ten Belgian Blue Berets left the Prime Minister's compound, they fell into the hands of the people who were laying siege to the residence and were disarmed with no resistance on their part.

According to the information available to us, a Rwandan Army officer attached to the headquarters who lived in Kiyovu was waiting for the vehicle that was supposed to take him to work as usual. A minibus with two soldiers was dispatched to fetch him at about 9 a.m. He went to the Army Headquarters following the usual route which led to Paul VI Avenue, passing below the Nuncio's office and following its upper part towards the junction located next to the Prime Minister's residence. Before reaching the junction where a roadblock had been spontaneously set up by soldiers, the officer saw a group of Rwandan and white soldiers in front of the Prime Minister's residence. When the vehicle rolled up to a stop at the roadblock, the group hurried to the junction. The group of white men was unarmed and included about two or three black Blue Berets whereas the Rwandan soldiers were armed. A Belgian lieutenant directed him to the UNAMIR barracks in Camp Kigali and said that he had an urgent message to send to his superiors.

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Only the UNAMIR soldiers (both Belgian and black) got into the vehicle, while the Rwandan soldiers stayed. The vehicle took them to Camp Kigali and dropped them off at the UNAMIR barrack near the guardhouse and then went on to army headquarters. The soldiers who were dropped off at the camp were taken in by their fellow UNAMIR observers who were stationed in Camp Kigali.

The circumstances surrounding the death of the ten Belgian Blue Berets would seem to be as follows: after they arrived in Camp Kigali, a rumor supposedly went around very quickly within the camp saying that the Belgian Blue Berets who shot down the President's aircraft had been captured and were being held in Camp Kigali. The soldiers then went mad and threw themselves on the Blue Berets after breaking into the munitions store and taking weapons. The direct cause of the death of the Belgian Blue Berets is this rumor which was taken for the truth by these soldiers, after the dissemination of a view in certain political circles in Rwanda that had fostered intolerance of the Belgian soldiers because of their conduct during the period of hostilities in Rwanda.

It will be remembered that at the beginning of the war in October 1990, the Belgian government sent a commando unit to Rwanda, which left in spite of the wish and hope of some people in Rwandan political circles that it should stay in Rwanda to help RAF. This abandonment was perceived as a betrayal by these politicians, in view of historical links between Rwanda and Belgium in general and between the Belgian and Rwandan armies in particular.

It will also be remembered that the presence of Belgian soldiers in UNAMIR to protect the city of Kigali had been strongly objected to by most Rwandans but that the then government had imposed their presence. After they arrived in Kigali, the Belgian soldiers compromised their own position by their actions. For example:

- They attacked the home of Mr. Jean Bosco Barayagwiza, one of the leaders of the CDR party.
- They attacked the home of Colonel BEMS Bagosora, Director of Cabinet at the Ministry of Defence. This incident was reported to UNAMIR, which even apologized.
- They manhandled the daughter of Colonel Laurent Serubaga, former Rwandan Army chief of staff.
- People wearing the medal of President Habyarimana became the target of harassment by the Belgian Blue Berets;
- The Belgian Blue Berets had adopted the attitude of showing Hutus that they had flat noses by pressing down their own noses with their finger, as sign of scorn, and that Tutsis had straight noses like white people.
- They greeted Tutsis with two fingers in the V-sign to depict victory, as RPF used to.

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In addition to these actions which upset the people, the above-mentioned rumor, which blamed the Belgian Blue Berets for the attack on the President's aircraft and led to the death of President Juvenal Habyarimana, Major General Deogratias Nsabimana, Rwandan Army chief of staff, and Dr. Emmanuel Akingeneye, thus depriving the military of their beloved superiors and their doctor, was the last straw. This was the brutal, spontaneous and uncontrolled reaction of angry soldiers who did not realize the consequences of the attack on the Belgian Blue Berets. No one gave the order to attack the Belgian Blue Berets and no one prepared their murder. The intervention of the Camp Kigali commander, all the unit commanders in Kigali, the Army headquarters and the Cabinet of the Ministry of Defence who joined their efforts to quell the mutiny were all in vain. This superior was actually sent away by the mutineers. Since all units in the Camp had mutinied, an armed action could only come from outside and especially from UNAMIR in general and the Belgian contingent in particular, whose mission was to provide security for the city of Kigali while RAF units were subject to disarming.

