

Delivered by  
Amb Albright to U  
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US

TALKING POINTS  
RWANDA

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- We remain extremely concerned about the on-going tragedy in Rwanda. This is a problem that demands immediate international action.
- The United States wants to play a constructive role in alleviating the suffering in Rwanda and supporting efforts to achieve a lasting political solution.
- There have been a number of proposed responses to this tragedy. We would like to explore these ideas further, here in the Council, as well as with representatives of concerned African states.
- We have already taken some important steps. We will continue to support the diplomatic efforts now underway by the UN, OAU, the Tanzanian government and regional leaders to reach a ceasefire and return to the Arusha peace process. We want to consider how to support the UN effort to work with the OAU to ensure the safety of displaced persons on both sides of the border.
- We are committed to provide humanitarian relief, to implement an arms embargo and to have the UN Human Rights Commission fully investigate the situation in Rwanda.
- In addition, there may be another vitally important humanitarian mission that the UN and/or OAU could perform.
- We would be interested in exploring the possibility of creating a protective zone along the Rwandan border with an international force to provide security to populations, where refugees and displaced persons are in the most immediate danger.
- Such a mission could not only provide security for the protective zone and the distribution of humanitarian assistance but could also assist in refugee repatriation and serve in a preventive capacity to deter the spread of violence to Burundi. The operation would require robust rules of engagement.

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- This mission may require fewer troops and be less complex logistically than some other proposals now being discussed.
- It would, however, need the active support of neighboring countries, such as Burundi and Tanzania, and the assent of the Rwandan parties.
- In considering the actual humanitarian/peacekeeping mission in Rwanda, we must be mindful not to upset the delicate political balance that presently exists in Burundi.
- We must also work together to define clearly achievable objectives and an end-state such as resettlement of the displaced persons and refugees and/or a sunset provision requiring reconsideration of the operation in six months to preclude the mission becoming an open-ended one.
- If capable troops were available and the mission considered viable, the U.S. would fully support the operation politically and diplomatically and endeavor to help by providing financial resources, some lift, equipment and humanitarian assistance, upon agreement of a clear concept of operations.
- We would expect to be joined in this effort by other concerned nations.

(If asked what direct support U.S. could provide:

- If the mission were mounted independently by the OAU or by a collection of concerned states with the blessing of the UN Security Council, the U.S. would offer some assistance on a voluntary basis.
- If the mission were funded through UN assessments, the U.S. would seek the normal reimbursement for contributions of equipment or services.)
- At the same time, we have serious reservations about proposals to establish a large peace enforcement mission, which would operate throughout Rwanda with a mandate to end the fighting, restore law and order and pacify the population.
- While we have not definitively ruled in or out any particular response, in our view, there are several problems with this approach:

not being suggested.

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- Neither the UN nor the OAU have demonstrated a capability to mount large-scale peace enforcement missions with success.
  - This mission would be particularly complex, perhaps even more so than Somalia.
  - It remains very unclear whether the parties to the conflict would use force to oppose such a mission.
  - Thus far, it is unclear that any country has committed to send troops, and it appears unlikely that there will be sufficient pledges to mount the large force required.
  - Logistically, it would be difficult to stage a sizeable force out of Kigali, because all movement of troops and supplies would have to be done through an airport at the epicenter of a civil war.
  - It is unclear precisely what the peace enforcement mission would be or when it would end.
  - Finally, the chances of success appear slim.
- The SYG's indicative contingency planning falls between these two approaches. However, we believe that many of the problems we just laid out would also bedevil the SYG's proposed mission - particularly the logistical and recruitment aspects.
- Again, let me say that we hope we can work together to try to craft a viable diplomatic solution and provide relief to the hundreds of thousands who are suffering as a result of this tragic conflict.

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