However, General Roméo Dallaire, commander of UNAMIR, was informed that the ten Belgian Blue Berets were in danger in Camp Kigali and did not respond. The responsibility of the UNAMIR commander for failure to assist a person in danger should be examined.

The investigation that was begun by RAF command does not include a statement from General Dallaire or from the UNAMIR observers who were in Camp Kigali at the time of the tragedy. Unfortunately, this investigation could not be continued as RPF resumed and continued hostilities while the brutality and confusion that reigned at the crime scene did not allow for immediate identification of the criminals.

The death of the Belgian Blue Berets caused by Rwandan soldiers can only be regretted. However, it is unfortunate that the Belgian lieutenant directed the occupants of the vehicle to go to Camp Kigali.

As to the reaction of RAF commander, in addition to the investigation initiated, we saw before that the Crisis Committee sent a delegation to the Belgian Embassy to offer apologies.

Colonel BEMS Théoneste Bagosora, who was then Director of Cabinet in the Ministry of Defence and Major Bernard Ntuyahaga, who was then army staff officer in the Rwandan Army, against whom the Belgians issued warrants of arrest, are only scapegoats. They are victims of RPF demagoguery. It will be remembered that at the end of May and the beginning of June 1995, Radio Kigali also mentioned a certain Lieutenant-Colonel Jean Ntwirigaba who was mistaken for the former commander of Camp Kigali, and said that it is he who gave the order to kill the Belgian Blue Berets. As there has never been any RAF officer of this name, and the camp commander was someone else, this name no longer appears in the current Belgian warrant of arrest. The Belgian magistrates are

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therefore being manipulated by RPF. It is unfair to blame an action on innocent people for the simple reason that those who are guilty of it cannot be identified.

This is the same mistake which might be repeated in the matter of interethnic massacres. The authorities in various ranks of the administration are blamed because the perpetrators have not been identified. The RAF command hopes that the International Tribunal for Rwanda will be clairvoyant, fair and impartial enough not to make the innocent guilty.



## CHAPTER V: POPULAR SELF-DEFENCE

Some people confuse the organization of popular self-defence in Rwanda with the organization of massacres or genocide. It is time to clear the air.

From the outbreak of war, RPF attacked defenceless Hutu civilians, apparently for the simple reason that they were hostile to it, but in fact to implement its plan for the genocide of the Hutus. Each time there was a lull, RPF attacked civilians behind military positions and went around these by infiltration. The people thus began to feel the need for self-defence. The government could not place a soldier on every square metre of territory, and so felt obliged to organize its distressed people. It became necessary to adapt defence to the enemy's tactics to help the people defend themselves and counter RPF infiltration.

The self-defence was first organized in Mutara, where RPF invasion began. This strategy, which had proven efficient in countering the incursion and progress of RPF was used as a blackmail tool by the latter.

But after the massacre of people by RPF in Byumba and Ruhengeri *Préfectures* and its infiltration everywhere in the country, the Nsengiyaremye government decided to extend the self-defence to the Ruhengeri *Communes* under threat and Kiyombe *Commune* in Byumba *Préfecture*. The government of Madame Agathe Uwilingiyimana took over this. In spite of the signing of the Arusha Peace Agreement which put an end to the war, RPF continued its harassment of the people and its infiltration. It therefore became necessary to extend the popular self-defence to other regions.

However, this organization needed to be very careful because of the proliferation of weapons following the war. The Rwandan Armed Forces Commission set up for this purpose made concrete proposals (letter No. 2377/G3.2.0 of 30 October 1993 from the army headquarters):

- Distribution of weapons was to be based on the law;
- Transparency in organization to avoid suspicion between the various groups of the population and political parties was to be a guideline in recruitment;
- Recruitment was to involve the population concerned and the administration;
- Administrative and technical responsibilities were to be clearly defined.

## CONCLUSIONS

Since the invasion of our country by RPF on 1 October 1990 till the exile of the Rwandan people to Zaire, Tanzania, Burundi and elsewhere, RAF spared no effort to restore calm and peace amongst the three components of Rwandan society.

As the speeches, directives issued and action in the field clearly show, this interest in maintaining public peace and order was the leitmotif of the Government and other civil and military authorities through all the uncertainties of war. The fateful day of 6 April 1994 on which RPF shot down the presidential aircraft on its approach to Kanombe airport, causing the death of the President of the Republic of Rwanda, Juvenal Habyarimana and his Burundian counterpart, President Cyprien Ntaryamira, did not influence the attitude of Rwandan authorities in terms of MROP (Maintenance and Restoration of Public Order). This sudden and unexpected death led to a popular uprising and a wave of massacres throughout the country.

It should be pointed out that President Juvenal Habyarimana died while returning from Tanzania where he had once more signed a document for the implementation of the entire Arusha Peace Agreements. Yet neither his speeches nor his various official visits to neighboring countries could convince or force RPF to accept peace. For RPF, as it was said on the sidelines of the negotiations, the war was a final solution to the Rwandan question that would only end with the total conquest of power.

Each day this became reality. To delay the implementation of the Arusha Peace Agreements, RPF kept demanding new concessions, which were always granted. Thus, it is not surprising that the people became aware, gradually at first but with gathering force, of the impossibility of brokering an agreement with RPF, which apparently was an outshoot of Tutsi monopolistic power.

This suspicion of the people towards RPF was worsened by the arrival of the National Bureau of RPF at the CND, whose leaders continued preaching that they had come to liberate the country from the dictatorship of President Habyarimana who was instead, for the majority of people, a symbol of the unity of the People of Rwanda.

At the same time, RPF seized the opportunity to attract the entire Tutsi youth through its infiltrators.

With three precursors, the International Community was unable to foresee the disaster. Thus from the time it arrived, the Belgian contingent of UNAMIR, in spite of its presence being contested by the people, only revived interethnic strains instead of calming them. Some Belgians even attacked Hutu leaders of their own accord and for no reason, while others joined ranks with the Tutsis against the Hutus. What can be said of these Belgian soldiers who, while patrolling in Kigali, would show the V-for-Victory sign towards the Tutsis or show them the flat nose of the Hutus! General ~~Dallaire~~ and the Belgian

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Contingent of UNAMIR failed in their mission to maintain peace and instead displayed their partisan leanings in the Rwandan conflict.

To return to the *complicity of foreigners*, the first thing to point out is the pernicious actions of Mr. Yoweri Kaguta Museveni, President of Uganda, RPF ally. This alliance was forged long before the attack on Rwanda and more precisely when President Museveni, aided by RPF combatants, who were a majority within the ranks of NRA, took power in Uganda. To reward them, Museveni signed a pact with them to help them conquer Rwanda. On 1 October 1990, the promise was kept.

The complicity of Uganda that was so much condemned by national opinion to international circles was only heeded during the recent official visit of President Museveni to Rwanda from 14 to 17 August 1995. This is when an RPF officer, Colonel Karemera, stated on Radio Rwanda that several soldiers of RPA had been members of RNA for long, with President Museveni as their leader. During this visit, the possibility of how RPF could return armaments to Uganda and pay its debts to Uganda to support its war effort was discussed. This bitter truth has now been exposed by international opinion (BBC Radio, Voice of America, etc.) which had hitherto never dared to accuse the avowed aggressor President Yoweri Museveni.

The international community and the UN in particular, displayed a certain complacency, to say the least, in the face of this tragedy. While the problem of Rwandan refugees living in Uganda was nearing a peaceful solution, RPF, mainly composed of Tutsi Rwandan refugees within the ranks of NRA, unexpectedly attacked Rwanda, their own country. This did not concern the OAU or the UN unduly, so they could firmly condemn this act that was contrary to international rules and agreements. Encouraged by the pusillanimous indifference of these organizations, RPF increased its attacks, while violating with impunity all ceasefire and even peace agreements already negotiated. The RPF explained all these actions by the absence of democracy within the country whereas multiparty politics was taking hold in Rwanda.

It bears repeating that the coming of multipartyism to Rwanda, which allowed everyone to choose his political party freely, also opened the doors of Rwanda to refugees, even to RPF fighters, some of whom were already considered as friends and not as enemies in the traditional sense of the word. The tragic events which followed proved that RPF had no intention of making peace. The failure to apply the Arusha Peace Agreements by RPF after the death of President Habyarimana is one more proof amongst so many of the others cited in this report.

The attitude of Tanzania in the new Rwandan tragedy was not devoid of partiality. It will be clearly remembered that this country was the chief architect of the signing of the Arusha Accord by both parties. However, its ambiguity and lack of firmness in condemning the assassination of the two presidents who were returning from Tanzania was surprising. Its haste in first blocking Rwandan aircraft and handing them afterwards

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to RPF, instead of demanding the immediate opening of an international enquiry into this killing, only confirm its complicity in this dastardly act.

This conspiracy of betrayal of Rwanda stupefied everyone. The Hutu majority were constrained to go into exile to flee RPF atrocities, under the amused gaze of certain powers.

These people are today prey to epidemics, famine and other unimaginable horrors while the international community looks on complacently. They do not know what to do. And yet this community lacks nothing but the understanding of the Rwandan problem in order to help Rwandans find a peaceful and sustainable solution to it. The refugees are ready to return to their homes and would not object to having the authors of these massacres brought before the international tribunal created for this purpose, but on condition that the criminals of both opposing parties be charged.

At the present time, RPF is still orchestrating its false media campaigns by saying that RAF and *Interahamwe* are preparing, with the complicity of Zaire, to attack Rwanda. This is the pretext it has used to request and obtain from the UN Security Council the lifting of the arms embargo. Yet, in denying this, Zaire which is sheltering the refugees, obtained no response from the UN, though the latter has various means of verifying this information. It instead preferred to provide huge support for the Tutsi minority in power in Kigali. This very minority continues to violate fundamental rights in full view and with the full knowledge of the international community. The collective massacres, like those that took place in Kibeho, Kanama, Mudasomwa; abductions, targeted killings, rapes, violence, etc. are the daily experience of Tutsis who stayed in the country or returned there under the auspices of UNHCR. UNCHR has refused to make public the statements of those returning from Rwanda and who suffered at the hands of RPF on their return, so as to avoid compromising the immutable principle of a 'voluntary' return.

As the Community of Rwandan Refugees have repeatedly and publicly stated, the solution to their problem lies in dialogue. Otherwise the cycle of alternating Hutu and Tutsi refugees will go on forever, accompanied by fresh atrocities. The international community should consider this matter without preconceived notions, neutrally and objectively, and take a final decision to provide a peaceful and sustainable solution to the Rwandan question.

This question cannot be settled as a dispute between two persons or two groups of persons; it is an historical problem between two ethnic groups that are one people, and who must live together. The appropriate mechanisms and framework should be found to provide a sustainable solution to it.

The RAF support a fair and impartial investigation to establish the truth and identity of those responsible. They also prefer dialogue between the Kigali authorities and the

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refugee spokespersons to the trials before the ICTR. It is only by this means that actual, much-desired reconciliation can be possible.

Influence-peddling on the part of some states should at least be tempered by a modicum of common sense or morality. In view of the strong support that RPF enjoys in certain countries, RAF and Rwandan exiles suspect a conspiracy by these states to obliterate the greatness of Rwanda, which was hitherto a haven of peace and a beacon of national unity.

It is unfortunate to note, at the dawn of the 21<sup>st</sup> century, that major icons of modern civilization wish to force a people to kow-tow to an authority that does not fulfill its aspirations. It is contrary to the principle of the right to self-determination in keeping with international laws and agreements.

AJPR	<i>Rwanda: L'autre face du genocide</i>
MP	Military Police
MP	Member of Parliament
MRND	<i>Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement et la Démocratie</i>
NRA	National Resistance Movement
OCIR	<i>Office des Cultures Industrielles du Rwanda</i>
ORINFOR	<i>Office Rwandais de l'Information</i>
PL	<i>Parti Libéral</i>
PSD	<i>Parti Social Démocrate</i>
SITREP	Situation Report

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